Court Filings

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a lower-court order that denied a final extreme risk protection order (ERPO) against a state correction officer, Mathew J. Galliher. The court held that petitioner New York State Police proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent participated in a violent assault on a restrained inmate that caused serious injury and death, and thus met the statutory definition of a substantial risk of physical harm to others. The Fourth Department concluded the trial court applied the wrong standard and remitted the case for further proceedings consistent with issuance of the ERPO.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Family Court order that dismissed the mother's custody petition and awarded joint custody after the mother failed to appear at a hearing. The court held that Family Court did not adequately ensure the mother knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived her right to counsel before allowing her to proceed pro se. Because the right to counsel in child custody proceedings is fundamental, the court reinstated the mother's petition and remitted the case to Family Court for a new hearing to allow a proper waiver inquiry and further proceedings.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Supreme Court's denial of Deutsche Bank's summary judgment motion in a mortgage foreclosure. The loan was originated by Ameriquest, later placed into a trust under a pooling and servicing agreement that named Deutsche Bank as trustee, and an assignment to Deutsche Bank was executed in 2009 by the servicer acting under a limited power of attorney. The appellate court held Deutsche Bank met its burden to show standing by producing the assignment and mortgage documents, and directed the trial court to appoint a referee to compute the amount due.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to multiple defendants and reinstated the City of Rome’s amended complaint. The City sued after a chlorine gas leak at a new water filtration facility damaged property; defendants were involved in design and construction. Supreme Court had held the plant operator’s removal of a frosted chlorine tank was a superseding, unforeseeable event absolving defendants. The appellate court ruled defendants failed to prove that the operator’s conduct broke the causal chain, so summary judgment was improper and issues of foreseeability must go to a factfinder.

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in full. Plaintiff sued for breach of an option agreement that allegedly gave him an exclusive right to repurchase company interests; he attempted to exercise the option in November 2023. The court held the written option was clear and expired on December 31, 2020 (and could only be extended by plaintiff before that date), so the attempted exercise was untimely and there was no breach. The court rejected plaintiff's alternative strained reading that the option barred any sale or never expired.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a jury verdict in favor of defendants in a medical malpractice case and granted a new trial. Plaintiffs alleged the radiologist defendant failed to identify a potentially cancerous abnormality on chest X-rays. The court held the trial judge erroneously gave an "error in judgment" jury instruction, which is appropriate only when a doctor chooses among several medically acceptable alternatives. Because the evidence showed only an alleged failure to meet the standard of care (a failure to diagnose), giving that charge risked confusing the jury and was not harmless, requiring reversal and reinstatement of the complaint.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's partial denial of defendants' summary judgment motion and granted defendants' motion to dismiss the medical malpractice claim. Plaintiffs alleged defendants failed to diagnose Cushing's syndrome, but defendants' expert attested that care met the standard and there was no biochemical or pathological evidence of Cushing's or an ACTH-secreting tumor during defendants' treatment. Plaintiffs' expert did not meaningfully rebut defendants' causation evidence or address 2019 surgical pathology, so plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue on causation.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a Bronx County Supreme Court order that had found defendant J.P. to presently suffer from a dangerous mental disorder and committed him to a secure psychiatric facility for six months. The court held that although the initial hearing met statutory and due process requirements despite the examining witnesses not testifying, defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to meaningfully challenge the People's examiner reports, secure the examiners' testimony, obtain a defense expert, or present any defense evidence. The matter is remitted for a new CPL 330.20(6) hearing.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's order that had dismissed the indictment against defendant Diamond Haggan under CPL 30.30. The People had filed a certificate of compliance for discovery and the court held that the prosecution was not required to obtain third-party employment and medical records as part of initial automatic discovery, so withholding them did not invalidate the certificate. Although the People improperly withheld a victim entity report as duplicative, there was no bad faith and the People had otherwise met their discovery obligations, so the dismissal was improper and the indictment was reinstated for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division reversed Family Court’s May 17, 2024 order that modified a 2015 Texas custody and visitation order and granted the mother sole physical and legal custody. The court held that, under New York’s version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), New York lacked authority to modify a prior Texas custody order because Texas retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and the father continues to reside in Texas. The court also found that Family Court failed to properly invoke temporary emergency jurisdiction because it did not communicate with the Texas court or limit the duration of its order, so the order was vacated and the case remanded for proper UCCJEA procedures.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's order that had vacated an arbitration award in a dispute between transit employees and the New York City Transit Authority. The appellate court held the arbitrator acted within his authority, properly reviewed the process by which the Medical Review Officer reached and then altered his drug-test determination, and found improper influence by the employer's representative. The panel concluded the award did not violate public policy and reinstated the arbitration award, denying the Authority's cross-motion to vacate and granting the petition to confirm.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court Bronx County's grant of summary judgment for New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation and reinstated Janice Campbell's medical malpractice complaint. The suit alleges surgeons lacerated the plaintiff's bladder during pelvic surgery. The appellate court found that plaintiff's expert affidavit raised a triable issue by opining surgeons deviated from the standard of care by failing to perform a retrograde bladder fill, which would have better delineated bladder margins given substantial pelvic adhesions. The court held this claim was included in the bill of particulars, so dismissal was improper.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reversed Supreme Court's declaration that Justin Ball is entitled to a civil jury trial to contest administrative charges seeking fines and revocation of his EMT license. The court held that the federal Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated against the states and therefore does not guarantee a civil jury in a state administrative licensure proceeding, and that New York's constitutional jury guarantee does not extend to regulatory license-revocation proceedings rooted in the statutory scheme governing professional licensure. The court granted the Department of Health's motion to dismiss and ended the injunction against the administrative process.

