Court Filings

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the King County Assessor in a class action brought by the Washington Hospitality Association (WHA). WHA sought property tax relief under RCW 84.70.010(1), arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic qualified as a “natural disaster” that reduced hotel property values. The court held that “natural disaster” in the statute refers to a physically destructive event originating in the earth, atmosphere, or planet (e.g., flood, earthquake, eruption), and does not encompass a pandemic or disease-related economic losses. Because WHA’s properties suffered no physical damage, relief was unavailable.

The Georgia Court of Appeals issued an order on April 20, 2026 denying the appellant Dorrin Johnson's emergency motion for a stay of enforcement pending appeal in the matter captioned Johnson v. Molleda. The court declined to pause enforcement of the underlying judgment or order while the appeal proceeds. The decision is a brief administrative disposition denying the requested temporary relief without extended explanation in the excerpt provided.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in Pimentel v. Morquecho because the appellant failed to file a required brief and enumerations of error by the court's deadline of April 13, 2026. The court issued a formal order on April 20, 2026, noting the missed filing and entered dismissal as the disposition. No opinion on the merits was reached because the procedural default (failure to file required appellate documents) warranted dismissal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for discretionary appeal in the case Samuel Kwushue v. City of Atlanta and denied the application. The order is brief: the Court of Appeals reviewed the application and entered an order denying it on April 20, 2026. No opinion or reasoning is provided in the document; the entry is a procedural disposition that leaves the lower-court decision in place and does not grant further review by this court.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted an application for interlocutory appeal by Triduum Associates, LLC and others in their case against Holly Springs, Georgia. The court's order allows the appellant to file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days and directs the superior court clerk to include this order in the record sent to the Court of Appeals. The decision is procedural: it merely authorizes taking an immediate appeal before final judgment and sets short timing and transmission instructions for the record.

The Clermont County Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for homeowners Vernon and Meredith Hubbard in a home-remodeling dispute. The Hubbards had obtained a $108,000 judgment against TFB Development, LLC and two individuals, Lenny (Leonard) Weber and Sandra Davis. The appellate court held the Hubbards did not produce admissible summary-judgment evidence showing Weber or Davis were parties to the written contract or otherwise individually liable, because the contract identified TFB (not the individuals) as the contractor and contained an integration clause. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals reviewed a default-judgment ruling in a bailment case where Mahadev Logistics claimed Columbus Truck & Equipment failed to safeguard and return a 2015 Volvo truck after it was stolen from the repair facility. The trial court found breach and awarded only $1,447.94 for increased repair costs, denying towing, storage, replacement-key, and lost-profit claims. The appellate court affirmed liability but reversed the damages ruling in part, finding insufficient evidence to support the trial court's limited calculation and remanding for a hearing to quantify repair- and towing-related damages while rejecting lost-profit and most storage claims.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court’s denial of Kurt Rillema’s motion to strike a November 18, 2024 default judgment entered in favor of C.M. Rillema argued the judgment should be stricken because of defects related to notice, the automatic bankruptcy stay, and the court’s allegedly excessive sanctioning for failure to comply with a prior order. The panel held the trial court properly denied relief because (1) the court could enter default judgment under Pa.R.C.P. 1037(c) for failure to answer, (2) the automatic stay rendered earlier court action void but did not extend Rillema’s time to answer, and (3) no fatal defect appeared on the face of the record to warrant striking the judgment.

The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's order ordering the Will County Clerk to place Cesar Guerrero on the April 1, 2025 consolidated election ballot as the Democratic nominee for Joliet Township Supervisor. The Board of Elections had listed Guerrero on a ballot-forfeiture list because his campaign committee owed civil penalties, and the County Clerk removed his name. Guerrero paid the fines on January 29, 2025, was renominated to fill the vacancy in early February, and the court held that the Election Code did not bar ballot placement once the penalties were paid and that the vacancy-filling complied with timing rules. The court also affirmed summary judgment for the County Clerk on Guerrero’s statutory civil-rights claim because the record lacked evidence of willful and wanton conduct.

