Oliver Perry Harris v. the State of Texas

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-25-00173-CR
     ___________________________

   OLIVER PERRY HARRIS, Appellant

                    V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS


  On Appeal from the 297th District Court
         Tarrant County, Texas
        Trial Court No. 1579184


   Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Walker, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In 2021, pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant Oliver Perry Harris pleaded

guilty to one count of indecency with a child by contact, and the trial court placed

Harris on ten years’ deferred adjudication community supervision. In 2024, the State

petitioned to proceed to adjudication, alleging that Harris had violated the terms of

his community supervision. After a hearing at which Harris pleaded “[n]ot true” to all

the State’s allegations, the trial court found one of the allegations true, adjudicated

Harris guilty, and sentenced him to seven years’ confinement.

      Harris’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967),

representing that “no reversible errors are reflected by the available record” and “that

the appeal in this case is frivolous and wholly without merit.” In compliance with

Kelly v. State, counsel provided Harris with copies of the brief and motion to withdraw

and informed him of his right to file a pro se response, to review the record, and to

seek discretionary review pro se should this court deny relief. See 436 S.W.3d 313,

319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

       Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders by presenting a

professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable

grounds for relief. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)

(orig. proceeding). Harris was given the opportunity to file a pro se response to the



                                           2
Anders brief but filed nothing. We also gave the State an opportunity to file a

response to counsel’s motion, but it did not file anything either.

       Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on

the ground that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we must

independently examine the record. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1991). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson

v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

      We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief and have determined

that the trial court’s judgment requires modification regarding the assessment of

reparations in the amount of $1,743.00.

      We have previously held that when reparations are comparable to fees—and

are therefore not punishment and not part of a defendant’s sentence—they do not

have to be included in the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence to be properly

included in the written judgment. See Brown v. State, No. 02-08-00063-CR, 2009 WL

1905231, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 2, 2009, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication). But to include such fees, the State must supply

evidence that the defendant actually owes them. Lewis v. State, 423 S.W.3d 451, 460–

61 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.); see also Romo v. State, No. 02-23-00197-CR,

2024 WL 1100790, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication); Levine v. State, No. 02-19-00414-CR, 2020 WL

5414974, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 10, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not

                                            3
designated for publication) (clarifying that although “evidentiary-sufficiency principles

do not apply to reparations,” they “must . . . have some sort of record support”).

Thus, we have struck reparations when we were unable to determine the authority for

their imposition. See Lewis, 423 S.W.3d at 461; see also Romo, 2024 WL 1100790, at *2;

Lawson v. State, No. 02-18-00361-CR, 2019 WL 3244493, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth July 18, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Gatewood v.

State, No. 02-18-00021-CR, 2018 WL 4625780, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Sept. 27, 2018, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

      Here, the trial court’s judgment includes a “Special Finding” ordering Harris to

pay $1,743.00 in reparations. But the trial court did not orally pronounce these

reparations at sentencing, and there is nothing in the record itemizing them or

explaining what they are for. Outside of the judgment itself, the only record reference

to “reparations” is found in a docket entry dated June 2, 2025—the date of the

revocation hearing. In pertinent part, this entry states, consistent with the judgment,

“Court cost, fines, reparations and fees-PAYABLE . . . . REPARATIONS IN THE

AMOUNT OF $1,743.00 PAYABLE.” And, although it does not use the word

“reparations,” the order to withdraw funds dated June 3, 2025, states that Harris

“currently has incurred court fees and costs in the District Court of Tarrant County,

Texas, as above entitled and represented in the certified Judgment and Bill of Costs

attached hereto in the amount of $1,743.00.” But the accompanying judgment and

bill of costs, both also dated June 3, 2025, reflect that Harris owes no court costs or

                                           4
fees,1 and the record contains no other evidence showing that Harris actually owes

any such costs or fees.

      On this record, there is nothing that would allow us to determine what portion

of the $1,743.00, if any, is for fines—which must be orally pronounced at

sentencing—and what portion is merely for fees and costs. Compare Bradley v. State,

No. 02-17-00009-CR, 2017 WL 5895350, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 30,

2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (modifying judgment

adjudicating guilt to delete fine where trial court did not include fine in its oral

pronouncement of sentence at probationer’s revocation hearing), with Brown, 2009 WL

1905231, at *2 (holding that reparations need not be orally pronounced when they are

comparable to fees).

      We have the authority to modify a judgment “to make the record speak the

truth when the matter has been called to [our] attention by any source.” See French v.

State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Having found no record support

for the reparations, we modify the judgment to delete the reparations in the amount

of $1,743.00. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Romo, 2024 WL 1100790, at *2. We also

delete the $1,743.00 assessment from the order to withdraw funds from Harris’s

inmate trust account. See Bradley, 2017 WL 5895350, at *1 n.2. Except for these

necessary modifications, we agree with Harris’s appointed counsel that this appeal is

      1
        Additionally, we note that the judgment also reflects that Harris owes no fines
or restitution.


                                          5
wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record that arguably might

support an appeal of the judgment. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm

the trial court’s judgment as modified. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b).

                                                      /s/ Brian Walker

                                                      Brian Walker
                                                      Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: April 16, 2026




                                           6