In Re Adeel Zaidi, A.K. Chagla and Prestige Consulting D/B/A Turnaround Management Group

Supreme Court of Texas
                               ══════════
                                No. 24-0245
                               ══════════

      In re Adeel Zaidi, A.K. Chagla and Prestige Consulting
              d/b/a Turnaround Management Group,
                                   Relators

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
           On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

                          Argued October 7, 2025

       JUSTICE DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court.

       Justice Bland did not participate in the decision.

       In this original proceeding, the relators challenge an order
disqualifying their attorney because his legal assistant previously
worked for the opposing side.          A longstanding bright-line rule for
side-switching legal staff requires disqualification unless minimal
prophylactic measures were undertaken to safeguard prior client
confidences from the risk of inadvertent disclosure. 1 At the inception of



       1 Phx. Founders, Inc. v. Marshall, 887 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. 1994) (orig.

proceeding); Grant v. Thirteenth Ct. of Appeals, 888 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Tex.
1994) (orig. proceeding); see In re RSR Corp. (RSR II), 568 S.W.3d 663, 664
(Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing that the rule’s application is limited
employment, the nonlawyer must be instructed not to work on matters
worked on in prior employment. The relators acknowledge there is no
evidence this occurred. But they argue the rule does not apply because
the legal assistant was not switching sides when she was hired and did
not work on the matter until six years later. They also assert that the
real parties in interest waived their right to seek disqualification by not
promptly filing their motion after their counsel received e-filing
notifications listing the legal assistant’s name.
       We disagree. We hold that (1) regardless of whether a nonlawyer
was switching sides when hired, that employee must be admonished at
some time before commencing work on a later-arising conflict for the
employing firm to avoid disqualification and (2) the e-filing notifications
do not conclusively establish waiver. We deny the mandamus petition.
                               I. Background
       The underlying lawsuit began in 2009. Relators Adeel Zaidi, A.K.
Chagla, and Prestige Consulting, Inc. are the defendants, and real
parties in interest Apex Katy Physicians, LLC and its managing
member Pankaj Shah are the plaintiffs. Shah was initially represented
by Fred Wahrlich with Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr, P.C. Wahrlich’s
former legal assistant is at the center of this disqualification dispute. 2


to “side-switching legal staff”); In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 353-54 (Tex.
1998) (orig. proceeding) (describing the Phoenix Founders “bright-line rule”).
       2 Although the plaintiffs use the term “legal assistant,” the defendants

refer to her as a “legal secretary” at their counsel’s firm. For consistency, we
use the former term. In this type of inquiry, “we take a functional approach,
looking not only to labels and job titles but also to the side-switching
employee’s duties at the original employer.” In re RSR Corp. (RSR I), 475




                                       2
       From 2009 to 2011, that legal assistant worked on the plaintiffs’
side of the case for Wahrlich and Munsch Hardt. During that time, she
“actively” participated in “strategic communications and key attorney
work product,” drafted and filed documents, took part in “several
hundred” privileged attorney–client communications, and attended
meetings—including some where Andrew Meade was present as counsel
for the other plaintiff, Apex Katy Physicians. Those discussions and
work product, Shah later averred, concerned “issues that remain central
to the litigation now.” In 2011, the legal assistant left Munsch Hardt to
work for Hicks Thomas LLP, which did not represent any party at that
time. Two years later, Wahrlich and Munsch Hardt withdrew from
representing Shah, and Meade and his firm now represent both
plaintiffs.
       After a bench trial, the court rendered judgment in the plaintiffs’
favor. Around that time, the defendants hired attorney Robin Harrison
to represent them on appeal, and in 2016, the court of appeals reversed
and remanded the case for a new trial. 3 That same year, Harrison joined
Hicks Thomas—five years after that firm had hired Wahrlich’s legal
assistant. When Hicks Thomas screened Harrison for conflicts, the
instant matter was not flagged because the firm did not track the legal
assistant’s prior work. Significantly, as the defendants acknowledge,


S.W.3d 775, 780-81 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); see Grant, 888 S.W.2d at
467-68 (applying the Phoenix Founders rule to a “legal secretary”). There is no
dispute about the legal assistant’s duties, label, and title with her original
employer.
       3 See Zaidi v. Shah, 502 S.W.3d 434, 448 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).




