In the Interest of C.S.S. v. the State of Texas

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN



                                       NO. 03-25-00258-CV




                                      In the Interest of C.S.S.




                  FROM THE 264TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY
            NO. 106927B, THE HONORABLE MIKE RUSSELL, JUDGE PRESIDING



                             MEMORANDUM OPINION


                 Raymond T. DeMeritt, appearing pro se, appeals from the trial court’s order

denying his motion to terminate child support and wage withholding. We affirm the trial

court’s order.


                                         BACKGROUND 1

                 DeMeritt was declared to be the father of C.S.S. in a 1985 Agreed Decree of

Legitimation and was ordered to pay child support to Sherry Lea Townsend for the benefit of

C.S.S. Pursuant to that order, DeMeritt was required to pay monthly child support of $175,

beginning August 31, 1985, to the Office of the Attorney General (OAG). In September 1989,

the OAG filed a Uniform Support Petition, seeking reimbursement, support, and arrearages from

DeMeritt. In October 1989, the 146th District Court of Bell County (the Texas trial court) signed

a Certificate and Order under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, transmitting


       1   The facts in this section are derived from the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact.
the case to the California Department of Justice for enforcement.           An Order for Support

Reimbursement and Wage Assignment was rendered by the Superior Court of the State of

California for the County of Sacramento (the California trial court) in April 1990, in which

DeMeritt was ordered to pay (1) monthly current child support of $175 until C.S.S. reached the

age of eighteen, married, or became emancipated or until further court order and (2) a monthly

repayment of $50 towards an arrears judgment of $7,250 until said arrears were paid in full.

               On September 18, 2024, DeMeritt filed a Petition to Terminate Withholding for

Child Support in the Texas trial court, stating that C.S.S. is married. He attached to his petition a

Financial Activity Report from the OAG as of September 10, 2024, showing that he owed

$33,971.82. On December 11, 2024, DeMeritt filed a Motion to Terminate Child Support and

Garnishment, alleging that the OAG had failed to properly allocate his child-support payments as

set out in Texas Family Code Section 157.268 and had “misclassified” unpaid interest as

principal. He further alleged that he had already met his child-support obligations and had

“overpaid” by making total payments of $111,944 toward a total obligation of $38,000.

               On January 6, 2025, the OAG filed an answer, appending and incorporating by

reference several exhibits: (1) the Texas trial court’s 1989 order, (2) the California trial court’s

1990 order, and (3) a Financial Activity Report detailing accounting entries from August 31,

1997, to January 3, 2025, and indicating that as of January 6, 2025, DeMeritt owed $30,990.57.

The OAG specifically denied DeMeritt’s claims that he was ordered to pay a total obligation of

$38,000, that he had paid $111,944 toward that total, and that he had overpaid his child-support

obligation. The OAG contended in its answer that pursuant to Texas Family Code Section

157.267, accrued interest is part of a parent’s child-support obligation and may be enforced by

any means provided for collection of child support, and that pursuant to Section 158.004, if

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current support is no longer owed, the OAG may order that income be withheld for arrearages,

including accrued interest, in an amount sufficient to discharge those arrears in not more than

two years. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 157.267, 158.004; see also id. § 158.502 (authorizing OAG

to issue administrative writs of withholding for outstanding child-support arrearages).

               The OAG further cited Section 157.265(f) of the Family Code, which provides

that child-support orders rendered before January 1, 2002—such as the one here—are governed

by the law in effect at the time the order was rendered, with such law continuing in effect for that

purpose. See id. § 157.265(f). The OAG asserted that because in 1990 no Texas statutes

regulated how much interest accrued on child-support arrears, the OAG has followed its policy

on interest accrual instead.   See id. § 157.265(e) (providing that arrearages existing before

January 1, 2002, that were not confirmed and reduced to money judgment accrued interest at rate

applying to arrearages before that date); see also In re M.C.C., 187 S.W.3d 383, 385 (Tex. 2006)

(holding that for unpaid child support that had not been judicially confirmed before 2002

amendment to Section 157.265, applicable pre-2002 law applied to include such interest in

obligor’s outstanding obligation, which total obligation would begin accruing interest at new

six-percent rate on January 1, 2002); Office of Att’y Gen. v. Lee, 92 S.W.3d 526, 528 (Tex. 2002)

(holding that OAG could properly issue administrative writ of withholding for postjudgment

interest accruing on 1987 arrearage judgment despite judgment’s failure to specifically award

postjudgment interest); In re M.C., No. 02-15-00044-CV, 2016 WL 2770145, at *4–5 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth May 12, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (observing that before Section

157.265’s inception in 1991, interest accrued under common law on unconfirmed child support

but common law was unclear whether such interest should be characterized as prejudgment or

postjudgment interest).   The OAG represented that its current policy for arrears that were

                                                 3
confirmed in 1990 is to use an interest rate of “a minimum of 10%, but no more than 20%,

compounded annually. At the end of each fiscal year, the interest accruals for the year are

converted and added to the principal. Each month’s total arrears is based off the confirmed

arrears owed at the end of the last fiscal year minus any payments.” Cf. Tex. Fam. Code

§ 157.267 (“Accrued interest is part of the child support obligation and may be enforced by any

means provided for the collection of child support.”).

