George Sheehan v. Pamela Sheehan

Opinion filed April 16, 2026




                                      In The


        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                   __________

                               No. 11-24-00223-CV
                                   __________

                       GEORGE SHEEHAN, Appellant
                                         V.
                      PAMELA R. SHEEHAN, Appellee


                     On Appeal from the 142nd District Court
                             Midland County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. CV60093


                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
       Appellant, George Sheehan, appeals the trial court’s enforcement order and
final judgment, which enforced a divorce decree’s property division award in favor
of Appellee, Pamela R. Sheehan. In three issues, which we treat as two, George
argues that the trial court erred in: (1) substantively modifying the divorce decree,
resulting in a void judgment; and (2) awarding attorney’s fees.
       We affirm.
                       I. Factual and Procedural Background
      This case is before this court for a second time. In Sheehan v. Sheehan
(Sheehan I), George appealed the initial divorce decree, arguing that the trial court
erred in concluding that George’s personal injury suit settlement funds constituted
community property to be awarded. As detailed in Sheehan I, the facts that relate to
the settlement funds are as follows:
      George and [Pamela] married in 1994. The testimony at trial revealed
      that they had an acrimonious marriage that included separations at
      various times. On December 15, 2014, George was involved in a motor
      vehicle accident while in the scope of his employment with West Texas
      Gas. George and Pamela were separated at the time of the accident, but
      they reconciled afterwards. They remained together until 2019.
      George suffered injuries as a result of the accident that required him to
      have multiple surgeries. George settled with the driver of the other
      motor vehicle for her policy limits of $30,000. George’s employer
      provided insurance coverage to him through two policies issued by The
      Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania. One policy provided
      worker’s compensation coverage.           The other policy provided
      underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage.
      George settled his UIM claim with The Insurance Company of the State
      of Pennsylvania after a mediation that occurred in August 2019. The
      gross amount of the settlement was $1,250,000. After the deduction of
      attorney’s fees and expenses, the net amount payable to George from
      the settlement was $710,724.25. His attorneys wire-transferred that
      amount into his and Pamela’s joint checking account on October 8,
      2019. George and Pamela separated for the final time later that month,
      and Pamela filed for divorce on November 1, 2019.
No. 11-22-00085-CV, 2023 WL 5436578, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 24,
2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). We overruled George’s issues on appeal, and we affirmed
the trial court’s judgment in all respects. Id. at *4. Relevant to this appeal, the final
decree of divorce awarded Pamela “[t]he amount of $64,661[.]44 from the checking
account in the name of [George] located at BB & I [sic].” Subsequently, Pamela


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filed a petition to enforce the decree, and also sought to enforce the award of funds
from the account.
        At the hearing on the petition, George argued that the account was empty, and
therefore, the trial court had effectively awarded no money. The trial court noted on
the record that it did not intend to award an empty account. George acknowledged
that the trial court entered a temporary restraining order prior to the final divorce
decree to prevent George from depleting community property. In a prior hearing,
George specifically admitted to having read and signed the temporary orders;
however, according to Pamela, George depleted community property assets by
purchasing cars, boats, and ATVs. George also purchased a new house in his son’s
name, which he intended to have “transferred [back to his name] after th[e] divorce
[was] over with.” All told, George took approximately $126,000 out of his 401(k)—
$102,000 after penalties. After he spent a portion of those funds, he deposited the
remainder into the BB&T account. That account once held the amount awarded in
the divorce decree, but now reflected a negative balance.
        Following the enforcement hearing, the trial court signed an order finding that
George “failed to comply with the divorce decree as he did not deliver the amount
of $64,661.44 to [Pamela] as ordered, although [he] was able to comply.”
Consequently, the trial court awarded a money judgment in favor of Pamela for
$64,601.44 and reasonable attorney’s fees of $6,200.1 George appealed.




        1
          The award of $64,601.44 in the judgment being appealed is $60 less than the amount awarded in
the divorce decree. The parties do not assign error to this discrepancy. See Matter of Marriage of Russell,
556 S.W.3d 451, 455–56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (explaining that “a nunc pro tunc
judgment may not be used to correct judicial errors” which “occur[] in the rendering, rather than the
entering, of a judgment and arises from a mistake of law or fact that requires judicial reasoning to fix” but
may only be used to correct clerical errors which represent “a discrepancy between the entry of a judgment
in the record and the judgment that was actually rendered”).