                                      3
there is no evidence that Hicks Thomas or Harrison instructed her not
to work on cases she had worked on in her prior employment.
       Between 2017 and 2022, the legal assistant worked on this case
with Harrison on thirteen occasions, performing “limited secretarial
services” when his regular assistant was unavailable. As part of this
work, she filed two case documents in March 2022. Those documents
were electronically served on Meade and members of his firm, and the
e-filing notifications listed the legal assistant’s name as the filer on
Harrison’s behalf.
       In January 2023, Shah’s representative recognized the legal
assistant’s name on one of the notifications. Shah and Meade both
averred this was the time they first became aware that Wahrlich’s
former legal assistant was working for Hicks Thomas. After researching
whether this constituted a conflict, Meade notified Harrison and
requested information on Hicks Thomas’s screening measures.
Harrison responded that the legal assistant did not recollect her prior
work on the matter, had not shared any confidential information with
him, and would be screened from the matter going forward. But the
plaintiffs considered these steps too little, too late and moved to
disqualify Harrison and Hicks Thomas in early March. The trial court
granted the motion, and the court of appeals summarily denied relief. 4
The defendants now petition this Court for mandamus relief. 5

       4 716 S.W.3d 702 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024).

       5 After oral argument, we abated the proceeding to allow a successor

trial judge to reconsider the original ruling. See TEX. R. APP. P. 7.2(b). Because
the successor judge denied the defendants’ motion for reconsideration, we have
lifted the abatement and reinstated the case to the active docket.




                                        4
                               II. Discussion
       No adequate appellate remedy exists to rectify the erroneous
disqualification of counsel, so if the trial court’s disqualification order
was a clear abuse of discretion, mandamus relief will issue. 6            That
standard is not satisfied here because the defendants failed to establish
that denial of the disqualification motion was the only legally
permissible outcome. 7
                                      A.
       Our profession recognizes few duties more important than
protecting client confidences. Preserving those confidences is “not an
option” but rather “of paramount importance.” 8 This duty rests on the
foundational premise that “[f]ree discussion should prevail between
lawyer and client in order for the lawyer to be fully informed and for the
client to obtain the full benefit of the legal system,” 9 which “ultimately
serves the broader societal interest of effective administration of
justice.” 10 Client confidences must be zealously guarded because fears


       6 See RSR I, 475 S.W.3d at 778.

       7 See In re Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd., 603 S.W.3d 53, 56 (Tex. 2019) (orig.

proceeding).
       8   In re George, 28 S.W.3d 511, 517 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT
1.05(a)–(b) (imposing a duty on lawyers to protect confidential client
information), cmt. 1 (“[T]he proper functioning of the legal system require[s]
the preservation by the lawyer of confidential information of one who has
employed or sought to employ the lawyer.”), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE,
tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9).
       9 TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.05 cmt. 1.

       10 Paxton v. City of Dallas, 509 S.W.3d 247, 250 (Tex. 2017).




                                       5
about potential disclosure would imperil the free flow of information—
especially if a client is concerned that the information may later appear
in an adversarial proceeding. 11 Once a secret has been disclosed, the
proverbial bell cannot be unrung.
       Because lawyers often employ assistants to aid in the rendition of
professional services, legal staff are privy to confidences and may be a
later source of inadvertent or deliberate disclosure. 12 To help “clients
feel more secure” and “guard the integrity of the legal practice by
removing undue suspicion that clients’ interests are not being fully
protected,” 13 we have established certain presumptions for nonlawyers
who are directly supervised by attorneys and retained to assist with
litigation. 14 If a nonlawyer worked on the other side of a matter in a
prior employment, there is (1) a conclusive presumption that confidences
were obtained from the prior representation and (2) a rebuttable
presumption that those confidences were shared with the new
employer. 15 The latter presumption is rebuttable for nonlawyers, in



       11 See NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex. 1989)

(“[T]rust necessary in any attorney–client relationship is destroyed if the client
must be concerned that any information given the attorney may appear later
in an adversarial proceeding.”), abrogated on other grounds by In re Thetford,
574 S.W.3d 362, 373 n.16 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
       12 See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 5.03 cmt. 1.

       13 Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 131 (Tex. 1996)

(orig. proceeding).
       14 RSR I, 475 S.W.3d at 780; Phx. Founders, 887 S.W.2d at 835.

       15 In re Guar. Ins. Servs., Inc., 343 S.W.3d 130, 134 (Tex. 2011) (orig.

proceeding).




                                        6
contrast to lawyers, 16 because of concerns about their employment
mobility and “the prejudice and economic harm that could result to a
client” from the harsh result of disqualification in that scenario. 17 But
if a lawyer at the new firm directed the nonlawyer to work on the matter,
“‘including clerical work,’” that presumption is “not rebuttable unless the
assigning lawyer should not have known of the conflict.” 18
       When these presumptions apply and are not rebutted, a court
must disqualify counsel. 19 Because disqualification is a severe remedy
that can “result in immediate and palpable harm, disrupt trial court
proceedings, and deprive a party of the right to have counsel of choice,” 20


