Diogu Kaqlu Diogu II v. Commision for Lawyer Discipline

Opinion issued April 30, 2026




                                     In The

                             Court of Appeals
                                    For The

                         First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                             NO. 01-24-00303-CV
                           ———————————
                    DIOGU KALU DIOGU, II, Appellant
                                       V.
           COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, Appellee


                   On Appeal from the 458th District Court
                          Fort Bend County, Texas
                    Trial Court Case No. 21-DCV-279744


                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant, Diogu Kalu Diogu, II, appeals the trial court’s judgment of

disbarment in this attorney disciplinary case brought by appellee, Commission for

Lawyer Discipline (“the Commission”). In five issues, Diogu contends that (1) he

did not violate the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (“TDRPC”),
as alleged by the Commission, (2) the trial court erred by conducting a jury trial

before his motion for recusal was ruled on, (3) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to

adjudicate his disciplinary case, (4) his TDRPC violations, even if true, did not

warrant disbarment, and (5) the trial court erred by allowing his motion for new trial

to be overruled by law.

      We affirm.

                                    Background

      On January 8, 2021, the Commission1 filed its first amended original

disciplinary petition alleging that Diogu committed professional misconduct by

violating several provisions of the TDRPC in connection with two separate

underlying civil matters: the “Melanson” matter and the “EIC” matter.

A.    The Melanson Matter

      In May 2018, Diogu filed a civil action styled Diogu Law Firm PLLC and

Diogu Kalu Diogu II v. Melanson et al., Cause No. 18-DVC 251076, in the 434th

District Court of Fort Bend County, Texas. In that case, the defendants moved to

dismiss Diogu’s claims under the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (“TCPA”) 2 and

sought attorney’s fees and sanctions against Diogu.



1
      The Commission, a standing committee of the State Bar of Texas, is an
      administrative agency of the Texas Judicial Department. See TEX. GOV’T CODE
      ANN. §§ 81.011(a), 81.076(b).
2
      TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011.

                                          2
      The Commission alleged in its amended petition that Diogu, during the course

of the Melanson litigation and while representing himself and his law firm:

      • Misrepresented that he had never previously been sanctioned on any matter
        related to the TCPA in his pleadings and in open court;

      • Misrepresented that he could not afford to pay court costs in an attempt to
        proceed in forma pauperis in his appeal of the matter before the Fourteenth
        Court of Appeals; and

      • Filed a motion to disqualify/recuse the trial judge and the administrative
        judge of the Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region; the judge assigned
        to hear the motion found it “groundless and filed in bad faith and/or for the
        purpose of harassment, and . . . clearly brought for unnecessary delay,
        without sufficient cause, and in furtherance of dilatory tactics and to
        unnecessarily delay further legal proceedings”; the assigned judge
        awarded monetary sanctions against Diogu and his law firm for filing the
        motion to recuse/disqualify.

B.    The EIC Matter

      Diogu represented the plaintiff in a case styled Experience Infusion Center,

LLC v. Texas Health + Aetna Insurance Holding Co. and Aetna Life Insurance Co.,

Civil Action No 4:17-cv-0034, in the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Texas, Houston Division. The Commission alleged in its amended

petition that Diogu accepted the case on a contingent fee basis but failed to obtain a

signed, contingent fee agreement from his client. After a two-year hiatus from the

case, Diogu learned of an imminent settlement in the lawsuit. The Commission

alleged that Diogu drafted a contingent fee agreement, which he filed in federal

district court, misrepresenting that both he and his client had signed the contingency

                                          3
fee agreement. His client filed a sworn declaration stating that he did not sign the

agreement, either electronically or in person, and he did not authorize anyone to

sign it on his behalf.

C.    TDRPC Violations

      In its amended petition, the Commission alleged that Diogu’s conduct in the

Melanson and EIC matters constituted violations of the TDRPC, specifically:

      • 3.01 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
        controvert an issue therein, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that there
        is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.”);

      • 3.02 (“In the course of litigation, a lawyer shall not take a position that
        unreasonably increases the costs or other burdens of the case or that
        unreasonably delays resolution of the matter.”);

      • 3.03(a)(1) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . (1) make a false statement
        of material fact or law to a tribunal . . . .”);

      • 3.03(a)(5) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . (5) offer or use evidence
        that the lawyer knows to be false.”); and

      • 8.04(a)(3) (“A lawyer shall not . . . (3) engage in conduct involving
        dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . . . .”).

Diogu answered, asserting a general denial and several affirmative defenses.3




3
      During the course of litigation, Diogu filed numerous pre-trial motions, including a
      pleading entitled, “Plea to the Jurisdiction; Motion to Dismiss under TCPA Sections
      27.003 or 27.011(A); Motion for Sanction under the Inherent Power of the Court;
      Second Supplemental Motion for Sanction and Response to Motion to Strike,” and
      a first amended motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

                                           4
        In November 2023, following a hearing, the trial court granted Diogu’s

motion for trial continuance in part and set the case for a jury trial on January 30,

2024.

