In the Interest of R.H. and E.H., Children v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed April 16, 2026




                                                In The


           Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                             __________

                                     No. 11-25-00317-CV
                                             __________

           IN THE INTEREST OF R.H. AND E.H., CHILDREN

                         On Appeal from the 42nd District Court
                               Callahan County, Texas
                             Trial Court Cause No. 22769


                          MEMORANDUM OPINION
       This is an accelerated appeal from the trial court’s order terminating the
parental rights of the mother and father of R.H. and E.H. 1 Only the mother
appealed.2 Appellant presents a single issue challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is
in the children’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp.
2025). We affirm the trial court’s order.


       1
        We use initials to refer to the children. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
       2
        The father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights to the children.
                        Termination Findings and Standards
      The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. To terminate one’s parental rights, it must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in
Section 161.001(b)(1), and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Id.
Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce
in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the
allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007 (West 2019).
      In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence
established that Appellant engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with
persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-
being of the children, and that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (b)(2).
      In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding
was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of the required
appellate deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor
of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed
facts that do not support the finding,’” and the factfinder is “the sole arbiter of the
witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” Id. (first quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256,
266 (Tex. 2002); and then quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)).
As such, when considering the credibility of the evidence presented, we may not
substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316.


                                           2
      In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we weigh the
disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all the evidence that favors
the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference
to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against
the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, pet. denied).
      With respect to the best interest of the child, no unique set of factors need be
proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not restrict
the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). However, courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley
factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex.
1976). These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the
emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional
and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of
the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals
to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these
individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or
proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the
existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts
or omissions of the parent. Id.
      To support a best interest finding, the Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services (the Department) is not required to prove each Holley factor; in
some circumstances, evidence of the presence of only one factor will suffice. C.H.,


                                          3
89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014,
no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds
for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative evidence illustrating that
termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d
at 266.
      The absence of evidence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the
factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that
termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates that
the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and
well-being of the child. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. This is so because the best interest
analysis evaluates the best interest of the child, not the parent. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at
548; In re E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied)
(citing In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)).
      In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or
her past conduct in determining whether termination of a parent’s parental rights is
in the child’s best interest. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d 825,
829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may infer that a parent’s past
conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the child may recur in the
future if the child is returned to the possession of the parent. In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d
105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); May v. May, 829 S.W.2d
373, 377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, writ denied). Moreover, the
factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the child’s physical and
emotional needs an inability or unwillingness by the parent to meet the child’s
physical and emotional needs in the future. J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118; see also In re




                                           4
A.S., No. 11-16-00293-CV, 2017 WL 1275614, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 31,
2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
                          The Evidence Presented at Trial
      Appellant became pregnant with twins R.H. and E.H. soon after she and the
father started dating in late 2023. Her methamphetamine use began around the same
time, a month or two into their relationship. Appellant claimed that prior thereto,
she had not used drugs in over a decade—she resumed drug use for “survival,”
hoping to avoid the father’s physical and emotional abuse. At some point, she
moved to Baird “to get away from [the father].” However, approximately a week
before the children were born, Appellant invited the father to the apartment that she
shared with her twelve-year-old son, X.G. She permitted the father to stay for three
days before she told him to leave. After she locked the father out, the father broke
a window, attempted to pry open the door, and damaged X.G.’s father’s car with a
hammer. Appellant reported the attempted burglary to police but did not apply for
a protective order.
      When the children were born on July 3, 2024, Appellant, R.H., and E.H. tested
positive for methamphetamine. Appellant admitted to using methamphetamine
throughout her pregnancy, as recently as a week before she gave birth. She also
revealed that the father physically abused her; he “slapped her and choked her” at
the hospital hours after the children were born.
      Appellant was discharged from the hospital on July 5, but the children were
in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) until July 26. They were in incubators,
on oxygen, and were fed through feeding tubes. Appellant returned to the hospital
sporadically in the weeks that followed to visit the children late at night or between
feeding hours. Appellant was continuously informed by hospital personnel that, due
to her methamphetamine use, she was prohibited from breastfeeding the children.


