In the Interest of A. Children v. Department of Family and Protective Services

Opinion issued April 14, 2026




                                        In The

                                Court of Appeals
                                       For The

                           First District of Texas
                              ————————————
                                NO. 01-25-01056-CV
                             ———————————
                   IN THE INTEREST OF Z.A.A., A CHILD



                    On Appeal from the 313th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 2023-02333J


                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In this accelerated appeal,1 appellant, father, challenges the trial court’s order,

entered after a hearing, terminating his parental rights to his minor child, Z.A.A.,2

and continuing the sole managing conservatorship of Z.A.A. by appellee, the



1
      See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405(a); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4.
2
      At the time father’s parental rights were terminated, Z.A.A. was six years old.
Department of Family and Protective Services (“DFPS”).3 In two issues, father

contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial

court’s findings that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return Z.A.A. to father4 and

termination of father’s parental rights was in the best interest of Z.A.A.5

      We affirm.

                                      Background

      On October 13, 2023, DFPS filed a petition seeking termination of father’s

parental rights to Z.A.A. and managing conservatorship of Z.A.A.6 After a bench

trial, the court, on December 4, 2024, signed an order appointing DFPS as the sole

managing conservator of Z.A.A., but it did not terminate the parental rights of father

at that time. Instead, it allowed father to have supervised visitation of Z.A.A.7

Father was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $227.64. Z.A.A. was

placed in the care of his maternal great grandfather, with whom he had been living

during the case.8

3
      The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Z.A.A.’s mother, but she is not
      a party to this appeal.
4
      See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(N)(i).
5
      See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
6
      DFPS also sought managing conservatorship of Z.A.A.’s younger half-brother, and
      termination of mother’s parental rights to both children. Father is not the biological
      father of Z.A.A’s younger brother.
7
      The trial court did not appoint father as a possessory conservator of Z.A.A., finding
      that it would not be in the child’s best interest to do so.
8
      Z.A.A.’s younger brother was also placed with their great grandfather.

                                            2
      On May 8, 2025, DFPS filed a first amended motion to modify

conservatorship and for termination of father’s parental rights to Z.A.A.9 The first

amended motion sought to have Z.A.A.’s great grandfather appointed as his sole

managing conservator and for father’s parental rights to be terminated. A hearing

on DFPS’s first amended motion was held on November 11, 2025.

      DFPS Caseworker Darrington

      Iris Darrington testified that she was the conservatorship caseworker assigned

to Z.A.A., and DFPS had previously been granted sole managing conservatorship of

the child.10 Z.A.A. was living with his great grandfather, with whom he had been

living since April 2024, along with his younger brother. Z.A.A.’s great grandfather

met his needs and had the financial means to care for Z.A.A. DFPS, through its

motion to modify, sought to have Z.A.A.’s great grandfather appointed as the sole

managing conservator of the child and termination of father’s parental rights to

Z.A.A. so that the great grandfather could adopt Z.A.A. DFPS did not have any

concerns about Z.A.A. residing with his great grandfather.                Z.A.A.’s great



9
      DFPS also sought termination of mother’s parental rights to Z.A.A. and Z.A.A.’s
      younger brother.    Mother signed an “Irrevocable Affidavit of Voluntary
      Relinquishment of Parental Rights to [DFPS]” on April 30, 2025.
10
      Darrington testified that Z.A.A. entered DFPS’s care after it received allegations of
      neglectful supervision of the child by mother and father. It was alleged that mother
      and father were selling narcotics “out of a hotel” and Z.A.A. was in a car with
      father’s relatives when the relatives were arrested. Narcotics were found the car,
      and Z.A.A. was not in a car seat.

                                            3
grandfather had been the only relative in Z.A.A.’s life that had provided him with

stability.

       Darrington further testified that Z.A.A.’s great grandfather had a “backup

plan” if “something were to happen to him” before Z.A.A. turned eighteen years old.

The great grandfather had a “big supportive family,” and a family member who was

caring for another one of Z.A.A.’s siblings had agreed to care for Z.A.A. should

something happen to the great grandfather. That family member was already a

licensed caregiver with a foster agency.

