Court Filings

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District dismissed Constance Benavides’s appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 of Cameron County because she failed to meet appellate procedural requirements. The clerk’s record was overdue, and Benavides did not file the required docketing statement or inform the court that she paid or arranged to pay the clerk’s fee or was entitled to proceed without payment. After notice and a court order giving her ten days to comply, she did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and for failure to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and a court order.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed a pro se appeal filed on behalf of corporate entities because a nonlawyer cannot represent entities in court. After notifying the parties that an attorney must represent the corporations, counsel who filed an amended notice of appeal withdrew and no new attorney entered an appearance or filed a brief. The court concluded the entities failed to comply with directives to obtain counsel and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and failure to follow court orders.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed this appeal on April 9, 2026. Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. initially appealed a trial-court judgment but later obtained full relief when the trial court granted its post-judgment omnibus motion and entered a take-nothing judgment; Rush Truck moved to dismiss its portion of the appeal, which the court granted. The court also dismissed Ronald Joe Andrus, Jr.’s portion of the appeal for want of prosecution and failure to follow court directives after his counsel did not respond to requests, failed to pay filing fees, and failed to request or pay for the clerk’s record.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed an interlocutory appeal by Robert Berleth and his firm challenging the trial court’s denial of their plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss under Texas Rule 91a. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because Berleth, a court‑appointed turnover receiver, is not a "governmental unit" under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §§ 51.014(a)(8) and 101.001(3), so he cannot bring an interlocutory appeal. The court relied on statutory text and precedent distinguishing uniquely governmental organs from privately appointed receivers whose authority is limited to satisfying a specific judgment.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Ra Hermes Velthra’s appeal challenging a trial court’s finding that he could pay court costs. Velthra sought review under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(g) after a February 26, 2026 hearing, but the appellate court concluded Rule 145(g) does not permit a standalone interlocutory appeal. The court ordered Velthra to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed; he submitted the indigency order but no final judgment in the underlying case. Lacking jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal on April 8, 2026.

The court dismissed Bianca Fox's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Fox, pro se, filed a notice of appeal purporting to challenge a January 30, 2026 turnover order, but the clerk’s record contains only two interlocutory orders from that date — denial of her motion for protection and an order to comply with a subpoena — neither of which is an appealable final judgment or an authorized interlocutory appeal. The court gave Fox an opportunity to show cause why the appeal should proceed; she did not respond, so the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were denied as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Jacqueline Wilbourn’s appeal from a superior-court judgment in favor of Galadriel Enterprises because the court lacked jurisdiction. Wilbourn had appealed to the superior court from a magistrate-court judgment and then appealed the superior-court judgment to this Court, but she did not use the required discretionary-appeal procedures. The Court explained that de novo reviews of magistrate rulings and appeals in damage actions where the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by discretionary application, and noncompliance is jurisdictional, so the appeal was dismissed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the appellant's motion to withdraw the appeal in the case Jonathan Blanton v. Eric Spinks et al. The court released jurisdiction back to the trial court upon issuance of the order. No substantive ruling on the merits was made; the action simply ends the appellate proceeding and restores control of the case to the lower court.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in Aslam Gilani and Peak Amusement, LLC v. Epic Amusement, LLC for failure to file the required appellate brief and enumeration of errors. The appeal was docketed March 5, 2026; appellants requested and received an extension to April 7, 2026, with a warning that failure to file by 4:30 p.m. would result in dismissal. Because the appellants did not file the brief by the extended deadline, the court dismissed the appeal pursuant to its rules and controlling precedent.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Cedric Herbert’s original mandamus petition seeking an order requiring a trial judge to refer his recusal motion to another judge. The court explained that mandamus in the appellate courts is reserved for extremely rare cases because superior courts generally have authority to grant such extraordinary relief and the petitioner should first seek relief in the appropriate lower court. Because Herbert did not show he first petitioned the superior court and this case was not one of the rare exceptions, the Court of Appeals declined to exercise original jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

The First District Court of Appeals granted appellant Todd Colter’s motion for voluntary dismissal of his appeal against Ubican Global, Inc., because the parties settled. The court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and ordered that any other pending motions be dismissed as moot. No written opinion was issued; the panel issued a short per curiam memorandum disposing of the appeal on the agreed dismissal.

The First District of Texas dismissed Kenneth Steven Isbell’s appeal from a Harris County district court because he failed to pay or arrange payment for the clerk’s record fee and did not respond to the court’s notice that the appeal was subject to dismissal. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring payment or arrangement and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution, also denying as moot any pending motions. The decision was issued as a brief memorandum opinion by a three-justice panel.

