What did the court decide?

The concurrence agreed that plaintiffs who obtained disclosure through what was labeled a "temporary injunction" can be considered prevailing parties for attorney's fees when the disclosure cannot be undone.

Who is affected by this decision?

Parties seeking information under the specific statutory scheme (here, a provision of the Texas Education Code) and defendants subject to orders to disclose such information are affected because disclosure may confer prevailing-party status for fees.

Does this mean all temporary injunctions make a plaintiff a prevailing party?

No. The concurrence stresses the conclusion depends on this statute's nature and the irreversible effect of disclosure; other fee-shifting statutes may operate differently.

The case outcome was affirmed and the concurrence clarifies fee entitlement; affected parties may evaluate attorney's-fee claims under the statute and consider further post-judgment procedures if appropriate.

Webb Consolidated Independent School District v. Robert Marshall and Amy Marshall

Docket 24-0339

Court of record · Indexed in NoticeRegistry archive · AI-enriched for research

CivilAffirmed

Filed: Apr 24, 2026 · 1 week ago
Jurisdiction: Texas
Court: Texas Supreme Court
Type: Concurrence
Case type: Civil
Disposition: Affirmed
Judge: Lehrmann; Hawkins; Young; Sullivan
Docket: 24-0339

Petition for review from the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas

Summary

The Texas Supreme Court (Justice Hawkins, joined by two justices) concurred with the Court’s opinion holding that the plaintiffs qualify as prevailing parties entitled to attorney’s fees under a specific Texas statute. The concurrence explains that although the trial court labeled the relief a "temporary injunction," the statutory scheme at issue makes such relief effectively final because disclosure of information cannot be undone. Because the defendants complied and the information was disclosed, the plaintiffs obtained ultimate relief and thus prevailed for fee-shifting purposes.

Issues Decided

Whether a plaintiff who obtained a trial-court order characterized as a temporary injunction qualifies as a prevailing party for purposes of recovering attorney's fees under the relevant Texas Education Code provision.
Whether injunctive relief that results in disclosure of information can be considered final relief when the disclosure cannot be undone.

Court's Reasoning

The concurrence reasons that a labeled "temporary" injunction can produce ultimate relief when the statute at issue grants access to information that cannot be retracted; once disclosed, the change is irreversible. Thus, the trial court's order functioned as final relief under the fee-shifting statute, and the plaintiffs materially achieved the primary benefit they sought. The concurrence cautions that this reasoning rests on the particular statutory scheme and should not be generalized to other fee-shifting statutes.

Authorities Cited

Texas Education Code § 11.1512
Lackey v. Stinnie604 U.S. 192 (2025)

Parties

Petitioner: Webb Consolidated Independent School District
Respondent: Robert Marshall
Respondent: Amy Marshall
Judge: Justice Kyle D. Hawkins
Judge: Justice Young
Judge: Justice Sullivan

Key Dates

Opinion filed: 2026-04-24

What You Should Do Next

1
Evaluate fee claim under the statute
Plaintiffs or their counsel should prepare and file a motion for attorney's fees referencing the court's reasoning that disclosure here constituted ultimate relief.
2
Defendants consider post-judgment options
Defendants should consult counsel about whether to seek rehearing, any narrow relief, or to comply with fee proceedings given the Court's interpretation.
3
Future litigants analyze statutory context
Litigants should analyze whether the particular fee-shifting statute at issue treats temporary relief as final based on whether the relief is reversible.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did the court decide?: The concurrence agreed that plaintiffs who obtained disclosure through what was labeled a "temporary injunction" can be considered prevailing parties for attorney's fees when the disclosure cannot be undone.
Who is affected by this decision?: Parties seeking information under the specific statutory scheme (here, a provision of the Texas Education Code) and defendants subject to orders to disclose such information are affected because disclosure may confer prevailing-party status for fees.
Does this mean all temporary injunctions make a plaintiff a prevailing party?: No. The concurrence stresses the conclusion depends on this statute's nature and the irreversible effect of disclosure; other fee-shifting statutes may operate differently.
What happens next?: The case outcome was affirmed and the concurrence clarifies fee entitlement; affected parties may evaluate attorney's-fee claims under the statute and consider further post-judgment procedures if appropriate.

The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.

Full Filing Text

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 24-0339
══════════

Webb Consolidated Independent School District,
Petitioner,

Robert Marshall and Amy Marshall,
Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

JUSTICE HAWKINS, joined by Justice Young and Justice Sullivan,
concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion. I write separately to underscore the
Court’s observation that a party does not “prevail” for the purposes of
recovering attorney’s fees merely by obtaining a temporary injunction.
Temporary injunctions exist to preserve the status quo based in part on
the trial court’s prediction as to who might prevail in the future. If that
prediction does not come true for any reason, the plaintiff does not
“prevail.”
So why are the plaintiffs here entitled to prevailing-party status?
Because the so-called “temporary injunction” issued by the trial court
was not actually a temporary injunction. This case presents an unusual
statutory scheme designed to promote transparency in government by
expanding access to information. The injunctive relief this statute
authorizes functions as ultimate relief because once information is
disclosed, as the Court aptly puts it, “there is no putting the genie back
in the bottle.” Ante at 13. And a “temporary” injunction under this
statute does not preserve the status quo, but permanently alters it. See
Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 200 (2025). Accordingly, when the trial
court ordered the defendants to disclose certain information, and
defendants complied, the plaintiffs obtained ultimate relief.
Future litigants and courts should take care not to misread
today’s opinion. Other fee-shifting statutes may function very differently
from Section 11.1512 of the Texas Education Code. Nothing in today’s
opinion should be read to suggest that anything short of a final judgment
entitles a plaintiff to prevailing-party status.

Kyle D. Hawkins
Justice

OPINION FILED: April 24, 2026