       According to Darrington, she believed that it was in Z.A.A.’s best interest for

father’s parental rights to be terminated because Z.A.A. had lived with his great

grandfather for the majority of his life and the great grandfather planned to adopt

him.11 While Z.A.A. lived with his great grandfather, his behavior had improved.

       DFPS was requesting the termination of father’s parental rights based on “his

abandonment” of Z.A.A. Father had not seen Z.A.A. since December 2024, even

though Z.A.A.’s great grandfather and father had an amicable relationship, and in

the past, the great grandfather would allow father to stop by and see Z.A.A.

       As to father, Darrington explained that father had a “criminal history

involving drugs and domestic violence,” and he had been incarcerated for different

periods of time since Z.A.A. had entered DFPS’s care. For instance, father was

11
       The great grandfather also planned to adopt Z.A.A.’s younger brother.

                                           4
incarcerated in October 2023 for the offense of assault of a family member, and he

was released from incarceration in May 2024. Father was again incarcerated in

October 2024 for about two months. In December 2024, father was released from

incarceration and remained free until September 2025 when he was incarcerated for

a few weeks. Darrington noted that from December 2024 until September 2025,

father did not have any contact with Z.A.A. and did not visit the child, even though

he was not incarcerated during that time. After being released from incarceration in

either September 2025 or October 2025, father had not had any contact with Z.A.A.

Father had not provided any child support for Z.A.A.12

      Darrington testified that DFPS had created a Family Service Plan (“FSP”) for

father,13 but it had been unable to contact father. DFPS had attempted to contact

father using the telephone numbers it had for him, but father did not respond. DFPS

also contacted father’s mother, but his mother told DFPS that she did not have any

contact with him. The telephone number that father’s mother gave DFPS for father

was disconnected. DFPS had also tried searching social media and using previous

addresses it had for father to attempt to locate him. And DFPS had contacted father’s




12
      At another point in her testimony, Darrington testified that father had given money
      to Z.A.A.’s great grandfather in the past, but not consistently.
13
      A copy of father’s FSP was not admitted into evidence at trial.

                                           5
parole officer to attempt to get father’s contact information, but she did not have any

contact information that DFPS had not already tried using.14

      According to Darrington, father had not participated in any of the

requirements of his FSP, and he had not addressed his narcotics issues or issues with

domestic violence to show that he could provide Z.A.A. with a safe and stable

home.15 Darrington testified that DFPS had attempted to contact father so that he

could participate in the requirements of his FSP and DFPS could “make a reasonable

effort to reunify him with [Z.A.A.]” Father had not responded to any attempted

contact from DFPS since May 2024.16 Before May 2024, DFPS had last heard from

father in January 2024 when Darrington was able to visit father and discuss his FSP

with him.

      As to termination of father’s parental rights, Darrington explained that father

had been absent for the majority of the case, and he had failed to demonstrate a

“lifestyle change that would ensure the safety and well-being” of Z.A.A. Father had




14
      Darrington noted that father was personally served with DFPS’s first amended
      motion on September 10, 2025, but she had been unable to get ahold of father.
15
      Darrington testified that father had never cared for Z.A.A. on his own.
16
      In May 2024, father sent a text message to DFPS stating that he was in favor of
      Z.A.A.’s great grandfather being named permanent managing conservator of Z.A.A.
      This occurred before the trial court signed its December 4, 2024 order appointing
      DFPS as the sole managing conservator of Z.A.A.

                                           6
failed to support and maintain contact with Z.A.A. for over six months and had not

participated in the requirements of his FSP.

      Z.A.A.’s Great Grandfather

      Z.A.A.’s great grandfather testified that he had cared for Z.A.A. before the

case began “off and on,” but Z.A.A. had been living with him consistently for a year

and a half. Z.A.A.’s behavior had improved while living with his great grandfather.

      According to Z.A.A.’s great grandfather, father had not seen Z.A.A. since

December 2024, and when he did see Z.A.A., he would just ride his bicycle by the

great grandfather’s home and “holler at” Z.A.A. He did not come into the house.

Sometimes the great grandfather saw father at a distance in the neighborhood.

Z.A.A. never asked to see father.

      Z.A.A.’s great grandfather testified that he wanted to adopt Z.A.A.,17 and he

had worked with DFPS to “come up with a backup caregiver in case something

happen[ed] with [him] and [he was] not able to care for [Z.A.A.] until [he] turn[ed]

18” years old.18




17
      The great grandfather also wanted to adopt Z.A.A.’s younger brother.
18
      DFPS kinship caseworker Marina Muse testified that she spoke with the “backup
      caregiver” for Z.A.A. and she had agreed to the role.

                                          7
      Child Advocates Volunteer

      Traykevia Gibbs, a volunteer with Child Advocates, Inc. (“Child Advocates”),

testified that she was assigned to Z.A.A.’s case and she believed it was in the best

interest of Z.A.A. for father’s parental rights to be terminated based off father’s lack

of effort in the case. According to Gibbs, father had made little to no effort to be

involved with Z.A.A. or to support the child. Further, Z.A.A.’s great grandfather

had been the primary caregiver for Z.A.A. for more than a year. Gibbs believed that

the great grandfather was able to meet all of Z.A.A.’s needs, and she did not have

any concerns with the care Z.A.A.’s great grandfather had been providing for the

child. Gibbs had spoken to the great grandfather’s backup caregiver and believed

that the great grandfather and the backup caregiver had a “solid plan in place.”19 The

backup caregiver would also support Z.A.A.’s great grandfather in case of an

emergency.

      Gibbs noted that in addition to Z.A.A. and Z.A.A.’s younger brother, three

other minor children20 and great grandfather’s adult child also lived in the great

grandfather’s home. The great grandfather had been able to meet the needs of




19
      Gibbs testified that Z.A.A.’s great grandfather was eighty or eighty-one years old.
20
      As to the three other minor children, Gibbs noted that they were not living with
      Z.A.A.’s great grandfather because of a court order and that meant that mother could
      come and take the children at any point. Mother was not allowed to remove either
      Z.A.A. or Z.A.A.’s younger brother from the great grandfather’s home.

                                           8
everyone living in his home. Gibbs believed that Z.A.A.’s great grandfather would

be protective of Z.A.A.

      As to father, Gibbs testified that she had tried to contact father throughout the

case on a monthly basis. Father had not been responsive though, and because of

that, Gibbs had never been able to speak to father.

      Father’s Criminal History

      The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of a trial court judgment showing

that on March 28, 2024, father was adjudicated guilty of the felony offense of

possession of a controlled substance, weighing more than four grams but less than

200 grams,21 and his punishment was assessed at confinement for two years. The

offense occurred on January 26, 2022, while Z.A.A. was in his care. The trial court

also admitted into evidence a copy of a trial court order of deferred adjudication

showing that on March 24, 2015, father was placed on community supervision for a

period of one year related to the misdemeanor offense of assault of a family

member.22 Finally, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy of a trial court

judgment showing that on August 31, 2016, father was convicted of the




21
      See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a), (d).
22
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01.

                                          9
misdemeanor offense of theft,23 and his punishment was assessed at confinement for

six days.

      Permanency Report

      The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of a DFPS permanency report

filed on October 31, 2025 in the trial court. At the time the report was written,

Z.A.A. was six years old, and he had been living with his great grandfather since

April 2024. Z.A.A. had siblings that also lived in the home as well as an uncle—his

great grandfather’s adult child. Z.A.A. liked playing with Legos, remote control

cars, and action figures. Z.A.A. was “developmentally on target” and in the first

grade. Z.A.A. participated in behavioral therapy on a weekly basis and had been

diagnosed with disruptive mood dysregulation disorder (“DMDD”). While in the

care of his great grandfather, Z.A.A. had medical checkups, a vision examination,

and had visited the dentist. The permanency report stated that DFPS’s primary goal

for Z.A.A. was adoption by his great grandfather.

      As to father, the report explained that he had not had any contact with DFPS

since DFPS was named sole managing conservator of Z.A.A. in December 2024.

                                 Standard of Review

      A parent’s right to “the companionship, care, custody, and management” of

his child is a constitutional interest “far more precious than any property right.”