               On February 3, 2025, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on

DeMeritt’s motion. See id. § 158.506(a), (c) (authorizing obligor to file motion with court to

withdraw administrative writ of withholding and to request hearing thereon after being unable to

resolve dispute with OAG regarding existence or amount of arrearages). DeMeritt and C.S.S.’s

mother, Townsend, each testified briefly, and the OAG stood on its answer and attached exhibits.

DeMeritt testified that he had paid $115,000 toward his obligation of $38,000; that the OAG had

not provided him a “full breakdown” on “how the payments applied to the principal interest,”

despite his repeated requests; and that it was a “mathematical impossibility” for any arrears to

still be owing since he had paid nearly three times his original obligation. Townsend testified

that DeMeritt had “been in a constant state of arrears pretty much since” C.S.S. was born. She

testified that “[i]f he had just paid that $175 a month, he would obviously be paid off. But he

had done everything in his power to get out of paying child support. And that’s why the State of

Texas is adding interest to the amount of arrears. He obviously still owes the money.”

               On March 3, 2025, the trial court signed an order denying DeMeritt’s requested

relief and later, on DeMeritt’s request and after a notice of past-due findings of fact and

conclusions of law, timely issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. DeMeritt perfected

this appeal from the trial court’s order denying his request to terminate withholding.

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                                           DISCUSSION

                We review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion.           In re J.C.T.,

No. 05-12-01290-CV, 2014 WL 3778909, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 31, 2014, pet. denied)

(mem. op.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it rules arbitrarily, unreasonably, without

regard for guiding rules or principles, or without supporting evidence.             Kazmi v. Kazmi,

693 S.W.3d 556, 566 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, pet denied) (citing Transcor Astra Grp. S.A.

v. Petrobras Am. Inc., 650 S.W.3d 462, 482 (Tex. 2022)).             In the family-law context, the

abuse-of-discretion standard overlaps with traditional standards for reviewing the sufficiency of

the evidence. Id. (citing Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006,

pet. denied)). The legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of

error but are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. A.S.

v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 665 S.W.3d 786, 795 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023,

no pet.).

                We first determine “whether the trial court had sufficient information on which to

exercise its discretion and, if so, whether the trial court erred in its application of discretion.” Id.

The focus of the first inquiry is the sufficiency of the evidence, which we answer using

traditional sufficiency standards of review. Kazmi, 693 S.W.3d at 566. Additionally, because

the trial court made findings of fact and DeMeritt does not specifically challenge any of them,

the findings are binding on this Court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law or

there is no evidence to support them. See McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex.

1986); see also Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518, 523

(Tex. 2014) (“We defer to unchallenged findings of fact that are supported by some evidence.”).




                                                   5
               DeMeritt raises five issues. In his first, he contends that the trial court erred by

denying his request to terminate withholding because he had “fully satisfied the original child

support obligation of approximately $38,000” by making “total payments exceeding $119,000.”

He supports this argument with one citation to the record: a 2009 notice of nonsuit that the OAG

filed in this cause with respect to a 2006 enforcement action it had begun for confirmation of

child-support arrearages. He argues that the OAG’s continued garnishment of his wages, after

this nonsuit notice “formally end[ed] the enforcement proceeding,” violates Family Code

Sections 154.001(a) and 157.263. But Section 154.001(a) merely provides the various durations

of child support that a court may order (e.g., until the child turns eighteen or graduates from high

school), and Section 157.263 merely provides the procedures for a court to render a judgment

confirming child-support arrearages. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 154.001(a), 157.263. Neither

statute supports his argument that by nonsuiting a prior enforcement action the OAG was without

authority to continue garnishing his wages for unpaid child support and interest thereon.

               Furthermore, DeMeritt does not cite anything in the record supporting his

contention that his “original child support obligation” was only $38,000 or rebutting the OAG’s

evidence showing the arrearages due at the time of the hearing. See In re A.R.G., 645 S.W.3d

789, 793 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.) (noting that under Family Code Section

157.162(c), party may submit OAG’s Financial Activity Report to prove cumulative arrearage as

of final date of record). Because DeMeritt, through his motion to terminate withholding, was

challenging the OAG’s accounting records documenting his payment and non-payment of child

support over the years, he had the burden of proving that he did not owe any arrearages. See

In re J.C., No. 05-14-01299-CV, 2016 WL 35447972, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28, 2016,

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that trial court did not err in denying father’s petition to

                                                 6
terminate wage withholding because evidence showed some amount of child-support arrearage

remained unpaid, even though parties disputed amount); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 158.506(c)

(authorizing obligor to file motion with court to withdraw administrative writ of withholding and

to request hearing thereon).