                                          5
Appellant nevertheless returned to breastfeed and left upset when she was prohibited
from doing so.
         Meanwhile, Department investigator Stephanie Fade attempted to meet with
Appellant and assess the safety of her home. Appellant missed their scheduled
meeting times, and was either not home or did not answer the door when Fade went
to her apartment. Appellant admitted during their phone conversation to using
methamphetamine a week before she gave birth, but said she used “because the
[father] was beating her up.” She made a point to tell Fade that she wanted the father
in the children’s lives, and that he was not with her when she used
methamphetamine.
         Fade learned that Appellant let the father inside her apartment again on
July 12, then assaulted her and fled when police arrived. When Fade finally met
with Appellant on July 19 at the Callahan County Sheriff’s Office, Appellant refused
to submit to drug testing, discuss a safety plan, or sign medical releases for her and
the children. The Department was granted temporary managing conservatorship of
R.H. and E.H. on July 24, 2024, and they were discharged to a foster home two days
later.
         Following the adversary hearing in August 2024, Appellant was ordered to
complete parenting classes and a substance abuse treatment program, participate in
a program such as Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) or Narcotics Anonymous (NA), and
provide proof to her caseworker each month of continued participation in AA or NA.
Additionally, the Department created a family plan of service for Appellant that the
trial court modified, approved, and adopted as an order of the court. As part of
Appellant’s service plan, she was ordered to:
         • maintain legal employment, a safe and stable home, and permit her
           caseworker access to her home;



                                          6
      • inform the Department of any changes in address, contact information, or
        household members within three days;
      • complete parenting classes,
      • complete a substance abuse assessment, a psychological evaluation, a
        mental health screening, and follow all recommendations;
      • abstain from using illegal drugs or alcohol, submit to random drug screens
        on the day requested, and test negative for all substances;
      • participate in individual counseling;
      • attend scheduled parent-child visits and provide necessary baby supplies;
        and
      • sign a release of information to allow the Department to communicate with
        the service providers.
Permanency case manager Joycelyn Perry attempted to contact Appellant several
times to facilitate her participation in services—however, Appellant no longer lived
in her apartment in Baird, and Perry’s calls and text messages went unanswered. In
November 2024, Perry arrived unannounced at a parent-child visitation to establish
contact with Appellant. Appellant “appeared . . . agitated [and] frustrated with
[Perry] that [Perry] was there,” and again refused to sign a release or submit to a
drug test. She also ignored Perry’s numerous directives to drug test in November
and December 2024, and in January 2025. On January 30, 2025, Appellant tested
positive for methamphetamine after she was ordered to submit to drug testing by the
trial court. As a result, her parent-child visitation was suspended. Appellant’s next
drug screen on March 27 was a “[n]egative dilute,” which was considered an
“attempt[] to alter the specimen.” Although she tested negative in April, she tested
positive for methamphetamine in May 2025.
      The final termination hearing commenced on July 17, 2025, resumed on
October 8, and concluded on October 14, 2025. Perry testified that Appellant did
not maintain consistent contact with the Department or her designated service