23
      See id. § 31.03(a), (e).

                                         10
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). The

United States Supreme Court has emphasized that “the interest of [a] parent[] in the

care, custody, and control of [his] child[] . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental

liberty interests recognized by th[e] Court.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65

(2000). Likewise, the Texas Supreme Court has concluded that “[t]his natural

parental right” is “essential,” “a basic civil right of man,” and “far more precious

than property rights.” Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (internal

quotations omitted). Consequently, “[w]e strictly construe involuntary termination

statutes in favor of the parent.” In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012).

       Because termination of parental rights is “complete, final, irrevocable and

divests for all time that natural right . . . , the evidence in support of termination must

be clear and convincing before a court may involuntarily terminate a parent’s rights.”

Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20. Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree

of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction

as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 101.007; see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). Because

the standard of proof is “clear and convincing evidence,” the Texas Supreme Court

has held that the traditional legal and factual standards of review are inadequate. In

re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264–68.




                                            11
      In conducting a legal-sufficiency review in a termination-of-parental-rights

case, we must determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the finding, is such that the fact finder could reasonably have formed a firm belief

or conviction about the truth of the matter on which DFPS bore the burden of proof.

Id. at 266. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we

“must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a

reasonable factfinder could do so,” and we “should disregard all evidence that a

reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” In

re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). However,

this does not mean that we must disregard all evidence that does not support the

finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Because of the heightened standard, we

must also be mindful of any undisputed evidence contrary to the finding and consider

that evidence in our analysis. Id. If we determine that no reasonable trier of fact

could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, we

must hold the evidence to be legally insufficient and render judgment for the parent.

Id.

      In conducting a factual-sufficiency review in a termination-of-parental-rights

case, we must determine whether, considering the entire record, including evidence

both supporting and contradicting the finding, a fact finder reasonably could have

formed a firm conviction or belief about the truth of the matter on which DFPS bore


                                          12
the burden of proof. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). We should

consider whether the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could

not have resolved the disputed evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., 96

S.W.3d at 266. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a

reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant

that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then

the evidence is factually insufficient.” In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex.

2006) (internal quotations omitted).

                       Termination of Father’s Parental Rights

      In his first issue, father argues that the trial court erred in terminating his

parental rights to Z.A.A. because the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return Z.A.A.

to father. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(N)(i). In his second issue,

father argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights to Z.A.A.

because the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s

finding that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of Z.A.A. See

id. § 161.001(b)(2).

      In order to terminate the parent-child relationship, DFPS must establish, by

clear and convincing evidence, one or more of the acts or omissions enumerated in

Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) and that termination of parental rights is


                                          13
in the best interest of the child. See id. § 161.001(b). Both elements must be

established, and termination may not be based solely on the best interest of the child

as determined by the trier of fact. See id.; Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727

S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). Notably though, “[o]nly one predicate finding under

section 161.001[(b)](1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there

is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re A.V., 113

S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003).

A.    Reasonable Efforts

      In his first issue, father argues that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that DFPS made reasonable efforts to

return Z.A.A. to father, as required by Texas Family Code section

161.001(b)(1)(N)(i), because a court-ordered FSP was “not established, []or in

effect, after [f]ather was personally served in September 2025 [with DFPS’s first

amended motion to modify conservatorship and for termination of father’s parental

rights to Z.A.A].” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(N)(i).

      A trial court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if it finds

by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has “constructively abandoned [his]

child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of

[DFPS] for not less than six months,” DFPS made reasonable efforts to return the

child to the parent, the parent did not regularly visit or maintain significant contact


                                          14
with the child, and the parent demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a

safe environment. Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(N). Father argues that the evidence was

insufficient to show that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return Z.A.A. to father

because father did not receive a court-ordered FSP after father was personally served

with DFPS’s first amended motion. See In re Y.T.A.-D., Nos. 14-24-00161-CV,

14-24-00163-CV, 2024 WL 3715392, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug.

8, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (this element focuses on DFPS’s conduct).

