Manuel Mata v. the State of Texas

In The
                                 Court of Appeals
                        Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                         No. 07-25-00053-CR


                                 MANUEL MATA, APPELLANT

                                                   V.

                              THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                         On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 1
                                     Tarrant County, Texas1
                   Trial Court No. 1832353, Honorable Brian Bolton, Presiding

                                            April 8, 2026
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION
                        Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.


        Appellant, Manuel Mata, appeals from his conviction for interference with public

duties, a class B misdemeanor, for which he received ninety days of incarceration.2 By

three issues, Appellant argues that (1) the interference with public duties statute is



        1 This matter was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth pursuant to a docket

equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. We apply the Second Court’s precedent to the extent it
conflicts with our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
        2 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.15(b).
unconstitutional as applied to the facts at hand, (2) the evidence was legally insufficient

to support his conviction, and (3) the charge of the court included improper and harmful

language. We affirm.


                                      BACKGROUND


       Fort Worth Police Officer Jorden Mathieu stopped a vehicle for crossing into

another lane of traffic and nearly causing an accident. He detected the smell of alcohol

on the driver’s breath, noticed a beer can in a cup holder, and observed the driver’s red,

watery eyes. When he realized the driver spoke only Spanish, Mathieu requested a

Spanish-speaking officer and DWI officers to conduct an investigation.         Once other

officers took over the DWI investigation, Mathieu assumed scene security.


       During the investigation, Appellant and a woman approached the scene shouting

legal advice at the DWI suspect. Mathieu approached them and explained they could

continue recording so long as they remained behind a spot on the pavement to provide

distance.   Photographs admitted as exhibits show a clear demarcation line, which

corresponds with Mathieu’s body-worn camera footage and Appellant’s own recorded

video. For the majority of the investigation, Appellant and the woman remained behind

the demarcated line, walking up and down along it. In Appellant’s recording, he can be

seen and heard identifying the line that Mathieu originally directed him to stand behind.


       After the DWI suspect was taken to jail, Mathieu continued his portion of the

investigation by attempting to ascertain the suspect’s identity through the Criminal Justice

Information System, which contains law enforcement records and private information

such as social security numbers, addresses, phone numbers, and criminal records.

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Mathieu was also responsible for ensuring the suspect’s vehicle remained secured until

it could be towed. While Mathieu was searching for the suspect’s identity, Appellant

approached the driver-side window and recorded Mathieu’s computer screen.


       Mathieu testified that he is required to protect the confidential information in the

system. He exited his patrol unit to address Appellant’s recording because Appellant had

crossed the established boundary. When Mathieu exited his vehicle, he repeatedly

directed Appellant to get behind a line. Mathieu acknowledged this line was not the same

as the original. Mathieu testified that exiting his vehicle to address Appellant’s proximity

disrupted his investigation. The videos show Mathieu explaining to Appellant that he is

entering personal and confidential information into the computer and that his investigation

is not finished.


       Mathieu warned Appellant that if he did not get behind the line, he would be

arrested. Appellant responded, “Fuck you. Your shit is done, stupid ass.” Mathieu again

directed Appellant to get behind the line. Appellant told Mathieu to “draw one,” then began

screaming “Which one? There’s ten of them!” At that point, Mathieu arrested Appellant.


       Mathieu agreed that members of the public are permitted to film and shout

profanity at police officers. However, Mathieu explained that he is permitted to establish

a physical boundary from where the public may record for the safety of the public and the

officers. On cross-examination, Appellant asked Mathieu what was unreasonable about

where he was standing when Mathieu decided to arrest him. Mathieu explained that

where Appellant was standing was ambiguous. When officers set a boundary, they pick

a physical, visible object for individuals to remain behind, such as a crack in the ground.

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                                            ANALYSIS


A. Appellant’s “As Applied” Challenge


       We begin with Appellant’s second issue. A person commits an offense under

Texas Penal Code § 38.15(a) if, with criminal negligence, he interrupts, disrupts, impedes,

or otherwise interferes with a peace officer performing a duty or exercising authority

imposed or granted by law. Appellant argues that § 38.15 is unconstitutional as applied

to his particular facts. See State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2011) (“A litigant raising only an ‘as applied’ challenge concedes the general

constitutionality of the statute, but asserts that the statute is unconstitutional as applied

to his particular facts and circumstances.”).