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                         II. Enforcement and Clarification
      A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
      We review the trial court’s ruling on a post-divorce motion for enforcement
of a divorce decree under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Moore v. Moore, 568
S.W.3d 725, 729 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, no pet.). “The test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court acted in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner or
whether it acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” Id. (citing
Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985)).
      A final, unambiguous divorce decree that disposes of all marital property bars
relitigation. S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428, 441 (Tex. 2022); Pearson v. Fillingim,
332 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam). In other words, a party may not
collaterally attack a divorce decree by seeking an order that alters or modifies the
decree’s property division. See Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. 2009);
see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007(a), (b) (West 2020). However, “the trial
court that renders a divorce decree retains jurisdiction to clarify and to enforce the
decree’s property division.” Perry v. Perry, 512 S.W.3d 523, 527 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (citing Pearson, 332 S.W.3d at 363); see FAM.
§§ 9.002, .006. “Sections 9.002 and 9.006 acknowledge the continuing jurisdiction
of the trial court to enforce [the divorce decree].” Morrison v. Morrison, 729 S.W.3d
328, 333 (Tex. 2026) (emphasis omitted) (first citing FAM. §§ 9.002, .006; and then
citing Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 902). “Those provisions grant ‘power’ to the trial court
to ‘enforce the property division’ and to ‘render further orders.’” Id. (quoting FAM.
§§ 9.002, .006.).
      Among its enforcement remedies, the trial court may render a money
judgment, “[i]f a party fails to comply with a decree of divorce or annulment and
delivery of property awarded in the decree is no longer an adequate remedy.” FAM.
§ 9.010(a); see Morrison, 729 S.W.3d at 332 (recognizing that awarding a
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money judgment is a permissible enforcement remedy); In re Marriage of Pyrtle,
433 S.W.3d 152, 162–65 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (holding that
Section 9.010 authorized the trial court to render a money judgment for damages
caused by husband’s failure to comply with provision of decree’s property division).
Further, if a party did not receive payments of money as awarded in the decree, the
trial court may render judgment against the defaulting party for the amount of unpaid
payments to which the party is entitled. FAM. § 9.010(b). The trial court may also
award reasonable attorney’s fees as costs in a proceeding to enforce a decree’s
property division. Id. § 9.014; see Morrison, 729 S.W.3d at 332.
      However, such orders “cannot be used to make a substantive change in a
divorce decree after it becomes final, even if it contains substantive legal error.” In
re W.L.W., 370 S.W.3d 799, 803 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, orig. proceeding)
(citing Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex. 2003)). “An order that
amends, modifies, alters, or changes the actual, substantive division of property
made or approved in a final decree of divorce is beyond the jurisdiction of the trial
court and is void.” Beshears v. Beshears, 423 S.W.3d 493, 500 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2014, no pet.); see FAM. § 9.007(b).          “The line between enforcement and
modification of a judicial decree depends in large measure on the relief granted.”
Morrison, 729 S.W.3d at 329. To determine whether a subsequent order modifies a
decree, “we must interpret the decree to determine not what the trial court should
have done but, if possible, what the [trial] court actually did.” Shanks, 110 S.W.3d
at 447.
      B. Discussion
      In his first issue, George argues that the trial court erred by substantively
changing the divorce decree in violation of Sections 9.006 and 9.007 of the Texas
Family Code. See FAM. §§ 9.006, .007. First, George argues that “[t]he [o]rder
appealed . . . was entered by the 142nd District Court of Midland County[] but signed
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by the elected judge of the 318th District Court,” who was without authority to
modify the decree. Second, George asserts that the trial court modified the decree
by awarding a money judgment for funds held in a specific account which was now
liquidated. Pamela responds that the trial court’s order does not constitute a
modification of the decree, but it enforces George’s obligations under the decree.
We agree with Pamela.
        In the divorce decree, the trial court awarded a specific sum of money
contained in the BB&T account, while also entering a separate order prohibiting the
parties from depleting community property assets. However, since George violated
that order and depleted and/or switched the account, a money judgment for the
damages caused by George’s actions was appropriate. 2 See id. § 9.010(a); Gomez v.
Gomez, 632 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.) (concluding that the
trial court was authorized to render a money judgment to wife as enforcement of the
property division where husband withdrew and spent all of the funds in his


