Court Filings

The Cuyahoga County Probate Court appointed an independent, non‑interested attorney as successor trustee of the Gary L. Bryenton Declaration of Trust after the named successor declined and a proposed beneficiary appointment was disputed. Barbara Bryenton had filed a notice appointing herself and her daughter Elisabeth as co‑trustees, but the court struck that notice, found conflicts among beneficiaries (notably Susan’s allegations of bias), and, after a short hearing with no sworn evidence, appointed a neutral trustee. The appellate court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion and that the probate court followed the statutory priority for filling trustee vacancies.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of medical-malpractice claims against Dr. Faisal Quereshy. Plaintiffs had originally filed suit in May 2022 and obtained extensions to file a required affidavit of merit, but failed to timely produce one. After refiling in November 2023 and receiving another 90-day extension, plaintiffs again missed the deadline and later attempted to cure the defect by filing an amended complaint with an affidavit. The court held that Civ.R. 10(D)(2)’s strict extension limits control and plaintiffs’ late affidavit could not cure the deficiency, so dismissal was proper.

The Ohio Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the Belmont County Common Pleas Court’s grant of a civil stalking protection order (CSPO) sought by Petitioner D.F. against Respondent Melissa Starkey. The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Starkey engaged in a pattern of conduct—social media posts, a threatening phone call to a bar owner, and related statements—that caused D.F. to reasonably believe Starkey would cause physical harm or mental distress. The appellate court held the evidence was legally sufficient, the trial court’s credibility findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the five-year duration was not an abuse of discretion.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s determinations that the Hendersons’ attempts to abandon severed mineral rights under Ohio’s Dormant Mineral Act were ineffective. Plaintiffs (heirs and assignees of John W. Means and Wolf Run II, LLC) sought declaratory judgment and quiet title to minerals under 160 acres. The court concluded the Hendersons failed to exercise reasonable diligence in locating mineral holders (they did not search Stark County records where holder addresses existed), so notice by publication was improper and abandonment failed. The court therefore affirmed quiet-title judgments for the plaintiffs and two defendant-holders (Means and Doxzen).

The Court of Appeal reversed in part a trial-court dismissal of an attorney-plaintiff’s lawsuit against Wells Fargo and a branch employee. The court held the complaint failed to state breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant, and negligent hiring claims because the bank agreement and pleading did not support those theories, and amendment would be futile. But the court concluded the negligent misrepresentation claim survived: the complaint alleged a bank employee told the plaintiff the check had “cleared” despite lacking a reasonable basis and after the plaintiff warned the bank the check might be fraudulent. The dismissal is reversed only as to negligent misrepresentation; all other rulings are affirmed.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals granted a joint motion by AusPro Enterprises, L.P. and MMK Holdings, L.P. (doing business as Planet K) and the City of Cedar Park to abate (pause) the appeal for 30 days so the parties can finalize a settlement that requires city council approval. The court ordered the parties to file either a motion to dismiss, a motion to reinstate, or a status report (or a motion to extend the abatement) by May 8, 2026. The appeal remains abated until further court order.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of appellants' request for a second temporary injunction seeking to stop the homeowners association's election to amend its declaration to allow sale of a subdivision park. Appellants (residents) had a prior temporary injunction preventing sale of Thrush Ridge Park and sued for declaratory and injunctive relief; the Association held an election and appellants sought to enjoin it. The appeals court concluded the record lacked the evidentiary exhibits from the injunction hearing, so the appellants failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Ra Hermes Velthra’s appeal challenging a trial court’s finding that he could pay court costs. Velthra sought review under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(g) after a February 26, 2026 hearing, but the appellate court concluded Rule 145(g) does not permit a standalone interlocutory appeal. The court ordered Velthra to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed; he submitted the indigency order but no final judgment in the underlying case. Lacking jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal on April 8, 2026.

The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Progressive Direct Insurance Company’s special appearance and dismissed the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. The suit arose after a Washington resident insured by an Ohio-based, non-Texas-licensed insurer was injured in San Antonio and sued in Texas over denial of underinsured motorist benefits. The court held Progressive Direct lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Texas for either specific or general jurisdiction and that exercising jurisdiction would violate fair play and substantial justice, so Texas courts cannot constitutionally adjudicate the contract dispute.

The Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio, denied Joy Cherie Kilgore’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking relief related to an underlying case in Bexar County District Court. The court considered Kilgore’s petition and an incorporated emergency motion for temporary relief filed April 6, 2026, and concluded she was not entitled to mandamus relief under the Texas appellate rules. Because the requested extraordinary relief was denied, the court also denied the emergency motion as moot. No written opinion explaining detailed reasoning was issued—this is a brief disposition under the appellate rules.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's civil commitment of Jose Arredondo, Jr. after a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he is a sexually violent predator. Arredondo appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by refusing a jury instruction telling jurors to treat expert testimony "just like any other testimony." The appellate court held the requested instruction would effectively single out the State's sole expert and thus improperly comment on the weight of the evidence, contrary to Davidson v. Wallingford and Texas procedural rules, so the refusal was not an abuse of discretion.

The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded the case. The Lalondes sued to enforce a 2021 written agreement to buy a tract of land; Tortuga Ranch counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment that the agreement was void or unenforceable. The appellate court held Tortuga Ranch could not obtain summary declaratory relief because its counterclaim was a mirror-image challenge duplicating the pending breach-of-contract suit, so Tortuga Ranch failed to show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The court also reversed the award of conditional appellate attorney’s fees and declined to render partial summary judgment for the Lalondes because that relief would be interlocutory.

The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default divorce judgment that resolved conservatorship, possession and access to the parties’ child, child and spousal support, property division, and attorney’s fees. Christopher Carpenter filed a motion for new trial (or to reform the judgment) supported by his and his attorney’s affidavits explaining that an email of the petition failed to reach counsel, causing the missed answer. The court held that Christopher met the Craddock elements (excusable failure to answer, meritorious defense, and no unfair delay or prejudice) and concluded the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion.

The court dismissed Bianca Fox's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Fox, pro se, filed a notice of appeal purporting to challenge a January 30, 2026 turnover order, but the clerk’s record contains only two interlocutory orders from that date — denial of her motion for protection and an order to comply with a subpoena — neither of which is an appealable final judgment or an authorized interlocutory appeal. The court gave Fox an opportunity to show cause why the appeal should proceed; she did not respond, so the appeal was dismissed and pending motions were denied as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Jacqueline Wilbourn’s appeal from a superior-court judgment in favor of Galadriel Enterprises because the court lacked jurisdiction. Wilbourn had appealed to the superior court from a magistrate-court judgment and then appealed the superior-court judgment to this Court, but she did not use the required discretionary-appeal procedures. The Court explained that de novo reviews of magistrate rulings and appeals in damage actions where the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by discretionary application, and noncompliance is jurisdictional, so the appeal was dismissed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the appellant's motion to withdraw the appeal in the case Jonathan Blanton v. Eric Spinks et al. The court released jurisdiction back to the trial court upon issuance of the order. No substantive ruling on the merits was made; the action simply ends the appellate proceeding and restores control of the case to the lower court.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that GEICO was entitled to judgment on the pleadings for breach of a settlement agreement. The case arose after Abdel-Rahman made a pre-suit motor vehicle tort settlement offer that included the five statutory material terms required by OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021) plus additional nonstatutory terms. GEICO sent a written acceptance agreeing to the material terms while rejecting the offeror’s attempt to make the statute inapplicable. The court followed prior appellate decisions holding that acceptance of the statutory material terms alone forms an enforceable settlement under OCGA § 9-11-67.1, so GEICO proved a breach and entitlement to specific performance.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in Aslam Gilani and Peak Amusement, LLC v. Epic Amusement, LLC for failure to file the required appellate brief and enumeration of errors. The appeal was docketed March 5, 2026; appellants requested and received an extension to April 7, 2026, with a warning that failure to file by 4:30 p.m. would result in dismissal. Because the appellants did not file the brief by the extended deadline, the court dismissed the appeal pursuant to its rules and controlling precedent.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted Kiran Kimbrough's application for discretionary appeal from a decision involving the City of Atlanta. The court ordered that the appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the April 8, 2026 order and directed the Clerk of Superior Court to include this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals. The order formally accepts discretionary review and initiates the appellate filing deadline and record transmission procedures.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Cedric Herbert’s original mandamus petition seeking an order requiring a trial judge to refer his recusal motion to another judge. The court explained that mandamus in the appellate courts is reserved for extremely rare cases because superior courts generally have authority to grant such extraordinary relief and the petitioner should first seek relief in the appropriate lower court. Because Herbert did not show he first petitioned the superior court and this case was not one of the rare exceptions, the Court of Appeals declined to exercise original jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

The Court of Appeals granted Ardalan Karbasyoun's application for discretionary appeal from a final judgment in favor of Foamworks Alpharetta, LLC. The court concluded the trial-court order disposed of the entire case and therefore was a final, appealable order under Georgia law. Because a right of direct appeal exists for such final judgments, the Court granted the application and instructed Karbasyoun to file a notice of appeal in the trial court within ten days. The trial-court clerk must include this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.

