Court Filings

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in full. Plaintiff sued for breach of an option agreement that allegedly gave him an exclusive right to repurchase company interests; he attempted to exercise the option in November 2023. The court held the written option was clear and expired on December 31, 2020 (and could only be extended by plaintiff before that date), so the attempted exercise was untimely and there was no breach. The court rejected plaintiff's alternative strained reading that the option barred any sale or never expired.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department denied plaintiff James R. Caputo’s motion for reargument or for permission to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals in his action against multiple defendants including Nathan Holt and others. The court issued a brief memorandum and order on April 24, 2026, declining both reliefs without published opinion. No change was made to the underlying appellate disposition by this decision; the motion was simply denied.

The Appellate Division affirmed a trial court order that, after reargument, denied plaintiff’s challenge to defendant’s motion (converted to summary judgment) dismissing certain claims and awarding defendant unpaid alternative rent. The dispute arose from a lease cotenancy clause requiring a single anchor tenant; when the anchor space was filled by two tenants, the landlord sought full rent while the tenant claimed entitlement to an offset under the cotenancy provision. The court held the tenant could enforce the alternative rent under the lease amendments and that the landlord could not rely on an estoppel certificate to negate that rent offset obligation.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a jury verdict in favor of defendants in a medical malpractice case and granted a new trial. Plaintiffs alleged the radiologist defendant failed to identify a potentially cancerous abnormality on chest X-rays. The court held the trial judge erroneously gave an "error in judgment" jury instruction, which is appropriate only when a doctor chooses among several medically acceptable alternatives. Because the evidence showed only an alleged failure to meet the standard of care (a failure to diagnose), giving that charge risked confusing the jury and was not harmless, requiring reversal and reinstatement of the complaint.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, denied the plaintiff's motion for reargument and denied leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals in the case where Joseph D. Burgdorf sought further review of a prior decision against Betsy Ross Nursing and Rehabilitation Center and various individual defendants. The court affirmed its earlier disposition by refusing to revisit the matter or permit an appeal to New York’s highest court. No extended opinion or new legal analysis was provided in this memorandum and order.

The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to defendants and dismissing plaintiff Shawn Broton's second amended complaint. Broton, formerly Deputy Chief of Syracuse Police, alleged constitutional and statutory claims after being denied reinstatement to a rank-and-file position in December 2017 and after an ethics investigation later found his allegations unfounded. The court held most claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations because they accrued on the December 18, 2017 denial, and alternatively found no triable issues of fact as to defendants’ entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a trial court order denying summary judgment to defendants Dr. Saurin Popat and Delaware Medical Group in a medical malpractice suit brought by Meg and Brian Bray. The court found defendants initially showed they met the standard of care, but plaintiffs submitted an expert affirmation—establishing medical licensure and board certification in endocrine surgery—that raised triable issues as to whether Dr. Popat's assessment, diagnosis, and treatment fell below the accepted standard. Because the parties’ experts conflicted, summary judgment was inappropriate and the case must proceed.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department unanimously affirmed a Supreme Court (Steuben County) order that denied plaintiff Maura Bianco's motion for summary judgment in her suit against defendant Jacqueline S. Johnson. The appellate court reviewed the lower court's December 27, 2024 order and concluded there were issues precluding summary disposition, so the matter remains for further proceedings in the trial court. The appellate decision was issued April 24, 2026 and affirmed without costs.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a trial court judgment awarding Amber Well Drilling money damages based on a jury verdict in quantum meruit. The court held that the written home-improvement contract failed to comply with General Business Law § 771, so the contractor could not enforce the contract for breach or recover contractually stipulated interest and attorneys' fees. The court nonetheless allowed recovery for completed work under unjust enrichment/quasi-contract and awarded prejudgment interest at a statutory/alternative rate. Plaintiff's broader arguments to revisit precedent and to sever the fee/interest clause were rejected.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the lower court's denial of Eastmore Owners Corp.'s motion to dismiss three causes of action brought by tenant Blanche Zelmanovich. The court held that Zelmanovich plausibly pled housing discrimination and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under federal, state, and city fair housing and human rights laws. Her complaints about inaccurate noise reports, temporal proximity between notice of default and notice of her disability, differential treatment of a neighbor, and a psychologist's letter supporting an emotional support dog were sufficient at the pleading stage to create inferences of discrimination and failure to engage in an interactive accommodation process.