The First District of Texas dismissed Dominique Cunningham’s appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of her suit against Justice of the Peace Steve Duble because Cunningham repeatedly failed to file an appellate brief that complied with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court struck her noncompliant briefs, gave her opportunities and extensions to file a corrected brief, and found her March 16, 2026 submission still deficient in essential content and formatting. Because she failed to cure the briefing defects, the court struck the corrected brief and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed Nikki Arnold’s appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 of Travis County because she failed to file her appellate brief. The brief was due February 11, 2026; the court notified Arnold on February 18 that she had until March 2 to respond or face dismissal for want of prosecution. No brief or extension motion was filed, so the appellate court dismissed the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed Jillian Warren’s appeal for want of prosecution because she failed to file her appellant brief, which was originally due March 2, 2026, and did not respond to the court’s notice requiring a satisfactory response by March 23, 2026. The court invoked Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(b) and entered dismissal on April 7, 2026. No substantive merits decision was reached because the appeal was dismissed for procedural noncompliance.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Tiffany Roseman's appeal from the superior court's dismissal of her petition for review because the court lacked jurisdiction. The case began in magistrate court, Roseman sought de novo review in superior court, and after the superior court dismissed her petition she appealed directly to this Court of Appeals. The Court held that appeals from superior-court de novo reviews of magistrate-court rulings require using the discretionary appeal procedures under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1), which Roseman did not follow, so the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Joseph Michael Hirsch's appeal for failure to comply with the Court's docketing and briefing rules. The appellant did not file the required enumeration of errors and brief within the time ordered by the Court, despite a specific March 17, 2026 order giving a March 27, 2026 deadline. Because the filings were not received by the court, the appeal was deemed abandoned and dismissed under the Court of Appeals rules cited in the order.

The Court of Appeals dismissed April Campbell’s application for discretionary review of a magistrate court dispossessory judgment because the court lacks jurisdiction. Columbia Park Citi obtained a magistrate judgment on February 25, 2026 awarding possession and $11,773.69 in past-due rent. Campbell filed for discretionary review on March 10, 2026, which was 13 days after the judgment. The court held that appeals in dispossessory actions must be filed within seven days, so Campbell’s filing was untimely and the Court declined to transfer the matter to the state or superior court.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Tony L. Ware’s direct appeal of a January 23, 2026 trial-court order that corrected a clerical error under OCGA § 9-11-60(g). The court found it lacked jurisdiction because the corrected order left issues pending in the trial court and was therefore not a final judgment subject to direct appeal. The court also rejected Ware’s arguments that the order dissolved an injunction or could be treated as a collateral attack under the collateral-order doctrine, explaining those paths required interlocutory application or were inapplicable here.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in A26A1231 because the appellant failed to comply with the Court's docketing notice and Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) by not filing an enumeration of errors and brief within the required time. The court had given a specific deadline of March 27, 2026, after an earlier order on March 17, 2026, but the appellant did not file the required documents. For these procedural violations, the Court concluded the appeal was abandoned and ordered it dismissed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed a direct discretionary appeal from a magistrate-court dispossessory judgment because it lacks jurisdiction. After the magistrate court granted Star Borrower SFR6 LP a writ of possession on March 11, 2026, defendants filed this application for discretionary appeal to the Court of Appeals. The court explained that appeals from magistrate courts are ordinarily taken by a new (de novo) appeal to the state or superior court under OCGA § 15-10-41(b)(1), and therefore the Court of Appeals may review such matters only after that intermediate review. The filing was transferred to the magistrate court for transmission to the state or superior court.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the appellant Star Venture Auto, LLC’s motion to withdraw its appeal in the case against Jacquelyn Taylor. By granting the motion, the appellate court released jurisdiction back to the trial court effective upon receipt of the order. The decision is procedural: the court did not address the merits of the underlying dispute but approved dismissal of the appeal and returned the matter to the trial court for further proceedings or finalization there.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted discretionary review of Akeno Reid’s challenge to trial-court orders denying his motions to vacate child support and contempt orders. After reviewing the full record and a related earlier appeal (A25A0917), the Court concluded that granting review was improvident and dismissed Reid’s appeal. The court did not address the merits of Reid’s claims and instead ended the appeal because discretionary review was inappropriate under the circumstances.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the Mulbahs' application for discretionary review in a dispossessory (eviction) case because it was untimely. After the magistrate ruled for defendant KL Capital, LLC, the Mulbahs sought review in superior court; that court dismissed their petition on 2026-02-12 and denied reconsideration on 2026-03-04. The Mulbahs filed for discretionary review on 2026-03-09, but Georgia law requires such appeals in dispossessory actions to be filed within seven days of the judgment, and a reconsideration motion does not extend that deadline. Because timeliness is jurisdictional, the court dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Payne’s appeal as a nullity because the appellant, Wesley Payne, had died before substitution of the estate occurred, and Georgia law treats further proceedings as void as to a deceased party until someone is substituted. The trial court had dismissed the case for discovery violations after Payne’s death; the appellate court held that actions taken after his death are void as to him. The court remanded for the trial court to resolve pending motions to substitute the estate and, if appropriate, to reconsider defendants’ dismissal motions.