In Re Cristina Gallegos Ortega v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-26-00217-CV

                                   COURT OF APPEALS

                       THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                          CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG



                        IN RE CRISTINA GALLEGOS ORTEGA


                      ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS


                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

                      Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca
                       Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva1

        By petition for writ of mandamus, relator Cristina Gallegos Ortega asserts that the

trial court 2 abused its discretion by exercising jurisdiction over a suit affecting the parent-


         1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R.
47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
         2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number F-4337-25-7 in the County Court at

Law No. 7 of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Sergio Valdez. See id. R. 52.2.
child relationship under the Texas Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement

Act (UCCJEA). See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 152.001–.317. We conditionally grant the petition

for writ of mandamus.

                                           I.       BACKGROUND

        This original proceeding arises from an original suit affecting the parent-child

relationship that was filed by father Jose Angel Alfaro Olvera against mother Gallegos

Ortega in the County Court at Law No. 7 of Hidalgo County, Texas, regarding minor child

A.N.A.G. 3 In his first amended original petition, Alfaro Olvera requested the trial court to

exercise jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 152.201(a):

        The minor child, a nine-year-old Mexican citizen, resided her entire life in
        Mexico under the care and custody of [Alfaro Olvera]. The child was
        removed from Mexico by [Gallegos Ortega] and brought to Texas without
        [Alfaro Olvera’s] consent. [Gallegos Ortega] is also a Mexican citizen but
        currently resides in the United States under an uncertain immigration status.
        [Alfaro Olvera’s] attorney in Mexico has advised that the child’s physical
        presence in Mexico is required for the pending custody proceedings to
        move forward. Accordingly, [Alfaro Olvera] respectfully requests that this
        Court assert temporary emergency jurisdiction under [Texas Family] Code
        § 152.204 to protect the welfare of the child and to facilitate her return to
        her habitual residence in Mexico.

               [Alfaro Olvera] further shows that the child faces risk of harm and
        potential immigration consequences if she remains in Texas. The child is
        currently enrolled in school in the United States, which is not permitted
        under her visa classification, placing her at risk of removal or loss of status.
        In addition, [Gallegos Ortega] was arrested in January 2026 for alleged
        criminal activity in Texas. Given these circumstances, [Alfaro Olvera] asks
        the Court to recognize that Mexico is the child’s home state for purposes of
        the UCCJEA and to take jurisdiction for the limited purpose of ordering the
        return of the child to her lawful residence in Mexico, where jurisdiction
        properly lies and where her ongoing safety, schooling, and legal status can
        be maintained under the supervision of the appropriate Mexican court.

        3 We use a pseudonym to refer to the minor child. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d) (“On the

motion of the parties or on the court's own motion, the appellate court in its opinion may identify the parties
by fictitious names or by their initials only.”); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8 cmt. (“The rule does not limit an appellate
court's authority to disguise parties’ identities in appropriate circumstances in other cases.”).
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Alfaro Olvera further requested the trial court to: (1) appoint both parents as joint

managing conservators for the child; (2) appoint Alfaro Olvera as the conservator with the

exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child in Mexico; (3) determine

whether it was necessary to take measures “to protect the child from the risk of abduction”

by Gallegos Ortega under Texas Family Code Section 153.503; (4) order Gallegos Ortega

to pay child support; and (5) issue a writ of attachment for the child. Alfaro Olvera filed a

declaration in support of the factual allegations in his petition.

       Gallegos Ortega filed a special appearance and answer requesting the trial court

to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Gallegos Ortega asserted that the home state

of the child was Mexico, that there were two custody proceedings pending in Mexico

regarding the child, and that Mexican courts had not declined to exercise jurisdiction over

the proceedings there. Gallegos Ortega thereafter filed a motion to dismiss Alfaro Olvera’s

lawsuit.