The Appellate Division, First Department dismissed Christina Ventura's appeal from a Bronx Supreme Court order that granted defendant Ahmed summary judgment dismissing her complaint for lack of a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102(d). The appellate court held the order was entered against plaintiff for failure to timely respond (a default), so the order was not appealable as of right. The proper procedure was to move to vacate the default and then appeal any denial. Because of that procedural defect, the court did not reach Ventura's substantive arguments on the motion's merits.

The Appellate Division, First Department reviewed a contempt finding against plaintiff-wife for allegedly failing to transfer funds under this Court's March 20, 2025 order. The court held that the contempt adjudication was an improvident exercise of discretion and vacated the contempt finding because the prior order lacked a clear deadline for transfer and the motion court did not make required findings that the wife's conduct impaired the husband's rights. The court otherwise affirmed the lower court's order as to issues not challenged on appeal.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's partial denial of defendants' summary judgment motion and granted defendants' motion to dismiss the medical malpractice claim. Plaintiffs alleged defendants failed to diagnose Cushing's syndrome, but defendants' expert attested that care met the standard and there was no biochemical or pathological evidence of Cushing's or an ACTH-secreting tumor during defendants' treatment. Plaintiffs' expert did not meaningfully rebut defendants' causation evidence or address 2019 surgical pathology, so plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue on causation.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed Supreme Court, Bronx County's denial of defendant Federal 53 Inc.'s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff alleged his vehicle struck a tow truck's detached front bumper; Federal 53 argued plaintiff was solely at fault because the tow truck was legally stopped. The appellate court found Federal 53 did not eliminate material factual issues, pointing to authenticated photographs that raised questions whether the tow truck's bumper protruded into the plaintiff's lane in violation of a local regulation and whether that condition proximately caused the collision. A later order granting leave to reargue was dismissed as academic.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Bronx Supreme Court order that denied US Bank's motion to confirm a Referee's report and for a judgment of foreclosure and sale, and granted defendant Moises Merino's cross-motion to toll mortgage interest for certain multi-year periods. The court found the Referee relied solely on a servicer employee's affidavit and attached records that lacked sufficient attestation or identifying marks tying them to the plaintiff or a particular servicer, so confirmation was improper. The court also held the lender caused lengthy delays in the referee process that prejudiced Merino, warranting equitable tolling of interest.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed Supreme Court's denial of Joseph Pena's amended petition for leave to file a late notice of claim against the City of New York and NYPD officers. The court held Pena failed to prove the City had actual knowledge of the essential facts of his negligence claim within 90 days of accrual or within a reasonable time thereafter. The submitted evidence — an accident report and an alleged incomplete notice served after the deadline — did not show the City knew the facts supporting his theory that an NYPD high-speed chase caused the collision, and Pena also failed to show the City was not prejudiced by the delay.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Supreme Court's judgment confirming a partial final arbitration award that required petitioners to pay respondent $1,123,644.48. Petitioners had sought to vacate the award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded her powers and misinterpreted contract rights to advancement and indemnification. The appellate court held that judicial review is extremely limited, that the arbitrator’s contract interpretation was rational and within the scope of her authority under the JAMS rules, and that petitioners did not show a violation of public policy or any clear excess of power warranting vacatur.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's order that had vacated an arbitration award in a dispute between transit employees and the New York City Transit Authority. The appellate court held the arbitrator acted within his authority, properly reviewed the process by which the Medical Review Officer reached and then altered his drug-test determination, and found improper influence by the employer's representative. The panel concluded the award did not violate public policy and reinstated the arbitration award, denying the Authority's cross-motion to vacate and granting the petition to confirm.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Supreme Court judgment confirming a final arbitration award in favor of MLN New York Inc. and denying Jinong Liu's cross-petition to vacate the award. The court held that the arbitrator reasonably relied on testimony from multiple employee witnesses that Liu misreported hours, shifted blame to the majority shareholder, attempted to induce employees to sue the company for a kickback, and otherwise acted disloyally. The court found these facts supported findings that Liu was a faithless servant and breached fiduciary duties, and rejected Liu's manifest-disregard and insufficiency arguments.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Supreme Court order that denied petitioner Elisabeth Kepley’s motion for leave to vacate a prior dismissal and denied her request to file additional papers. The court found that Kepley had previously abused the judicial process by bringing meritless litigation and that the proposed additional papers were irrelevant to the issues already decided. The First Department concluded the trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to permit further filings and denied the requested relief, while awarding costs to the respondents.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff Lisa Johnson's personal-injury complaint arising from a slip-and-fall at defendants' bowling alley. The court held the appeal was properly considered on the merits despite a procedural argument about appeal timing, but found no admissible evidence that any specific negligent condition (such as excessive oiling or waxing) caused the fall. Because causation could only be based on speculation, defendants met their burden and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, so the dismissal was upheld.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a Supreme Court order granting plaintiff Luis Gavilanes summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240(1) against defendant 919 Ground Lease LLC and others. The court held that the evidence shows defendants’ negligence in failing to provide proper fall protection — plaintiff was directed to climb cross-pipes without a harness tie-off and could not secure his harness — and that this was a proximate cause of his injury. The court also found defendant translations insufficiently certified but that factual disputes about ladder availability did not defeat liability.