        In December 2023, Diogu removed his disciplinary case to federal court.

Concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the federal district court

remanded the case to state court.

        On January 23, 2024, Diogu filed an amended motion to disqualify and recuse

Judge Gonzales from his disciplinary case. In his motion—filed three years after

Judge Gonzales had been assigned to preside over his case and a week before trial—

Diogu asserted that it was improper for Judge Gonzales to preside over the case

because she had an interest in the outcome, failed to disclose that she was a family

law judge, and lacked subject matter competence.         The Commission filed its

response, asserting that no ground existed to either recuse or disqualify Judge

Gonzales.

        Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a, after Judge Gonzales declined

to recuse herself voluntarily, Diogu’s motion to recuse/disqualify was referred to the

presiding judge of the Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region of Texas. Judge

Brown entered an order on January 24, 2024, denying Diogu’s motion and amended

motion to recuse/disqualify Judge Gonzales. The court concluded that Diogu’s

motion urged disqualification but “fail[ed] to allege any grounds for disqualification


                                          5
as required by Rule 18b of the Texas Rules for Civil Procedure.” The order stated

that Diogu’s motion to recuse Judge Gonzales also failed to comply with Rule 18

because the motion, which complained of rulings beginning in November 2023, was

filed less than ten days before the pretrial hearing and was therefore untimely, and it

complained mainly of Judge Gonzales’s rulings which cannot form the sole basis of

a motion to recuse.4


4
      Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b states:
             (a) Grounds for Disqualification. A judge must disqualify in any
                 proceeding in which:
                (1) the judge has served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy,
                or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served
                during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter;
                (2) the judge knows that, individually or as a fiduciary, the judge
                has an interest in the subject matter in controversy; or
                (3) either of the parties may be related to the judge by affinity or
                consanguinity within the third degree.
      TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(a).
      Rule 18a states, in relevant part:
             (b) Time for Filing Motion.
                (1) Motion to Recuse. A motion to recuse:
                    (A) must be filed as soon as practicable after the movant
                        knows of the ground stated in the motion; and
                    (B) must not be filed after the tenth day before the date set for
                        trial or other hearing unless, before that day, the movant
                        neither knew nor reasonably should have known:
                         (i) that the judge whose recusal is sought would preside at
                         the trial or hearing; or
                         (ii) that the ground stated in the motion existed.
      TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(b).

                                             6
      On January 25, 2024, Diogu filed a motion to disqualify Judge Brown and to

“reconsider and declare void” her order denying his motion to disqualify/recuse

Judge Gonzales. According to Diogu, Judge Brown should have disqualified herself

because she had a “direct interest” in the case, and thus, her order denying Diogu’s

motion to disqualify/recuse Judge Gonzles was void, and that his motion to recuse

Judge Brown was timely. The Commission filed its response to Diogu’s motion the

same day.

      On January 26, 2024, the trial court held a pretrial hearing by Zoom. Judge

Gonzales advised the parties that the trial would go forward on January 30, 2024.

      On January 29, 2024, Judge Brown entered an order declining to voluntarily

recuse herself and referring Diogu’s motion to disqualify her to the Chief Justice of

the Supreme Court of Texas. Senior Judge Trapp, presiding judge of the Second

Administrative Judicial Region, was assigned to rule on Diogu’s pending motion to

disqualify Judge Brown.

      On January 29, 2024, Diogu filed a petition for writ of mandamus and motion

to stay the pending jury trial in his attorney disciplinary case. 5 This Court denied

Diogu’s motion to stay the trial the same day. The next day—the first day of trial—




5
      See In re Diogu, No. 01-24-00074-CV, 2024 WL 483158 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
      Dist.] Feb. 8, 2024, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

                                         7
Diogu filed another motion to stay with an amended petition for writ of mandamus.

This Court denied his second motion to stay and amended petition.

      On January 30, 2024, Judge Gonzales conducted a jury trial at which Diogu

did not appear. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found that Diogu had committed

professional misconduct as follows:

      While representing himself and/or Diogu Law Firm PLLC in the
      Melanson Case, Diogu . . . asserted or controverted an issue in that
      proceeding in the absence of reasonable belief that the basis for doing
      so was not frivolous in violation of TDRPC [rule] 3.01;

      While representing himself and/or Diogu Law Firm PLLC in the
      Melanson Case, Diogu . . . took a position that unreasonably increased
      the costs or other burdens of the Melanson Case or unreasonably
      delayed resolution of the matter in violation of TDRPC [rule] 3.02;

      While representing himself and/or Diogu Law Firm PLLC in the
      Melanson Case, Diogu . . . knowingly made a false statement of
      material fact or law to a tribunal in violation of TDRPC [rule]
      3.03(a)(1);

      While representing himself and/or Diogu Law Firm PLLC in the
      Melanson Case, Diogu . . . knowingly offered or used evidence that he
      knew to be false in violation of TDRPC [rule] 3.03(a)(5); and

      While representing himself and/or Diogu Law Firm PLLC in the
      Melanson Case, Diogu . . . engaged in conduct involving dishonesty,
      fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of TDRPC [rule]
      8.04(a)(3).

