Court Filings

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District) denied Levi Hardy’s petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a successor judge’s order granting a new trial in a divorce case after a three-day bench trial. Levi argued the successor judge (who did not preside over the bench trial) abused discretion by granting a new trial without receiving evidence or stating reasons. The court declined to extend Texas mandamus precedent that allows merits review of new-trial orders after jury trials to new-trial orders following bench trials, concluding extraordinary circumstances were not shown and that a prompt retrial here outweighed the harms of interlocutory review.

The El Paso Court of Appeals denied a petition for mandamus seeking to overturn a probate court order disqualifying attorney Tony Aguilar from representing the estate of Judith Wheatley. The court held that Aguilar’s deposition and other evidence showed he was likely an essential fact witness about how six deeds conveying the Poki Roni Ranch came to be in Judy’s possession. Because his testimony could be necessary and adverse to Travis’s estate, the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in disqualifying him under the advocate-witness rule. The court therefore refused to grant extraordinary mandamus relief.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate its new-trial order in a personal-injury case. The trial court had granted a new trial after a jury found the defendant did not negligently cause a rear-end collision. The appeals court held the new-trial order was facially insufficient because it relied improperly on the idea that negligence was conclusively shown (a basis for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, not a new trial) and failed to explain how the evidence undermined the jury’s finding as required for a factual-sufficiency-based new trial.

The court granted the parties' agreed motion to dismiss the appeal and the plaintiff's underlying claims with prejudice. The Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing Appellant Eric Erdeljac's claims against appellees Kalahari Development LLC, KR Acquisitions, LLC (d/b/a Kalahari Resorts & Conventions), and Gerson Velasquez with prejudice, dismissed the appeal with prejudice, and denied as moot any other pending motions. Court costs are taxed against the party incurring them. No opinion was issued.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Ram Country of Fort Stockton, LLC’s interlocutory appeal from a county court’s order appointing an arbitrator because the court lacks jurisdiction to review orders that merely appoint an arbitrator under the Federal Arbitration Act. Ram Country alternatively asked the court to treat the filing as a petition for a writ of mandamus; the court considered that request but denied mandamus because Ram Country failed to show it lacked an adequate appellate remedy and did not meet procedural certification requirements. The court relied on Texas precedent holding appointment orders are not appealable interlocutory orders.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed a no-answer default judgment entered by the County Court at Law No. 10 in Bexar County in favor of Investment Retrievers, Inc. The Rodriguezes, appearing pro se, challenged the default judgment on three grounds: violation of due process, the absence of a hearing, and that their SSI benefits are exempt from execution. The appeals court found the record showed proper service and compliance with rules for default judgments, that damages may be proved by affidavit without oral testimony, and that the appellants failed to support or cite authority for their exemption claim, so there was nothing preserved for review.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Lawrence Jeanpierre's appeal against Discover Bank for want of prosecution. Jeanpierre repeatedly missed the briefing deadline, filed a late brief and an amended brief that violated the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and failed to file a compliant second amended brief or request further extensions after the court struck his filings and set deadlines. Because he did not file a timely, compliant brief or request an extension, the court dismissed the appeal under the appellate rules permitting dismissal for failure to prosecute.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment granting Castroville State Bank a judicial foreclosure against Lance and Kerry Meyer after the Meyers defaulted on loans secured by deeds of trust. The Bank moved for a hybrid summary judgment and no-evidence dismissal of the Meyers’ affirmative defenses; the trial court granted final summary judgment. The appellate court held the Meyers (pro se) failed to raise fact issues or provide admissible, properly cited record evidence to defeat summary judgment and waived other complaints, so the foreclosure judgment stands.