       An as-applied challenge is subject to waiver, must be preserved, and may not be

raised for the first time on appeal. See Reynolds v. State, 423 S.W.3d 377, 383 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014); Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). As a

prerequisite to presenting any complaint for appellate review, the appellant must show

that the complaint was made to the trial court in a timely and specific manner, and that

the trial court ruled on the complaint or refused to rule and the complaining party objected

to that refusal. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).


       The record reflects that Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress and renewed

his arguments during trial. Citing Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2017), Appellant

contended that the boundary Mathieu established was unreasonable and that he was

engaged in constitutionally protected activity when he filmed Mathieu. Appellant asked



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the trial court to suppress all evidence obtained after Mathieu instructed him to step back.

The trial court denied the motion.


       A motion to suppress evidence and an as-applied constitutional challenge to a

statute are procedurally distinct.    A suppression motion seeks to exclude evidence.

Geuder v. State, 115 S.W.3d 11, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). An as-applied challenge

attacks the validity of the charging instrument itself, not the admissibility of evidence. See

Owens v. State, 728 S.W.3d 155, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (“[W]hen the State has

chosen to apply a statute in a manner that violates a defendant’s First Amendment rights,

the proper remedy is dismissal.”).


       Appellant did not move to dismiss the information or argue that § 38.15 was

unconstitutional as applied to his conduct. He sought suppression of the evidence.

Because Appellant failed to raise an as-applied challenge to § 38.15 at the trial level, his

first issue was not preserved for appellate review. See Reynolds, 423 S.W.3d at 383

(“‘As applied’ constitutional claims are subject to the preservation requirement and

therefore must be objected to at the trial court in order to preserve error.”). See also Solis

v. State, 726 S.W.3d 394, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025).


B. Sufficiency of the Evidence


       In his first issue, Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support his

conviction. We disagree.


       Due process requires that a conviction be based on legally sufficient evidence.

Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The relevant standard is

whether a rational jury could have found each essential element of the offense beyond a
                                           5
reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We consider all evidence, direct and circumstantial,

in the light most favorable to the verdict. Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2023). We compare the statutory elements as defined by a hypothetically

correct jury charge. Id. The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility and weight to

be attached to the evidence. Id. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we

presume the trier of fact resolved those conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that

determination. Id.


       A person commits an offense “if the person with criminal negligence interrupts,

disrupts, impedes, or otherwise interferes with a peace officer while the peace officer is

performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted by law.” TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 38.15(a)(1). A person acts with criminal negligence when he ought to be aware of a

substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The

risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross

deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the

circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint. Id. § 6.03. Criminal negligence

does not require proof of the defendant’s subjective awareness of the risk of harm, but

rather awareness of the attendant circumstances leading to such a risk. Montgomery v.

State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The key to criminal negligence is

not the actor’s being aware of a substantial risk and disregarding it, but rather the failure

to perceive the risk at all. Id.


       It is a defense to prosecution that the interruption, disruption, impediment, or

interference alleged consisted of speech only. TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.15(d). A First
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Amendment right to record the police exists, subject to reasonable time, place, and

manner restrictions. Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 688 (5th Cir. 2017). This

permits law enforcement to set a temporary “skirmish line” when circumstances call for it.

See Faust v. State, 491 S.W.3d 733, 746–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Duncantell v. State,

230 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (finding sufficient

evidence where officer told appellant to remain ten feet away while officers conducted an

investigation but appellant refused to follow instructions); Mata v. State, No. 02-23-00110-

CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 9379, at *14 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 14, 2023, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Refusing to leave the scene when instructed

to do so and distracting an officer from performing his duty constitute interference under

Section 38.15.”).


       Appellant contends that he was convicted for the constitutionally protected activity

of recording peace officers and nothing more than asking clarifying questions. According

to Appellant, he sought clarification only because Mathieu changed the boundary.

Appellant finally contends that it was impossible to interfere with a field sobriety test no

longer underway.


       We disagree with Appellant’s characterizations as the record tells the complete

story. Mathieu testified that Appellant was not arrested for his speech or the act of

recording but for refusing to get behind the boundary and distracting Mathieu from

completing his investigation. The record supports this testimony. Earlier in the encounter,

Appellant crossed the line and directed profanity at the officers. Mathieu testified he could

have arrested Appellant at that point but chose not to. Mathieu did not arrest Appellant

until Appellant approached his patrol vehicle, recorded the computer screen displaying
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confidential information, and then physically refused to adhere to Mathieu’s repeated

instructions to get behind the designated line.


