Court Filings

The Tenth Court of Appeals dismissed William Penn Dixon’s pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the intermediate appellate court lacks original habeas jurisdiction in criminal matters. Dixon had asked the court to order the trial court to act, hold a hearing, suppress evidence, and dismiss pending criminal charges alleging an illegal search. The court explained that jurisdiction to hear original criminal habeas petitions rests with the Court of Criminal Appeals, district courts, county courts, or judges in those courts, so the appellate court could not grant the requested relief and dismissed the filing for want of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Elisha Holloway’s appeal from a county court judgment awarding possession and damages to The Julian at South Pointe because Holloway failed to file the required docketing statement and did not respond to the Court’s notices. The Clerk had set deadlines and warned that failure to comply could result in dismissal. Because no docketing statement or extension request was received, the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and for failure to follow a clerk’s directive, and it dismissed an emergency motion as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed an eviction appeal as moot after the appellants informed the court they no longer occupy the disputed property and do not oppose dismissal. The court noted that eviction proceedings in justice and county courts focus solely on the right to actual possession under Texas law and the civil rules. Because the appellants vacated the premises, the court vacated the county court judgment, dismissed the appeal and all pending motions, and provided no further relief on possession or related claims.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed an appeal brought by Mitternight Boiler Works, Inc. after Mitternight filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appellate court granted the motion prior to issuing any decision on the merits and dismissed the appeal, denying as moot all other pending motions. The dismissal was entered by per curiam opinion and the court noted the procedural rule authorizing dismissal on the appellant's motion.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District granted the parties' joint motion to reinstate and dismiss an appeal brought by Rene Martinez from an order enforcing a Rule 11 settlement. After the case was abated for mediation, the parties executed a mediated settlement agreement and asked the court to dismiss the appeal. The court reinstated the appeal and dismissed it by joint motion, ordering costs taxed against the party that incurred them and noting that no motion for rehearing will be entertained.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Walter Green Jr.’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Green had previously been convicted of continuous family violence and later filed an Article 11.07 habeas application challenging his conviction and sentence. The trial court recommended dismissal as a subsequent application and forwarded its findings to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which dismissed the application. Green attempted to appeal the trial court’s findings that were sent to the Court of Criminal Appeals, but the appellate court concluded it lacks jurisdiction over postconviction matters and dismissed the appeal after Green failed to show grounds to proceed.

The Second District Court of Appeals at Fort Worth dismissed Reginald Munoz’s appeal for failure to pay the required $205 filing fee after being warned twice under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court cited the appellant’s noncompliance with Rule 42.3(c) and related rules, and referenced the Texas Supreme Court’s 2015 fee order. The court ordered Munoz to pay all costs of the appeal and issued a per curiam memorandum opinion dismissing the case on April 23, 2026.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of USMAN MOHSIN for failure to comply with filing rules. The appellant did not file the required enumeration of errors and brief within twenty days after docketing and ignored the court's March 31, 2026 order to file by April 10, 2026. Because the appellant still had not filed the materials as of April 23, 2026, the court deemed the appeal abandoned and dismissed it under the court's procedural rules.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Saadi Orabi's appeal for failure to comply with docketing and briefing rules. The appellant did not respond to the notice of docketing or file the required enumeration of errors and brief within the time prescribed by Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) and Rule 13. The court had previously ordered those filings by February 20, 2026, but they were never filed, so the appeal was deemed abandoned and dismissed pursuant to Court of Appeals Rules 7 and 23(a).

