Court Filings

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of class certification in a putative class action against owners of a Red Roof Inn asserting violations of Civil Code § 1940.1. The trial court had denied certification because it believed each class member would need to prove the hotel was their personal “primary residence,” making individualized issues predominant. The appellate court held that the statute requires inquiry into whether the hotel is a “residential hotel” (a hotel-wide question), not individualized proof that each guest treated the hotel as their own primary residence. The case is remanded for reconsideration of class certification.

A jury convicted Jan Curtis Harzan of communicating with and arranging to meet a minor for sexual purposes after he messaged and agreed to meet an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old. Before trial the court ruled evidence of alleged sexual misconduct by Harzan from the 1970s would be excluded in the prosecution’s case-in-chief but could be admitted if Harzan asserted an entrapment defense. To avoid that prejudicial evidence, Harzan declined the entrapment defense and was convicted. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the court’s conditioning of exclusion violated Harzan’s constitutional right to present a defense, though the evidence supporting guilt was otherwise substantial.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Kaelyn Smith’s felony-murder judgment because the trial court failed to complete statutorily required notice and form under Ohio’s violent-offender law (Sierah’s Law, R.C. 2903.41 et seq.) before sentencing. Smith had pleaded guilty to felony murder with a firearm specification; the parties and judge discussed the violent-offender form and defense counsel waived reading the paperwork, but the record does not contain an executed form or an affirmative on-the-record advisement. Because the trial court did not provide the required pre-sentencing notice, the appellate court found plain error and ordered further proceedings for proper notice and signature.

The First District Court of Appeals reversed the municipal court's denial of a victim's request for restitution and remanded for a restitution hearing. Defendant Adam Winkle had pleaded guilty/no contest to several driving-related offenses after side‑swiping multiple cars while intoxicated. Victim M.L. submitted a victim impact statement with documentation that she paid a $500 insurance deductible for damage to her vehicle. The appellate court held the trial court erred in refusing restitution based on the existence of insurance and directed a hearing to determine restitution for the deductible.

The First District Court of Appeals reversed Patricia Hauser’s municipal-court conviction for theft and discharged her. Hauser pleaded no contest after the State recited facts that she left a bar without paying a $69.33 tab when her credit card was declined. The appellate court held the State’s explanation of circumstances affirmatively showed the bar owner consented to her possession of the drinks when he served them, which negated an essential element of the charged theft offense. Because the explanation could not support the conviction under R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), the court reversed and discharged Hauser.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Victor Valley Community College District in Jessie Walton’s suit alleging sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and related claims. The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion by excluding counsel’s curable declaration defect, and erred in holding Walton lacked FEHA standing, failed Government Claims Act notice, and could not show the District acted with deliberate indifference under Education Code section 66270. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its summary judgment, grant summary adjudication only on Walton’s Civil Code claim she did not contest, and deny summary adjudication on the remaining claims for trial setting.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Claims’ grant of summary judgment for the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC). The dispute concerned whether a $120 fee for an independent medical reviewer that BWC included in its subrogation demand was released by a prior settlement. The appellate court held the settlement’s release of subrogation rights did not bar Thomas’s claim for reimbursement because the fee was not part of the statutory subrogation interest and BWC was statutorily required to pay costs of medical reviews itself. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the convictions of Travis Ratcliff because the trial court misinformed him at his plea-change hearing about the nature and maximum length of the prison terms he faced. Ratcliff had pleaded guilty to seven counts, including two second-degree felonies that, under Ohio law after the Reagan Tokes Act, carry mandatory indefinite sentences. The trial judge told Ratcliff those counts carried definite two-to-eight year terms and the written plea form repeated that error. The appeals court concluded this was a complete failure to comply with Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(a) and vacated the pleas without requiring a showing of prejudice.

The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the superior court's dismissal of a putative class complaint by absent class member Destiny Corbin against Life Care Centers. Corbin filed claims for unpaid meal periods five days after a separate, court-approved class settlement (Atkinson) resolved claims about unpaid COVID-19 testing and screening time. The court held that the scope of preclusion depends on the settling parties’ intent; because the Atkinson settlement and its notices released only claims related to COVID-19 testing and screening for absent class members, it did not bar Corbin’s distinct meal-period claims. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals reversed a Warren Municipal Court order that denied the State leave to dismiss an aggravated menacing charge against Christopher Glover. The municipal court refused dismissal despite the prosecutor’s detailed statement that the named victim (A.H.) did not see a gun and did not fear Glover, two on-scene officers could not corroborate aggravated menacing, and the defendant joined the dismissal request. The appellate court held the trial court abused its discretion by substituting a sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry for the narrow leave-of-court review required when a prosecutor seeks dismissal.