       16 See In re Mitcham, 133 S.W.3d 274, 276 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)

(“For attorneys, there is an irrebuttable presumption they gain confidential
information on every case at the firm where they work (whether they work on
them or not), and an irrebuttable presumption they share that information
with the members of a new firm.” (citations omitted)). But see TEX.
DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.10(a)(2) (eff. Oct. 1, 2024) (providing for
other associated lawyers of a firm to avoid the prohibition against representing
a client under certain circumstances by timely screening a disqualified lawyer,
apportioning no fee to that lawyer, and giving prompt written notice to any
affected former client).
       17 In re Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P., 320 S.W.3d 819, 825

(Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); In re Am. Home Prods. Corp., 985 S.W.2d 68, 75
(Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding); Phx. Founders, 887 S.W.2d at 835.
       18 Guar. Ins., 343 S.W.3d at 134 (quoting Columbia Valley, 320 S.W.3d

at 828).
       19  See In re Turner, 542 S.W.3d 553, 555-56 (Tex. 2017) (orig.
proceeding) (“A trial court must grant a motion to disqualify a firm whose
nonlawyer employee previously worked for opposing counsel if the nonlawyer
(1) obtained confidential information about the matter while working at the
opposing firm and (2) then shared that information with her current firm.”).
       20In re Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2002) (orig.
proceeding).




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we have additionally required a demonstration of prejudice before an
attorney may be disqualified in other contexts. 21              In this context,
however, actual prejudice is not required because it is a “virtually
insurmountable burden” for a prior client to show that its counsel’s
former employee revealed confidences to that client’s detriment. 22 The
presumed sharing of confidences is the prejudice; to conclude otherwise
would defeat the purposes of the presumptions. 23
       The shared-confidences presumption is therefore “rebutted not by
denials of disclosure, but by prophylactic measures assuring that legal
assistants do not work on matters related to their prior employment,” 24


       21 See, e.g., Murrin Bros., 603 S.W.3d at 57 (requiring a showing of

prejudice “[e]ven if a violation of the disciplinary rules is established”); Meador,
968 S.W.2d at 351 (requiring a weighing of prejudice “where a lawyer, through
no wrongdoing of his or her own, receives an opponent’s privileged materials”).
       22 Grant, 888 S.W.2d at 467 (“[A]ny rule focusing on actual disclosure

would place a virtually insurmountable burden on the party seeking
disqualification, since the only persons who know whether confidences were
actually shared will generally be the very lawyers seeking to avoid
disqualification.”); cf. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.9 cmt. 3 (“A
former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by
the lawyer to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential
information to use in the subsequent matter.”); Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 131 (“[I]t
would always be virtually impossible for a former client to prove that attorneys
in the same firm had not shared confidences.”).
       23   See Phx. Founders, 887 S.W.2d at 834-35 (noting that these
presumptions serve “to prevent the moving party from being forced to reveal
the very confidences sought to be protected” and “while a court must ordinarily
presume that some sharing will take place, the challenged firm may rebut this
presumption by showing that sufficient precautions have been taken to guard
against any disclosure”); cf. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 132 (recognizing the
“difficulty in proving a misuse of confidences, and the anxiety that a misuse
may occur”).
       24 Mitcham, 133 S.W.3d at 276.




                                         8
which “encourages institutional measures to guard against any
disclosure, whether deliberate or inadvertent.” 25 We have repeatedly
emphasized that two preventative measures must be shown and are “the
only way” to overcome the rebuttable presumption:
      (1) to instruct the legal assistant “not to work on any
      matter on which the [legal assistant] worked during the
      prior employment, or regarding which the [legal assistant]
      has information relating to the former employer’s
      representation,” and (2) to “take other reasonable steps to
      ensure that the [legal assistant] does not work in
      connection with matters on which the [legal assistant]
      worked during the prior employment, absent client
      consent.” 26
The first prong, which is plain and simple enough, will be the focus of
our analysis below. The second prong’s “other reasonable steps” must
include, “at a minimum, formal, institutionalized screening measures
that render the possibility of the nonlawyer having contact with the file
less likely.” 27 But whether these screening measures actually worked is
not determinative. 28   Instead, we have equated this requirement to
“effective screening,” and courts ultimately look to whether the second
firm “‘has taken measures sufficient to reduce the potential for misuse




      25 Grant, 888 S.W.2d at 467.

      26 Am. Home Prods., 985 S.W.2d at 75 (quoting Phx. Founders, 887

S.W.2d at 835); see Turner, 542 S.W.3d at 556 (“only by a showing” (quoting
Columbia Valley, 320 S.W.3d at 824)); RSR I, 475 S.W.3d at 780 (“only be
overcome by”); Guar. Ins., 343 S.W.3d at 134 (“only way”).
      27 Columbia Valley, 320 S.W.3d at 826.