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ricky R. Franklin’s direct appeal of a trial-court award of attorney fees to Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC and Wilmington Savings Fund Society because the appeal should have been pursued by filing an application for discretionary review under Georgia law. The trial court had awarded $14,354.50 in fees under OCGA § 9-15-14(b), and denied Franklin’s motions for a new trial and to set aside the fee award. The appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because Franklin did not follow the mandatory discretionary appeals procedure required for appeals of attorney-fee awards.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Andre Latrell Burton’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Burton filed a notice of appeal on March 2, 2026 challenging the trial court’s November 5, 2025 denial of his 2024 motion to set aside his sentence. Because Georgia law requires a notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of the order and Burton’s notice was filed about four months late, the Court concluded it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Willie Clarence Lee Jr.'s appeal from the trial court's December 4, 2025 dismissal of his motion to vacate, set aside, or reverse judgment because his notice of appeal, filed January 7, 2026, was untimely. The court explained that Georgia law requires a notice of appeal within 30 days of the judgment or order being appealed and that timely filing is an absolute jurisdictional requirement. Because Lee filed his notice 34 days after the order, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal without reaching the motion's merits.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ergin Tek’s direct appeal of a trial court order that removed a mechanic’s lien and found slander of title because the case was not final. The trial court reserved damages and attorney-fee issues for a later hearing, so the case remained pending. The Court explained that Tek needed either a final judgment, an express determination that there is no just reason for delay, or compliance with interlocutory appeal procedures (including a certificate of immediate review) to obtain appellate jurisdiction. Because Tek did not follow those procedures, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Allied Property Group, LLC’s application for interlocutory review as untimely. Allied sought review after the trial court dismissed all its claims and granted a certificate of immediate review on March 17, 2026. Georgia law requires an application to this Court within ten days of that certificate, but Allied filed on March 31, 2026—four days late. Because compliance with OCGA § 5-6-34(b) is jurisdictional, the Court lacked authority to consider the late application and dismissed it, leaving Allied to await final judgment to pursue an appeal.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals dismissed a mandamus complaint filed by James and Cynthia Lundeen and Sir Isaac Newton Enterprises seeking to force Cuyahoga Common Pleas Judge Sherrie Miday to vacate her order dismissing the Lundeens’ counterclaim for false-light invasion of privacy. The court held Judge Miday had subject-matter jurisdiction after the case was transferred to common pleas court and that any error in her ruling would make the judgment voidable, not void, meaning mandamus was not an appropriate remedy because an appeal is an adequate remedy at law. The court also declared the Lundeens vexatious litigants and barred pro se filings without leave.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals denied Monica G. Justice’s request for a writ of mandamus that would have ordered the Franklin County clerk to serve her a July 22, 2025 amended sentencing entry. The court adopted the magistrate’s decision and granted the State’s motion to dismiss because Justice, an incarcerated pro se relator, failed to comply with statutory procedural requirements for inmate litigants. Specifically, she did not file the required affidavit listing prior civil actions, did not provide the certified inmate-account statements/affidavit of indigency needed to waive fees, and did not caption the petition in the name of the State on her relation.

The court denied Sterling Robinson’s request for a writ of mandamus seeking an order that Judge Jaiza N. Page vacate his criminal judgment. Robinson argued the trial court’s judgment was void because he withdrew his consent to the proceedings. The magistrate recommended and the court agreed that a criminal judgment is not a “consent judgment” and that a defendant’s alleged refusal or withdrawal of consent does not deprive a common pleas court of subject-matter jurisdiction over felony charges. Because Robinson failed to allege a clear legal right or a clear legal duty owed by the judge, the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim.

The Ohio Second District Court of Appeals dismissed Mao Ju’s mandamus action seeking to force a Xenia Municipal Court magistrate to further process her citizen criminal affidavit charging her former spouse with interference with custody. The court held that the magistrate properly reviewed the affidavit and determined it did not establish probable cause for a misdemeanor, and that Ohio statutes do not require the magistrate to docket the affidavit, assign a case number, refer misdemeanor allegations to a prosecutor, or hold a formal probable-cause hearing. Because Ju could not show a clear legal right or a mandatory duty owed by the magistrate, the writ was denied.

The Appellate Division, First Department dismissed Christina Ventura's appeal from a Bronx Supreme Court order that granted defendant Ahmed summary judgment dismissing her complaint for lack of a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102(d). The appellate court held the order was entered against plaintiff for failure to timely respond (a default), so the order was not appealable as of right. The proper procedure was to move to vacate the default and then appeal any denial. Because of that procedural defect, the court did not reach Ventura's substantive arguments on the motion's merits.