The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded defendant Jose Gerardo Espiritu’s conviction for sexual offenses because the trial court failed to follow the process required by Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 during jury selection. Defense counsel objected when the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror who identified herself as a nurse. The trial court accepted the prosecutor’s stated reason (that the juror was a nurse) without determining whether that reason was a presumptively invalid ground under section 231.7(e)(10). Because the court did not make the required inquiry into presumptively invalid categories, the appellate court reversed and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court’s judgment that had affirmed the City of Atlanta Board of Zoning Adjustment’s denial of Beacon Media’s permit to erect a freestanding billboard. Beacon applied for a permit, the City initially denied it, then granted it, and an adjacent landowner, Jamestown, appealed to the BZA and succeeded. The appeals court held Jamestown lacked standing under Georgia’s substantial-interest-aggrieved-citizen test because it did not show any special harm unique from other similarly situated property owners. Because Jamestown lacked standing, the court reversed the superior court’s affirmance of the BZA decision.

The Second District Court of Appeals reversed the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court’s dismissal of Thomas Coddington’s complaint seeking return of equipment allegedly wrongfully withheld after his father’s death. The trial court had dismissed the case as time-barred by the probate creditor-claim statute, R.C. 2117.06. The appellate court held that Coddington’s allegation of ownership and wrongful withholding places his claim outside the probate presentment requirement, so the trial court erred to the extent it dismissed under R.C. 2117.06. The case is remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of other defenses the trial court did not address.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the conviction of appellant Damien Mancuso because the prosecution failed to fix the date of the charged sexual offense with reasonable certainty, violating his due process rights. The court recognized the difficulties victims may face in reporting historic sexual abuse and the Legislature’s elimination or extension of limitations for many child sexual offenses, but held that the Commonwealth must still narrow the timeframe enough to allow a fair defense. The concurrence joined the majority and emphasized that an overly broad date range in distant-past allegations is fundamentally unfair to defendants.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Valladares had earlier vacated a 2007 aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) conviction as void under Aguilar, and he argued the sentencing court relied on that prior conviction when imposing a 70-year sentence for a 2009 murder conviction. The court held Valladares established cause because, when he filed his first postconviction petition in 2014, controlling caselaw prevented him from raising the vacatur claim, and he established prejudice because the sentencing record shows the court and prosecution relied on the void conviction.

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed a trial-court denial of Chancellor Aaron’s successive postconviction petition and ordered a new trial. Aaron had been convicted of first-degree murder in 2005 based largely on eyewitness testimony from Daniel Wesley. On remand the court found Wesley’s posttrial recantation and corroborating statements (including a 2017 affidavit and a 2018 State investigative report confirming the affidavit) were new, material, and sufficiently conclusive to undermine confidence in the guilty verdict. Because there was no physical evidence and the State’s case rested on witness testimony that later changed, the court concluded a retrial was warranted.

The Appellate Division reversed defendant Christopher Reynoso's convictions for murder, attempted murder, and weapons offenses and remanded for a new trial because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his initial waiver of Miranda rights and subsequent pre-invocation statements were voluntary. The court found several police-controlled circumstances undermined voluntariness: the mother's limited English and inadequate translation, denial of a private post-warning consultation between defendant and his mother, and a detective's statement implying negative consequences if defendant asked for a lawyer. Those factors, taken together, overcame evidence the interrogation was calm and included breaks, requiring reversal and suppression error remediation.

The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the Texas Department of Public Safety lawfully terminated Texas Ranger Robert Christopher Callaway after an incident at his daughter’s high school in which he threatened counselors and other officers while carrying his badge, handcuffs, and a firearm. Callaway claimed his conduct was caused by PTSD and sued for disability discrimination under the Texas Labor Code. The Court held that Section 21.105 excludes from Chapter 21 protection disabilities that impair an individual’s ability to reasonably perform the job, and concluded Callaway’s PTSD objectively impaired his ability to perform DPS duties, so his discrimination claim fails as a matter of law.

The Texas Supreme Court decided that a 1984 pole-attachment contract between Spectrum (successor) and CPS Energy incorporates later-enacted statutory limits on pole-attachment rates. The Court held the agreement’s clear promise to “at all times observe and comply with . . . all laws” and that the contract is “subject to” such laws means legislative changes affecting the parties’ rights and obligations become enforceable under the contract. Because CPS charged and collected higher rates from Spectrum while collecting less from AT&T, Spectrum may pursue its breach-of-contract claim alleging violations of the Public Utility Regulatory Act. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded to the trial court.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated summary judgment for H-E-B in a slip-and-fall premises-liability case. The plaintiff slipped on a clear liquid puddle in a grocery aisle and sued H-E-B, alleging the store knew or should have known of the hazard. The Court held that to raise a fact issue on constructive notice a plaintiff must present some evidence about how long the dangerous condition existed at the time and place of injury. Because the record lacked any evidence on the puddle’s duration, H-E-B could not be charged with constructive knowledge and summary judgment was proper.

