Court Filings

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability and to dismiss the defendants' comparative negligence defenses in a rear-end collision case. The plaintiff had asserted his vehicle was stopped for about 10 seconds at a red light when the defendants' vehicle struck him from behind. The court found that a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a presumption of negligence by the rear driver, and the defendants failed to present admissible evidence of a non-negligent explanation (such as an unanticipated brake failure), so the plaintiff met his prima facie burden.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment that had dismissed third-party claims for contractual indemnification asserted by the project owner and general contractor against Gabriel Steel Erectors. The underlying lawsuit arises from a 2018 workplace fall of an ironworker employed by Gabriel. The court found that the indemnity clause obligating Gabriel to indemnify for losses “to the fullest extent permitted by law” could permit partial indemnification and that triable issues exist about whether Gabriel had primary responsibility for the worker's safety. Thus the indemnification claims cannot be decided as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division reversed a medical-malpractice judgment for a child born extremely premature after concluding the trial court erred by allowing a neurologist to testify that the defendants' failure to diagnose and treat the mother's preterm labor caused the child's later autism. Applying New York's Frye standard, the court held the proffered causation theory rested on observational associations and speculative inference rather than generally accepted scientific principles linking prematurity or low birth weight to autism. Because that testimony was improperly admitted, the court ordered a new trial and dismissed the plaintiff's cross-appeal as academic.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claims for specific performance, fraud, and tortious interference and denied the plaintiff's summary judgment motions. The court found that the seller (Gholis) showed it was ready, willing, and able to close by producing a title policy and that the buyer (Scott Randolph, LLC) defaulted by failing to appear at the time-of-the-essence closing, so Gholis may retain the down payment. The court also found Bushwack and Stellberger entitled to dismissal of the fraud and interference claims because key events occurred after the plaintiff sought to terminate the contract.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and granted Drexel University's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's personal injury claim against Drexel. The plaintiff was injured at his employer's workplace when equipment fell from a forklift operated by two Drexel students participating in Drexel's cooperative education program. The court held Drexel did not exercise sufficient control over the students' work or conduct to be vicariously liable as an employer or principal, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact to the contrary.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court's dismissal of Rosario's wrongful-death, fraud, and civil-conspiracy claims against the Town and Village of Mount Kisco. The plaintiff alleged the municipality failed to enforce housing regulations after her adult son died in a basement fire in an illegally converted apartment. The court held the complaint did not plead a special relationship between the municipality and decedent, did not identify a private right of action under the cited statutes, and failed to allege facts showing voluntary assumption of duty, affirmative control, justifiable reliance, or municipal participation in fraud or a conspiracy.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court judgment that had granted summary judgment to Remede Consulting Group on damages against employee-defendant Jason Pitter for misuse of a corporate credit card. The court affirmed that Remede proved Pitter's liability on breach of contract, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty because Pitter had received the corporate card policy, acknowledged it, and used the card for personal expenses without raising a triable issue of authorization. However, the appellate court held the plaintiff did not establish a precise, uncontested sum owed, so summary judgment on damages awarding $135,246.77 was denied and the judgment was reversed on that point.

The Appellate Division affirmed a Supreme Court order granting summary judgment to Lakeview Auto Sales and Service, Inc., and to Herold Motor Cars, Inc. and John C. Herold, and denying RJK Auto Brokers' cross-motion. RJK had purchased nine vehicles from Dream Carz, which never obtained title; RJK then paid Herold Motor to obtain title to eight sold vehicles. The court held the moving defendants showed they had no contract or fraudulent conduct with RJK and that Dream Carz was not an entrustee or a merchant able to pass good title. RJK failed to raise triable issues of fact to avoid dismissal.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's personal-injury claims against homeowner Kim Eichle and certain claims against third-party defendant Joseph Russo. The plaintiff alleged the infant was injured after being punched outside a New Year's Eve party at Eichle's home and asserted causes of action under New York's Dram Shop statutes and premises liability. The court held Eichle showed she neither served visibly intoxicated guests nor furnished alcohol to minors, and that the infant could not identify whether an icy sidewalk caused his fall, so the plaintiff failed to raise triable issues of fact.