The appellate court reviewed a dismissal under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure of negligence claims filed by Samantha Allumi on behalf of her son Chase after he fell from an inflatable slide at a school field day. The trial court dismissed the negligence claims against the school district, board, and the parent organization (SHSO) as immune under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. The appellate court affirmed dismissal as to negligence allegations that amounted to failures of supervision, but reversed as to specific pre-activity failures to guard or warn (including failure to provide safety equipment, notify parents, ensure medical clearance, and provide a safe slide) and remanded for further proceedings, including a determination whether the activity was a "hazardous recreational activity." The court also held SHSO qualifies as a local public entity under the Act.

The Appellate Division held that New Jersey's Ski Act applies to snow tubing. The court reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment for Ski Campgaw Management LLC, concluding the Act displaces common-law negligence claims where it applies. Because plaintiff failed to show the operator had actual or constructive notice of the deceleration mat being bunched up (a condition the statute requires notice of before liability attaches), Campgaw was entitled to summary judgment. The court remanded with directions to dismiss the plaintiff's claims with prejudice.

The Third District affirmed the trial court’s grant of D.R. Horton’s motion for relief from a default final judgment. Amerant Bank obtained a clerk’s default and default final judgment after D.R. Horton failed to respond to an amended complaint; D.R. Horton later moved under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(1), citing calendaring and clerical errors and in-house counsel’s unexpected maternity leave. The trial court found excusable neglect, a meritorious defense (supported by a draft answer), and prompt diligence after discovering the judgment, and therefore vacated the default final judgment. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas denied Beverly Brooks's emergency petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a trial-court order dated April 13, 2026. Brooks sought to prevent counsel Kirkendall Dwyer, LLP from withdrawing all funds held in the trial court's registry and to secure a portion of the registry funds representing accrued interest. The appeals court declined relief and left the trial court's order intact, which granted withdrawal of the full registry amount to Kirkendall Dwyer and denied Brooks's request for interest funds.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order that dissolved prejudgment writs of garnishment obtained by Texas Global Equity Fund XII (TGE) against 22 entities believed to owe money to Breckenridge Development 2019 (BD19). TGE had sued BD19 for unpaid loan principal and interest after BD19 failed to provide required financial reports, repay a prior Frost Bank loan as required, and cure defaults. The appeals court held TGE proved the statutory grounds for garnishment (the debt was liquidated, due and unpaid; BD19 lacked sufficient property to satisfy it; and the garnishment was not sought to injure BD19), and BD19 failed to prove extrinsic grounds to dissolve the writs. The court reinstated the writs and remanded for further proceedings.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by appellant Ricardo Turullols Bonilla after he moved to dismiss it. The dismissal was granted under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the court issued a short memorandum opinion stating the appeal is dismissed. The decision is procedural: the court did not reach the merits of the underlying dispute but terminated appellate review because the appellant withdrew the appeal by motion.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Appellate District of Texas dismissed this appeal because the parties filed a joint notice that they resolved their disputes and moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and entered dismissal. The decision is procedural: no merits ruling was made because the parties voluntarily ended the litigation by settlement and asked the court to close the appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Trimen Enterprises, Inc.'s appeal seeking review of the trial court's refusal to allow an amended answer and the entry of default judgment against Trimen. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because the case remains pending below as other claims against a co-defendant were unresolved, and the trial court did not enter a certificate under OCGA § 9-11-54(b). Because Trimen did not follow the interlocutory-appeal procedures in OCGA § 5-6-34(b), including obtaining a certificate of immediate review, the appeal was premature and must be dismissed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed a pro se appeal by Crandall Postell from a probate court order approving sale of estate real property because Postell remained represented by counsel when he filed the notice of appeal. The record contained no probate-court order allowing attorney Daniel Wilder to withdraw, and Georgia precedent bars a party from simultaneously being represented and proceeding pro se. Because a pro se notice filed while represented is a legal nullity, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal by homeowner Chinh Vo challenging the denial of his motion to set aside a May 2025 final judgment in favor of Bellmoore Park Homeowners Association. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because appeals from denials of motions to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60(d) must proceed by discretionary appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(8),(b). Because compliance with the discretionary-appeal procedure is jurisdictional, the court dismissed the direct appeal for failure to follow the required procedure.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Ed Hunter's appeal from the City of South Fulton because the appellant failed to comply with docketing notice and Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) by not filing an enumeration of errors and brief within the required time. The court had previously ordered those filings by April 6, 2026; they were still not filed as of the April 17, 2026 order. Relying on its procedural rules, the court deemed the appeal abandoned and entered dismissal.