      28 Guar. Ins., 343 S.W.3d at 135.




                                     9
of confidences to an acceptable level.’” 29 In evaluating this second prong,
we have directed courts to take a “flexib[le]” approach and employ a
“fact-intensive, multi-factor inquiry.” 30
       Together, these distinct requirements—an instruction and
effective screening—“minimize the danger” that a legal assistant will
inappropriately convey confidential information, even inadvertently. 31
Strict adherence is required. 32 These steps align with a supervising
lawyer’s obligation under our disciplinary rules (1) to “make reasonable
efforts to ensure” a nonlawyer employee’s conduct “is compatible with
the professional obligations of the lawyer” and (2) to instruct the
nonlawyer “regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating
to representation of the client.” 33 As we have said before, “this is a small


       29 Id. at 134-35 (quoting Phx. Founders, 887 S.W.2d at 836).

       30 Id. at 135-36.

       31 Am. Home Prods., 985 S.W.2d at 75; see Turner, 542 S.W.3d at 557

n.2 (“Whether the subsequent screening measures were effective is a question
separate from the provision of the preliminary instruction.”).
       32 Am. Home Prods., 985 S.W.2d at 76.

       33 TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 5.03(a) & cmts. 1–2.           This
general obligation also extends to the employing law firm. See id. R. 1.06
cmt. 19 (“A law firm is not prohibited from representing a client . . . merely
because a nonlawyer employee of the firm . . . has a conflict of interest arising
from prior employment . . . . But the firm must ordinarily screen the person
with the conflict from any personal participation in the matter to prevent the
person’s communicating to others in the firm confidential information that the
person and the firm have a legal duty to protect.”); id. R. 5.03 cmt. 2 (“Each
lawyer in a position of authority in a law firm . . . should make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the organization has in effect measures giving reasonable
assurance that the conduct of nonlawyers employed . . . by . . . the firm . . . is
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.”).




                                       10
burden when balanced against the threat of confidences being
revealed.” 34
                                       B.
       At   first blush,     our   precedent     straightforwardly     requires
disqualification in this case because the legal assistant worked on both
sides with no prior instruction. She is conclusively presumed to have
obtained client confidences at the first firm (Munsch Hardt) and, at a
minimum, rebuttably presumed to have shared those confidences at the
second firm (Hicks Thomas). Plaintiff Shah never consented to the legal
assistant working on the matter at Hicks Thomas, and the required
instruction was not provided before she worked on the case for that firm.
In Turner, we held that “if a firm fails to establish that it met the first
prong by instructing the nonlawyer employee to refrain from working on
any conflicted matters, we need not reach the effectiveness of the firm’s




        In 2024, we adopted a new version of rule 1.10, which provides for the
timely screening of disqualified attorneys under certain circumstances. Id.
R. 1.10(a)(2); see supra note 16. In a comment, we noted that “[p]aragraph (a)
also does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm if the person
prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or
legal secretary.” Id. R. 1.10 cmt. 3. This version of the rule was not in effect
at the time of the trial court’s disqualification order. Nor does it change the
minimal preventative requirements to protect confidences our case law has
established for side-switching nonlawyers. Cf. id. Preamble: Terminology &
cmt. 6 (eff. Oct. 1, 2024) (defining “Screened” to include “the timely imposition
of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the
circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to
protect” and commenting that “[s]creening should include firm staff”).
       34 Columbia Valley, 320 S.W.3d at 828.




                                       11
screening measures under the second step,” and the disqualification
motion must be granted. 35 So too here.
       The defendants do not ask us to overrule any precedent. Instead,
in three points, they attempt to distinguish our authority and argue that
no instruction was required given the facts of this case.             On close
examination, we find these arguments wanting.
       First, the defendants claim an admonishment would have had
“little effect” when the legal assistant was hired because the conflict did
not arise until years later. We cannot accept that distinction. In our
experience, paralegals, secretaries, and other legal assistants aiding the
bar are, by and large, commendably diligent, respectful, and ethical. For
these employees, an instruction is vital because they usually “do not
have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline.” 36 We
are confident most legal staff, when admonished, will faithfully comply
to the best of their abilities and not work on conflicted matters, including
those that arise years later. 37 Accordingly, an instruction when a firm


       35 542 S.W.3d at 556-57.