                Moreover, in its answer the OAG outlined how it had computed interest on

DeMeritt’s delinquent payments—providing sample calculations for recent months, using a 10%

interest rate, compounded annually—and DeMeritt did not produce any evidence or authority

controverting such computation. Finally, as already noted, DeMeritt does not challenge the trial

court’s finding that as of January 6, 2025, he had “an outstanding balance of $30,990.57.”

Although DeMeritt argues and testified that he has paid three times his “original obligation,” we

cannot say that there is no evidence to support the trial court’s finding about his current

outstanding balance—which necessarily takes into account the interest the OAG calculated and

assessed over the decades—nor can we say that the evidence conclusively established that he

owes nothing. See McGalliard, 722 S.W.2d at 696. On this record, we cannot conclude that the

trial court abused its discretion in denying DeMeritt’s request to terminate withholding. That is,

the trial court had sufficient information on which to exercise its discretion and did not err in

exercising it as it did. See A.S., 665 S.W.3d at 795. We overrule DeMeritt’s first issue.

                In his second issue, DeMeritt argues that the OAG’s garnishment of his

social-security benefits violates 42 U.S.C. § 407. See 42 U.S.C. § 407. He concedes, however,

that garnishment of social security benefits is expressly permitted for child support. See id.

§ 659(a) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including section 407[)] . . . moneys . . .

shall be subject . . . to withholding . . . to enforce the legal obligation of the individual to provide

child support”).    Nonetheless, he argues that Section 659(a) “does not authorize continued

                                                   7
garnishment once the principal obligation has been paid or for reclassified interest amounts.”

Beyond this statement, DeMeritt does not provide further substantive argument or citation to

support his contention. Additionally, his contention is premised on his allegation that he has

already met his child-support obligation. As discussed in addressing DeMeritt’s first issue,

DeMeritt has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that he did

not meet his burden to prove that his child-support obligation had been met. We overrule

DeMeritt’s second issue.

               In his third issue, DeMeritt contends that, despite his “repeatedly requesting an

accounting of how $119,000 in payments were applied,” the OAG produced only the Financial

Activity Report appearing in the clerk’s record, which “fails to distinguish between principal and

interest or explain how the current balance was calculated.” He argues that the OAG’s failure to

explain its accounting violates his right to due process and Family Code Section 154.004.

However, Section 154.004 merely provides for where child-support payments must be made (“to

the state disbursement unit”) and does not support DeMeritt’s issue. See Tex. Fam. Code

§ 154.004 (“Place of Payment”). As to his due-process argument, DeMeritt was provided an

evidentiary hearing and had the opportunity to present evidence controverting the OAG’s

calculation of how much he owes. However, he did not call any witnesses to demonstrate that

the OAG’s accounting was flawed or provide any other evidence or authority to dispute the

OAG’s records and explanation of its interest policy stated in its answer. DeMeritt has not cited

any authority demonstrating that due process requires more than the process he received, as the

party asserting that he had fulfilled his child-support obligation and challenging the OAG’s

accounting. On this record, DeMeritt has not demonstrated that he was deprived of due process

through the proceedings below. We overrule DeMeritt’s third issue.

                                                8
               In his fourth issue, DeMeritt contends that he was prejudiced by the following

“procedural omissions” by the trial court: (1) failing to rule on his “Motion to Compel Full

Accounting,” which he filed over a week after the hearing on his motion to terminate

withholding; (2) delaying issuing its findings of fact; and (3) “simply adopt[ing]” the OAG’s

accounting balances without addressing his arguments about nonsuit, overpayment, and

constitutional violations. He supports this argument by citing Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296

and In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2012). Beyond mere citation to these two authorities,

however, DeMeritt provides no substantive argument or explanation of how they apply to his

issue. He also does not assert how he was allegedly harmed by any of these purported errors. 2

Cf. Tex. R. App. P. 44.1 (harmless-error rule). He therefore has waived this issue due to

inadequate briefing. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring that briefs include argument for

contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to record); LMP Aus. Eng. Aire,

LLC v. Lafayette Eng. Apartments, LP, 654 S.W.3d 265, 291 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022, no pet.).

               In his final issue, DeMeritt argues that he is entitled to restitution and interest on

“all funds collected after satisfaction of” his child-support obligation. However, this argument is

premised on the assumption that DeMeritt has satisfied his child-support obligation. We have

already determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that he did not

prevail in proving that fact. We therefore overrule his final issue.




       2  Additionally, our review of the relevant rules of civil procedure and the record reveals
that the trial court complied with the applicable deadlines for filing its findings of fact and
conclusions of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 296, 297, 306a, 306c. And the case DeMeritt cites,
In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2012), is not relevant to this case, as it addressed whether
service by publication on a parent in a proceeding to terminate parental rights constituted
due process.
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                                       CONCLUSION

              Having overruled DeMeritt’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s order denying his

motion to terminate wage withholding for child support.



                                            __________________________________________
                                            Karin Crump, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Crump and Ellis

Affirmed

Filed: April 22, 2026




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