The Texas Supreme Court resolved a dispute over how to value a nonparticipating royalty reserved in a 1960 deed. The court held the deed’s phrase “produced from the above described acreage” fixes the valuation point at the wellhead, and the phrase “free of cost forever” refers only to exemption from exploration and production costs. Because the deed lacks language shifting valuation to processed, downstream sales or expressly adding postproduction costs to the royalty base, postproduction costs may be deducted from downstream proceeds to determine the value of the raw minerals at the well. The court reversed the court of appeals and rendered partial summary judgment for the operator, remanding for further proceedings consistent with that interpretation.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for ISI Contracting, Inc. in Robert Huber’s trespass suit arising from a TxDOT highway project adjacent to Huber’s restaurant. ISI had claimed immunity under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 97.002, arguing it complied with contract documents. The appellate court held ISI failed to conclusively prove every statutory element: Huber sought loss-of-use and lost-profit damages not barred by the statute, some alleged harms arose from ISI’s activities rather than a contract-related condition or defect, and ISI did not conclusively show compliance with contract documents material to any alleged condition or defect. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals reversed and rendered judgment for AZZ, Inc. in a breach-of-contract case. Southeast Texas Industries (STI) sued multiple AZZ entities for defective galvanizing and obtained a jury verdict and judgment against AZZ, Inc. for $4,539,468.25 plus fees and interest. On appeal AZZ, Inc. argued there was no evidence it was the entity that contracted with STI. The court held the evidence was legally insufficient to show AZZ, Inc. (rather than the Beaumont galvanizing entity) agreed to galvanize the pipe, so the verdict against AZZ, Inc. could not stand and STI takes nothing from AZZ, Inc.

The Tenth Appellate District of Texas reversed the trial court’s denial of Joseph Blair Brooks’ habeas corpus application seeking release under article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Brooks had been jailed more than 90 days awaiting trial on an indictment for solicitation of capital murder. The Court held article 17.151 mandates release—either by personal recognizance or by reducing bail to an amount the record shows the defendant can afford—when the statute’s prerequisites are met, and that the trial court abused its discretion by denying relief even though Brooks previously had a bail reduction and did not post bond.

The Court of Appeals reversed a post-answer default judgment awarding over $27 million to William Carrell and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was entered after appellants’ counsel withdrew days before trial and appellants did not appear. The court held appellants’ failure to appear was due to mistake or accident (not conscious indifference) because there was no reliable evidence appellants received actual notice of the trial setting after counsel’s withdrawal and substitute counsel lacked authority/adequate time to prepare. Because the lack of notice defeated the default, a new trial was required.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Esdras Pineda’s suit against his workers’ compensation carrier, National Specialty Insurance Company, and remanded for further proceedings. The trial court had granted the insurer’s plea to the jurisdiction, finding Pineda’s pro se petition did not show he exhausted administrative remedies or identify the appeals-panel decisions that aggrieved him. The appeals court held the defects in Pineda’s petition were curable because the insurer’s plea and attached evidence showed Pineda had appealed the administrative law judge’s decisions to the appeals panel and that the appeals panel allowed those decisions to become final, so Pineda should be allowed to amend his pleadings.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, Texas) reviewed sanctions entered against Genevieve Glasgow in a post-divorce civil case brought against her former husband. The court held the trial court abused its discretion in awarding monetary attorney’s fees because the evidence did not meet the required showing of reasonable and necessary fees, reversed the portion awarding fees, affirmed the remaining sanctions (including dismissal with prejudice of remaining claims), and remanded solely for redetermination of attorney’s fees. The court found the declarations and spreadsheets submitted did not detail particular services, who performed them, when, or the time reasonably required.

The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and denied Akeel Bin-Bellah’s collateral attack on his guilty plea. Bin-Bellah had pleaded guilty, as part of a global plea bargain, to one count of second-degree assault and three counts of fourth-degree assault for the December 2017 beating of his mother, and expressly stipulated that the counts reflected separate and distinct acts. Division One vacated the three misdemeanors on double-jeopardy grounds, but the Supreme Court held that a knowing, voluntary plea that includes factual admissions to separate acts forecloses a later double-jeopardy challenge. The court reinstated the three fourth-degree convictions and dismissed the personal restraint petition.

The Washington Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held that a creditor seeking recognition of a foreign-country money judgment under the state’s Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (ch. 6.40A RCW) must, absent general or specific personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor in Washington, show that the debtor has property in Washington. The case arose after an English court entered judgment for Alterna against SpiceJet and Alterna sought recognition in King County. The Court reasoned recognition is not purely ministerial and that constitutional due process requires a jurisdictional nexus for recognition actions when personal jurisdiction is lacking.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, vacated, and remanded a trial court order that granted R.T.’s petition to seal a 2003 federal conviction. The appeals court held that a state trial court may only order sealing of records that are maintained by Ohio state agencies under R.C. 2953.32, and cannot compel federal agencies to seal or disregard federal conviction records. Because the trial court’s order used broad boilerplate language (directing all official records sealed and directing service on federal and state agencies), the appellate court found the order exceeded the court’s limited authority and remanded for a more specific hearing narrowly identifying which state-maintained records, if any, may be sealed.