      After considering all the evidence presented and argument, the factors set out

in the Guidelines for Imposing Sanctions, and additional evidence regarding the




                                         8
appropriate sanction to be imposed, Judge Gonzales signed a judgment of

disbarment on January 30, 2024.

      On February 2, 2024, Diogu filed a motion to set aside default judgment and

for new trial. Judge Gonzales held a hearing on Diogu’s motion for new trial. The

motion was overruled by operation of law.

      On February 7, 2024—after the jury trial in his attorney disciplinary case had

concluded—Diogu filed an amended motion to disqualify Judge Brown. Following

a hearing, Judge Trapp entered an order denying Diogu’s amended motion to

disqualify Judge Brown and to reconsider and declare void her order denying

Diogu’s motion to disqualify Judge Gonzales; Diogu’s motion for reconsideration

of his amended motion was also denied.

      On March 4, 2024—more than one month after the judgment of disbarment

had issued—Diogu again sought to remove his attorney disciplinary case to federal

court. Concluding that it lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction over the case, the

federal district court remanded the case to state court.6

                                   Issues on Appeal

      Diogu presents the following five issues on appeal:

      • “Whether Appellant Violated Rules 3.01, 3.02, 3.03(a)(1), 3.03(a)(5), and
        8.04(a)(3), of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct as
        Alleged by the Commission For Lawyer Discipline”;
6
      In its order, the federal district court noted that Diogu “was disbarred after years of
      Texas state court litigation, including a jury trial.”

                                             9
      • “Whether the District Court Erred by Conducting a Trial Prior to the
        Supreme Court Ruling on the Recusal of the 11th Administrative Judge
        Susan Brown, Under Rule 18a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure by
        Honorable Judge Robert Trapp of the 2nd Administrative Judicial Division
        and Senior District Judge”;

      • “Whether the District Court Had Jurisdiction to Adjudicate the
        Disciplinary Hearing in Violation of Rule 3.072 of the Texas Rules of
        Disciplinary Procedure After the Expiration of 180 Days from the Date of
        Diogu’s Original Answer”;

      • “Whether the Alleged Violations by Diogu . . . , Even if True, Rose to the
        Level of Disbarment”; and

      • “Whether Judge . . . Gonzalez erred in Electing to Overrule Diogu’s
        Motion for New Trial by Operation of Law.”

                            Violations of the TDRPC

      In his first issue, Diogu asserts that the Commission failed to prove that he

violated TDRPC 3.01, 3.02, 3.03(a), 3.03(a)(5), and 8.04(a)(3).         We construe

Diogu’s assertion as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the

Commission supporting the jury’s findings that Diogu engaged in professional

misconduct and the trial court’s judgment of disbarment rendered on the jury’s

verdict.7




7
      Under the “Argument & Authority” section for his first issue, Diogu sets out the
      standards of review for legal and factual evidentiary sufficiency challenges.

                                         10
A.    Inadequate Appellate Record

      An appellant bears the burden of bringing forth a record that enables the

appellate court to determine whether his complaints constitute reversible error. See

Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990); Nicholson v. Fifth Third

Bank, 226 S.W.3d 581, 582 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Issues

depending on the state of the evidence cannot be reviewed without a complete

record. See Deaguero v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 05-22-01102-CV, 2024

WL 1326486, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 28, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). That is,

when an appellant complains of the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence, the

appellant’s burden to show that the judgment is erroneous cannot be discharged in

the absence of a complete or an agreed statement of facts. Schafer v. Conner, 813

S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex. 1991). If the appellate record does not include a complete

reporter’s record, absent circumstances not relevant here,8 “the reviewing court must

presume that the evidence . . . was adequate to support the [resulting] decision.”

MSW Corpus Christi Landfill, Ltd. v. Gulley-Hurst, L.L.C., 664 S.W.3d 102, 109

(Tex. 2023).

      Here, Diogu did not file in this Court the reporter’s record from his jury trial.

Thus, we have no way of assessing whether the evidence was sufficient to support


8
      See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(c) (contemplating appellant’s request for partial
      reporter’s record with “a statement of the points or issues to be presented on appeal”
      and clarifying procedures and presumptions in such circumstances).

                                            11
the jury’s findings of misconduct and the trial court’s judgment of disbarment.

Because Diogu’s evidentiary challenge requires review of the portion of the record

not brought forward on appeal, we must presume that the trial court’s judgment was

supported by sufficient evidence that Diogu engaged in professional misconduct in

violation of rules 3.01, 3.02, 3.03(a), 3.03(a)(5), and 8.04(a)(3). See Vernco Constr.,

Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 151 (Tex. 2015) (citing Guthrie v. Nat’l Homes

Corp., 394 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex. 1965) (stating that, in absence of reporter’s

record, appellate court must presume that trial court’s judgment is supported by

sufficient evidence)).

