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In the Interest of T.C.-J., a Child v. the State of Texas

Docket 07-25-00412-CV

Court of record · Indexed in NoticeRegistry archive · AI-enriched for research

FamilyAffirmed
Filed
Jurisdiction
Texas
Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
Type
Lead Opinion
Case type
Family
Disposition
Affirmed
Docket
07-25-00412-CV

Accelerated appeal from a trial court judgment terminating parental rights in a Department of Family and Protective Services suit

Summary

The Texas Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to her child, T.C.-J., after the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services removed the child due to suspected prenatal and ongoing methamphetamine exposure. The jury found statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in the child’s best interest. The appellate court rejected Mother’s challenges because she failed to preserve complaints about the sufficiency of the best-interest evidence and about admission of prior Department history by not making the required trial objections or motions.

Issues Decided

  • Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest.
  • Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Mother’s prior history with the Department as more prejudicial than probative.

Court's Reasoning

The court affirmed because Mother did not preserve her sufficiency challenges—the required motions or objections (such as a motion for new trial) were not made—so the appellate court could not review them. Likewise, Mother’s appellate complaint about Rule 403 prejudice did not match the objection she raised at trial (relying on a motion in limine), so the complaint was waived for appellate review. Because the required trial-level preservation was lacking, the court denied relief without reaching the merits of the evidentiary or sufficiency claims.

Authorities Cited

  • Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)
  • Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (preservation of error / motion for new trial)
  • Texas Rule of Evidence 403

Parties

Appellant
Mother
Petitioner
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
Child
T.C.-J.
Judge
Carry Baker
Judge
Judy C. Parker

Key Dates

Opinion issued
2026-04-16

What You Should Do Next

  1. 1

    Consult counsel about preservation and post-appeal options

    Mother should speak with an attorney immediately to evaluate whether counsel’s failure to preserve error was unjustified and whether any post-appeal remedies (e.g., motion for rehearing, or other extraordinary relief) are available.

  2. 2

    Review trial record and counsel performance

    Obtain and review the full trial transcript and motions to determine precisely what objections were made and whether appellate counsel can argue ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to preserve error.

  3. 3

    Coordinate with child-services attorney regarding custody outcomes

    If termination is final, confer with counsel and the Department about the practical consequences for visitation, reunification prospects, and the foster family’s adoption plans.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did the appeals court decide?
The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights because Mother failed to preserve her challenges to the evidence and to the admission of certain evidence.
Who is affected by this decision?
Mother, the child (T.C.-J.), and the Department of Family and Protective Services are directly affected; the foster family is positioned to adopt if termination remains final.
Why didn’t the court examine the evidence itself?
Because Mother did not make the required motions or objections at trial (like a motion for new trial or a specific Rule 403 objection), the appellate court said those complaints were waived and therefore would not be reviewed on appeal.
Can Mother raise these issues again?
Not on the same direct appeal unless she can show trial counsel unjustifiably failed to preserve error; otherwise, relief would require a different procedural vehicle, such as extraordinary writs or other post-conviction procedures, depending on circumstances.

The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.

Full Filing Text
In The
                                  Court of Appeals
                         Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                           No. 07-25-00412-CV


                             IN THE INTEREST OF T.C.-J., A CHILD

                             On Appeal from the 108th District Court
                                      Potter County, Texas
                 Trial Court No. 095058-E-FM, Honorable Carry Baker, Presiding

                                             April 16, 2026
                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION
                     Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

        In this accelerated appeal, Mother seeks reversal of the trial court’s judgment

terminating her parental rights to her child, T.C.-J., in a suit brought by the Texas

Department of Family and Protective Services. 1 She challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence to support the jury’s best-interest finding and contends the trial court abused its




        1 To protect the privacy of the parties involved, we will refer to the Appellant as “Mother,” and the

child by her initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
discretion in admitting evidence of her history with the Department. 2 We affirm the trial

court’s judgment of termination.


                                            BACKGROUND


       In May of 2019, the Department removed newborn T.C.-J. from Mother’s care due

to concerns of Mother’s drug use during her pregnancy. Mother admitted that she tested

positive for “pills, weed, and mar—um, meth” at three prenatal visits. After participating

in a Department service plan for nine months, T.C.-J. was returned to Mother’s care.


       The Department again became involved with Mother and five-year-old T.C.-J. in

November of 2024, when it investigated allegations that Mother had a history of

methamphetamine abuse and had relapsed. After submitting to drug testing, Mother

tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. According to Mother, the drug

test results were “altered.” She agreed to participate in a safety plan whereby her son

would supervise her with T.C.-J. Before the safety plan could be implemented, she

attempted to remove T.C.-J. from school. The Department sought and obtained an

emergency removal order. T.C.-J. was placed in a foster home and screened for drugs.