       36 TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 5.03 cmt. 1; see Richard E.

Flamm, Lawyer Disqualification: Disqualification of Attorneys and Law Firms
§ 28.7 (2d ed. 2014) (“[B]ecause non-lawyers may not always be as sensitive to
the importance of safeguarding client confidences as attorneys are, there may
be even more reason to worry about the sanctity of confidences in a case[]
where a non-lawyer has moved to another firm than when an attorney has
done so.”).
       37 Because a small number of legal staff may not satisfy this ideal, firms

must do more than merely admonish the nonlawyer, as we have noted above.
See Columbia Valley, 320 S.W.3d at 826 (“[A] simple informal admonition to a
nonlawyer employee not to work on a matter on which the employee previously
worked for opposing counsel, even if repeated twice and with threat of




                                      12
hires a nonlawyer is a best practice to guard against disclosures and
conflicts. That said, if the conflict did not exist at that time, a failure to
instruct may be remedied later to avoid disqualification. As we
explained in Turner, “regardless of whether the second firm knows of
the precise conflict,” the nonlawyer must be instructed “to refrain from
working on conflicted matters before she commences work on a
particular matter”—not necessarily at the time of hiring. 38
       This makes sense. Requiring an instruction before a nonlawyer
commences any work on a conflicted matter is a bright-line rule that
ensures clear and predictable outcomes, minimizes collateral litigation
over disqualification, and enables firms to structure their practices
accordingly. 39 If instructed, nonlawyers are put on notice of their ethical


termination, does not satisfy the ‘other reasonable measures’ a firm must take
to properly shield an employee from the litigation.”). Moreover, these
institutionalized screening measures help all employees at a firm understand
its “expectations for guarding against conflicts of interest” and preserving
confidences. Id.
       38  542 S.W.3d at 557. Our opinions have at times used language
implying that, consistent with best practices, the time of hiring is the relevant
time for an instruction. See, e.g., id. (“The failure to provide this general
instruction to a new employee creates an unacceptable risk of disclosure[.]”);
Phx. Founders, 887 S.W.2d at 835 (noting that the “newly-hired paralegal”
should be admonished). But we have never held that an instruction must occur
at that time to avoid disqualification, especially when the conflict arises later.
       39 We acknowledge that this may lead firms and their human resources

departments to adopt pro forma instructions designed to merely satisfy this
rule. Although a perfunctory instruction may leave a less indelible imprint,
the admonishment still provides valuable information and training to a new
nonlawyer employee. We hope firms will go beyond these minimal
requirements and instruct their legal staff in a manner to convey the
significance of guarding against conflicts and protecting prior client
confidences. See, e.g., Guar. Ins., 343 S.W.3d at 136 (noting that the firm




                                       13
obligations and are reasonably likely to inform the supervising lawyer
when assigned work creates a conflict. 40 To this end, it is immaterial
whether the instruction is given when an employee is hired or at any
other time before the employee commences work on the conflicted
matter.    But once a nonlawyer works on the matter at a lawyer’s
direction, the shared-confidences presumption is “not rebuttable unless
the assigning lawyer should not have known of the conflict.” 41 Absent a
prior instruction, it would be difficult (if not impossible) to demonstrate
that the assigning lawyer should not have known of the conflict. 42
       Applying Turner’s rule, we conclude that the defendants failed to
rebut the shared-confidences presumption. The conflict arose in 2016
when Harrison joined Hicks Thomas, and the legal assistant became a



instructed the nonlawyer to refrain from working on matters on which he had
worked previously in multiple ways: his hiring orientation, confidentiality
agreement, and employee handbook, which directed him “to notify his
supervising attorney immediately if he realized a conflict”).
       40 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 123 cmt. f

(A.L.I. 2000) (“Nonlawyer employees of a law office owe duties of confidentiality
by reason of their employment.”). If after being instructed, the nonlawyer did
not remember the conflicted matter when asked to work on it, the employing
firm may still be able to avoid disqualification by demonstrating that it had
effective screening measures in place, even if the measures failed to actually
screen the nonlawyer. Guar. Ins., 343 S.W.3d at 135-36.
       41 Guar. Ins., 343 S.W.3d at 134.

       42 See id. at 136 (holding that there was “no evidence the supervising

attorney reasonably should have known about the conflict” based, in part, on
the fact that the nonlawyer had been properly instructed even though he forgot
about the matter and did not inform the lawyer about the conflict). Under our
disciplinary rules, the obligation to instruct lies not just with the firm, but also
with the lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer. TEX.
DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT 5.03(a) & cmts. 1–2; see supra note 33.




                                        14
side-switching nonlawyer as a matter of fact when she commenced work
on the case the following year. 43 Thus, a failure to instruct the legal
assistant when she was hired in 2011 could have been remedied at any
time before 2017, 44 and disqualification could possibly have been
avoided. But as the defendants concede, no evidence supports that this
occurred.
       Second, the defendants advocate for a de minimis exception to
this rule. In their view, a prior instruction was not required because no
genuine threat of disclosure existed given the length of time between
when the legal assistant worked on each side, the type of work she
performed at Hicks Thomas, 45 the fact that the case had already been
tried, and Harrison’s testimony that no confidences were disclosed to
him. 46 We disagree. Turner’s rule is easily administrable and imposes