       On March 12, 2026, the trial court held a hearing and signed an order which denied

Gallegos Ortega’s jurisdictional challenge and stated that the trial court was exercising

“temporary emergency jurisdiction” over the case. The order provides:

       The Court finds that the parties testified to two different [c]ourt proceedings
       which were ongoing in the Country of Mexico. The Court finds that the
       parties filed proceedings in the two Courts in the Country of Mexico with one
       being in Valle Hermoso, Tamaulipas, Mexico, and the other in Rio Bravo,
       Tamaulipas, Mexico. The Court finds that the parties agreed that that there
       was no residency connection to the case in Rio Bravo, Tamaulipas, Mexico.
       The Court finds that there are competing Court cases in the Country of
       Mexico, relating to the same parties and child named in this case,
       addressing the same issues. The Court finds that neither party offered into
       evidence any documents relating to the cases pending in Mexico. The Court
       thus had no documentary evidence to consider as it relates to the cases
       pending in the Country of Mexico.

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              The Court finds that the child [A.N.A.G.] trave[l]ed to the Country of
       the United States on a Tourist Visa. This [Tourist Visa] allowed her to stay
       in the United States from 72 hours to one week during each visit to the
       United States. The Court finds that the child does not currently have any
       valid approved permission to be in the United States beyond her Tourist
       Visa. The Court finds that [A.N.A.G.] has resided in the Country of Mexico
       her entire life with the exception of the time period starting when she was
       brought to the United States on her Tourist Visa.

              The Court finds that [Gallegos Ortega] trave[l]ed to the United States
       on a Tourist Visa which allowed her to be in the United States for a period
       of 72 hours during each visit. The Court finds that from . . . 2020 to
       2023 . . . [Gallegos Ortega] did not have any valid approved permission to
       remain in the United States, with the exception of her Tourist Visa. The Court
       further finds that [Gallegos Ortega] is facing criminal charges in the Country
       of Mexico for the manner in which she removed the child from the Country
       of Mexico.

             The Court finds that [Alfaro Olvera] has been trave[l]ing from the
       Country of Mexico to the United States within the parameters of his Tourist
       Visa.

               After considering all of the evidence and arguments of Counsel, the
       Court finds that the facts and circumstances as presented in this case have
       created the necessity for this Court to exercise temporary emergency
       jurisdiction, and thus issues the following Order. The Court takes into
       consideration all of the evidence, including but not limited, to any findings
       herein.

The trial court’s order thus allowed Alfaro Olvera to: (1) take immediate possession of the

child; (2) return the child to Mexico; and (3) take the child before the judges presiding over

the custody proceedings in Mexico. The following day, on March 13, 2026, the trial court

issued a writ of attachment for the child.

       Gallegos Ortega filed this petition for writ of mandamus and an emergency motion

to stay. We granted the emergency motion, ordered the trial court’s March 12, 2026 order

and the March 13, 2026 writ of attachment stayed, and ordered Alfaro Olvera to file a

response to the petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4, 52.8, 52.10.

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Alfaro Olvera has filed a response asserting in relevant part that Gallegos Ortega has an

adequate remedy by appeal, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction over the case under Texas Family Code

Section 152.204.

                                     II.    MANDAMUS

       A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which is ordinarily available only

when the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the party seeking relief lacks an

adequate remedy on appeal. In re Ill. Nat’l Ins., 685 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Tex. 2024) (orig.

proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per

curiam); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig.

proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).

“A court abuses its discretion if no evidence supports the finding on which its ruling rests

and if the court could reasonably have reached only a contrary conclusion.” In re

AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). We

conduct a “benefits-and-detriments analysis” to determine if the relator possesses an

adequate remedy at law. In re Auburn Creek Ltd. P’ship, 655 S.W.3d 837, 843 (Tex. 2022)

(orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136–

37.