The Appellate Division reviewed a nonjury trial judgment enforcing a 2016 judgment against B & A Demolition and related parties. The court dismissed appeals from two interlocutory orders as moot, modified the trial judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' veil-piercing claims, but affirmed the trial court's setting aside of two truck transfers as fraudulent under the Debtor and Creditor Law, and awarded costs to the defendants. The court found insufficient proof that the owner exercised complete domination to pierce the corporate veil, but sufficient evidence and badges of fraud to avoid certain transfers and recover attorneys' fees under the fraudulent conveyance statutes.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's order (after reargument) granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' personal injury complaint. The court held the defendants had shown, as a matter of law, that the injured plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102(d) and that the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of causation because their expert did not rebut defendants' evidence that the injuries were preexisting and degenerative. The court affirmed on the alternative ground of lack of causation, though it noted some triable issues as to certain injury categories before resolving causation against the plaintiffs.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court foreclosure judgment because the bank never obtained personal jurisdiction over the homeowner. Nationstar served the summons and complaint by leaving them with the homeowner's former attorney, who lacked authority to accept service. The court held the homeowner timely preserved the jurisdiction defense and that service on a former lawyer does not satisfy statutory service rules. Because service was defective, the foreclosure judgment, referee confirmation, and sale direction were vacated and the complaint dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's order granting Lalezarian Properties, LLC's motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's amended complaint in a slip-and-fall personal injury action. The plaintiff, a security guard who slipped on ice in an underground garage, sued the alleged property owner. The court held that Lalezarian showed it did not own, manage, operate, or control the property and thus cannot be liable for the hazardous condition, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The court therefore properly granted the defendant's motion upon reargument.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a Supreme Court order that had allowed Con-Kel Landscaping to reargue and then obtain summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's personal injury claims. The plaintiff slipped on ice in an underground garage and sued Con-Kel, the snow-removal contractor. The appellate court held Con-Kel improperly raised for the first time on a reargument motion the argument that the plaintiff would be precluded from testifying (and thus could not make a case). Because reargument cannot present new legal theories or facts not previously offered, the reargument should have been denied and the grant of summary judgment vacated. Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The Appellate Division affirmed a Supreme Court order denying Margaret Liu’s motion to vacate a 2018 default judgment awarding Shau Chung Hu $1,480,636.50 in a hybrid proceeding seeking, among other relief, ownership and rescission relating to Lowbet Realty Corp. The Court held Liu’s CPLR 5015(a)(1) motion was untimely because it was made more than one year after service of the judgment, and that her claimed excuse—lack of personal service of the petition—failed because she had filed a notice of appearance and never challenged jurisdiction. The court also rejected relief under CPLR 317 because Liu had appeared in the action.

The Appellate Division reversed part of a Supreme Court judgment in a proceeding to confirm a master arbitration award where Integrated Specialty ASC, LLC sought no-fault benefits and attorneys' fees. The court held the trial court erred by awarding only $1,000 under the no-fault fee regulation and by failing to award additional fees for the CPLR article 75 confirmation proceeding. The appellate court awarded the regulatory maximum fee of $1,360 and remanded for the trial court to determine the amount of additional attorneys' fees under 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) and then enter an amended judgment.

The Appellate Division affirmed a judgment awarding the claimant $15,508,705 as just compensation after the MTA condemned a Queens retail property for elevator renovations at the Flushing Main Street station. Following a nonjury trial, the trial court accepted the claimant's appraisal, which treated the property's highest and best use as one-story retail with development potential and relied on a nearby comparable sale to set a 2.5% capitalization rate. The court rejected the MTA's appraisal, which used a 6.5% cap rate based on national strip-center data and less comparable local transactions, finding the trial court's valuation was within the experts' ranges and adequately explained by the evidence.

The Appellate Division affirmed a lower court judgment that annulled the Town/Village of Harrison Planning Board's denial of BKP Harrison, LLC's application for amended site plan approval to replace a restaurant with a new restaurant and drive-through. The court held the board's denial was arbitrary and capricious because it relied on speculative traffic predictions, subjective doubts about the applicant honoring delivery-hour commitments, an improper interpretation of zoning (a power reserved to code enforcement and the zoning board of appeals), and a traffic study not shared with the applicant. The appellate court therefore ordered the planning board to grant the application.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's refusal to award additional attorneys' fees to Smart Choice Medical, P.C. after Smart Choice filed its fee submission late and then sought permission to renew based on an argument that the court's briefing schedule postdated its deadline. The court held that Smart Choice's asserted “new” factual basis was actually available earlier and that it failed to offer a reasonable justification for not presenting that information earlier. Because the renewal standard under CPLR 2221(e) was not met, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying renewal or awarding additional fees.