                                         7
providers, and Appellant’s preferred method of communication varied. She initially
told Perry that she would only respond to text messages or communicate through her
attorney, then asked Perry to contact her by e-mail. Appellant informed Perry that,
rather than use the service providers referred by the Department, she intended to find
her own providers. But because Appellant never signed the requisite release of
information, Perry was unable to make certain referrals or verify that Appellant
completed her services, including inpatient treatment. Appellant likewise never
provided Perry with proof of housing, employment or income, or completion of her
psychological evaluation or mental health assessment.
      In November 2024, the children were placed with their maternal aunt, K.S.,
who lives with her husband, J.S., and their five children. Perry testified that R.H.
and E.H. have bonded with the family, and that K.S. and J.S. have “always been able
to meet [the children’s] needs in every aspect.” For instance, they transported R.H.
and E.H. to their physical and occupational therapy appointments to improve their
muscle development, strength, and movement. They sought the additional care that
E.H. needed and monitored her for signs of fetal alcohol syndrome and other
developmental delays. And, due to K.S.’s and J.S.’s vigilance, it was discovered
that E.H. had “an old hemorrhage, likely due from birth,” as well as a heart murmur.
Perry opined that K.S. and J.S. had the parenting abilities to care for the children and
could provide them with a stable home.
      Appellant testified on the last day of the final hearing. She described her
relationship with the father as “[a] nightmare”—he was physically and emotionally
abusive, and “got [her] started on [methamphetamine].” Appellant initially sought
to “invoke [her] Fifth Amendment right to not incriminate [herself]” when asked
whether she was responsible for her decision to engage in drug use. She testified
that she last used methamphetamine in May 2025, admitted to using with knowledge


                                           8
that she was pregnant, and admitted to using fifteen to twenty times after the children
were removed. But she suggested that she did so reluctantly: “[I]n my personal
opinion it all directly ties back to [the father]. She explained: “I’m a recovering
addict . . . [being] around another person, an active addiction, can lead to a relapse.”
According to Appellant, she “fell into an old pattern” and was “terrified not to [use
methamphetamine] because the repercussions of not [using] were worse.”
      Appellant declared that she has been sober since admitting herself into
Serenity House, a substance abuse treatment facility, in June 2025. After her
discharge from inpatient treatment in July, Appellant lived in a transitional home
and started working at Red Lobster, but testified that she recently moved to a sober
living home that could accommodate the children. Prior to the final hearing, she did
not update the Department on her whereabouts, and no one had assessed the safety
of the home or appropriateness for children. When asked about her sporadic contact
with the Department, Appellant replied that the father smashed her phone. He also
“put a developer app on” her phone so that he “could control everything from his
phone,” including her text messages, e-mails, and social media accounts. The father
purportedly deleted Appellant’s text messages and e-mails, which she testified
caused her to never receive the Department’s referrals for services. But she asserted
that she ultimately completed most of her service plan requirements during “the
whole [thirty]-something days” that she was in Serenity House. There, she received
trauma counseling and acquired skills to maintain sobriety, so she addressed the
domestic violence and drug use concerns that led to the removal of her children.
      Appellant also endeavored to “invoke [her] Fifth Amendment right” to not
incriminate herself in response to an inquiry about her new companion, Matt
Patmann, and his drug use. She eventually disclosed that she “started seeing”
Patmann in June 2025, and that he was on parole for manufacturing or delivering


                                           9
methamphetamine. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112 (West Supp.
2025). Appellant averred that Patmann has “been a huge support in [her] recovery”
and “would work all the services” if required to by the Department.
      Finally, Appellant agreed that the children were well-cared for by her sister
and that she “would choose her [sister]” to care for them if her parental rights were
terminated. In addition to R.H., E.H., and X.G., Appellant has two older sons with
whom she has minimal contact.
      At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated Appellant’s
parental rights to the children pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and found
termination to be in the best interest of the children. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(E),
(b)(2). The trial court further found that despite the Department’s reasonable efforts
to return the children to Appellant, a continuing danger remained that prevented the
children’s return to her care. Id. § 161.001(f)(1). This appeal followed.
                             Best Interest of the Children
      Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the best
interest of the children. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much
broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant
discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley, 544
S.W.2d at 371–72). We reiterate that the trial court, as the trier of fact, is the sole
judge of the witnesses’ credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. We are not at liberty
to disturb the determinations of the factfinder so long as those determinations are not
unreasonable. Id. at 311–12; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). Giving
the requisite due deference to the trier of fact, we hold that, based on the evidence in
the record and the application of the Holley factors, the trial court could have formed