       43 Although the legal assistant was not formally assigned to work with

Harrison on the case, he instructed her to perform tasks on the matter. See
Columbia Valley, 320 S.W.3d at 827-28 (“We fail to see a meaningful
distinction between ‘assigning’ a nonlawyer to a case versus having the
nonlawyer perform work on the case without a formal assignment.”).
       44 For example, a firm could employ annual conflict reviews or trainings

for its legal staff as additional prophylactic measures to help ensure they have
been properly admonished. Although our cases do not necessarily require such
steps, the potential consequence of disqualification may incentivize these or
similar “institutional measures to guard against any disclosure, whether
deliberate or inadvertent.” Grant, 888 S.W.2d at 467.
       45 But see id. at 468 (noting that limited tasks “such as typing, filing,

and scheduling” still “posed an unacceptable danger of a prohibited
disclosure”).
       46 From our review of the record, we have no reason to doubt Harrison’s

testimony. But our precedent has determined that the legal system is best
served by a rule that focuses on prophylactic measures to address genuine




                                      15
only a slight burden on firms as they discharge the paramount duty to
protect confidences. When possible, we strive to avoid “inviting greater
complexity and uncertainty into the law by drawing ever finer
distinctions in an effort to account for the factual vagaries that so often
test the edges of bright-line rules.” 47 What is more, our test already
incorporates de minimis considerations in the second prong’s
multi-factor inquiry to determine whether “other reasonable steps” were
taken. 48 As we said in Turner, however, “that inquiry assumes the
second firm provided the initial instruction to the nonlawyer employee
to refrain from working on conflicted matters.” 49



threats of disclosure and not on whether actual disclosures occurred. See Am.
Home Prods., 985 S.W.2d at 75 (recognizing that unequivocal and
uncontroverted testimony “from lawyers that a legal secretary did not reveal
anything to them” does not raise a fact question on that issue and is no
evidence to overcome the rebuttable presumption).
       47 Myers-Woodward, LLC v. Underground Servs. Markham, LLC, 716

S.W.3d 461, 469 (Tex. 2025); see Ronald D. Rotunda, Conflicts Problems When
Representing Members of Corporate Families, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655,
667-68 (1997) (explaining that in the disqualification context, “there is a need
for brighter lines and clearer tests so that firms know what to do,” and law
firms and clients “understandably[] would like to know what the rules are so
that they can obey them before a disqualification motion is ever filed”).
       48 Columbia Valley, 320 S.W.3d at 824 (emphasis added) (quoting Am.

Home Prods., 985 S.W.2d at 75); see id. at 824-25 (“To determine whether the
screening used by a firm is effective, we have said that the following factors
may be considered: (1) the substantiality of the relationship between the
former and current matters; (2) the time elapsing between the matters; (3) the
size of the firm; (4) the number of individuals presumed to have confidential
information; (5) the nature of their involvement in the former matter; and
(6) the timing and features of any measures taken to reduce the danger of
disclosure.”).
       49 542 S.W.3d at 557 n.2.




                                      16
       Indeed, when a nonlawyer has worked on both sides of a case, we
have described this as “a serious conflict of interest,” raising significant
“concerns about client confidentiality and the integrity of the legal
system.” 50 Parties have every right to be worried about a genuine threat
of disclosure on learning that their counsel’s former employee, who had
been privy to confidences, is now employed by opposing counsel and has
actually worked on the same matter for the other side—here, for over
five years intermittently. 51 We decline the defendants’ invitation to
adopt a de minimis exception to Turner’s rule.
       Finally, the defendants contend that the trial court must weigh
the prejudices to each side before disqualifying counsel. No doubt, the
prejudice to the defendants resulting from the disqualification of their
counsel would rest heavily on the scales, if weighing were required. And
the defendants point to other contexts where we have required a
showing of actual prejudice; for example, when disqualification is based
on the violation of a disciplinary rule 52 or “where a lawyer, through no
wrongdoing of his or her own, receives an opponent’s privileged


       50 Columbia Valley, 320 S.W.3d at 826.

       51 See id.

       52 See  Murrin Bros., 603 S.W.3d at 57 (“Even if a violation of the
disciplinary rules is established, the party requesting disqualification must
also show it will suffer prejudice if disqualification is not granted.”); In re Users
Sys. Servs., Inc., 22 S.W.3d 331, 336-37 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (noting
that even if counsel “violated the ‘spirit’ of the rule,” his “actions did not cause
any prejudice that would require disqualification”); Ayres v. Canales, 790
S.W.2d 554, 557-58 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (requiring for disqualification
a demonstration of “actual prejudice . . . resulting from the opposing lawyer’s
service in the dual roles” as both counsel and witness in violation of the
disciplinary rules).