      TCPA Does Not Apply

      In connection with his first issue, Diogu also argues that that the TCPA

“recognizes an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings,

shielding them from defamation or civil actions,” and “[it] applies to this case.” He

reasons that because the Commission is not one of the entities listed in the TCPA’s

exemptions, the Commission’s allegation that he violated TDRPC 3.01 “[cannot be]

upheld under the TCPA.” Diogu’s argument is unavailing.

      The TCPA, which is embodied in Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and

Remedies Code, “protects citizens who petition or speak on matters of public

concern from retaliatory lawsuits that seek to intimidate or silence them.” In re

Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 584 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. &


                                          12
REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011. The Texas Legislature amended the TCPA,

effective September 1, 2019, for actions filed on or after that date, as the

Commission’s attorney disciplinary action was. See Act of May 17, 2019, 86th Leg.,

R.S., ch. 378, § 11, 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 684, 687. If an action falls under one

of the TCPA’s twelve exemptions, the TCPA does not apply and may not be used to

dismiss the action. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.010. The TCPA

does not apply to, among others things, “a disciplinary action or disciplinary

proceeding brought under Chapter 81, Government Code, or the Texas Rules of

Disciplinary Procedure.” Id. § 27.010(10). The Commission’s amended petition

states, in part: “Petitioner brings this disciplinary action pursuant to the S TATE BAR

ACT, TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE ANNOTATED §81.001, et seq. (West 2013); the

TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; and the TEXAS RULES OF

DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.” Diogu’s disciplinary action is not subject to the TCPA.

      We overrule Diogu’s first issue.

                           Motions to Disqualify/Recuse

      In his second issue, Diogu asserts that the trial court erred by conducting a

trial before the Texas Supreme Court had ruled on his motion to recuse Judge Brown

in violation of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a.




                                          13
A.    Standard of Review and Applicable Law

      “[W]hen faced with a motion to recuse, a judge has only two options: grant

the motion to recuse or refer the motion to another judge for a ruling.” Whatley v.

Walker, 302 S.W.3d 314, 325–26 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet.

denied). We review an order denying a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion.

In re M.C.M., 57 S.W.3d 27, 33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied);

see TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(j)(1)(A) (“An order denying a motion to recuse may be

reviewed only for abuse of discretion on appeal from the final judgment.”). A trial

court abuses its discretion by acting in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without

reference to any guiding rules or principles. Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79

S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002).

B.    Analysis

      The chronology of Diogu’s efforts to recuse and/or disqualify in this case is

as follows:

      • Diogu filed his motion to disqualify and/or recuse Judge Gonzales from
        presiding over his attorney disciplinary case;

      • Diogu amended his motion to disqualify and/or recuse Judge Gonzales;

      • Judge Gonzales declined to voluntarily recuse herself and Diogu’s motion
        to recuse/disqualify was referred to the presiding judge of the Eleventh
        Administrative Judicial Region of Texas, Judge Susan Brown;

      • Judge Brown issued her order denying Diogu’s motion and amended
        motion to disqualify/recuse Judge Gonzales;

                                        14
      • Diogu filed his motion to disqualify Judge Brown and sought
        reconsideration of Judge Brown’s order denying his request to
        disqualify/recuse Judge Gonzales;

      • Judge Brown issued an order declining to voluntarily recuse herself and
        referring Diogu’s motion to disqualify her to Chief Justice Hecht of the
        Texas Supreme Court;

      • Judge Gonzales conducted a jury trial in Diogu’s attorney disciplinary case
        on January 30, 2024;

      • Chief Justice Hecht assigned Judge Trapp to hear Diogu’s motion to
        disqualify Judge Brown;

      • Diogu filed an amended motion to disqualify Judge Brown, seeking
        reconsideration of her order denying his request to disqualify/recuse Judge
        Gonzales and again seeking Judge Gonzales’s disqualification;

      • Judge Trapp held a hearing on Diogu’s motion to disqualify Judge Brown;
        and

      • Judge Trapp issued an order denying Diogu’s motion to disqualify Judge
        Brown.

      Diogu argues that the filing of his motion to recuse and disqualify Judge

Brown “should have served as a stay on further proceedings” in his attorney

disciplinary case before Judge Gonzales. He asserts that the Texas Supreme Court

assigned the motion to recuse Judge Brown to Judge Trapp, but that “without waiting

for the ruling of Judge Trapp on the recusal matter, on January 30, 2024, Judge

Gonzales conducted a jury default trial that resulted in his disbarment.