T.C.-J.’s hair follicle tested positive for methamphetamine at an extremely high level. An

expert in forensic toxicology testified that the level was “roughly twenty times the cut off,”

indicating the result was due to a “pattern of use or exposure.”


       After T.C.-J. was removed from her care, Mother was required to complete several

tasks and classes as part of a Department service plan. A caseworker testified that



       2 Father’s parental rights were also terminated in this proceeding but he does not appeal.


                                                   2
Mother obtained a psychological, psychosocial, and mental health evaluation; completed

a substance abuse assessment; and attended seven sessions of individual counselling.

She did not otherwise complete what was required. Specifically, she failed, among other

things, to complete an outpatient drug rehabilitation program and maintain a drug-free

lifestyle. She did not submit to random drug screenings in February, March, July, and

September of 2025.      Mother’s hair follicle testing in June of 2025 was positive for

methamphetamine and showed a “pattern” of repetitive use. Mother’s visitation with T.C.-

J. was suspended in July of 2025 due to Mother’s multiple positive drug screens for

methamphetamine.        Throughout the case, Mother consistently denied using

methamphetamine, but uncontroverted hair strand tests and urinalysis testing continued

to show a positive result for methamphetamine.


       At the time of the final hearing, T.C.-J. had been in the Department’s care for a

year. She is thriving in her foster home placement, and the foster family is motivated to

adopt her if parental rights are terminated. T.C.-J. attends first grade and she is meeting

appropriate milestones. She is described as healthy and happy.


       The jury returned a unanimous verdict terminating Mother’s parental rights to T.C.-

J. on the grounds of endangering conditions, endangerment, constructive abandonment,

and failure to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program. See TEX.

FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O). The jury also found that termination was in

T.C.-J.’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Mother timely filed this appeal.




                                             3
                                          ANALYSIS


Best-Interest Finding


       In her first issue, Mother argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to

support the best-interest finding. We hold that Mother did not preserve this complaint for

review.


       Following a jury trial, a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence must be

preserved in one of five ways: (1) a motion for instructed verdict, (2) a motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict, (3) an objection to the submission of the question to the jury,

(4) a motion to disregard the jury’s answer to a vital fact question, or (5) a motion for new

trial. In re B.P.-R., No. 07-25-00228-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 462, at *5 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo Jan. 21, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.); see TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Preservation of

a factual sufficiency challenge requires a motion for new trial. In re B.P.-R., 2026 Tex.

App. LEXIS 462, at *5; TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2).


       Mother filed none of the required motions or objections necessary to preserve her

sufficiency complaints. Nor does she argue that counsel unjustifiably failed to preserve

error. See In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 574 (Tex. 2005) (stating “the court of appeals

may review the factual sufficiency of the evidence in a parental termination case—even

if a party failed to preserve error in trial court—if the parent’s counsel unjustifiably failed

to preserve error,” but finding no error because mother “never alleged in either the court

of appeals or in this Court that her counsel unjustifiably failed to preserve error”). Because

Mother failed to preserve her complaint of legal and factual evidentiary sufficiency as to

the jury’s best-interest finding, we overrule her first issue.

                                               4
Evidence of Prior Department History


       In her second issue, Mother contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of

Mother’s prior history with the Department because it was “far more prejudicial than

probative,” “should have been excluded,” and “the case should have been decided on this

current CPS case and nothing more.” In support of her contention, she points to the text

of Texas Rule of Evidence 403 and states that “[the rule] requires the [trial] court do a

balancing test.” However, her objection at trial was that the matter was covered in her

motion in limine, not that the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403 as

unfairly prejudicial. Mother’s complaint on appeal does not comport with her objection

made at trial.


       To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the

trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the

desired ruling. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. If a party fails to do this, error is not preserved, and

the complaint is waived. In re A.G., No. 07-17-00298-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 243, at

*4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 9, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We do not find any

indication in the record that Mother raised in the trial court her complaint that evidence of

her history with the Department was more prejudicial than probative.            We may not

consider a complaint that was not ruled on by the trial court. In re A.G., 2018 Tex. App.

LEXIS 243, at *5.


       Likewise, Mother’s objection at trial, that the evidence was subject to her motion in

limine, does not comport with her appellate complaint. When a party’s argument on

appeal does not comport with her objection at trial, her appellate issue is waived. In re

                                              5
Marriage of Wright, No. 07-22-00233-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 2137, at *5 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo Mar. 31, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Moser v. Davis, 79 S.W.3d 162,

169 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.)). Because Mother’s argument was not presented

to the trial court below, any error was not preserved, and we must overrule her issue.


                                      CONCLUSION


       Having overruled both issues raised by Mother, the judgment terminating parental

rights is affirmed.




                                                      Judy C. Parker
                                                       Chief Justice




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