The Appellate Division, First Department dismissed Jacob Adekola’s appeal from Supreme Court orders that granted Deutsche Bank’s motions for a default judgment, an order of reference, confirmation of a referee’s report, and a judgment of foreclosure and sale. The court held Adekola lacked standing to appeal because he failed to appear in the underlying action before filing his notice of appeal and therefore was not an aggrieved party. Because the appeal was dismissed for lack of standing, the panel did not reach the merits of Adekola’s arguments for relief.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the denial of defendant Isabella Geriatric Center’s motion to dismiss a wrongful-death complaint brought after a resident contracted COVID-19 and died. The court held that defendant did not establish entitlement to immunity under the Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act because, while two statutory prerequisites were satisfied (it was a health care facility providing COVID-related services), there were triable issues about whether the facility acted in good faith and whether its conduct rose to gross negligence. A post-death health department citation suggesting policy noncompliance was central to the decision.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a lower-court order denying summary judgment to the landlord-defendants on their counterclaim for unpaid rent. The court held defendants were entitled to partial summary judgment that plaintiffs owe use-and-occupancy damages for the period October 2020 through March 2021, when plaintiffs returned to and lived in the apartment after elevator service was restored. The court otherwise affirmed the denial of summary judgment because disputed facts remain about defendants' alleged fraudulent inducement, whether plaintiffs were partially constructively evicted or unreasonably rejected alternative housing, and whether plaintiffs ratified the lease.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court Bronx County's grant of summary judgment for New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation and reinstated Janice Campbell's medical malpractice complaint. The suit alleges surgeons lacerated the plaintiff's bladder during pelvic surgery. The appellate court found that plaintiff's expert affidavit raised a triable issue by opining surgeons deviated from the standard of care by failing to perform a retrograde bladder fill, which would have better delineated bladder margins given substantial pelvic adhesions. The court held this claim was included in the bill of particulars, so dismissal was improper.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the foreclosure judgment entered for Bank of America against defendant Nicholas Sands. The court confirmed the Referee's report on the amount due because the bank submitted admissible business records and supporting filings, and Sands failed to produce proof of payments or raise evidentiary objections. The court found any failure to calendaring a post-report hearing did not prejudice Sands. It declined to review a separate challenge to service of a 90-day notice because Sands had abandoned that issue by not appealing the prior order or raising it below. The court also held the loan was not a protected "home loan."

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a Bronx Supreme Court order on a Labor Law § 241(6) claim. The court affirmed that plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment and defendants were not entitled to dismissal as to Industrial Code §§ 23-1.5(c)(3) and 23-9.2(a) because the grinder lacked a visible guard, the employer had notice, and the unguarded tool was necessary for the work. The court reversed as to Industrial Code § 23-1.5(c)(1), holding that provision is too vague to support liability under Labor Law § 241(6). The remainder of the lower court's order was affirmed.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a Supreme Court order concerning deposition priority in a multi-plaintiff civil case. The court held that defendants who filed a pre-answer motion preserved their CPLR 3106(a) priority to take party depositions and plaintiffs needed court leave to depose defendants before the defendants' time to answer expired. The Appellate Division also ruled that defendants are entitled to depose each individual plaintiff (all 27), not just 10, because each sues in his individual capacity and the Commercial Division presumptive limit can be altered. Nonparty depositions and document discovery may proceed as scheduled.

The Appellate Division reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment about whether two individuals (Maloney and Stern) must indemnify plaintiffs under two paragraphs of limited joinders tied to a joint venture agreement (JVA). The court affirmed the lower court in holding that paragraph (ii) does not obligate Maloney and Stern to indemnify plaintiffs for first-party claims, but it vacated the declaration and denied summary judgment as to paragraph (i) because that paragraph is ambiguous about covering first-party claims. The court relied on Delaware law requiring a clear statement to extend indemnities to first-party claims and found disputed issues of contractual interpretation for paragraph (i).