      In support of his argument, Diogu cites Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a

governing recusal and disqualification of judges. Rule 18a(f)(2)(A), which sets out

                                         15
the duties of the “respondent judge,” provides: “If a motion is filed before evidence

has been offered at trial, the respondent judge must take no further action in the case

until the motion has been decided, except for good cause stated in writing or on the

record.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)(2)(A). According to Diogu, when Judge Gonzales

proceeded to conduct a trial on the merits of his disciplinary action, without waiting

for Judge Trapp to rule on his motion to recuse Judge Brown, she “violated the tenets

of Rule 18a” and “[t]he judgment of disbarment against [him] on January 30, 2024,

is therefore legally void.” Diogu’s argument is misplaced.

      Rule 18a(f) sets out the duties of the “respondent judge,” i.e., the judge whose

recusal or disqualification is sought. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(c)(2). It provides that,

“[i]f a motion is filed before evidence has been offered at trial,” the respondent judge

“must take no further action in the case until the motion to recuse or disqualify has

been decided.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)(2)(A). Thus, the rule contemplates that

the judge who is sitting in the case will take no further action in the case until the

motion to recuse or disqualify her has been decided. Here, Diogu’s motion and

amended motion to recuse or disqualify Judge Gonzales were denied by Judge

Brown. Diogu’s argument that Judge Gonzales should not have conducted the trial




                                          16
while the motion to recuse and disqualify Judge Brown was still pending

misapprehends rule 18a.9

      To the extent that Diogu complains that his motion to disqualify Judge Brown

that he filed before trial began, in which he sought reconsideration of Judge Brown’s

order denying his request to disqualify and/or recuse Judge Gonzales, should have

stayed the proceedings, this argument is equally unavailing. This Court considered

and rejected a similar argument in Diogu v. Ratan-Aporn, 01-14-00694-CV, 2015

WL 3982531 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 30, 2015, pet. denied) (mem.

op.). There, Diogu filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to

recuse the trial judge. See id. at *3. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred

in proceeding with the trial and should have stayed its proceedings because his

motion for reconsideration was still pending.10 See id. This Court disagreed,




9
      The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
      Division reached the same conclusion in In re Attorney Suspension of Diogu, Case
      No: 24-396, 2024 WL 1460159 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2024) (mem. op.). There,
      Diogu moved to quash an order in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy case suspending him
      from practice before the bankruptcy court on the ground that the underlying state
      court disbarment order was void. See id. at *2. Diogu raised the same argument he
      does here: that moving to recuse Judge Brown also worked to stay Judge Gonzales’s
      further action in the disciplinary case. See id. The bankruptcy court disagreed,
      concluding that Diogu’s argument “misreads the statute.” Id. The court explained:
      “Rule 18a(f)(2)(A) stays further action by the respondent judge, meaning the judge
      against whom the motion is filed. Therefore, Judge Gonzales’ authority to proceed
      in the case was unaffected by the motion to recuse Judge Brown.” Id.
10
      In Diogu v. Ratan-Aporn, 01-14-00694-CV, 2015 WL 3982531 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [1st Dist.] June 30, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.), Diogu sued his wife and
                                          17
concluding that “[n]othing in rule 18a or the case law interpreting it supports Diogu’s

position that the trial court could not proceed with the ongoing trial while a Motion

for Reconsideration was pending.” Id.

       We conclude that Judge Gonzales did not err by proceeding to trial on Diogu’s

disciplinary case while his motion to recuse Judge Brown was pending.

       We overrule Diogu’s second issue.




                              Trial Court’s Jurisdiction

       In his third issue, Diogu asserts that the trial court conducted trial more than

180 days after he filed his original answer, and thus, it lacked jurisdiction to

adjudicate his disciplinary case.

       In support of his assertion, Diogu relies on Texas Rule of Disciplinary

Procedure (“TRDP”) 3.07,11 which provides, in relevant part: “Disciplinary Actions

shall be set for trial on a date not later than 180 days after the date the answer is filed,

except for good cause shown.” TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 3.07. Diogu filed

his original answer on February 23, 2021, and trial on his disciplinary case was held



       Yauwapa Ratan-Aporn, alleging that his marriage was induced by fraud and that
       Aporn conspired with his wife to defraud him. See id. at *1.
11
       In his briefing on appeal, Diogu mistakenly cites the rule as TRDP 3.072, which
       does not exist.

                                            18
on January 30, 2024, nearly three years after Diogu filed his answer. According to

Diogu, the use of “shall” in rule 3.07 makes the 180-day time period mandatory

rather than directory, and thus, the trial court was without jurisdiction to conduct the

jury trial in his disciplinary case. We disagree.

      TRDP 17.05, “Effect of Time Limitations,” provides:

      The time periods provided in Rules 2.10, 2.12, 2.15, 2.17C, 2.17E,
      2.17P, 2.25, 3.02, 3.04, . . . 7.11, 9.02, 9.03, 10.02, 11.01, 11.08, and
      12.06(d) are mandatory. All other time periods herein provided are
      directory only and the failure to comply with them does not result in the
      invalidation of an act or event by reason of the noncompliance with
      those time limits.

TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 17.05. Rule 17.05 does not include rule 3.07 among

those rules with mandatory time periods; instead, rule 3.07 falls within the provision

that “[a]ll other time periods herein provided are directory only and the failure to

comply with them does not result in the invalidation of an act or event by reason of

the noncompliance with those time limits.” Id. Therefore, noncompliance with rule

3.07 does not invalidate a trial court’s jurisdiction. Other courts have reached the

same conclusion. See. e.g., Neely v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 302 S.W.3d

331, 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (holding

“noncompliance with Rule 3.07 does not invalidate a trial court’s jurisdiction”);

Favaloro v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 13 S.W.3d 831, 836 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2000, no pet.) (rejecting appellant’s argument that resetting of trial date outside



                                          19
180-day period provided in rule 3.07 invalidated trial court’s jurisdiction because,

under rule 17.05, rule 3.07 was directory in nature, not mandatory).

      We overrule Diogu’s third issue.

                              Sanction of Disbarment

      In his fourth issue, Diogu argues that the TDRPC violations alleged against

him, even if true, do not rise to the level of disbarment. He asserts that the sanction

imposed against him by the trial court far exceeds the violations alleged against him.

According to Diogu, if a sanction is, in fact, appropriate, “the Court should at most

issue a private reprimand to him and order that he take some classes on disciplinary

rules with the Texas Bar.”

A.    Standard of Review and Applicable Law

      A trial court has broad discretion to determine the consequences of

professional misconduct. State Bar of Tex. v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex.

1994); Rosas v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 335 S.W.3d 311, 320 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2010, no pet.) “The violation of one disciplinary rule is sufficient to

support a finding of professional misconduct.” Cantu v. Comm’n for Lawyer

Discipline, No. 13-16-00332-CV, 2020 WL 7064806, at *20 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg Dec. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). The judgment of a trial court

in a disciplinary proceeding may be so light or heavy as to amount to an abuse of

discretion. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d at 659. We will reverse the trial court’s decision


                                          20
concerning the consequences of professional misconduct only if an abuse of

discretion is shown. Rosas, 335 S.W.3d at 320. As noted above, a trial court abuses

its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner or acts without

reference to any guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators,

Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1986). “The mere fact that a trial court may decide

a matter differently than an appellate court does not demonstrate an abuse of

discretion.” Cantu, 2020 WL 7064806, at *20 (citing Downer, 701 S.W.3d at 242).

      For attorney discipline cases involving grievances filed prior to June 1, 2018,

TRDP 3.10 sets forth several factors for trial courts to consider in determining the

appropriate sanctions for misconduct. See TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 3.10

(repealed June 1, 2018). For cases involving grievances filed after June 1, 2018, the

Texas Supreme Court replaced these factors with guidelines in Part XV of the current

version of the TRDPs. See Order Adopting Amendments to the Texas Rules of

Disciplinary Procedure, Misc. Docket No. 18-9031 (2018); TEX. RULES

DISCIPLINARY P. R. 15.01–.09 reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G,

app. B. In this case, the grievance upon which the Commission based its amended

petition was filed on or about July 9, 2019; therefore, we apply the guidelines in the

current version of the rules.12




12
      Diogu cites TRDP 3.01 which is no longer in effect.

                                          21
      Rule 15.02 provides that “[i]n imposing a sanction after a finding of

[p]rofessional [m]isconduct, the disciplinary tribunal should consider the following

factors: (a) the duty violated; (b) the [r]espondent’s level of culpability; (c) the

potential or actual injury caused by the respondent’s misconduct; and (d) the

existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.” T EX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R.

15.02. Sanctions include: (1) disbarment, (2) suspension, (3) public reprimand, and

(4) private reprimand, see TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 1.06FF, and may include

additional ancillary requirements such as restitution and payment of reasonable

attorney’s fees. See id.

      Rule 15.04 identifies which sanctions are generally appropriate for the various

categories of professional misconduct. See TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 15.04.

In particular, “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when: (a) a [r]espondent

abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or

(b) a [r]espondent knowingly fails to perform services for a client, fails to adequately

communicate with a client, fails to provide competent representation, or fails to

abide by client decisions and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client;

or (c) a [r]espondent engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters,

inadequate client communications, lack of competent representation, or failure to

abide by client decisions and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.

See TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 1504(A)(1). Finally, after misconduct has been


                                          22
established, rule 15.09 permits a disciplinary tribunal to consider aggravating and

mitigating circumstances in deciding the appropriate sanction to impose. See TEX.

RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 15.09.

B.    Analysis

      In its judgment, the trial court stated that “the acts, omissions, and conduct on

the part of [Diogu] constitute a violation of Rules 3.01, 3.02, 3.03(a)(l), 3.03(a)(5),

and 8.04(a)(3) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules Of Professional Conduct.” With

respect to its sanction determination, the trial court stated:

             After considering the above finding of professional misconduct,
      the Court heard and considered additional evidence regarding the
      appropriate sanction to be imposed against Respondent and, having
      considered all the evidence presented and argument and further
      considering the factors set out in the Guidelines for Imposing Sanctions
      in Part XV of the TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE
      as well as the facts established in the case, the Court finds that the
      proper discipline of Respondent, is a Disbarment.