                                         17
materials.” 53 But we have never required proof of actual prejudice or a
weighing of prejudices when disqualification is based on the presumed
sharing of confidences by an attorney or side-switching nonlawyer. 54 As
already noted, this would defeat the purposes of the presumption
framework. 55 To show actual prejudice, a prior client would have to
disclose the very confidences it seeks to protect and then overcome an
almost insurmountable burden of showing that the confidences were
revealed to members of the second firm to the prior client’s harm. 56 We
have explained that it would be “virtually impossible” for a client to
demonstrate that his former attorney “revealed his confidences to his




       53 Meador, 968 S.W.2d at 351-52 (establishing factors that include the

weighing of prejudice to the parties but noting that “these factors apply only
when a lawyer receives an opponent’s privileged materials outside the normal
course of discovery”); see Murrin Bros., 603 S.W.3d at 57 (quoting one of the
Meador factors while generally noting that in “addition to the movant’s burden
to show prejudice, the trial court should also consider ‘the extent to which the
nonmovant will suffer prejudice from the disqualification of his or her
attorney’” (quoting Meador, 968 S.W.2d at 350)).
       54 E.g., Am. Home Prods., 985 S.W.2d at 75-77 (side-switching
nonlawyer); Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 131-32 (attorney); see Meador, 968 S.W.2d
at 351 (explaining that a court has the power “to disqualify an attorney even
though he or she has not violated a specific disciplinary rule”).
       55 See supra note 23 & accompanying text.

       56 George, 28 S.W.3d at 516-17; Grant, 888 S.W.2d at 467; see George,

28 S.W.3d at 517 (“To compel the client to show . . . the actual confidential
matters previously entrusted to the attorney and their possible value to the
present client would tear aside the protective cloak drawn about the
lawyer–client relationship.” (quoting T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1953))).




                                      18
harm, and he should not be required to do so.” 57 The same is true for
side-switching nonlawyers.
      The defendants’ proposed standard would also present other
intractable problems. For example, it may be difficult for a prior client
to remember what confidences had been disclosed when either the
events occurred long ago, as here, or involved a lengthy attorney–client
relationship. 58 And for corporate clients, the difficulty is compounded
because “several different people may have disclosed its confidences.” 59
Further, a side-switching nonlawyer’s knowledge of confidences is
unlike privileged materials obtained outside the discovery process.
Privileged materials are “tangible” and “can be examined” to separate
tainted and untainted information. 60       As a result, “lesser means to
remedy the moving party’s harm” may be readily available. 61                In
contrast, a mind’s inner workings are often opaque and its contents not
easily partitioned. 62 Our presumptions best protect the confidences that


      57  Henderson v. Floyd, 891 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. 1995) (orig.
proceeding).
      58 George, 28 S.W.3d at 517.

      59 Id.

      60 Id. at 519.

      61 Nitla, 92 S.W.3d at 423 (noting that the moving party “could only

demonstrate that reviewing the [privileged] documents might have enabled
[opposing] counsel to identify four new witnesses to depose” and “less severe
measures, such as quashing depositions, could cure [the moving party]’s
alleged harm”).
      62 See George, 28 S.W.3d at 519 (“Unlike the contents of a lawyer’s mind,

work product is tangible and can be examined. Untainted work product can be
separated from tainted work product.”); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.




                                     19
may be contained therein. Accordingly, we hold that the presumed
sharing of confidences, if not rebutted, is the prejudice and trial courts
need not further weigh the prejudices for disqualification when a
nonlawyer has worked on both sides of a matter.
       At bottom, an instruction is a simple, but effective, first-line
defense in guarding against inadvertent or deliberate disclosure of
prior-client confidences. 63      Adhering to this modest requirement
“prevents litigation such as this that needlessly expends the time and
effort of the parties and the courts.” 64 Because no instruction was given
before the legal assistant worked on the conflicted matter, the trial court
properly exercised its discretion so long as the plaintiffs did not waive
their right to seek disqualification. We now address that issue.




Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 224 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978) (explaining that an inquiry
into whether actual confidences were disclosed “should be avoided whenever a
presumption can be utilized due to the unsatisfactory nature of the potential
evidence,” including “questionable reliance on ex parte representations made
in camera by the party seeking disqualification as to communicated
confidences”).
       63 Our two-prong framework requiring both an instruction and other

reasonable steps helps reduce the risk of disclosure to an acceptable level by
addressing two types of nonlawyers. Generally speaking, the first prong is
directed at ethical nonlawyers who will comply with instructions while the
fact-intensive second prong is geared toward forgetful, inattentive, or even
potentially rogue nonlawyers. See supra notes 37, 39, 48. However, an ethical
nonlawyer may be forgetful or careless at times—such is the lot of human
nature—and other reasonable steps provide guardrails to support an
instruction. And even a rogue nonlawyer may be more likely to abide if
admonished. Thus, both prongs are necessary, but neither is sufficient on its
own to satisfy the test.
       64 Am. Home Prods., 985 S.W.2d at 75.




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                                       C.
        When considering disqualification motions, “courts must adhere
to an exacting standard . . . to discourage their use as a dilatory trial
tactic.” 65   Consistent with this standard, a “[f]ailure to timely seek
disqualification constitutes waiver.” 66 Waiver primarily concerns the
movant’s intention, as it requires an “intentional relinquishment of a
right actually known, or intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming
that right.” 67 A disputed fact issue on intention precludes mandamus
relief, as “we may not make factual determinations in mandamus
proceedings.” 68
        The affidavits of plaintiff Shah and his counsel Meade attest that
they first became aware of the conflict in January 2023, when Shah’s
representative recognized the legal assistant’s name on an earlier
e-filing notification. The plaintiffs and their counsel also documented
their diligence after that time. Within a month, Meade researched the
issue, notified Harrison of the conflict, and requested information from
Hicks Thomas. When Harrison responded, the plaintiffs promptly filed




        65 RSR II, 568 S.W.3d at 666 (quoting Spears v. Fourth Ct. of Appeals,

797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding)).
        66 Id.Following our precedent, the parties frame this equitable issue
in terms of waiver.
        67 Id. (quoting Ulico Cas. Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 773, 778

(Tex. 2008)).
        68 RSR I, 475 S.W.3d at 778.




                                       21
a disqualification motion in early March. 69 We have held that around a
two-month delay in filing a disqualification motion does not constitute
waiver when there was evidence the movant acted diligently. 70 That is
the case here.
       The defendants do not focus on that two-month delay; instead,
they dispute when the plaintiffs became aware of the conflict. Under
the defendants’ theory, the plaintiffs were on notice, as a matter of law,
nearly a year earlier when the case documents with the e-filing
notifications listing the legal assistant’s name were filed in March 2022.
If so, an unexplained one-year delay before filing the disqualification
motion would be unquestionably dilatory. As the defendants would have
it, their evidence of the date the e-filing notifications were sent
conclusively overcomes Shah’s and Meade’s testimony. 71
       On this record, we cannot agree.           The defendants’ competing
evidence fails to establish as a matter of law that the plaintiffs were
aware of the conflict before January 2023. Notably, the March 2022
documents were served on Meade, not the legal assistant’s former



       69 See In re EPIC Holdings, Inc., 985 S.W.2d 41, 52-53 (Tex. 1998) (orig.

proceeding) (considering efforts to identify and resolve disqualification issues
between the opposing parties as relevant to whether the delay was timely).
       70 Am. Home Prods., 985 S.W.2d at 73 (collecting cases, noting the

movant’s diligence, and holding that “the delay in filing the motion to
disqualify, which was less than two months, as a matter of law did not
constitute a waiver under the facts of this case”).
       71 The defendants raise this point only as a question of law.       In this
Court, they have not identified a disputed fact question on this issue nor
argued that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the disqualification
motion on submission rather than conducting an oral evidentiary hearing.




                                       22
employer Munsch Hardt, which had not been involved in the case since
2013. And even if Meade had noticed the name or had constructive
notice of it, his awareness of the conflict does not necessarily follow
without two significant and unsupported inferential leaps. Meade first
would have had to recognize the name as being the same as Munsch
Hardt’s former legal assistant when the only record evidence of his
interactions with her was that they both attended some joint strategy
meetings from 2009 to 2011. Then, Meade would have had to recall that
she had worked on the same matter over a decade ago for Munsch Hardt
as Wahrlich’s legal assistant. 72 These unsubstantiated inferences do not
conclusively overcome Shah’s and Meade’s testimony that they first
became aware of the conflict in January 2023.
       We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in concluding that the plaintiffs timely sought disqualification.
                               III. Conclusion
       Disqualification is a harsh remedy, but the burden of employing
preventative measures to avoid this result is slight.            A firm must
admonish and take other reasonable measures to effectively screen a
side-switching nonlawyer from a conflicted matter. In this context, a
bright-line rule provides clear guidance to the bar and comfort to clients
that their confidences will be protected—a primary duty embedded in

       72 Meade testified to that effect in a subsequently filed declaration,

explaining that he “did not immediately recall [the legal assistant]’s full name”
until he was “reminded” of it in January 2023, “after which [he] recalled her
role at Munsch Hardt and her involvement in [their] meetings and discussions
of dispute strategy.” This testimony, however, is not necessary to our
disposition, and we do not rely on it here because the declaration had not been
filed when the trial court originally granted the disqualification motion.




                                       23
all facets of our legal system. Because the side-switching legal assistant
received no prior instruction and the plaintiffs were not, as a matter of
law, untimely in seeking disqualification, the trial court properly
exercised its discretion in granting the motion to disqualify.        We
therefore deny the petition for writ of mandamus.




                                        John P. Devine
                                        Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: April 10, 2026




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