      An FSP is designed to reunify a parent with a child who has been removed

from a parent’s care by DFPS. In re G.K.G.A., No. 01-16-00996-CV, 2017 WL

2376534, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 1, 2017, pet. denied) (mem.

op.). Thus, DFPS’s implementation of an FSP is generally considered a reasonable

effort to return a child to the parent as required by Texas Family Code section

161.001(b)(1)(N)(i). See In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d 321, 329 (Tex. App.—Eastland

2025, pet. denied). However, evidence of an FSP is not the exclusive means of

establishing that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return a child. See id.; In re J.G.S.,

550 S.W.3d 698, 704–05 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.); see also In re

Y.T.A.-D., 2024 WL 3715392, at *7 (“[I]mplementing a service plan is not the

exclusive means of establishing that reasonable efforts were made.”). Ultimately,

“the issue is whether [DFPS] made reasonable efforts, not ideal efforts.” In re J.A.,




                                          15
No. 04-20-00242-CV, 2020 WL 5027663, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 26,

2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal quotations omitted).

      Here, the record shows that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return Z.A.A. to

father. DFPS made consistent efforts to contact father throughout the case, which

father rejected. DFPS caseworker Darrington testified that she had engaged in

extensive efforts to reach father. DFPS last heard from father in May 2024, when

father contacted DFPS via text message, stating that he was in favor of Z.A.A.’s

great grandfather being named permanent managing conservator of Z.A.A.

According to Darrington, during the case, DFPS had tried using the telephone

numbers that it had for father in order to reach him, and it had contacted father’s

mother, who told DFPS that she had not had any contact with him. DFPS also tried

using the telephone number that father’s mother had for father to contact him, but

that number was disconnected. Further, DFPS used social media to search for father

and used previous addresses to attempt to locate him. And DFPS had contacted

father’s parole officer to attempt to get father’s contact information, but the officer

did not have any contact information that DFPS had not already tried using. See In

re Y.T.A.-D., 2024 WL 3715392, at *8 (explaining record reflected DFPS made

reasonable efforts to return children to parent, where parent “consistently rejected

[DFPS’s] attempts to contact her and engage her participation”); In re L.C.M., 645

S.W.3d 914, 922 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (noting, in holding evidence


                                          16
sufficient to support trial court’s finding that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return

child to parent, record showed DFPS attempted to engage with parent multiple

times); see also In re M.B., No. 14-25-00418-CV, --- S.W.3d ---, 2025 WL

3275376, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 25, 2025, no pet.) (“Although

[parent] challenges . . . the reasonable efforts of [DFPS], it is unclear what additional

actions [DFPS] could have taken to return [the child] when [parent] refused

to . . . communicate.”); Gamez v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No.

03-09-00190-CV, 2009 WL 4456150, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 1, 2009, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding parent’s failure to provide contact information and

DFPS’s attempts to find her while case was pending supported “reasonable efforts”

element).

      Additionally, we note that it is undisputed that DFPS had placed Z.A.A. in the

care of one of his family members. See, e.g., D. F. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. &

Protective Servs., No. 03-25-00738-CV, --- S.W.3d. ---, 2026 WL 482451, at *9

(Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 20, 2026, no pet.) (explaining after children removed from

parent’s care, they “were placed with family members throughout th[e] case,” which

constituted “sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that [DFPS] made

reasonable efforts to return the children to [parent]”); A. D. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. &

Protective Servs., 673 S.W.3d 704, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, no pet.) (noting

DFPS “made attempts to place [child] with a family member before placing him in


                                           17
foster care when no other viable family options were available”); In re L.C.M., 645

S.W.3d 914, 921–22 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“[DFPS’s] efforts to place

the child with relatives constitutes legally and factually sufficient evidence that

reunification was attempted.”); see also In re G.C.S., Jr., 657 S.W.3d 114, 132 (Tex.

App.—El Paso 2022, pet. denied) (returning-child-to-parent element does not

necessarily require proof that child was physically delivered to parent).

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding,

we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that

DFPS made reasonable efforts to return Z.A.A. to father. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(N)(i). And viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that

a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that DFPS

made reasonable efforts to return Z.A.A. to father. See id.

      Further, we conclude that the trial court could have reconciled any disputed

evidence in favor of finding that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return Z.A.A. to

father. See id. And any disputed evidence was not so significant that a fact finder

could not have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that DFPS made

reasonable efforts to return Z.A.A. to father. See id.

      Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return Z.A.A.




                                          18
to father as required for termination of father’s parental rights under Texas Family

Code section 161.001(b)(1)(N). See id.

      We overrule father’s first issue.

B.    Best Interest

      In his second issue, father argues that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights

was in the best interest of Z.A.A. because the Holley factors were either “neutral” or

weighed against termination of father’s rights. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d

367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).

      The best-interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the child. See In re

M.A.A., No. 01-20-00709-CV, 2021 WL 1134308, at *20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Mar. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). It is presumed that the prompt and permanent

placement of the child in a safe environment is in his best interest. See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 263.307(a); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d at 383.

      There is also a strong presumption that the child’s best interest is served by

maintaining the parent-child relationship. In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Thus, we strictly scrutinize termination

proceedings in favor of the parent. See In re M.A.A., 2021 WL 1134308, at *20; In

re N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.).


                                           19
      In determining whether the termination of father’s parental rights was in the

best interest of Z.A.A., we may consider several factors, including: (1) the desires

of Z.A.A.; (2) the current and future physical and emotional needs of Z.A.A.; (3) the

current and future emotional and physical danger to Z.A.A.; (4) the parental abilities

of the parties seeking custody of Z.A.A.; (5) whether programs are available to assist

those parties; (6) plans for Z.A.A. by the parties seeking custody; (7) the stability of

the proposed placement for Z.A.A.; (8) father’s acts or omissions that may indicate

that the parent-child relationship is not proper; and (9) any excuse for father’s acts

or omissions.24 See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d at 647.

We may also consider the statutory factors set forth in Texas Family Code section

263.307. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307; In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631

n.29 (Tex. 2018); In re C.A.G., No. 01-11-01094-CV, 2012 WL 2922544, at *6 &

n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 12, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      We note that the above listed factors are not exhaustive, and DFPS need not

prove all factors as a condition precedent to the termination of parental rights. See

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; see also In re C.L.C., 119 S.W.3d 382, 399 (Tex. App.—

Tyler 2003, no pet.) (“[T]he best interest of the child does not require proof of any

unique set of factors nor limit proof to any specific factors.”). The absence of

evidence about some of the factors does not preclude a fact finder from reasonably

24
      Much of the evidence discussed below applies to multiple factors.

                                          20
forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in a child’s best interest. In

re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d 101, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). In some cases, undisputed evidence of only one factor

may be sufficient to support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.

See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; see also In re J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d at 122.

      The same evidence of acts and omissions used to establish grounds for

termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) may also be relevant to

determining the best interest of the child. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; In re

L.M., 104 S.W.3d at 647. The trial court is given wide latitude in determining the

best interest of the child. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982);

see also Cuellar v. Flores, 238 S.W.2d 991, 992 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1951, no

writ) (trial court “faces the parties and the witnesses, observes their demeanor and

personality, and feels the forces, powers, and influences that cannot be discerned by

merely reading the record”).

      1.     Z.A.A.’s Desires

      When father’s parental rights were terminated, Z.A.A. was six years old.

Although there was no specific evidence of Z.A.A.’s desires, when a child is young,

a fact finder may consider evidence that the child is bonded with his foster parent,

receives good care in his current placement, and has spent minimal time with his

parent. See In re L.W., No. 01-18-01025-CV, 2019 WL 1523124, at *18 (Tex.


                                          21
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (in determining

sufficient evidence to support best-interest finding, considering children bonded

with foster family, foster parents wanted children to continue to live with them, and

foster parents meeting children’s needs).

      At the time of trial, Z.A.A. had been living in his placement with his great

grandfather for more than a year and a half. Z.A.A.’s younger brother also lived

with his great grandfather, and it is undisputed that Z.A.A.’s great grandfather was

meeting his needs. Z.A.A.’s behavior had improved while in his great grandfather’s

care. According to DFPS caseworker Darrington, Z.A.A.’s great grandfather had

been the only relative in Z.A.A.’s life that provided him with stability, and the great

grandfather wanted to adopt Z.A.A., along with Z.A.A.’s younger brother. See In re

L.M.N., No. 01-18-00413-CV, 2018 WL 5831672, at *20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Nov. 8, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (considering evidence children doing

well in placement and foster parents meeting children’s needs); In re M.L.R-U., Jr.,

517 S.W.3d 228, 238 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (considering evidence

foster family provided safe and healthy environment when determining children’s

desires). Father had not seen Z.A.A. since December 2024, and according to his

great grandfather, Z.A.A. did not ask to see father.




