Justin Clayton Goldthrite v. the State of Texas

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana


                   No. 06-25-00133-CR



      JUSTIN CLAYTON GOLDTHRITE, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee




         On Appeal from the 124th District Court
                 Gregg County, Texas
               Trial Court No. 53,857-B




      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
       Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Justin Clayton Goldthrite was indicted for and pled guilty to aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon.1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2). Goldthrite appeals his conviction,

arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial because the State failed to

comply with Articles 39.14 and 38.371 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure by failing to

provide him with certain discovery. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 38.371, 39.14

(Supp.). Because we find the trial court did not err in denying Goldthrite’s motion for new trial,

we affirm.

I.      Denial of Motion for New Trial

        Goldthrite argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial on the basis

that incident reports involving the complaining witness should have been disclosed by the State.

        A.       Standard of Review

        “An appellate court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of

discretion, reversing only if no reasonable view of the record could support the trial court’s

ruling.” Burch v. State, 541 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). “This is a deferential

standard of review that requires appellate courts to view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the trial court’s ruling.” Id. In applying this standard of review, we must presume that the

trial court disbelieved evidence supporting appellant’s claims. See id. at 821. “In determining

whether the trial court abused its discretion, an appellate court must not substitute its own


1
 In companion appellate cause number 06-25-00134-CR, Goldthrite challenges his conviction for one count of the
offense of retaliation. In companion appellate cause number 06-25-00135-CR, Goldthrite challenges his conviction
for a second count of the offense of retaliation. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06(c) (Supp.).
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judgment for that of the trial court, and it must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is within the

zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id. at 820.

           B.       Analysis

           Goldthrite argues that the State violated Article 39.14 when it “failed to make discovery

of reports and statements of assaultive conduct by the complaining witness,” amounting to

reversible harmful error. Goldthrite’s argument seems to challenge the voluntariness of his plea,

arguing that he was entitled to offense reports from other counties involving the complaining

witness in the case. Specifically, Goldthrite argues that the State failed to produce incident

reports related to the complaining witness in which she was arrested in situations involving

Goldthrite.

                  As set out by the Court of Criminal Appeals culminating in its Watkins
           decision, the baseline inquiries for determining a violation under the Michael
           Morton Act as embodied in Article 39.14 are: (1) did the State fail to disclose
           evidence (that was not work product or otherwise privileged); (2) was the
           withheld evidence favorable to the defendant; and (3) was the evidence material.

Fortuna v. State, 665 S.W.3d 861, 867 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (citing

Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“setting out Brady[2] three-prong

test”); Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“construing ‘material,’

and effectively distinguishing third prong under the Texas statute”)).

           Here, however, there was a guilty plea. As explained by our sister court in Humphries v.

State:

           A guilty plea involves, among other things, a waiver of a defendant’s rights to be
           tried by a jury, to confront his accusers, to have a speedy and public trial, and to

2
    See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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       invoke his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Boykin v. Alabama,
       395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); Ex parte Palmberg, 491 S.W.3d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim.
       App. 2016) (orig. proceeding). To be effective, a waiver of those rights must be
       made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Ex parte Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d
       316, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)[ (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)]. To be
       knowing and voluntary, a guilty plea must be made with sufficient awareness of
       the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. McMann v. Richardson, 397
       U.S. 759, 766 (1970). When the record shows that a defendant was properly
       admonished, it presents a prima facie showing that the guilty plea was entered
       knowingly and voluntarily. Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim.
       App. 1998)[ (per curiam)]; Ex parte Gibauitch, 688 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. Crim.
       App. 1985)[ (per curiam)]; see CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13 (West Supp. 2023). The
       burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that “he did not fully understand the
       consequences of his plea such that he suffered harm.” Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at
       197 (citing Ex parte Gibauitch, 688 S.W.2d at 871). If the defendant “attests
       during the initial plea hearing that his plea is voluntary,” the defendant has a
       “heavy burden” on appeal to prove that his plea was involuntary. Houston v.
       State, 201 S.W.3d 212, 217 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.)
       (quoting Coronado v. State, 25 S.W.3d 806, 809 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet.
       ref’d)).

Humphries v. State, Nos. 11-22-00271-CR & 11-22-00272-CR, 2024 WL 3528959, at *6 (Tex.

App.—Eastland July 25, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). To the extent

Goldthrite argues that he was entitled to the offense reports related to the complainant before

deciding how to plead, this is not the sort of information that the State is required to provide.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the voluntariness of a defendant’s guilty

plea is not contingent upon his awareness of the full dimension of the prosecution’s case.”

Ex parte Palmberg, 491 S.W.3d at 809. “Naturally, the more information the defendant acquires

before[ pleading guilty] about the prosecution’s case, the better informed his decision to plead

guilty will be, providing him the opportunity to make a ‘wise’ plea.” Id. (citing United States v.

Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)).


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       We are bound by the precedent of the Court of Criminal Appeals which has stated
       that as long as a defendant has “sufficient awareness of his circumstances—
       including an awareness that some facts simply remain unknown to him or are
       undetermined as of the time of his plea—his potentially unwise plea is still a
       voluntary one.”

Thurman v. State, Nos. 01-19-00833-CR & 01-19-00834-CR, 2021 WL 3160632, at *6 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 27, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(quoting Ex parte Palmberg, 491 S.W.3d at 809).           A review of the record indicates that

Goldthrite was “sufficiently aware of the circumstances when making his decision to plead . . .

guilty to the underlying offenses.” Id. In fact, Goldthrite himself was acutely aware of the

offenses related to the complainant that he complains about on appeal, as he was directly

involved in those offenses as well. See id. Goldthrite specifically questioned the complaining

witness as to the offenses he now complains about on appeal, revealing that he was fully aware

of the incidents prior to making his decision to plead guilty. Therefore, issue one is overruled.

       Goldthrite also argues that under Article 38.371, he and the complaining witness were in

a dating relationship. Article 38.371(b) states that “each party may offer testimony or other

evidence of all relevant facts and circumstances that would assist the trier of fact in determining

whether the actor committed the offense described by Subsection (a), including testimony or

evidence regarding the nature of the relationship between the actor and the alleged victim.” TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.371(b). Though it is not entirely clear in his briefing, it appears

that Goldthrite is arguing that, due to the nature of his relationship with the complainant, he was

entitled to question her regarding the incident reports that the State failed to disclose. Again, we

note that Goldthrite did, in fact, question her regarding those incidents. There is nothing in his

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argument that explains what else, if anything, he would have done if he had been in possession

of the offense reports. Therefore, issue two is overruled.

        Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Goldthrite’s motion

for new trial.

II.     Conclusion

        We affirm the judgment of the trial court.



                                             Charles van Cleef
                                             Justice

Date Submitted:        April 7, 2026
Date Decided:          April 20, 2026

Do Not Publish




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