In the Interest of G.L.M., a Child v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed April 23, 2026




                                                In The


           Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                             __________

                                     No. 11-25-00316-CV
                                             __________

                  IN THE INTEREST OF G.L.M., A CHILD

                         On Appeal from the 446th District Court
                                  Ector County, Texas
                            Trial Court Cause No. E24056PC


                          MEMORANDUM OPINION
       This is an appeal from a final order in which the trial court terminated the
parental rights of the parents of G.L.M. 1 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West
Supp. 2025). Only the mother appealed. We affirm.
       After a final termination hearing, the trial court found by clear and convincing
evidence that Appellant: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to
remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional
well-being of the child; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with
persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-
being of the child; and (3) failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that


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        We use initials to refer to the child. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
specifically established the actions necessary for Appellant to obtain the return of
the child who had been in the managing conservatorship of the Texas Department of
Family and Protective Services (the Department) for not less than nine months as a
result of the child’s removal under Chapter 262 of the Texas Family Code for the
abuse or neglect of the child. See id. § 161.001(b)(D), (E) (West Supp. 2025),
§ 161.001(b)(1)(O) (West 2024). 2 The trial court further found that termination of
Appellant’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Id. § 161.001(b)(2). We
modify and affirm the trial court’s order.
        Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw in this
court. The motion is supported by a brief in which counsel professionally and
conscientiously examines the record and applicable law and concludes that there are
no arguable issues to present on appeal. Counsel has provided Appellant with a copy
of the brief, a copy of the motion to withdraw, an explanatory letter, and a copy of
the clerk’s record and reporter’s record. Counsel also advised Appellant of her right
to object to counsel’s motion to withdraw, and to file a pro se response to counsel’s
Anders brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 6.5. As such, court-appointed counsel has
complied with the requirements of Anders, Schulman, and Kelly. See Kelly v. State,
436 S.W.3d 313, 318–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403,
406–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
        Appellant has not filed a pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief. Following
the procedures outlined in Anders and Schulman, we have independently reviewed
the record in this case, and we agree that Appellant’s appeal is frivolous and without
merit. With respect to the trial court’s endangerment findings in particular, the
evidence established that Appellant’s pattern of drug and alcohol abuse,


        We note that the legislature amended Section 161.001(b)(1) and repealed subsection (O). See Act
        2

of May 16, 2025, 89th Leg. R.S. ch. 211, § 2, 2025 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 573, 574–75. The amendments
only apply to suits affecting the parent-child relationship that are pending on or after the effective date of
the amendments; thus, we apply the law in effect at the time the suit was pending below. Id. § 3.
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accompanied by related dangers to the child, presented a substantial risk of harm to
the child and rendered Appellant incapable of parenting. See In re R.R.A., 687
S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. 2024); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); see
also In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex. 2019) (addressing due process and
due course of law considerations with respect to appellate review of grounds (D) and
(E)).
        Given the clear and convincing evidence that Appellant endangered the child,
we would ordinarily decline to address the trial court’s predicate-ground findings.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 551 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2024, no pet.). But under certain circumstances, we may modify the trial court’s
termination order so that it accurately reflects only those findings permitted by law
and supported by the record. See In re E.M., No. 11-24-00310-CV, 2025 WL
1240792, at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (deleting
the termination-ground findings in the written termination order that were not
supported by the record, and the trial court expressly limited its termination-ground
findings in its oral pronouncement); In re M.G., No. 02-23-00074-CV, 2023 WL
4008687, at *9–10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 15, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(affirming and modifying termination order to delete unsupported finding of
predicate ground (N)); In re A.O., No. 02-21-00376-CV, 2022 WL 1257384, at *13
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 28, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (modifying
termination order to remove erroneous reference to the mother’s indecency with a
child even though “correcting this finding d[id] not alter the final outcome of th[e]
case”); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b). As noted, the legislature’s amendments to
Section 161.001(b)(1) that repealed subsection (O) became effective September 1,
2025. See Act of May 16, 2025, 89th Leg. R.S. ch. 211, § 2, 2025 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 573, 574–75.        Here, the final termination hearing commenced on
September 16, 2025, and the trial court issued its final termination order on
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September 25, 2025. Because the proceedings below were pending on or after the
effective date of the amendments to Section 161.001(b), the trial court’s finding
pursuant to the repealed version of subsection (O) is void. See id. § 3. We therefore
modify the trial court’s final order of termination to delete its finding under
subsection (O). See E.M., 2025 WL 1240792, at *8; R.J.O. v. Tex. Dep’t Fam. &
Protective Servs., No. 03-13-00478-CV, 2013 WL 6060778, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Austin Nov. 13, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (following an Anders review, modifying
termination order to remove finding under subsection (O) and affirming as
modified).
      Although we agree with appellate counsel’s conclusion on the merits, an
Anders motion to withdraw “may be premature” if filed in the court of appeals under
the circumstances presented in this case. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex.
2016) (“[A]n Anders motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals, in the
absence of additional grounds for withdrawal, may be premature.”). The court held
in P.M. that, in parental termination cases, court-appointed counsel’s duty to his or
her client generally extends “through the exhaustion of [all] appeals.” Id.; see
FAM. § 107.016(2). In this regard, “appointed counsel’s obligations can be satisfied
by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” P.M.,
520 S.W.3d at 27–28.
      Accordingly, we deny counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the trial
court’s order of termination as modified.




                                                JOHN M. BAILEY
April 23, 2026                                  CHIEF JUSTICE
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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