The court affirmed the Sandusky Municipal Court’s August 20, 2025 judgment denying Shardaye Smith’s motion for relief from judgment under Ohio Civil Rule 60(B). LVNV Funding obtained summary judgment in a small-claims-style collection action after serving process by certified mail to the address on Smith’s account. Smith later sought relief, claiming defective service, lack of jurisdiction, and invalid evidentiary foundation; the magistrate and trial court found she was properly served, had notice (as shown by an earlier filing contesting jurisdiction), failed to show a meritorious defense, and filed her motion untimely. The appellate court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief and affirmed.

The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the dealership’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. Plaintiff Berman sued Napleton for charging and not providing a rust- and stain-prevention product and signed two separate arbitration agreements during purchase: the Retail Installment Contract (RIC) and a Dispute Resolution Agreement (DRA). The court held the two agreements contain irreconcilable, material conflicts—about the arbitration forum, who decides whether a dispute is arbitrable, and allocation of arbitration fees—so no enforceable arbitration agreement exists as to Napleton’s effort to compel arbitration.

The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of Brittany Colatorti’s amended complaint seeking a declaration that Darby Hills’s appointment to a vacant state senate seat was invalid. Colatorti argued the committee failed to give statutorily required notice and that Hills was not a member of the Republican Party at relevant times. The court held the statute requires only that the appointee be a member of the party at the time of appointment; Hills became a precinct committeeperson before her February 28, 2025 appointment and therefore qualified. The complaint was legally insufficient and properly dismissed.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for further consideration. The dispute arose from Platinum Construction’s suit against Copper Creek and Jose Escoffie for theft of services and related claims after key emails and accounting records were missing. The court of appeals had found the trial court’s spoliation jury instruction reversible error and ordered a new trial without first addressing other appellate issues that might have led to rendition. The Supreme Court held that appellate courts must first decide rendition issues and that the court of appeals’ harm analysis was insufficient.

The Texas Supreme Court denied review of an appeal in an asbestos wrongful-death case involving Howmet Aerospace and the Burford family. Justice Young concurred in the denial while criticizing the court of appeals for rejecting a prior Texas Supreme Court statement that proof of dose is required even in single-source asbestos-exposure cases. He explained the factual posture (long-term household exposure from a worker’s contaminated clothes), summarized relevant precedent (Havner, Flores, Bostic), and said that although lower courts show confusion, this particular case cannot resolve the dose question because the court of appeals found the plaintiffs had produced sufficient proof of dose. He urged future review in an appropriate case.

The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision in a dispute between Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc. (doing business as JET ICU) and two Blue Cross entities. The appeal challenged the circuit court's judgment, but the appellate court, in a per curiam opinion, concluded that the lower-court ruling should stand and issued an affirmance without published opinion. The panel unanimously agreed to affirm, with no extended written analysis included in the opinion provided.

The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, affirmed a county court decision in an appeal brought by Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc. (d/b/a Jet ICU) against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., and Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Company (d/b/a Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Louisiana). The opinion is per curiam, short, and simply states the judgment was affirmed without published reasoning in this entry. The panel of judges Lucas (C.J.), Kelly, and Smith concurred. The decision was filed April 17, 2026.

The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling in a case where Hydro-Dyne Engineering, Inc. appealed from a Pinellas County circuit court decision involving Michael Williams, Scott Griffith, Cornerstone Mechanical, LLC, and Cornerstone H20, LLC. The appeal was taken under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130. The appellate court issued a one-line per curiam decision affirming the lower court's judgment, with three judges concurring. No further opinion or reasoning was provided in the published docket entry.

The appellate court reviewed a pro se appeal by Norman Chris Hrabovsky from an order of the Pinellas County Circuit Court involving Trask Daigneault, LLP and two individual defendants. After considering the parties' submissions, the Second District affirmed the lower court's decision. The per curiam opinion provides no extended factual or legal analysis in the published entry, simply announcing the affirmance and noting concurrence by the three judges. No further explanation of the circuit court's reasoning or the issues decided is included in the short published entry.

The Florida Second District Court of Appeal issued a brief per curiam decision affirming the lower court's ruling. The appeal was taken by Patrick Gilles from an order of the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, presided over by Judge Lindsay Alvarez. Both parties appeared pro se. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision without published opinion and the panel of judges concurred.