       The jury, as the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the

evidence, was in the proper position to determine whether Appellant was asking clarifying

questions or stalling out of obstinance. The jury could have believed that Appellant’s

physical refusal to get behind the identified line, coupled with his demand for clarification,

was intended to delay or impede Mathieu’s work. The videos demonstrate that before

Appellant’s arrest, Mathieu explained that his portion of the investigation was not over. A

reasonable jury could have concluded that Appellant negligently disrupted or impeded the

investigation by obstinately refusing to get behind the designated line, requiring Mathieu

to divert attention and effort away from his duties.


       Neither the information nor Mathieu’s testimony indicated that Appellant’s

conviction was based on disrupting the field sobriety test specifically. As the video

evidence suggests, Mathieu’s portion of an investigation was not over after the field

sobriety test concluded. Mathieu’s role in the investigation continued, running a search

for the suspect’s identity and securing the suspect’s vehicle until a tow truck arrived.

Appellant’s arrest did not result from his participation in protected activities.


       We overrule Appellant’s first issue.


C. Alleged Charge Error


       By his third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error

when it included the word “belligerent” in its charge to the jury. We disagree.


                                              8
       The application paragraph instructed the jury that it could find Appellant guilty if it

found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant, with criminal negligence, interfered with

Mathieu by:


          •   “approaching J. Mathieu and being belligerent” “and/or”

          •   failing to comply with J. Mathieu’s directions to maintain a reasonable
              distance, “and/or”

          •   crossing a line the Defendant was directed to stay behind “and/or”

          •   recording the mobile data computer, causing Mathieu to stop what
              he was doing and engage with the Defendant.


       During the charge conference, Appellant objected to “belligerent,” asserting that

its inclusion was prejudicial and the term was undefined. The trial court initially overruled

the objection but asked whether Appellant had a further request. Appellant stated that if

the term was retained, a definition should be provided. The parties then agreed to define

“belligerent” as “inclined to or exhibiting assertiveness, hostility, or combativeness.” The

trial court incorporated this definition and asked whether both parties agreed the charge

was accurate. Both answered affirmatively.


       We review alleged jury charge error in two steps. Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d

593, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). First, we determine whether error exists. Ngo v. State,

175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Second, if error exists, we assess whether

sufficient harm to require reversal resulted. Id. at 743–44. The charge must contain an

accurate statement of the law and set out all essential elements of the offense. Dinkins

v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).




                                              9
         Notably, Appellant agreed the charge was accurate. After the trial court overruled

his objection and incorporated a definition at his request, the court asked whether both

sides agreed the charge accurately reflected the law. Appellant’s counsel answered

affirmatively. “Under the doctrine of invited error, if a party requests or moves the court

to make an erroneous ruling, and the court rules in accordance with the request or motion,

the party responsible for the court’s action cannot take advantage of the error on appeal.”

Willeford v. State, 72 S.W.3d 820, 823 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref’d) (citing

Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding invited error estops

party from complaining of charge error that it induced)).


         Nevertheless, we hold that the court did not reversibly err. The relevant offense is

interference with a peace officer performing a duty. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.15(a)(1).

How a defendant interferes is a question of manner and means. A trial court may charge

the jury with alternate manner and means of committing the same offense if the evidence

supports them. See Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en

banc).


         Here, “belligerent” conduct describes only one of four alternative methods of

interfering. It does not add or alter an element. Significant here, the evidence was

sufficient to support conviction on the remaining three. Mathieu testified he repeatedly

directed Appellant to get behind the line, but Appellant physically refused. The video

evidence shows Appellant crossed the established boundary. Mathieu also testified that

Appellant approached the driver-side window and recorded the in-unit screen, forcing him

to exit his vehicle and diverting his attention from the investigation. The jury could have

found Appellant guilty on any of these three manners and means without regard to
                                              10
whether Appellant was “belligerent.” Accordingly, even if inclusion of the term was error,

it was harmless.


      We overrule Appellant’s third issue.


                                      CONCLUSION


      Having overruled all of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.




                                                       Lawrence M. Doss
                                                            Justice

Do not publish.




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