The Court of Appeals held that a defendant may not be required, as a condition of a negotiated guilty plea, to waive a Penal Law § 60.12 hearing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA). N.H. accepted a plea conditioned on waiving a § 60.12 hearing; the Court concluded such a waiver is not enforceable and reversed the Appellate Division, remitting the case to Supreme Court for further proceedings. The majority emphasized the DVSJA’s remedial purpose to afford survivor-defendants a judicial opportunity to establish eligibility for alternative, less severe sentences and treated the hearing right as unwaivable in plea bargaining.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, vacated Warren Burgess's guilty plea to misdemeanor criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and remitted the case to Criminal Court for further proceedings. Burgess had pleaded to a misdemeanor after felony counts were crossed out at arraignment, but the accusatory instrument lacked any factual allegation that the recovered firearm was operable — an element required to sustain the weapon possession charge. Because a facially sufficient accusatory instrument is a jurisdictional prerequisite that survives a guilty plea, the Court concluded the misdemeanor information was jurisdictionally defective and could not support the plea.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court order that had granted the plaintiff summary judgment to quiet title and declared a 2004 administrator's deed void from the start. The plaintiff had sued after her mother, appointed administrator c.t.a., conveyed decedent's property to herself and the plaintiff as joint tenants, contrary to the decedent's will leaving the property to the plaintiff alone. The appellate court held that because the defendant had Surrogate's Court letters of administration c.t.a., her transfer was cloaked with apparent authority and therefore was voidable (subject to attack), not void ab initio. The cross-motion for summary judgment was denied.

The Appellate Division reversed a Nassau County Supreme Court order and granted plaintiff Kelvin Goode leave to enter a default judgment against Bespoke Motor Group, LLC and Bentley Long Island, LLC in a breach of contract action. The court found service on an employee identified as a "service consultant" was proper under the rules for serving limited liability companies, the defendants failed to timely answer, and the plaintiff provided proof of service and the defendants' default. Because the defendants did not show a reasonable excuse for the default, the court granted default judgment without reaching the merits of any asserted defenses.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a Supreme Court order and granted defendant Aileen Betances' renewed summary judgment motion dismissing the amended complaint against her in a personal injury action. Plaintiffs alleged their vehicle was struck from the rear and that the defendant owned or operated the offending vehicle. The court held the defendant made a prima facie showing that she and her vehicle were not involved in the accident, and the plaintiffs' opposing papers failed to raise a triable issue of fact, so dismissal was appropriate.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court (Bronx County) and granted plaintiff Wilmington Savings Fund Society's motion to confirm a Referee's report and enter a judgment of foreclosure and sale. The court found the Referee's report was substantially supported by the affidavit of the plaintiff's corporate counsel for its loan servicer, which detailed the borrower's full payment history, established default as of October 1, 2008, and set forth the unpaid principal balance and accrued interest. The court relied on precedent permitting business records and servicer-calculated amounts when properly supported.

The Court of Appeals held that defendant's written speedy-trial motion under CPL 30.30(1)(b), filed on the day trial was to begin, was timely and provided reasonable notice to the People. The Appellate Division erred in affirming the trial court's summary refusal to consider the motion as untimely and for lack of notice. Because the motion complied with the specific statutory deadline in CPL 170.30(2) and included detailed calculations of chargeable days, the Court reversed and remitted the case for further proceedings on the motion so the People may be given a fair opportunity to respond and the trial court may exercise its discretion how to proceed.

The First Department reversed Supreme Court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss a fraudulent inducement complaint and granted the motion. Plaintiff claimed defendant lied about tenants and rents when selling Manhattan property, but documentary evidence in the closing binder (schedule 8.1(k)) and the purchase agreement terms (including a merger clause and an "as is" purchase) conclusively refuted reliance. The court also held that, even absent those documents, the complaint failed to plead all elements of fraudulent inducement with sufficient particularity, so dismissal was required.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court order that had awarded the mother $108,491.83 in counsel fees and expenses under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act after the court ordered the return of the parties' child to Italy. The panel held that Supreme Court made only conclusory findings and failed to apply the statutory and equitable factors required by ICARA and controlling federal caselaw (including the respondent's burden to show an award would be "clearly inappropriate" and use of the lodestar method to set fees). The matter is remitted for the lower court to consider the proper factors, decide whether an award would be clearly inappropriate, and, if not, calculate an appropriate fee amount.

The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment for Bassett Healthcare Network in a wrongful-death action by Harvey Brody, administrator of Barbara Brody's estate. The court held that issues of fact exist both on a common-law negligence claim that the facility failed to monitor its parking lot and on medical malpractice claims against the nurse practitioner who evaluated the decedent. The court found defendant met its initial burdens but that plaintiff submitted admissible evidence (job description, photos, and an expert affidavit) creating triable issues about assumed duty and whether the NP departed from the applicable standard of care.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and granted the defendant's motion to suppress a statement obtained after his arrest. The People relied on an NYPD "probable cause I-card" and the fellow officer rule to justify the arrest, but presented no testimony from the arresting officers and did not show the I-card's contents or that the arresting officers actually received or relied on it. Because the prosecution failed to prove that the officers who arrested the defendant had been communicated probable cause, the court held the arrest unlawful and suppressed the statement as its fruit, remitting the case for further proceedings.