Paul Dillion Brown A/K/A Paul Dillon Brown v. the State of Texas
Docket 06-25-00162-CR
Court of record · Indexed in NoticeRegistry archive · AI-enriched for research
- Filed
- Jurisdiction
- Texas
- Court
- Texas Court of Appeals, 6th District (Texarkana)
- Type
- Lead Opinion
- Case type
- Criminal Appeal
- Disposition
- Affirmed
- Docket
- 06-25-00162-CR
Appeal from conviction and sentence (life imprisonment) following guilty plea and punishment hearing in a first-degree felony fentanyl possession case in the 43rd District Court, Parker County, Texas.
Summary
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment convicting Paul Dillon Brown of possession with intent to deliver fentanyl and sentencing him to life imprisonment. Brown argued the appointment order incorrectly found he could pay for counsel and that his life sentence was cruel and unusual. The court held no modification to the appointment order was needed because Brown later retained private counsel and was not ordered to pay appointed-counsel fees. The Eighth Amendment claim was not considered because Brown failed to present his motion for new trial to the trial court, so the issue was unpreserved.
Issues Decided
- Whether the trial court's appointment order should be modified to delete a finding that the defendant had the ability to contribute to the cost of legal services.
- Whether the defendant's life sentence for possession with intent to deliver fentanyl violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and whether that claim was preserved for appellate review.
Court's Reasoning
The court explained that because Brown retained private counsel after the appointment and the judgment did not order him to pay appointed-counsel fees, there was no practical need to modify the appointment order. Regarding the Eighth Amendment claim, the court applied preservation rules: Brown filed a motion for new trial but did not present it to the trial court or request a hearing, so he failed to give the court actual notice and thus failed to preserve the sentencing complaint for appeal.
Authorities Cited
- Texas Health & Safety Code § 481.1123(d)TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.1123(d) (Supp.)
- Obella v. State532 S.W.3d 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (per curiam)
- Washington v. State271 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref'd) (per curiam)
Parties
- Appellant
- Paul Dillon Brown a/k/a Paul Dillion Brown
- Appellee
- The State of Texas
- Judge
- Scott E. Stevens, Chief Justice
Key Dates
- Date Submitted
- 2026-03-25
- Date Decided
- 2026-04-22
What You Should Do Next
- 1
Consider post-conviction relief options
Consult an attorney about filing a habeas corpus petition or other post-conviction remedies if you believe constitutional errors occurred that were not preserved on appeal.
- 2
Review preservation procedures
If pursuing further review, ensure any new claims are timely presented to the trial court and that motions for new trial are formally presented and heard to preserve issues for appeal.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What did the court decide about the appointment order saying I could pay for counsel?
- The court found no change was needed because you later hired private counsel and the judgment did not order you to pay appointed-counsel fees.
- Can the court review whether my life sentence is cruel and unusual?
- Not on this appeal, because you did not present your motion for new trial to the trial court or request a hearing, so the sentencing complaint was not preserved for review.
- Who is affected by this decision?
- Paul Dillon Brown is directly affected—the conviction and life sentence were affirmed—and the decision confirms that failure to present a motion for new trial forfeits appellate review of sentencing complaints.
- Does this mean I owe attorney fees for appointed counsel?
- No; the record and judgment contain no order requiring you to pay fees for appointed counsel.
The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.
Full Filing Text
In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-25-00162-CR
PAUL DILLION BROWN A/K/A PAUL DILLON BROWN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 43rd District Court
Parker County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR25-0053
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Paul Dillon Brown pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver four grams or more but
less than 200 grams of fentanyl, a first-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 481.1123(d) (Supp.). After a punishment hearing, the trial court sentenced Brown to life
imprisonment.1
On appeal, Brown questions whether the trial court erred by entering an order appointing
counsel that also found he had financial resources or ability to pay all or part of the cost of legal
services.2 Brown also argues that his sentence violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S CONST. amend. VIII. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment because (1) Brown, who later employed his own counsel, was not ordered to pay
attorney fees in this case and (2) Brown failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment complaint for
our review.
I. Brown Had Retained Counsel and Was Not Ordered to Pay Attorney Fees
After the caption and index, the first item in the clerk’s record is the trial court’s order
appointing counsel for Brown. In that order, the trial court found that the appointment of counsel
was necessary “in the interest of justice” and that Brown then “ha[d] financial resources and/or
an ability to pay all or part of the cost of legal services and related expenses to be provided by
th[at] order.” The order also contained language stating, Brown “is ordered to contribute to the
1
Originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). We follow the
precedent of the Second Court of Appeals in deciding the issues presented. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2
In our appellate cause number 06-25-00163-CR, Brown appeals his conviction for theft of a firearm. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (e)(4)(c) (Supp.).
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cost of the legal services and related expenses as may be ordered by the court.” The State
concedes the issue and agrees that the order determining appointment of counsel should be
modified by deleting the finding that Brown had the ability to contribute to the cost of his trial.
On our independent review, we find that no such modification is necessary.
After Brown was appointed counsel, he retained his own counsel. The trial court
permitted appointed counsel to withdraw and allowed the substitution of Brown’s retained
counsel. Brown’s appointed counsel represented him at trial and on appeal. For this reason, the
trial court’s judgment did not order Brown to pay any fee for appointed counsel, and the bill of
costs contains no such fee. As a result, we find that no modification to the prior order appointing
counsel is necessary.3
We overrule Brown’s first point of error.
II. Brown Failed to Preserve His Eighth Amendment Complaint
In his second point of error, Brown argues that his sentence of life imprisonment violates
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because it is “grossly
disproportionate to the offense.” We find this issue unpreserved.
Brown did not object to the imposition of his sentence. Although the appellate record
shows that Brown filed a motion for new trial raising an Eighth Amendment issue, he did not
present his motion to the trial court.
3
Brown acknowledges that there is no order to pay attorney fees but argues that the issue is still ripe for our review
due to language in Jones v. State, 428 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). However, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Jones determined that the issue was ripe for consideration because the written
judgment included an order to pay attorney fees. Id. at 172 n.2.
3
“A motion for new trial must be ‘presented’ to the trial court within 10 days of its filing.”
Obella v. State, 532 S.W.3d 405, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (per curiam) (citing TEX. R. APP.
P. 21.6). “The term ‘present’ means the record must show that the movant for a new trial
sustained the burden of actually delivering the motion for new trial to the attention or actual
notice of the trial court.” Washington v. State, 271 S.W.3d 755, 756 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2008, pet. ref’d) (per curiam). “This means the defendant must give the trial court actual notice
that he timely filed a motion for new trial and requests a hearing.” Obella, 532 S.W.3d at 407
(citing Rozell v. State, 176 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).
Here, Brown did not ask for a hearing on the motion, and nothing shows that the motion
was presented to the trial court. As a result, Brown failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment
complaint for our review. See Washington, 271 S.W.3d at 756; Means v. State, 347 S.W.3d 873,
874 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.); see also Fulton v. State, No. 02-19-00227-CR, 2020
WL 3969851, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 11, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication).
III. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Scott E. Stevens
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: March 25, 2026
Date Decided: April 22, 2026
Do Not Publish
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