The Appellate Division affirmed a Supreme Court judgment refusing to award additional attorneys' fees to Citimed Surgery Center, LLC. Citimed had been directed to file a motion for fees within 30 days after a May 11, 2023 order, but filed late and did not explain the delay. The court denied Citimed's motions as untimely, relying on precedent that court-ordered time frames must be respected to preserve the integrity of judicial orders. Because the second motion was filed beyond the 30-day period, the appellate court held the denial was proper and affirmed.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's judgment confirming a master arbitration award in favor of Bay Ridge Surgi-Center, LLC and refusing to award Bay Ridge additional attorney fees under 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4). Bay Ridge had sought relief after failing to appear for oral argument and moved to vacate that portion of the prior order and to obtain fees; the court denied the CPLR 5015(a)(1) motion and reargument request. The court held Bay Ridge could not use reargument to raise the fee claim for the first time and that Bay Ridge failed to submit the contemporaneous time records required to justify an award of additional fees.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court's order granting the plaintiff summary judgment on liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense of comparative negligence in a rear-end collision case. The plaintiff showed he was slowing for a red light when the defendant's vehicle struck his car from behind, establishing a presumption of the defendant's negligence. The defendants' evidence that the plaintiff made a sudden stop and that their car skidded on wet pavement did not provide a sufficient nonnegligent explanation or show the skid was unavoidable, so no triable issue of fact was created.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a judgment dismissing the plaintiff Alejandro Perez Barranco's claims under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) arising from a 2017 ladder fall. The court held the homeowner's exemption protected defendant Marina Fronshtein because the property was a one-family residence and she did not direct or control the work. The court also held defendant Marat Fronshtein was entitled to dismissal under the Workers' Compensation Law exclusivity provision because he and the injured plaintiff were coemployees acting within the scope of employment. The defendants' cross-appeal was rendered academic.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and granted summary judgment to defendants Eric and Leslie Gulkis in a personal injury action alleging liability under General Obligations Law § 11-100. The plaintiff claimed he was assaulted by an underage guest, Hellerman, at a party hosted at the Gulkis defendants' home and alleged the hosts unlawfully furnished alcohol to the minor. The appellate court held the hosts showed the minor was not intoxicated at the time of the assault and the plaintiff produced no evidence of intoxication, so the statutory claim against the hosts fails as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had dismissed a fraud, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing complaint against Madison Realty Capital and related defendants. The lower court had dismissed the action based on a release in a forbearance agreement and for failure to plead fraud, but the appellate court held the plaintiffs could amend as of right and that their amended complaint raised questions of fact whether the release was unfairly obtained and whether defendants made intentional misrepresentations to induce the plaintiffs to enter agreements. Accordingly, the defendants' CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss was denied.

The Appellate Division modified a Supreme Court order in a personal-injury action arising from a table-saw accident. The court held that the lower court erred by granting summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) claim against the property owners (the Cremoux defendants) and by denying leave for the contractor (Scott Bavosa Construction Corp.) to amend its third-party answer. The court found triable issues about whether the homeowner exemption applied and whether Industrial Code violations occurred, and it concluded the insurer-subrogation/antisubrogation defense Bavosa sought to add was not palpably insufficient.

The Appellate Division modified and affirmed in part a Kings County order in a personal-injury action arising from a worker's fall when perimeter safety netting gave way. The court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment that had dismissed contractual indemnification claims against the plaintiff's employer, Lippolis, and otherwise affirmed the denials of summary judgment for the defendants and third-party plaintiffs against subcontractor Monolithic. The court held triable issues remained about whether the injuries arose from Monolithic's work, whether the defendants were free from negligence, and whether Monolithic failed to procure required additional-insured coverage.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court's denial of the Reinholds' motion to vacate a March 23, 2022 order that granted JPMorgan Chase leave to enter a default judgment in a mortgage foreclosure. The Reinholds had not answered the foreclosure complaint and did not oppose the plaintiff's motion for default; they later sought relief under CPLR 5015(a) claiming law-office failure and that prior counsel had misled them. The court found their submissions inadequate to show a reasonable excuse for the defaults and therefore properly denied vacatur without reaching whether they had meritorious defenses.

The Appellate Division reversed a Nassau County Supreme Court order and granted the plaintiff leave to enter a default judgment on liability in a slip-and-fall personal injury case. The defendant failed to timely answer the complaint; when he served a late answer the plaintiff rejected it and moved for default judgment. The trial court had compelled the plaintiff to accept the late answer, but the appellate court found the defendant did not show a reasonable excuse for the delay (his counsel had no personal knowledge and the insurer’s affidavit was inadequate) and thus the trial court abused its discretion.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Suffolk County Comptroller in an action converted from a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The court held that Suffolk County may assess hotel and motel occupancy taxes under chapter 523, article II of the Suffolk County Code on the plaintiff’s Fire Island rental property for stays of under 30 consecutive days. The court reasoned that the state enabling statute grants broad authority to impose an occupancy tax and that the statutory and local definitions of “hotel or motel” are sufficiently broad to include the plaintiff’s short-term rentals.