       Alfaro Olvera asserts that the trial court issued a final, appealable order, and thus

mandamus relief should be denied because Gallegos Ortega had an adequate remedy

by appeal. In support of his contention, Alfaro Olvera notes that the trial court’s March 12,

2026 order expressly states that it is “final and appealable.” We disagree with Alfaro

Olvera’s assertions. “A writ of mandamus is an appropriate means to require a trial court

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to comply with the UCCJEA’s jurisdictional requirements.” Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d

322, 324 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); see In re Muldoon, 679 S.W.3d 182, 184 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2023, orig. proceeding); In re S.J., 522 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]). In a jurisdictional dispute

arising from child custody proceedings, the relator need not demonstrate that an appellate

remedy is inadequate because an order issued without jurisdiction is void. In re S.J., 522

S.W.3d at 580. Accordingly, we proceed to address the merits.

                                            III.    ANALYSIS

        Gallegos Ortega presents two issues through which she contends that: (1) the trial

court lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to make an initial custody determination

because Mexico is the child’s home state; and (2) there is no basis for temporary

emergency jurisdiction. 4

        The UCCJEA “was designed, in large part, to clarify and to unify the standards for

courts’ continuing and modification jurisdiction in interstate child-custody matters.” In re

Forlenza, 140 S.W.3d 373, 374 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); see Cortez v. Cortez, 639

S.W.3d 298, 306 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.). “The UCCJEA

helps . . . ensure child custody determinations are rendered in the state which can best

decide the case in the interest of the child.” In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 513 (Tex. 2020)

(citation modified); see In re Muldoon, 679 S.W.3d at 185. “The UCCJEA advances an

overarching objective of expediency and stability in an increasingly mobile world by

helping prevent manipulation of the system and undue complication of child-custody


        4 Gallegos Ortega presents additional issues and arguments in support of her contention that the

trial court erred; however, we need not address those arguments given our resolution of this matter on other
grounds. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1, 47.4.
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disputes, which can occur when a child is moved from one state to another.” In re D.S.,

602 S.W.3d at 513; see In re Muldoon, 679 S.W.3d at 185.

       Under the UCCJEA, we examine objective factors in determining jurisdiction.

Powell, 165 S.W.3d at 326. For purposes of jurisdiction over initial child custody

determinations, a foreign country is treated “as if it were a state of the United States.”

TEX. FAM. CODE § 152.105(a); see In re Salminen, 492 S.W.3d 31, 39–42 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding). Under the UCCJEA, a state court only has

jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination under certain circumstances.

See TEX. FAM. CODE § 152.201. Specifically, under Section 152.201 of the UCCJEA:

       [A] Texas court has jurisdiction to make initial child-custody determinations
       (1) if Texas is the child’s home state; (2) in certain situations where a court
       of another state does not have jurisdiction or declines to exercise jurisdiction
       on the ground that this state is the more convenient forum; or (3) no court
       of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria set out in
       [Section 152.201 of the Texas Family Code].

In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d at 513; see In re Muldoon, 679 S.W.3d at 185. Here, Texas is not

the child’s home state, and neither of the other circumstances are present. See TEX. FAM.

CODE § 152.201. Therefore, Section 152.201 does not provide jurisdiction for the trial

court to make an initial child custody determination under the UCCJEA. See id. We

sustain Gallegos Ortega’s first issue.

       With regard to Gallegos Ortega’s second issue, Section 152.204 of the UCCJEA

permits a Texas court to exercise “temporary emergency jurisdiction” over a child in

custody matters “if the child is present in this state and the child has been abandoned or

it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or

parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” Id.


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§ 152.204(a). The exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction under this section is

reserved for “extraordinary circumstances.” In re S.J., 522 S.W.3d at 580; see In re

Salminen, 492 S.W.3d at 40.

      The UCCJEA does not provide guidance on what constitutes “mistreatment or

abuse” but guidance is provided elsewhere in the Texas Family Code. See In re S.J., 522

S.W.3d at 580. Section 261.001(1) defines “abuse” as including, inter alia, “mental or

emotional injury to a child that results in an observable and material impairment in the

child’s growth, development, or psychological functioning,” “physical injury,” and harmful

“sexual conduct.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.001(1). When Section 152.204 applies, the trial

court “is empowered to act only on a short term, temporary, emergency basis when the

potential for immediate harm exists.” In re S.J., 522 S.W.3d at 580.