        2
         George testified as follows at the enforcement hearing when asked about the account:
        Q. The money that you received from that 401K, did you use that to set up a bank account
        at B&B trust—or B&BT [sic]?
        A. BB&T in Cibolo, Texas, yes, sir.
        Q. And so that account at some point during the discovery process had $64,000, correct?
        A. Yes, sir.
        Q. It started off with more, but got liquidated down as you spent it on living expenses?
        A. Yes, sir.
        ....
        Q. And at the time of this trial—or at the final hearing in this Court, had you spent the
        entirety of the BB&T account?
        A. Yes, sir.
        Additionally, in an inventory filed with the trial court prior to the divorce decree being signed,
George represented that he held $64,661.44 in an American State Bank account and $3,073.31 in a BB&T
account, which we presume is the “BB & I” account referenced in the divorce decree.
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retirement accounts in violation of a court order prohibiting him from depleting the
community’s assets while the divorce was pending); DeGroot v. DeGroot, 369
S.W.3d 918, 923 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (holding that trial court had the
authority to reduce award of fifty percent of an account to money judgment because
“[husband’s] liquidation of the 401(k) plan made it impossible for him to comply
with the terms of the decree by delivering to [wife] fifty percent of the 401(k) plan”);
see also Becka v. Becka, No. 05-19-00612-CV, 2020 WL 4047967, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Dallas July 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“In light of the evidence that [the]
[h]usband neither owned the account nor could transfer or close it, the trial court
acted within its discretion by awarding a money judgment based on the amount of
the USAA account at the time of the divorce.”); Dade v. Dade, No. 01–05–00912–
CV, 2007 WL 1153053, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 19, 2007, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (“We hold that the trial court, after considering the evidence that
[the husband] had not received the pension benefits as awarded by the divorce decree
and that [the wife] now had possession of those funds, acted within its discretion
pursuant to [Section] 9.010 in entering a money judgment against [her].”). In other
words, the enforcement order providing for a money judgment “does not seek
redivision. Instead, it provides . . . for the collection of damages resulting from
breach of the decree.” See Morrison, 729 S.W.3d at 335 (recognizing that the trial
court could permissibly include an enforcement provision that provides for damages
resulting from a party’s breach of a divorce decree’s property division). We
conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s enforcement order,
as it did not substantively change the divorce decree. Rather, it permissibly enforced
the delivery of the property awarded in the decree—which was no longer an adequate
remedy—by reducing it to a money judgment for the damages caused by his failure
to comply. See id.; Beshears, 423 S.W.3d at 500; see also FAM. § 9.010(a).


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      Finally, we note that the Texas constitution provides that “[d]istrict [j]udges
may exchange districts, or hold courts for each other when they may deem it
expedient, and shall do so when required by law.” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11; see also
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 24.003 (West 2023) (regarding the transfer of cases and
exchange of benches in counties with two or more district courts), 74.094(a)
(concerning hearing cases in a county); TEX. R. CIV. P. 330(e) (regarding the
exchange and transfer of cases between district courts in a county). The Honorable
David W. Lindemood signed both the original divorce decree, the enforcement
order, and final judgment that is the subject of this appeal, albeit from two district
courts in Midland County: the 318th District Court, the family district court of which
he was the presiding judge prior to his retirement, and the 142nd District Court,
where Pamela’s original petition for enforcement was filed. GOV’T §§ 24.601,
24.626. It is unclear on what basis George contends this was improper, except to
proffer his claim that Judge Lindemood made a substantive modification to the
decree’s property division, an argument that we have rejected. Accordingly, we
overrule George’s first issue.
      In his second issue, George contends that the trial court erred in awarding
attorney’s fees because the enforcement order was entered without jurisdiction and
is void. Because we have rejected George’s arguments as to his first issue, and
because the trial court is authorized to award attorney’s fees in an enforcement
proceeding, we overrule George’s second issue. See FAM. § 9.014; Morrison, 729
S.W.3d at 332.




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                               III. This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.




                                              W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                              JUSTICE


April 16, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.




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