The court of appeals affirmed the municipal-court judgments awarding Asbury Woods Senior Apartments $659.23 for unpaid rent, late fees, and a utility payment after defendant Gloria Render objected to the magistrate’s decision. The court found: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Render’s post-judgment motion for reconsideration because the court’s March 28, 2025 judgment was final; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a utility-transfer form despite Render’s claim the signature was forged, because the factfinder could compare signatures; and (3) Asbury’s damages claim was separate from the eviction claim, so dismissing the eviction did not require dismissal of the damages claim.

The Court of Appeals granted a writ of mandamus directing Cuyahoga Common Pleas Judge Kevin J. Kelley to follow this court’s prior mandate in JTC Solutions I. Relator JTC Solutions had argued the trial court failed to conduct the additional factfinding and explain the evidence supporting its ruling after this court reversed the trial court’s initial voiding of an arbitration clause. The appellate court found the January 5, 2026 entry granting arbitration ignored the express remand instructions to (1) inquire whether the arbitration clause is enforceable and applies to each claim and (2) state findings and evidence. The court denied the judge’s motion to dismiss and ordered compliance.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Canton Municipal Court's judgment granting DNW Properties possession of rental premises and denying tenant David Tucker a jury trial in a forcible entry and detainer action. DNW served termination notices and filed the eviction complaint; Tucker was served and filed a jury demand after the statutory deadline. The appellate court held that R.C. 1923.09(A) — which requires a jury demand on or before the return day of the summons in forcible entry and detainer proceedings — is constitutional and that Tucker waived his jury right by failing to timely demand it.

The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Adams County Court's February 5, 2025 judgment granting Joyce Mapes a forcible entry and detainer (eviction) against Ewing “Toby” Gibbs and denying Gibbs' counterclaim asserting ownership under a $45,000 land contract. Gibbs argued the county court lacked jurisdiction and the case should have been transferred to the common pleas court. The appellate court reviewed jurisdiction de novo, relied on statutes authorizing county courts to decide contract-based equitable remedies, and followed precedent holding such courts may adjudicate contract enforcement tied to a possession action, so no transfer was required.

The Fourth District Court of Appeals reviewed Husband Darrell L. Nichols Jr.’s appeal from a Pike County domestic relations judgment resolving competing post-divorce motions. The court overruled Husband’s challenges to the denial of a continuance and to alleged improper service, finding service at the 2060 Schuster Road address and Husband’s participation made the hearing proper. However, the court concluded the trial court exceeded its authority by revaluing and redistributing two specific vehicles (a 2007 Toyota Tacoma and a 2005 Subaru Impreza) after the original decree had ordered all listed vehicles sold and proceeds divided. The judgment is therefore reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings on those vehicles.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Eighth District Court of Appeals and held that the City of Cleveland retained political-subdivision immunity for the drowning death of William Johnson at a city pool. The executor sued claiming the use of a low folding chair instead of an elevated lifeguard chair amounted to a “physical defect” on pool grounds under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), which would remove immunity. The high court concluded that choosing one chair over another is not a tangible imperfection that impairs the function of pool grounds or equipment, so the statutory exception did not apply and summary judgment for the city must be entered.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of a preliminary injunction that would have enjoined a family planning provider from offering abortion services at a parcel subject to recorded CC&Rs. The CC&Rs were adopted and recorded in 1991 by the Tulare Local Hospital District and expressly prohibited abortion clinics within the Tulare Medical Center development. The court held the prohibition is unenforceable because (1) the District’s adoption and recording of the CC&Rs is government action that interferes with the fundamental right of reproductive choice under the California Constitution and (2) Civil Code section 53, read with section 531 and the Unruh Act, voids recorded covenants that indirectly limit property use because of a characteristic protected by the Unruh Act (the decision to have an abortion).

The Court of Appeal reversed in part and remanded. The Gonzalez family sued a California mortuary after a Texas medical examiner misidentified a body, causing the family to bury the wrong person and have their loved one cremated. A jury found for the mortuary on negligence and contract claims, finding the mortuary proved the affirmative defense of impracticability. The court held the defense of impracticability is equitable and must be decided by a judge, not a jury, so the contract verdict is reversed and remanded for a bench determination of the defense and, if necessary, a damages trial. The court affirmed that only the decedent’s wife had standing to sue on the contract.

The First District Court of Appeals granted appellant Todd Colter’s motion for voluntary dismissal of his appeal against Ubican Global, Inc., because the parties settled. The court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and ordered that any other pending motions be dismissed as moot. No written opinion was issued; the panel issued a short per curiam memorandum disposing of the appeal on the agreed dismissal.