      The trial court is required to follow certain procedures to exercise temporary

emergency jurisdiction under Section 152.204. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 152.204(c), (d).

The trial court must determine if there is a previous child custody determination that is

entitled to be enforced, and if so, “any order . . . under this section must specify in the

order a period that the court considers adequate to allow the person seeking an order to

obtain an order from the state having jurisdiction under [s]ections 152.201 through

152.203.” Id. § 152.204(c). Section 152.204(d) further provides for communications

between a Texas court making a temporary emergency order under Section 152.204 and

the court exercising jurisdiction under Sections 152.201 through 152.203. Id.

§ 152.204(d).

      Alfaro Olvera asserts that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by exercising

jurisdiction under Section 152.204. According to Alfaro Olvera:

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       The evidence established that [A.N.A.G.] faces imminent risk of harm from
       multiple sources: (1) [A.N.A.G.] is unlawfully present in the United States on
       an expired tourist visa, subjecting her to potential detention and deportation
       during a period of heightened immigration enforcement; (2) [A.N.A.G.] has
       been separated from her lifelong home and primary caregiver in Mexico;
       (3) [A.N.A.G.] has been denied meaningful contact with [Alfaro Olvera]
       since June 2025; (4) [Gallegos Ortega] faces criminal charges in both Texas
       and Mexico and potential arrest; and (5) [A.N.A.G.’s] custody remains
       unresolved despite competing proceedings in two Mexican courts. These
       circumstances, considered together, constitute mistreatment or threatened
       mistreatment warranting emergency intervention to protect [A.N.A.G.].

       Here, the record fails to reflect that the trial court followed the mandatory

procedures to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction in this case. See TEX. FAM.

CODE § 152.204(c), (d). Moreover, Alfaro Olvera failed to meet the statutory requirement

to show that the child had been abandoned or it was necessary in an emergency to protect

the child from mistreatment or abuse of threats thereof. See id. § 152.204(a); In re S.J.,

522 S.W.3d at 581–82 (collecting cases standing for the proposition that international

abduction of a child does not constitute mistreatment or abuse). It is undisputed that the

child was not abandoned, and the language of Section 155.204 does not indicate that a

risk of deportation, separation from a caregiver, pending criminal charges against

Gallegos Ortega, or a lack of contact with Alfaro Olvera, without more, constitutes an

emergency regarding potential mistreatment or abuse that would warrant the exercise of

temporary emergency jurisdiction. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 152.204(a). Further, Alfaro

Olvera does not cite any cases that support the proposition that the alleged circumstances

constitute mistreatment or abuse, or threatened mistreatment or abuse of the child. 5 We

conclude that the trial court did not have temporary emergency jurisdiction under Section


       5 We note, for instance, that the Texas Supreme Court has held that “the mere threat of deportation

or incarceration resulting from an unlawful act” does not establish endangerment as a ground for the
termination of parental rights. In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 805 (Tex. 2012).
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152.204(a) because there was no evidence that the child had been abandoned or that

there was an emergency where the child was subjected to or threatened with

mistreatment or abuse. See id. Accordingly, we sustain Gallegos Ortega’s second issue.

See id.; In re S.J., 522 S.W.3d at 582; In re Salminen, 492 S.W.3d at 39–42. Moreover,

as noted above, Gallegos Ortega need not demonstrate the inadequacy of an appellate

remedy here, which entitles her to mandamus relief. See Powell, 165 S.W.3d at 324; In

re Muldoon, 679 S.W.3d at 184; In re S.J., 522 S.W.3d at 580.

                                   IV.     CONCLUSION

       We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. We lift the stay previously

imposed in this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10. We direct the trial court to vacate its

March 12, 2026 order and its March 13, 2026 writ of attachment and to proceed in

accordance with our memorandum opinion. Our writ will issue only if the trial court fails to

promptly comply.

                                                               CLARISSA SILVA
                                                               Justice


Delivered and filed on the
30th day of April, 2026.




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