In the Interest of P.S.R.F, D.M.R.F, D.A.R, P.R.R, B.I.R, B.E.R, B.L.R, and Y.R.R., Children v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed April 23, 2026




                                                 In The


            Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                              __________

                                      No. 11-25-00315-CV
                                              __________

 IN THE INTEREST OF P.S.R.F., D.M.R.F., D.A.R., P.R.R., B.I.R.,
           B.E.R., B.L.R., AND Y.R.R., CHILDREN

                          On Appeal from the 446th District Court
                                   Ector County, Texas
                             Trial Court Cause No. E24059PC


                           MEMORANDUM OPINION
        This is an appeal from a final order in which the trial court terminated the
parental rights of the mother to her eight children, P.S.R.F., 1 D.M.R.F., D.A.R.,
P.R.R., B.I.R., B.E.R., B.L.R., and Y.R.R.2 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001
(West Supp. 2025). We affirm.

        1
         To protect the identities of the children, we refer to them by pseudonyms or initials. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 9.8(b).
        2
         The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the established father of five of the children
and alleged and unknown father of B.E.R., and the parental rights of the established father of B.L.R. and
Y.R.R. Only the mother appealed.
        After a final termination hearing, the trial court found by clear and
convincing evidence that Appellant: (1) endangered the children as set forth in
Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E); (2) constructively abandoned the children
pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(N); and (3) used a controlled substance in a
manner that endangered the health or safety of the children then failed to complete
a court-ordered substance abuse program under Section 161.001(b)(1)(O). See id.
§ 161.001(b)(D), (E), (N), (O).3 The trial court further found that termination of
Appellant’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Id. § 161.001(b)(2).
        Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw in this
court. The motion is supported by a brief in which counsel professionally and
conscientiously examines the record and applicable law and concludes that there are
no arguable issues to present on appeal. Counsel has provided Appellant with a copy
of the brief, a copy of the motion to withdraw, an explanatory letter, and a copy of
the clerk’s record and reporter’s record. Counsel also advised Appellant of her right
to object to counsel’s motion to withdraw, and to file a pro se response to counsel’s
Anders brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 6.5. As such, court-appointed counsel has
complied with the requirements of Anders, Schulman, and Kelly. See Kelly v. State,
436 S.W.3d 313, 318–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403,
406–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
        Appellant has not filed a pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief. Following
the procedures outlined in Anders and Schulman, we have independently reviewed
the record in this case, and we agree that Appellant’s appeal is frivolous and without


        3
         We note that the legislature has amended Section 161.001(b)(1), which resulted in the renumbering
of several provisions. See Act of May 16, 2025, 89th Leg. R.S. ch. 211, § 2, 2025 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
573, 574–75. For instance, and as relevant to the trial court’s findings in this case, former subsection (P) is
now subsection (O). The amendments only apply to suits affecting the parent-child relationship that are
pending on or after the effective date of the amendments; thus, we apply the law in effect at the time the
suit was pending below. Id. § 3.

                                                      2
merit. With respect to the trial court’s endangerment findings in particular, the
evidence established that Appellant’s pattern of drug abuse, accompanied by related
dangers to the children, presented a substantial risk of harm to the children and
rendered Appellant incapable of parenting. See In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 278
(Tex. 2024); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); see also In re N.G., 577
S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex. 2019) (addressing due process and due course of law
considerations with respect to appellate review of grounds (D) and (E)).
      Although we agree with appellate counsel’s conclusion on the merits, an
Anders motion to withdraw “may be premature” if filed in the court of appeals under
the circumstances that are presented in this case. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27
(Tex. 2016) (“[A]n Anders motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals, in
the absence of additional grounds for withdrawal, may be premature.”). The court
held in P.M. that, in parental termination cases, court-appointed counsel’s duty to
his or her client generally extends “through the exhaustion of [all] appeals.” Id.; see
FAM. § 107.016(2). In this regard, “appointed counsel’s obligations can be satisfied
by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” P.M.,
520 S.W.3d at 27–28.
      Accordingly, we deny counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the trial
court’s order of termination.




                                               W. STACY TROTTER
                                               JUSTICE


April 23, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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