The Fourth Court of Appeals denied CPS Energy's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a trial court's denial of its motion for protective order and the overruling of objections to a subpoena directed at non-party Dimension Energy Services in a pending Bexar County case. The appellate court held CPS Energy failed to preserve necessary factual issues for mandamus review and also noted an adequate alternative remedy exists because Dimension has filed its own protective-order motion in the trial court. The court therefore declined to consider new evidence or arguments raised for the first time on mandamus and denied relief.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Tamera Montgomery’s appeal of a trial court order granting summary judgment to Milton Ruben Toyota of Augusta because Montgomery failed to file her appellant brief by the April 13, 2026 deadline and did not request an extension. The appeal had been docketed March 23, 2026, and under Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) the court dismissed for failure to prosecute. The order is procedural — the appellate court did not address the merits of the summary judgment ruling.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the appellee's motion to remand the case Downey Trees, Inc. v. Stephens to the State Court of Forsyth County. The clerk was ordered to remand the matter, and the order allows either party to file a new notice of appeal within 30 days after resolution of a pending motion to enforce settlement. The decision is procedural and simply returns the case to the state court for further proceedings rather than addressing the underlying merits.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded consolidated medical-malpractice and related tort judgments against Dr. Abubakar Durrani and the Center for Advanced Spine Technologies. The jury had found for three plaintiffs on negligence, lack of informed consent, battery, and fraud and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The court held consolidation was proper, expert testimony and jury instructions were allowable, and prejudgment interest was properly awarded; but it vacated the awards for future medical expenses as unsupported and remanded to calculate statutory setoffs against plaintiffs’ settlements with other tortfeasors.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Ryan Karr's pro se complaint against the Estate of Dianna Sayre and Joseph Aaron Sayre. Karr had alleged perjury, abuse of a disabled person, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other misconduct tied to a prior CPO proceeding, but his nine-page complaint failed to plead distinct causes of action, facts, dates, or the elements required to give defendants adequate notice. The appellate court held the complaint did not satisfy Civ.R. 8(A) and affirmed dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), noting Karr also failed to meaningfully brief his assignments of error on appeal.

The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the Cook County circuit court’s dismissal with prejudice of United Equitable Insurance Company’s 2022 declaratory judgment complaint. UEIC sought a declaration it owed no coverage beyond a $25,000 policy limit and that it breached no duties to its insured; Walker moved to dismiss arguing res judicata and lack of an actual controversy. The court held the policy limit was undisputed and that UEIC improperly sought retrospective clearance from liability for alleged past bad-faith conduct—matters properly litigated in Walker’s separate bad-faith lawsuit—so there was no justiciable controversy for a declaratory judgment.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff Myles Watson's employment-discrimination suit against the Metropolitan Transit Authority and NYCTA. The Supreme Court had dismissed the case based on a broad release the plaintiff signed after disciplinary proceedings, but the appellate court found factual disputes about the circumstances of signing and therefore rejected dismissal on that ground. The court nonetheless affirmed because the complaint failed to state a viable disability discrimination claim under New York State law and the evidence showed no available safe and reasonable accommodation under the New York City law; the hostile-work-environment claim was also inadequately pleaded.

The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the bank's foreclosure complaint against 972 Gates Avenue, LLC as time-barred. Chase earlier commenced a foreclosure in August 2010 that accelerated the mortgage, starting the six-year statute of limitations. US Bank filed a new foreclosure in June 2022, over 11 years later, and did not plead or prove it was acting on behalf of Chase. Under the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act's CPLR 205-a, a successor/assignee cannot use the six-month savings rule unless it pleads and proves it acts for the original plaintiff, so US Bank was not entitled to tolling and the dismissal was proper.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Supreme Court order and judgment of foreclosure and sale. The dispute concerned whether John Evelyn, who conveyed his interest in the mortgaged Brooklyn property in 2015, remained a necessary defendant in a 2008 mortgage foreclosure. The court held that because Evelyn had made an absolute conveyance and the plaintiff waived any deficiency claim against him, he was no longer a necessary party and could be dropped from the caption under CPLR 1003. The foreclosure and sale order was therefore affirmed as to Evelyn.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Supreme Court order that denied the plaintiff’s renewed attempt to obtain summary judgment on liability against defendant Olson E. Van Rossum in a pedestrian-vehicle negligence case. The court held the plaintiff failed to show new facts with reasonable justification required for renewal, and on reargument the evidence still did not establish the plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to judgment on liability. Because the plaintiff’s submissions did not prove the defendant breached a duty proximately causing her injuries, the court adhered to the original denial of summary judgment.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' negligence complaint against the Town of North Hempstead. The plaintiffs sued after Yelena Sharbani allegedly tripped on an uneven sidewalk; the Town moved for summary judgment arguing it had no prior written notice of the defect. The court held the Town showed it lacked prior written notice and the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue that an exception (affirmative creation of the defect or special use) applied, so the Town was entitled to dismissal as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Kings County judgment dismissing Rios's personal-injury complaint after a jury found the bus driver’s negligence was not a substantial factor in the crash and that the other vehicle’s driver was solely at fault. The plaintiff had moved to set aside the liability verdict as against the weight of the evidence, but the court denied that motion. The court also found any claimed errors in admitting certain defense expert testimony to be harmless because the outcome would not have changed.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court order that had granted the plaintiff summary judgment to quiet title and declared a 2004 administrator's deed void from the start. The plaintiff had sued after her mother, appointed administrator c.t.a., conveyed decedent's property to herself and the plaintiff as joint tenants, contrary to the decedent's will leaving the property to the plaintiff alone. The appellate court held that because the defendant had Surrogate's Court letters of administration c.t.a., her transfer was cloaked with apparent authority and therefore was voidable (subject to attack), not void ab initio. The cross-motion for summary judgment was denied.

