Juan David Garcia v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00399-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG


JUAN DAVID GARCIA,                                                         Appellant,

                                           v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                         Appellee.


             ON APPEAL FROM THE 156TH DISTRICT COURT
                      OF BEE COUNTY, TEXAS


                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Cron
                Memorandum Opinion by Justice West

      Appellant Juan David Garcia pleaded guilty to sexual assault of a child, a second-

degree felony, and was placed on eight years’ deferred-adjudication community

supervision. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.011(a)(2), (f). The State filed a motion to revoke

appellant’s community supervision. After finding appellant to have violated the terms of

his community supervision, the trial court revoked his community supervision, adjudicated
him guilty of the underlying offense, and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment.

Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief stating that there are no

arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We

affirm.

                                    I.     ANDERS BRIEF

          Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel

filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record

yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated. See id.

Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas,

an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set

out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510

n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

          In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014),

appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no

reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Appellant’s counsel also informed this Court

in writing that he: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion

to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed appellant

of his right to file a pro se response, to review the record prior to filing that response, and




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to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided

appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record that only requires

appellant’s signature and date with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; see also In re Schulman, 252

S.W.3d at 408–09. In this case, appellant filed neither a timely motion seeking pro se

access to the appellate record nor a motion for extension of time to do so. Appellant did

not file a pro se response.

                               II.     INDEPENDENT REVIEW

       Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found

nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,

827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the

opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for

reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule

of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

                               III.   MOTION TO WITHDRAW

       In accordance with Anders, appellant’s counsel has asked this Court for

permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five

days from the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion

and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a petition for




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discretionary review. 1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at

411 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

                                           IV.      CONCLUSION

        We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                             JON WEST
                                                                             Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
9th day of April, 2026.




        1 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case

by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary
review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed
within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion
for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for
discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3.
Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.


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