      As with his first issue, Diogu’s challenge to the trial court’s sanction

determination—which was expressly based on the jury’s finding that Diogu

committed professional misconduct, additional evidence and argument presented

regarding the appropriate sanction, and the sanctioning guidelines set out in Part XV

of the TRDPs—requires us to review the evidence presented to the jury and the trial

court in support of the sanction imposed. Because Diogu failed to bring forth the

reporter’s record of the jury trial, we are unable to assess the evidence and arguments

presented, and the factors the trial court considered, in support of the trial court’s
                                           23
sanction determination. See Deaguero, 2024 WL 1326486, at *10 (finding no error

in imposition of sanctions where appellant failed to provide complete appellate

record precluding review of evidence of misconduct); Sandoval v. Comm’n for

Lawyer Discipline, 25 S.W.3d 720, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet.

denied) (presuming trial court’s sanction of three-year suspension was supported by

evidence because reporter’s record of sanction hearing was not provided to court).

Because we must presume the omitted evidence would support the trial court’s

sanction determination, we overrule Diogu’s fourth issue. See Christiansen, 782

S.W.2d at 843.

                           Motion for New Trial

      In his fifth issue, Diogu asserts that Judge Gonzales erred in allowing his

motion for new trial to be overruled by operation of law.

A.    Standard of Review and the Craddock Test

      We review the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of

discretion. See Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. 2009).

We will not disturb the trial court’s ruling on the motion absent a showing of an

abuse of discretion. Strackbein v. Prewitt, 671 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex. 1984).

      The question of whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion

for new trial following a default judgment is governed by the three-pronged test set

out by the Texas Supreme Court in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133


                                         24
S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939). To be entitled to a new trial, the movant must show that

(1) his failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference,

but the result of an accident or mistake, (2) the motion for new trial sets up a

meritorious defense, and (3) granting the motion will occasion no undue delay or

otherwise injure the non-defaulting party. Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons

Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 685 (Tex. 2002). When a movant meets all three elements

of the Craddock test, the trial court abuses its discretion if it does not grant a new

trial.    Bitter v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, Nos. 02-12-00197-CV to

02-12-00199-CV, 2014 WL 1999315, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 15, 2014,

no pet.) (mem. op.).

         The first Craddock element is satisfied when the movant’s factual assertions,

“if true, negate intentional or consciously indifferent conduct by the defendant and

the factual assertions are not controverted by the plaintiff.” Milestone Operating,

Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex. 2012). Courts consider “the

knowledge and acts of the particular defendant to determine whether a failure to

answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference,” but due to

mistake or accident. In re Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716, 721 (Tex. 2021). Conscious

indifference means more than mere negligence and has been defined to mean “the

failure to take action that would seem obvious to a reasonable person under the same

circumstances.” McLeod v. Gyr, 439 S.W.3d 639, 655 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014,


                                           25
pet. denied). In determining this issue, we look at all of the evidence in the record.

Id.

B.    Analysis

      In his motion to set aside default judgment and for new trial, as on appeal,

Diogu asserted that his failure to attend trial in this case was not due to conscious

indifference, but rather, because his rule 18a motion to recuse Judge Brown was

pending and the Texas Supreme Court had assigned it to Judge Trapp for

consideration. Diogu asserts that he “believed that it was unnecessary for him to

appear for trial since Judge Trapp has not ruled on the recusal motion.” He also

points to an email sent from Judge Gonzales’s staff attorney to Judge Brown’s

executive assistant on January 26, 2024, copying the parties, which stated: “We

received the attached Motions13 yesterday. . . . Mr. Diogu has filed a Motion to

Disqualify Judge Brown. In light of our fast approaching trial, Judge Gonzales

wanted to ensure you knew about this so this can be expedited, if possible. Please

let me know if you need anything from the Court.” According to Diogu, after he

received the email, “he believed that the trial would not [be held] since Judge

Gonzales was requesting clearance from the 11th Administrative Judicial Region of

Texas to expedite the recusal decision.”



13
      The motions attached to the email were (1) Diogu’s motion to disqualify Judge
      Brown; (2) the Commission’s response to the motion; and (3) a proposed order.