                                          10
a firm belief or conviction that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the
best interest of the children. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
      Evidence of each Holley factor is not required to support a best interest
finding. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
pet. denied); In re S.O., No. 05-22-01019-CV, 2023 WL 2237084, at *11 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). In other words, the absence of
evidence regarding some of these factors does not preclude a best interest finding,
“particularly if [the] undisputed evidence shows the parental relationship
endangered the child’s safety.” In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 477 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2015, no pet.) (quoting In re A.E., No. 05-14-01340-CV, 2015 WL 1184179, at *6
(Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 16, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).             Consequently,
“evidence relating to one single factor may be adequate in a particular situation to
support a finding that termination is in the best interest[] of the child.” J.S., 687
S.W.3d at 552 (quoting In re K.S., 420 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2014, no pet.)). And evidence that is relevant to Section 161.001(b)(1) termination
grounds may be probative of a child’s best interest. See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d
239, 249–50 (Tex. 2013) (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28).
      Appellant does not contest the trial court’s finding that she endangered the
children as set forth in Section 161.001(b)(1)(E). So long as the evidence supports
those findings, they are valid grounds for termination. See E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at
249–50; In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 552. In
this regard, evidence that Appellant endangered R.H. and E.H. could be considered
by the factfinder in determining whether termination was in the children’s best
interest. See E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249–50; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
      The record demonstrates that Appellant’s endangering conduct is attributable
to her persistent drug use, which “implicates most of the Holley factors.” In re E.D.,


                                         11
682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied). It is well-
established that a parent’s continuing pattern of drug use can support a best interest
finding due to the “attendant risks to employment, housing, and prolonged absence
from the children.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 279–81; see also In re J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d
245, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied) (the parents’ years of
drug use supported the trial court’s best interest finding). Appellant admitted to
using methamphetamine while she knew that she was pregnant with R.H. and E.H.,
which “supports a finding of direct injury to the child[ren].” In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d
657, 659 (Tex. 2024) (relating to the trial court’s endangerment findings). Appellant
also ignored numerous directives to submit to drug testing and conceded that her
methamphetamine use continued until May 2025. A parent’s decision to engage in
illegal drug use during the pendency of a termination suit, when the parent is at risk
of losing a child, is unquestionably contrary to the child’s best interest. See J.S., 687
S.W.3d at 551; In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2016, pet. denied); see also In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d 251, 265 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (“[A] fact finder reasonably can infer that a parent’s
failure to submit to court-ordered drug tests indicates the parent is avoiding testing
because they were using illegal drugs.”).
      Appellant attempted to elude culpability by blaming the father for her
methamphetamine use, her inconsistent contact with the Department, and her failure
to engage in services. Notwithstanding the abuse, Appellant communicated with the
father until May 2025, when she last used methamphetamine with him, and invited
him into her apartment before and after the children’s removal. Significantly,
Appellant allowed the father inside her apartment while X.G.—one of her three
sons—was present, despite the father’s propensity for violence. See In re J.S., 675
S.W.3d 120, 125 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.) (noting the mother’s “significant


                                            12
history of drug use” and that she “lost custody of another child due to [her] drug
use”); In re E.C.-L.H.-D., No. 07-24-00190-CV, 2024 WL 4692126, at *7 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo Nov. 5, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Physical violence in the
home leads to an unstable and unpredictable environment for children.”). The
domestic violence by the father against Appellant, Appellant’s drug use during
pregnancy and while the case was pending, and her continued association with the
father constitutes evidence of emotional and physical danger to R.H. and E.H. now
and in the future. See E.C.-L.H.-D., 2024 WL 4692126, at *7. And Appellant’s
decision to risk endangering her youngest son, when she only has minimal contact
with the older two, permit the inference that she is unable to meet the physical and
emotional needs of the children. See In re U.G.G., 573 S.W.3d 391, 402 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (“In reviewing the parenting abilities of a parent, a
fact finder can consider the parent’s past neglect or past inability to meet the physical
and emotional needs of the children.”).
      Although Appellant was repeatedly informed of the requirements to regain
custody of the children, she did not engage in services until a month before the final
hearing commenced. See N.T., 474 S.W.3d at 479 (“recent improvement alone is
not sufficient to avoid termination of parental rights”) (quoting In re K.D.C., No. 02-
12-00092-CV, 2013 WL 5781474, at *16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 24, 2013, no
pet.) (mem. op.)); see also J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346 (“[E]vidence of improved
conduct, especially of short-duration, does not conclusively negate the probative
value of a long history of drug use and irresponsible choices.”). From the inception
of the case through the conclusion of the final hearing, Appellant was evasive,
unresponsive, and recalcitrant—for example, she sought to invoke her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination three times before testifying about
Patmann and his drug use, and another time to avoid accepting responsibility for her