The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's negligence claim against Garden City Public Schools. The plaintiff sued under the Child Victims Act alleging the school negligently failed to prevent sexual abuse by a teacher. The school moved for summary judgment arguing it had no actual or constructive notice of the teacher's propensity for sexual abuse; the personnel file showed an earlier accusation was investigated and deemed unfounded. The court held the plaintiff's speculative allegations about bias or a cover-up did not create a triable issue of fact, so dismissal was proper.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability in a pedestrian-vehicle collision case. The plaintiff had sought a ruling that the driver was solely at fault and dismissal of the defendants' comparative negligence defense. The court held the plaintiff failed to meet her initial burden because her testimony did not eliminate triable issues about whether the driver could have seen her and whether she was at fault, so summary judgment was inappropriate.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's negligence claims against defendant driver Christopher McCabe and his employer Brown's of Bellport, Inc. The plaintiff was in a left non-HOV lane and rear-ended a stopped tractor-trailer after McCabe swerved left into the HOV lane to avoid being struck from behind. The court held that McCabe’s evasive maneuver merely furnished the occasion for the collision and was not a proximate cause, and that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact about McCabe’s negligence, so Brown's cannot be vicariously liable.

The Appellate Division dismissed John Evelyn's appeals from two Supreme Court orders in a mortgage foreclosure action because the right to a direct appeal ended when the court entered the final order and judgment of foreclosure and sale. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss these appeals, noting the issues raised are properly considered on the existing appeal from the final foreclosure judgment. The panel therefore dismissed the appeals without costs and treated related issues as preserved for review on the appeal from the order and judgment of foreclosure and sale.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a trial court order denying the plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendants’ answer, preclude their defenses, or resolve liability in the plaintiff’s favor for failure to produce court-ordered discovery in a personal injury action. The Supreme Court had found no clear showing that the defendants’ discovery lapses were willful and contumacious and instead extended a deadline for production. The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion under disclosure and sanction rules and therefore affirmed the denial of the extreme sanctions sought by the plaintiff.

The Appellate Division, Second Department modified the Supreme Court order by granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability in a personal-injury action where the plaintiff's electric bicycle collided with a vehicle while the driver attempted a left turn. The court concluded the driver was negligent as a matter of law for attempting the left turn when it could not be made with reasonable safety, and the defendants failed to raise a triable issue on liability. The court nevertheless affirmed the denial of the plaintiff's separate motion to dismiss the defendants' comparative negligence affirmative defense under CPLR 3211(b).

The Appellate Division reversed a Nassau County Supreme Court order and granted plaintiff Kelvin Goode leave to enter a default judgment against Bespoke Motor Group, LLC and Bentley Long Island, LLC in a breach of contract action. The court found service on an employee identified as a "service consultant" was proper under the rules for serving limited liability companies, the defendants failed to timely answer, and the plaintiff provided proof of service and the defendants' default. Because the defendants did not show a reasonable excuse for the default, the court granted default judgment without reaching the merits of any asserted defenses.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court's June 9, 2021 order denying both the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing a tenant's home health aide plaintiff's negligence complaint and the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on liability. The plaintiff was scalded by unexpectedly hot water while showering and alleged the landlord negligently maintained the building's hot-water/boiler system. The court held that competing evidence about prior hot-water incidents and the building's system created triable issues of fact about whether the defendant created or had notice of the dangerous condition, so neither side was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division affirmed a judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint against the New York City Transit Authority and bus driver Loraine C. Lord and dismissing the Cintron defendants' cross-claim against those defendants. The court reviewed a jury verdict that found the bus driver's admitted negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the collision and that the Cintron vehicle operator's negligence was the sole proximate cause. The court held the jury’s verdict was reasonably supported by testimonial, photographic, and video evidence and therefore was not against the weight of the evidence.