The Appellate Division, First Department dismissed Jacob Adekola’s appeal from Supreme Court orders that granted Deutsche Bank’s motions for a default judgment, an order of reference, confirmation of a referee’s report, and a judgment of foreclosure and sale. The court held Adekola lacked standing to appeal because he failed to appear in the underlying action before filing his notice of appeal and therefore was not an aggrieved party. Because the appeal was dismissed for lack of standing, the panel did not reach the merits of Adekola’s arguments for relief.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Michael Dean Samuelson’s pro se appeal from his convictions for theft and possession with intent to deliver because the trial-court certifications, which Samuelson signed, state his case was a plea bargain and that he has no right of appeal. The court gave Samuelson until March 27, 2026 to show grounds to continue the appeal and received no response. Relying on the trial-court certifications and applicable Texas appellate rules and precedent, the panel dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits.

The court dismissed pro se appellant Isabelle Edwards’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Edwards sought review of the trial court’s August 5, 2025 order granting KFS Lewisville LLC’s motion to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a and awarding attorneys’ fees, but the trial court expressly stated the fee amount had not yet been determined and that its order was not final. The appellate court concluded the order neither finally disposed of every claim nor was an appealable interlocutory order, so the appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction after Edwards failed to respond to the court’s notice to show grounds to continue the appeal.

The court dismissed an appeal from a county court-at-law involving matters concerning M.P. and A.P. because the appellant failed to pay the required $205 filing fee after her claim of indigence was rejected by the trial court. The appellate court gave notice and a deadline to pay, warned dismissal would follow under the appellate rules, and the fee was not paid by the deadline. The court denied as moot the appellant's pending motions and ordered the appellant to pay all costs of the appeal.

The court granted the father's request to dismiss his own appeal in a child custody case. The Department of Family and Protective Services had removed the child and filed to terminate parental rights; instead the parties reached an agreed judgment appointing the Department permanent managing conservator while mother and father remained possessory conservators. The father, incarcerated at the time, initially appealed but after new appellate counsel secured a hearing and the father waived his motion for new trial and the appeal, he moved to dismiss the appeal, which the court granted under the appellate rules.

The appellate court dismissed Mother's appeal from a final order in a suit affecting the parent–child relationship because her notice of appeal was untimely. The trial court signed the final order on 2025-06-24, and the notice of appeal was required within 20 days (by 2025-07-14) for this accelerated appeal pathway. Mother did not file her notice until 2026-03-17, and she did not respond to the court's request to show grounds to retain the appeal. Because no timely notice or extension was filed, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The court dismissed Brenton Autwavious Smith’s appeal from his murder conviction because the trial court certified this was a plea-bargain case in which the defendant has no right of appeal. The appellate court gave Smith a month to show grounds to continue the appeal after notifying him of the certification, but he did not respond. Because the trial-court certification showing no right to appeal was part of the record and Smith had waived appeal rights in his plea paperwork, the appellate court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.

The First District of Texas dismissed Star Construction Services, Sandra Scherer (d/b/a Star Construction Services), and Robert Scherer’s appeal because the appellants neither established indigence nor paid required appellate fees and failed to respond to the court’s notice. The court cited Texas rules and statutes governing fee payment and its authority to dismiss for nonpayment and failure to prosecute. Because appellants did not timely explain why they should not pay or actually pay the fees, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal brought by Blackbuck Petroleum PropCo I LLC and AGP Energy Services LLC from a trial court order denying their motion to compel arbitration. The parties executed a mediated settlement and a signed settlement, release, and confidentiality agreement that expressly resolved all past and present claims, including the pending appeal, and required dismissals with prejudice. Appellees moved to dismiss the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure; appellants did not oppose. The court granted the unopposed motion and dismissed the appeal, taxing costs against the appellants.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal in a dispute between John Dickerson and Atlas Sand Company, LLC after the parties jointly moved to dismiss. The parties agreed each would bear their own appellate costs as permitted by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court granted the joint motion and dismissed the appeals without reaching the merits of the underlying dispute.

The Court of Appeals dismissed EZ Automotive and Towing SVC LLC's appeal from the trial court's summary judgment because the judgment was not final or appealable. Recaman Auto Group obtained summary judgment on its declaratory-judgment claim about ownership of a Chevrolet Silverado, but the trial court expressly left Recaman's request for attorney’s fees undecided. Because the fee claim remained pending and the order lacked finality language, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.