                                           13
methamphetamine use. Even assuming the truth of her testimony that she was sober,
employed, and acquired housing, she failed to provide proof thereof to the
Department as required by her service plan. Appellant’s minimization of culpability,
failure to comply with her service plan requirements, and failure to demonstrate that
she addressed the Department’s concerns support the trial court’s best interest
finding. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d at 769; In re S.B.,
207 S.W.3d 877, 887–88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (“A parent’s drug
use, inability to provide a stable home, and failure to comply with [her] family
service plan support a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child.”);
In re A.H., No.11-24-00075-CV, 2024 WL 3879987, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland
Aug. 21, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[Mother’s] past behavior, minimization of
her conduct, drug use . . . and failure to properly address and treat her mental health
issues[] permit the rational conclusion that relinquishing [the child] to her care would
pose a substantial risk of harm to the child.”).
      The trial court was also permitted to consider any evidence of the children’s
desires, as well as Appellant’s and the Department’s plans for the children and
whether the plans and expectations are realistic or weak and ill-defined. See Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 371–72; U.G.G., 573 S.W.3d at 401–02. R.H. and E.H. were a year
old when the final hearing commenced, and fifteen months old when the hearing
concluded. When children are too young to express their desires, the factfinder may
consider whether the children have bonded with their caregivers, are well-cared for
by them, and whether the children have spent minimal time with a parent. In re
E.J.M., 673 S.W.3d 310, 334 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.); see also
N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.)
(evidence showing that a young child had bonded with foster family supported the
trial court’s best interest finding). The evidence demonstrates that R.H. and E.H.


                                          14
have bonded with K.S. and J.S., who have provided the children with a safe and
stable home and are willing to adopt them.
      Appellant, by contrast, failed to demonstrate the ability to maintain stable
housing, employment, and long-term sobriety. She also failed to alleviate the
Department’s concerns regarding her relationship choices and domestic violence in
the children’s presence. And because Appellant’s visitation with the children was
suspended following her positive drug test in January 2025, R.H. and E.H. “are not
familiar with [Appellant] . . . due to their lack of contact.” Appellant’s repeated
disregard for the well-being of R.H. and E.H. until June 2025 demonstrates a pattern
of parental indifference, which “supports a finding that termination of parental rights
is in a child’s best interest under every one of the Holley factors.” In re A.J.D.-J.,
667 S.W.3d 813, 823 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.); see also J.A.R.,
696 S.W.3d at 257 (“Stability and permanence are paramount in the upbringing of
children.”). Her clear disinterest for most of the children’s lives “poses an emotional
and physical danger to the child[ren]” now and in the future and shows Appellant’s
unwillingness or inability to meet the children’s needs now and in the future. A.J.D.-
J., 667 S.W.3d at 823; see Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. The record therefore
reflects multiple circumstances from which the trial court may have reasonably
discerned a “pattern of conduct that is inimical to the very idea of child-rearing.”
J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316 (quoting C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at
371–72. Accordingly, Appellant’s acts and omissions indicated that the existing
parent-child relationship is not a proper one, which supports the trial court’s best
interest finding. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
      Upon considering the evidence as it relates to Appellant’s actions and
inactions, the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future,
the emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future, Appellant’s


                                          15
lack of parental abilities and stability, and Appellant’s history of drug use, we hold
that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding
that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children.
See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
      Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
                                   This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the order of the trial court.




                                                W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                                JUSTICE


April 16, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.




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