Court Filings

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s temporary injunction that had blocked the Texas Department of State Health Services from treating manufactured delta-8 THC products as Schedule I controlled substances. The Department and its commissioner had amended Schedule I definitions after objecting to a federal rule; the Court held those amendments were within the commissioner’s broad, statutorily granted discretion and did not conflict unambiguously with the 2019 Texas Farm Bill. The Court also held the Administrative Procedure Act did not govern publication of schedule changes, and that sovereign immunity bars the vendors’ claims.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and held that the judicially created "positive steps" test cannot disqualify an unemployment benefits claimant for self-employment when the claimant has not actually performed services for wages. The case involved a claimant who, after leaving employment, formed a business entity, created a website, and spent money advertising but had not yet performed services or received earnings. The Court ruled that Section 4(l)(2)(B) of the Unemployment Compensation Law requires proof that services were performed for wages before applying the control and independence inquiry, so aspirational or preparatory acts alone cannot bar benefits.

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and held that the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) must apply a deferential standard when reviewing the New York City Water Board’s rates for voluntary “excess water.” The court concluded that DEC should assess whether the Water Board’s excess-water rates serve the Board’s economic and public policy goals and have a rational basis, rather than applying the statutory “fair and reasonable” test used for entitlement water. The court granted DEC’s motion for summary judgment and modified the judgment accordingly.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a Supreme Court judgment that had denied a CPLR article 78 petition by the Westchester Plaza Tenants Coalition challenging DHCR determinations that upheld a Rent Administrator's decision permitting an owner to modify pool and related facilities. The court found the DHCR's conclusion that the pool was not an essential service was arbitrary and capricious because the record showed the landlord maintained the pool on May 29, 1974, and charging fees for club membership alone did not remove the facility from the regulatory definition of essential services. The matter is remitted to DHCR for a new determination consistent with the opinion.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a lower court order that had remanded an NYC Housing Authority denial of a remaining family member (RFM) grievance. The petitioner, Eric Camacho, sought succession after his aunt (the tenant) died; NYCHA denied his claim because he did not meet the policy requirement of at least 12 months of continuous authorized occupancy prior to the tenant's death. The court held NYCHA's denial had a rational basis, rejected hardship and estoppel arguments, and found that a later change in NYCHA policy would not have altered the outcome.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reversed Supreme Court's declaration that Justin Ball is entitled to a civil jury trial to contest administrative charges seeking fines and revocation of his EMT license. The court held that the federal Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated against the states and therefore does not guarantee a civil jury in a state administrative licensure proceeding, and that New York's constitutional jury guarantee does not extend to regulatory license-revocation proceedings rooted in the statutory scheme governing professional licensure. The court granted the Department of Health's motion to dismiss and ended the injunction against the administrative process.

The California Supreme Court held that the Coastal Commission lacked appellate jurisdiction to overturn a San Luis Obispo County grant of a coastal development permit to Shear Development. The Court decided the proper review of the Commission’s jurisdictional claim — which depends on interpreting the county’s certified local coastal program (LCP) — is independent judgment, and no deference was warranted here. Applying the LCP text and extrinsic evidence, the Court concluded the proposed homesite is not in a sensitive coastal resource area and that the Commission’s alternate theory (that jurisdiction exists when a site lists multiple principal permitted uses) is incorrect. The Court reversed and directed issuance of a writ vacating the Commission’s decision and dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that Nationwide Energy Partners (NEP), a company that purchases electricity and resells it to apartment tenants using equipment it installs and maintains, is an "electric light company" and therefore a public utility subject to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO). The court concluded tenants qualify as "consumers" under R.C. 4905.03(C) and that NEP is plainly engaged in the business of supplying electricity because it buys power, sets resale prices, bills tenants, and may disconnect service. The Court reversed PUCO’s jurisdictional ruling and remanded for further proceedings on the remaining claims and tariff issues.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and remanded, holding that the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) timely sought an Attorney General opinion under the Public Information Act. Sierra Club had requested a large set of records on July 1, 2019. TCEQ emailed July 2 seeking clarification whether Sierra Club wanted confidential material released or would accept a narrowed response; Sierra Club declined. The Court held the ten-business-day clock began on July 2, the interagency-mail “mailbox rule” made TCEQ’s July 17 submission timely, and therefore TCEQ did not miss the statutory deadline. The case returns to the trial court to decide the merits of TCEQ’s claimed deliberative-process withholding privilege.