                                           26
      In its response to Diogu’s new trial motion, the Commission contested

Diogu’s assertion that he believed his motion to disqualify Judge Brown would

prohibit Judge Gonzales from proceeding with the jury trial. In support its position,

the Commission pointed to the following evidence:

      • After considering Diogu’s motion for trial continuance filed on
        November 3, 2023, Judge Gonzales issued an order granting trial
        continuance in part, notice of hearing date, and new trial order
        setting the trial for January 30, 2024, at 9:00 a.m., and setting the
        pretrial hearing for January 26, 2024;
      • After Diogu’s motion to recuse/disqualify Judge Gonzales had been
        denied, on January 25, 2024, Judge Gonzales’s staff attorney
        emailed the parties that the pretrial hearing would go forward on
        January 26 [“Per Judge Gonzales’ Order – we will see you tomorrow
        at 9:30am via ZOOM.”];

      • At the pretrial hearing on January 26, 2024, Judge Gonzales denied
        Diogu’s emergency motion for continuance of the trial setting and
        specifically advised the parties several times that the trial would go
        forward on January 30;14 and



14
      At the hearing, the following exchange occurred:
             [Diogu]: As I said, I’m not ready for the trial on Tuesday. I’m just
             letting the Judge know that.
             [The Court]: Okay. Right. And I’ve ruled on that [Diogu’s motion for
             continuance] and that has been denied.
             ....
             [The Court]: Diogu, did you present a motion in limine? I don’t think
             I saw one.
             [Diogu]: Not yet.
             [The Court]: Okay. Well, obviously, we’re picking a jury on Tuesday.
             The jury, I think, comes in at 10:00, as I recall.
             ....

                                          27
      • On January 29, 2024, Diogu filed a motion for stay of the January
        30, 2024 trial setting with this Court in connection with a petition
        for writ of mandamus, demonstrating he knew the trial was going
        forward; the petition was denied the same day.

      A movant satisfies his burden as to the first Craddock element when his

factual assertions, if true, negate intentional or consciously indifferent conduct by

the defendant and those factual assertions are not controverted by the plaintiff. See

Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex. 2006).

When controverted, as here, the question of whether a movant’s failure to act was

intentional or the result of conscious indifference is a fact question to be resolved by

the trial court. Estate of Pollack v. McMurrey, 858 S.W.2d 388, 391 (Tex. 1993).

The trial court “may generally believe all, none, or part of a witness’s testimony

[and] can reasonably believe, based on contradictory evidence, that there was

intentional or consciously indifferent conduct on the part of the movant.” Lynch v.

Lynch, 540 S.W.3d 107, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). In

light of this contradictory evidence, the trial court could have disbelieved Diogu’s

explanation and concluded that he did not negate conscious indifference to appearing

at trial. See Milestone Operating, 388 S.W.3d at 310.




             [The Court]: All right. So here’s the deal, Mr. Diogu. On Tuesday
             morning, we’re starting to pick a jury in Fort Bend County.

                                          28
      The trial court could have also disbelieved Diogu’s assertion that he thought

the jury trial would not proceed based on the email from Judge Gonzales’s staff

attorney to Judge Brown’s assistant regarding expedited consideration of Diogu’s

motion to disqualify Judge Brown. First, as previously discussed, Diogu’s motion

was seeking to disqualify Judge Brown, not Judge Gonzales, and therefore would

not affect Judge Gonzales’s ability to move forward. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a.

Second, contrary to Diogu’s assertion, there is nothing to suggest that Judge

Gonzales was “requesting clearance from the 11th Administrative Judicial Region

of Texas to expedite the recusal decision,” as evidenced by the fact that Judge

Gonzales proceeded to trial before the motion was decided. Third, after receipt of

the January 25, 2024 email, Diogu was notified that the pretrial hearing would go

forward. Further, at the pretrial hearing, Judge Gonzales denied Diogu’s emergency

motion for continuance of the trial setting and advised the parties that the trial would

go forward on January 30, 2024. Finally, to the extent that Diogu asserts that he

believed that his request that Judge Brown reconsider her denial of his motion to

recuse Judge Gonzales meant the trial would not proceed, the trial court could

reasonably have found that this factual assertion did not negate conscious

indifference. Nothing in rule 18a or the case law interpreting it supports Diogu’s

contention that the trial court could not proceed with the trial while a motion for

reconsideration was pending. Indeed, this Court previously rejected a similar


                                          29
argument raised by Diogu in a case in which he was a party. See Diogu, 2015 WL

3982531, at *3.

      On this record, the trial court reasonably could have found that Diogu’s

explanation did not negate conscious indifference to appearing at trial.15 We hold

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for new trial.

See Dolgencorp. 288 S.W.3d at 926.

      We overrule Diogu’s fifth issue.

      All pending motions are dismissed as moot.

                                     Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.



                                                Kristin M. Guiney
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guiney, and Morgan.




15
      Because resolution of Craddock’s first element is dispositive, we do not address the
      remaining two elements. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; see also Century Sports Wears,
      Inc. v. Wallis Bank, No. 02-20-00201-CV, 2021 WL 1685957, at *2 (Tex. App.—
      Fort Worth Apr. 29, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[W]e will uphold the denial of
      the motion for new trial if the evidence in the appellate record supports the denial
      based on a failure to satisfy any of the three Craddock elements.”).

                                           30