Court Filings

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a per curiam order dated April 21, 2026, quashed a notice of appeal in a dispute between Paula Grapes (as executrix of an estate) and Linda J. Grapes. The Court concluded that the appealed order was not one of the types of final orders that may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court under 42 Pa.C.S. § 722 and the state appellate rules defining final orders. Because the appeal did not meet the statutory and rule-based criteria for direct review, the notice of appeal was dismissed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a per curiam order on April 21, 2026 quashing a Notice of Appeal in a dispute involving Paula Grapes (as executrix of an estate) and Linda J. Grapes. The Court concluded the appeal could not proceed because the challenged order was not one of the types of final orders that may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court under state statute and appellate rules. The Court relied on 42 Pa.C.S. § 722 and Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341(b) in finding the appeal improper and therefore quashed the filing.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed an original petition for a writ of mandamus filed by P.R. and M.Z. against the Department of Children and Families. The opinion is per curiam, issued April 21, 2026, and does not include substantive reasoning in the published entry. The court noted the decision is not final until any timely motion under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330 or 9.331 is resolved. Judges Lewis, Winokur, and Neff concurred.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, El Paso) dismissed Boss Lady Pub and Maria Elena Olvera’s appeal because they filed a notice of appeal but did not pay required appellate filing fees or show entitlement to proceed without payment. The clerk warned them that failure to pay by a specified deadline could result in dismissal; they did not respond or pay. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot on April 20, 2026.

The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas resolved two related proceedings brought by John D. Ferrara challenging a trial-court denial of his first amended application for post-conviction habeas relief. The court dismissed Ferrara’s direct appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the trial court did not issue a merits-based writ or hold an evidentiary hearing before signing the denial. The court also denied Ferrara’s petition for writ of mandamus because he failed to show entitlement to extraordinary relief — he did not establish a clear ministerial duty by the trial court or that he lacked an adequate remedy by appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in Pimentel v. Morquecho because the appellant failed to file a required brief and enumerations of error by the court's deadline of April 13, 2026. The court issued a formal order on April 20, 2026, noting the missed filing and entered dismissal as the disposition. No opinion on the merits was reached because the procedural default (failure to file required appellate documents) warranted dismissal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Jimmy Wallace's appeal as premature. Wallace was convicted and filed a timely motion for new trial, then filed a motion to withdraw that motion and the next day filed a notice of appeal. Because the trial court had not yet ruled on the motion for new trial or the motion to withdraw it, the case remained pending below and the appellate court lacked jurisdiction under Georgia law. The court relied on statutory timing rules for appeals and precedent holding that the appellate clock does not start until the trial court finally disposes of a motion for new trial.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed Terrence Pellet’s petition for a writ of prohibition seeking relief against the Florida Department of Revenue, Child Support Program. The petition was filed in the court’s original jurisdiction, and the per curiam order simply states the petition is dismissed without published opinion. All three judges concurred. No additional reasoning, factual findings, or relief were set forth in the decision.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal filed by appellant Ricardo Turullols Bonilla after he moved to dismiss it. The dismissal was granted under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the court issued a short memorandum opinion stating the appeal is dismissed. The decision is procedural: the court did not reach the merits of the underlying dispute but terminated appellate review because the appellant withdrew the appeal by motion.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed Lewis Carl Hunt’s appeal of his conviction for murder because the trial court certified that the case was resolved by a plea bargain and that Hunt waived his right to appeal. Under Texas appellate rules, when a defendant pleads guilty or no contest pursuant to a plea agreement and the trial court certifies no right to appeal (or the defendant waives appeal), the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The court therefore dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Appellate District of Texas dismissed this appeal because the parties filed a joint notice that they resolved their disputes and moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1) and entered dismissal. The decision is procedural: no merits ruling was made because the parties voluntarily ended the litigation by settlement and asked the court to close the appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Trimen Enterprises, Inc.'s appeal seeking review of the trial court's refusal to allow an amended answer and the entry of default judgment against Trimen. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because the case remains pending below as other claims against a co-defendant were unresolved, and the trial court did not enter a certificate under OCGA § 9-11-54(b). Because Trimen did not follow the interlocutory-appeal procedures in OCGA § 5-6-34(b), including obtaining a certificate of immediate review, the appeal was premature and must be dismissed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed James Fields's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the trial court record lacks a written disposition as to Count 2 (a firearm charge). Fields was convicted on Count 5 (attempted armed robbery) and Count 6 (firearm during a felony) and acquitted on Count 1, while Count 3 resulted in a mistrial and Counts 3 and 4 were dead-docketed. Under Georgia law, an appeal from a multi-count indictment is only ripe when each count has a written judgment; because Count 2 remains unresolved in the record, Fields needed to seek interlocutory review and did not, so the appeal was dismissed.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed a pro se appeal by Crandall Postell from a probate court order approving sale of estate real property because Postell remained represented by counsel when he filed the notice of appeal. The record contained no probate-court order allowing attorney Daniel Wilder to withdraw, and Georgia precedent bars a party from simultaneously being represented and proceeding pro se. Because a pro se notice filed while represented is a legal nullity, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal by homeowner Chinh Vo challenging the denial of his motion to set aside a May 2025 final judgment in favor of Bellmoore Park Homeowners Association. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because appeals from denials of motions to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60(d) must proceed by discretionary appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(8),(b). Because compliance with the discretionary-appeal procedure is jurisdictional, the court dismissed the direct appeal for failure to follow the required procedure.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Ed Hunter's appeal from the City of South Fulton because the appellant failed to comply with docketing notice and Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) by not filing an enumeration of errors and brief within the required time. The court had previously ordered those filings by April 6, 2026; they were still not filed as of the April 17, 2026 order. Relying on its procedural rules, the court deemed the appeal abandoned and entered dismissal.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals denied Frederick Mundt’s application for reconsideration and request for en banc review of its prior opinion affirming the trial court’s dismissal of his postconviction petition under Ohio’s serious mental illness (SMI) statute. The court reaffirmed that Mundt had clinical diagnoses of Bipolar Disorder and Schizoaffective Disorder but found the record lacked sufficient evidence that those conditions significantly impaired his capacity to make rational judgments at the time of the offense. Because the trial court reasonably credited the state expert’s interpretation of Mundt’s conduct, the panel found no basis to overturn or rehear the decision.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal dismissed Molly Dorsey’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court found the trial court’s December 6, 2024 orders (an Amended Order of Summary Administration and an Amended Order Determining Homestead Status) were final, but Dorsey filed her notice of appeal on February 12, 2025—outside the 30-day deadline. Because no timely appeal of any final order was filed, the appellate court also lacked jurisdiction over earlier nonfinal orders and motions. The court rejected attempts to toll the appeal period and concluded the appeal must be dismissed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed William Antoine Thomas’s appeal from a conviction entered pursuant to a plea bargain because the trial-court certification, signed by the judge, Thomas, and his trial counsel, states the case is a plea-bargain case, that the defendant has no right of appeal, and that Thomas waived his right to appeal. The State moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the court granted the motion, holding the certification deprived it of jurisdiction to hear the appeal under applicable Texas appellate rules and precedent.

