Jarod Dajon Howell v. the State of Texas

In The
                                   Court of Appeals
                          Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                           No. 07-25-00306-CR


                             JAROD DAJON HOWELL, APPELLANT

                                                     V.

                                THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                             On Appeal from the 432nd District Court
                                      Tarrant County, Texas 1
                  Trial Court No. 1848274, Honorable Ruben Gonzalez, Presiding

                                             April 15, 2026
                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION
                     Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

        Appellant, Jarod Dajon Howell, appeals from the trial court’s judgments finding him

guilty of four counts of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. 2



        1 This cause was originally filed in the Second Court of Appeals.  It was transferred to this Court by
a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. In the event
of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
        2 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 481.112, .1123. All four counts alleged that Appellant
possessed a particular controlled substance in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams.
Count one alleged possession of fentanyl. Count two alleged possession of cocaine. Count three alleged
possession of heroin. Count four alleged possession of methamphetamine.
He was sentenced to 42 years’ incarceration for counts one and four and 35 years’

incarceration for counts two and three. 3 The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw supported

by an Anders 4 brief. We grant counsel’s motion and affirm the judgments of the trial court.


        In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel has certified that he has conducted

a conscientious examination of the record and, in his opinion, the record reflects no

reversible error upon which an appeal can be predicated. Id. at 744; In re Schulman, 252

S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d

807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), counsel has discussed why, under the

controlling authorities, the record presents no reversible error. In a letter to Appellant,

counsel notified him of the motion to withdraw; provided him with the motion, Anders brief,

and a motion to obtain access to the appellate record; and informed him of his right to file

a pro se response. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)

(specifying appointed counsel’s obligations on the filing of a motion to withdraw supported

by an Anders brief). By letter, this Court also advised Appellant of his right to file a pro

se response to counsel’s Anders brief. Appellant has not filed a response. The State has

not filed a brief.


        By his Anders brief, counsel discusses areas in the record where reversible error

may have occurred but concludes that the appeal is frivolous. We have independently

examined the record to determine whether there are any non-frivolous issues that were


        3 The punishment ranges for these offenses were enhanced because Appellant had been finally

convicted of a prior felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.42(c)(1).
        4 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).


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preserved in the trial court which might support an appeal, but we have found no such

issues. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988);

In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409; Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1969). Following our careful review of the appellate record and counsel’s brief, we

conclude that there are no grounds for appellate review that would result in reversal of

Appellant’s conviction or sentence.


        Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s

judgment. 5




                                                                   Judy C. Parker
                                                                    Chief Justice


Do not publish.




        5 Counsel shall, within five days after the opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the

opinion and judgment, along with notification of Appellant’s right to file a pro se petition for discretionary
review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4. This duty is an informational one, not a representational one. It is
ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and exists after the court of appeals has granted
counsel's motion to withdraw. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 411 n.33.

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