                                            22
      2.     Current and Future Physical and Emotional Danger

      A parent’s criminal history is relevant in analyzing the present and future

emotional and physical danger to a child and whether a parent is capable of providing

a safe and stable home for his child. See In re J.S.B., Nos. 01-17-00480-CV,

01-17-00481-CV, 01-17-00484-CV, 2017 WL 6520437, at *18–19 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 21, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re T.L.S., No.

01-12-00434-CV, 2012 WL 6213515, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec.

13, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (evidence of parent’s criminal history may support

trial court’s finding termination of parental rights in children’s best interest).

Notably, “[a]s a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and

instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of [the] child.” In re

R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

      DFPS caseworker Darrington testified that father had a “criminal history

involving drugs and domestic violence,” and he had been incarcerated at different

times since Z.A.A. had been in DFPS’s care. See In re D.J.G., No. 01-22-00870-CV,

2023 WL 3513143, at *23 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 18, 2023, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (illegal narcotics use by parent may constitute evidence of current and

future danger to child); In re A.M., 385 S.W.3d 74, 82 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet.

denied) (evidence of parent’s past misconduct can be used to measure parent’s future

conduct). According to Darrington, father was incarcerated in October 2023 for the


                                           23
offense of assault of a family member, and he was released from incarceration in

May 2024. Father was again incarcerated in October 2024 for about two months. In

December 2024, father was released from incarceration and remained free until

September 2025 when he was incarcerated for a few weeks. See In re L.J.H., No.

05-21-00183-CV, 2021 WL 4260769, at *16 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 20, 2021, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (“A parent’s conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty

and instability endangers the child’s physical and emotional well-being.”); see also

In re S.H., No. 01-22-00255-CV, 2022 WL 17254956, at *18 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Nov. 29, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Criminal activity that exposes a

parent to the potential for incarceration is relevant to the trial court’s best-interest

determination.”); In re T.L.S., 2012 WL 6213515, at *6 (evidence of parent’s

criminal history may support trial court’s finding termination of parental rights in

children’s best interest).

      Additionally, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy of a trial court

judgment showing that on March 28, 2024, father was adjudicated guilty of the

felony offense of possession of a controlled substance, weighing more than four

grams but less than 200 grams, and his punishment was assessed at confinement for

two years. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a), (d). The offense

occurred on January 26, 2022, while Z.A.A. was in father’s care.




                                          24
      The trial court also admitted into evidence a copy of a trial court order of

deferred adjudication showing that on March 24, 2015, father was placed on

community supervision for a period of one year related to the misdemeanor offense

of assault of a family member. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01; see also TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(7) (in determining whether parent able to provide

child with safe environment, considering history of abusive and assaultive conduct

by child’s family members); Clements v. Haskovec, 251 S.W.3d 79, 87 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.) (in parental-termination cases, evidence

parent in past engaged in abusive conduct permits inference parent will continue

behavior in future) . Finally, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy of a trial

court judgment showing that on August 31, 2016, father was convicted for the

misdemeanor offense of theft, and his punishment was assessed at confinement for

six days. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a), (e); see also In re K.S., 420 S.W.3d

852, 856 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (“[The] past is [a] prologue[;] there

is a great likelihood that [a parent’s] conduct w[ill] continue into the future. Actions

speak louder than words.”).




                                          25
      3.     Current and Future Physical and Emotional Needs, Parental
             Abilities, and Stability of Proposed Placement

             a.     Z.A.A.’s Needs and Current Placement

      At the time of trial, Z.A.A. had been in his great grandfather’s care for more

than a year and a half.25 Z.A.A. lived with his siblings in the home as well, including

his younger brother. A DFPS permanency report, a copy of which was admitted into

evidence at trial, stated that Z.A.A. liked playing with Legos, remote control cars,

and action figures. Z.A.A. was “developmentally on target” and in the first grade.

Z.A.A. participated in behavioral therapy on a weekly basis and had been diagnosed

with DMDD. See In re K.A.C., 594 S.W.3d 364, 376 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no

pet.) (considering child’s foster placement was able to provide for child’s therapeutic

needs). While in the care of his great grandfather, Z.A.A. had medical checkups, a

vision examination, and had visited the dentist. See In re M.A.A., 2021 WL 1134308,

at *23 (child’s basic needs include medical and dental care).

       According to DFPS caseworker Darrington, Z.A.A.’s great grandfather had

been the only relative in Z.A.A.’s life that had provided him with stability, and Child

Advocates volunteer Gibbs believed that Z.A.A.’s great grandfather was meeting the

child’s needs and was protective of him. See Adams v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. &

Protective Servs., 236 S.W.3d 271, 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no


25
      Z.A.A.’s great grandfather testified that prior to Z.A.A. being placed in DFPS’s
      care, he had taken care of Z.A.A. “off and on” throughout the child’s life.

                                          26
pet.) (in children’s best interest to be raised in consistent, stable, and nurturing

environment).

      Z.A.A.’s great grandfather noted that Z.A.A.’s behavior had improved while

Z.A.A. had been in his care, and he wanted to adopt Z.A.A., along with Z.A.A.’s

younger brother. See In re T.M.R., No. 13-21-00144-CV, 2021 WL 4998438, at *7

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A

factfinder may consider the consequences of [the] failure to terminate parental rights

and may also consider that the child’s best interest may be served by termination so

that adoption may occur.”); In re L.W., 2019 WL 1523124, at *23 (in holding

evidence sufficient to support trial court’s best-interest finding, considering children

were placed in adoptive home with foster parents who wanted children to continue

living with them). Z.A.A.’s great grandfather also had a “backup caregiver” in place

for Z.A.A. if something happened to the great grandfather before Z.A.A.’s turned

eighteen years old.

             b.       Father

      A child’s need for a safe and stable home is the paramount consideration in

assessing the best interest of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a)

(prompt and permanent placement of child in safe environment presumed to be in

child’s best interest); In re G.M.G., 444 S.W.3d 46, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (parent who lacks ability to provide child with safe and stable


                                          27
home is unable to provide for child’s emotional and physical needs); In re K.C., 219

S.W.3d 924, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). Here, there is no evidence in

the record that father is able to provide Z.A.A. with a safe and stable home. See In

re E.T., No. 02-25-00545-CV, 2026 WL 179594, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan.

22, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (trial court could reasonably infer from parent’s history

of repeated incarcerations that he could not provide child with stable home).

      Further, there is no evidence in the record that father wanted to be involved in

Z.A.A.’s life. Father had not seen Z.A.A. since December 2024—for almost a year

at the time of trial—even though the trial court had permitted father to have

supervised visitation with Z.A.A. in its December 4, 2024 order. He had also not

responded to DFPS’s attempts or Child Advocates’ attempts to contact him. See In

re K.S., 420 S.W.3d at 855–56 (lack of contact between parent and child weighed in

favor of termination because it showed “lack of resolve” or disinterest in parenting

child); In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied)

(trial court may measure parent’s future conduct by past conduct); see also In re

S.H., 2022 WL 17254956, at *19 (considering parent was “an inconsistent adult

figure” in child’s life in holding evidence sufficient to support trial court’s best

interest finding (internal quotations omitted)).

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding,

we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that


                                          28
termination of father’s parental rights was in the best interest of Z.A.A. See TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2). Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we

conclude that a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction

that termination of father’s parental rights was in the best interest of Z.A.A. See id.

We further conclude that the trial court could have reconciled any disputed evidence

in favor of finding that termination of father’s parental rights was in Z.A.A.’s best

interest, or any disputed evidence was not so significant that a fact finder could not

have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that termination is in the best

interest of Z.A.A. See id.

      Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that termination of father’s parental rights was in the

best interest of Z.A.A. See id.

      We overrule father’s second issue.

                                      Conclusion

      We affirm the order of the trial court.




                                                Kristin Guiney
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guerra and Guiney.



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