The Texas appellate court reinstated an appeal previously suspended by the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, reviewed a motion showing the debtor received a Chapter 7 discharge, and concluded the discharge mooted the dispute between John Deere and Bradley Irwin. Because the bankruptcy discharge voided the underlying debt and barred collection, there was no live controversy for the court to resolve. The court therefore vacated the trial court’s judgment and its prior appellate opinion and judgment, and dismissed the case as moot.

The defendant, Ethan Alexander Herrera, appealed a conviction for aggravated robbery. On April 13, 2026, Herrera filed a signed, voluntary motion to dismiss his appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a short memorandum explaining the dismissal was pursuant to the rule permitting voluntary dismissal when requested by an appellant and properly signed.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed Stacey Sprung’s pending appeal after Sprung filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The motion was filed before the court issued a decision, and the court granted it under the governing rule, resulting in dismissal of the appeal. The opinion is a short, per curiam memorandum noting submission and opinion dates and the panel that considered the matter.

The court dismissed a pending civil appeal after the parties jointly moved to dismiss under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appeal arose from the County Court at Law No. 1 in Jefferson County (trial cause No. 25CCCV0301). Because the joint motion was filed before the court issued a decision, the Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a brief memorandum disposing of the case without further analysis.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas dismissed Leo Roger Dugas’s appeal of a trial-court take-nothing judgment in a quiet-title suit against Ryan Edward Reuter. Dugas filed an initial brief that lacked legal authority and a corrected brief that failed to comply with numerous appellate rules. After warning and allowing an opportunity to amend, the court determined Dugas did not file a proper brief and proceeded on the clerk’s record, then dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court therefore did not reach the merits of the underlying title dispute.

The First District of Texas dismissed Trina Jones's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2 for failure to prosecute. The appellant's brief was due January 5, 2026, and after no brief was filed the court notified her on January 22, 2026, that the appeal could be dismissed unless the brief or an extension motion was filed by February 2, 2026. The appellant did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Timothy Williams's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 for failure to prosecute. Williams failed to file his appellant brief by the February 20, 2026 deadline, did not file the brief or a motion for extension after a March 6, 2026 notice, and did not respond by the March 16, 2026 date given. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot under applicable Texas appellate rules.

The court dismissed an appeal from a final judgment entered September 30, 2024 because the appellant filed his notice of appeal on July 1, 2025 — more than nine months after the judgment and well beyond the applicable deadlines. The court explained the general 30-day filing deadline, the circumstances that can extend it to 90 days, and the limited procedure for seeking an extension. The appellant was given notice that the appeal appeared untimely and did not respond, so the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals from five felony convictions for lack of jurisdiction because Brown validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements in each case. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to evidence in five trial causes, signed written waivers and advisals acknowledging he understood and waived appeal rights, and the trial court’s judgments reflected the waiver. Because the record affirmatively shows the waivers were knowing and voluntary and Brown admitted the waivers to this Court, the court concluded it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five criminal cases for lack of jurisdiction. Brown had pleaded guilty to theft-from-person in three cases and aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon in two others, and in each case he agreed as part of plea arrangements to waive his right to appeal. The trial-court paperwork and appellant’s own filings show he knowingly and voluntarily waived appeal rights, and the judgments expressly note appeals were waived. Because the record contains valid appeal waivers and no trial-court permission to appeal, the court dismissed the appeals.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five consolidated criminal cases because the trial-court record shows he validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to violations in three theft-from-person cases and pleaded guilty to two aggravated robbery cases; in each cause he signed documents and the judgments reflected an appeal waiver. Because the written certifications and filings demonstrate a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver and the trial court did not grant permission to appeal, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals.