Court Filings

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reviewed a nonfinal trial-court order in a landlord-tenant dispute. The court affirmed the portions of the order that related to the landlord’s summary proceedings for possession, but dismissed the appeal as to the trial court’s determination on a tenants’ motion to determine rents for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The panel held that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii) limits interlocutory appeals to orders determining the right to immediate possession, and an order resolving rents is not an enumerated, appealable nonfinal order.

The Washington Supreme Court reviewed whether the six-year construction statute of repose (RCW 4.16.300-.310) bars estate claims by the executor of Lee Hetterly, who developed fatal mesothelioma decades after working at ARCO’s Cherry Point refinery. The court held that claims arising from Brand Insulations’ construction work installing asbestos-containing insulation during refinery construction are time-barred by the statute of repose, but claims premised on Brand’s role as a product seller or negligent supplier are not barred. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with that division of claims.

The Court of Appeals reviewed five consolidated appeals arising from a Fulton County trial court’s appointment of a special master to manage pretrial matters in mass-tort litigation. Plaintiffs challenged the appointment, the denial of their indigency claims without a hearing, the contempt finding for nonpayment of special-master fees, and the order requiring payment of pro-rata fees. Defendants challenged the trial court’s imposition of joint-and-several liability for payment of the special-master fees. The appellate court affirmed the appointment in part, vacated the contempt ruling for lack of the required hearing on indigency, remanded for further proceedings, and vacated the joint-and-several-liability provision in the appointment order.

The appellate court reviewed a foreclosure action by Associated Bank against defendants including John Morrison. The court held that a 1995 quitclaim deed conveyed immediate title to Morrison and his siblings as tenants in common while reserving a life estate to the grantor, Rosa McShan. Because McShan had the authority to encumber only her life estate, the 2007 mortgage only attached to that life estate and was extinguished on her death. The court reversed the trial court’s grant of foreclosure and vacated related orders as to Morrison’s interest, but it affirmed denial of Morrison’s Consumer Fraud Act claim.

The Appellate Division reversed part of Supreme Court's order and granted the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to add a negligence claim against the school district. The plaintiff, a former student who was struck on the head in class in 2019, had sought to add negligence after depositions showed the teacher testified the contact was accidental. The trial court had denied the amendment as unexplained delay and prejudicial; the appellate court found no undue delay or surprise, held the proposed negligence claim was not plainly meritless, and concluded the district would not suffer the type of prejudice that justifies denial.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reviewed a combined CPLR article 78 petition and plenary action challenging a school board's termination of a bus driver, James Shara, and related claims of retaliatory discharge and constitutional violations. The court upheld Supreme Court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss the retaliation claim under Civil Service Law § 75-b and the § 1983 due-process/freedom-of-association claim as sufficiently pleaded, and rejected the defendants' collateral estoppel argument because they did not provide the PERB record. But the court reversed as to claims brought against individual school officials, concluding plaintiff failed to plead their personal involvement. The order was otherwise affirmed.

The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed part of a Supreme Court order that had denied a nursing assistant's motion to compel two internal incident reports (RL6 forms) and granted the hospital a protective order. The plaintiff sued for wrongful termination and retaliation after reporting safety concerns. The court held the hospital failed to carry its burden to show the reports were privileged under New York Education Law § 6527(3) or the federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, because there was no proof the reports were actually part of a medical peer‑review or submitted to a patient safety organization. The case was otherwise affirmed.

The Appellate Division reviewed a nonjury trial judgment in a contract and related action arising from the 2016 sale of a gas station business. The court modified the trial judgment to declare that plaintiff Yong Xu does not own an interest in defendant 401 Foster Gasoline, Inc., and awarded Xu $60,625.63 on his conversion claim against co-defendant Xiao Yan Wang for withdrawing funds from a joint bank account. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The court relied on the asset purchase agreement's clear written terms and the parol evidence rule to reject oral-contract and fraud claims, but found evidence supported Xu's conversion claim against Wang as to funds taken beyond her one-half share of the joint account.

The Appellate Division reviewed a nonjury trial judgment enforcing a 2016 judgment against B & A Demolition and related parties. The court dismissed appeals from two interlocutory orders as moot, modified the trial judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' veil-piercing claims, but affirmed the trial court's setting aside of two truck transfers as fraudulent under the Debtor and Creditor Law, and awarded costs to the defendants. The court found insufficient proof that the owner exercised complete domination to pierce the corporate veil, but sufficient evidence and badges of fraud to avoid certain transfers and recover attorneys' fees under the fraudulent conveyance statutes.

The Appellate Division modified a Supreme Court order in a personal-injury action arising from a table-saw accident. The court held that the lower court erred by granting summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) claim against the property owners (the Cremoux defendants) and by denying leave for the contractor (Scott Bavosa Construction Corp.) to amend its third-party answer. The court found triable issues about whether the homeowner exemption applied and whether Industrial Code violations occurred, and it concluded the insurer-subrogation/antisubrogation defense Bavosa sought to add was not palpably insufficient.

The Appellate Division modified and affirmed in part a Kings County order in a personal-injury action arising from a worker's fall when perimeter safety netting gave way. The court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment that had dismissed contractual indemnification claims against the plaintiff's employer, Lippolis, and otherwise affirmed the denials of summary judgment for the defendants and third-party plaintiffs against subcontractor Monolithic. The court held triable issues remained about whether the injuries arose from Monolithic's work, whether the defendants were free from negligence, and whether Monolithic failed to procure required additional-insured coverage.

The Appellate Division reviewed plaintiffs’ appeals from two Supreme Court orders in a dispute over whether plaintiffs (children from the decedent’s first marriage) are entitled to the decedent’s 50% interest in unimproved Martha’s Vineyard property. The court held that the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on its own motion, but it affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm. The appeal of the denial of reargument was dismissed as not appealable. The case is remanded for further proceedings on the complaint.

The Third District affirmed most of the trial court's summary judgment in favor of FAM Productions and Herrera, holding that plaintiff Saldana's claims based on four successive loans are limited to a single claim against FAM Productions (Washington) on the fourth loan and that neither FAM (Florida) nor Herrera are liable on the notes. The panel reversed the portion of the judgment dismissing Saldana’s claim against FAM (Washington) without prejudice to arbitration because the trial court did not resolve Saldana’s argument that FAM (Washington) waived arbitration by its litigation conduct. The case is remanded for the trial court to decide waiver in the first instance.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a lower-court order denying summary judgment to the landlord-defendants on their counterclaim for unpaid rent. The court held defendants were entitled to partial summary judgment that plaintiffs owe use-and-occupancy damages for the period October 2020 through March 2021, when plaintiffs returned to and lived in the apartment after elevator service was restored. The court otherwise affirmed the denial of summary judgment because disputed facts remain about defendants' alleged fraudulent inducement, whether plaintiffs were partially constructively evicted or unreasonably rejected alternative housing, and whether plaintiffs ratified the lease.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a Bronx Supreme Court order on a Labor Law § 241(6) claim. The court affirmed that plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment and defendants were not entitled to dismissal as to Industrial Code §§ 23-1.5(c)(3) and 23-9.2(a) because the grinder lacked a visible guard, the employer had notice, and the unguarded tool was necessary for the work. The court reversed as to Industrial Code § 23-1.5(c)(1), holding that provision is too vague to support liability under Labor Law § 241(6). The remainder of the lower court's order was affirmed.

The Appellate Division reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment about whether two individuals (Maloney and Stern) must indemnify plaintiffs under two paragraphs of limited joinders tied to a joint venture agreement (JVA). The court affirmed the lower court in holding that paragraph (ii) does not obligate Maloney and Stern to indemnify plaintiffs for first-party claims, but it vacated the declaration and denied summary judgment as to paragraph (i) because that paragraph is ambiguous about covering first-party claims. The court relied on Delaware law requiring a clear statement to extend indemnities to first-party claims and found disputed issues of contractual interpretation for paragraph (i).

The court considered Anthony Lopez’s appeal after the trial court granted summary judgment dismissing his dram-shop, respondeat superior assault, negligence, and gross-negligence claims against CBE Extreme Nightlife FW, LLC (Old School Texas). The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of Lopez’s negligence and gross-negligence claims because they were preempted by the Texas Dram Shop Act and affirmed dismissal of the respondeat superior assault claim because Lopez failed to challenge every ground supporting summary judgment. The court reversed summary judgment on the dram-shop claim, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence that Lopez’s extreme intoxication proximately caused his eye injury, and remanded for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division, Second Department modified the Supreme Court order by granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability in a personal-injury action where the plaintiff's electric bicycle collided with a vehicle while the driver attempted a left turn. The court concluded the driver was negligent as a matter of law for attempting the left turn when it could not be made with reasonable safety, and the defendants failed to raise a triable issue on liability. The court nevertheless affirmed the denial of the plaintiff's separate motion to dismiss the defendants' comparative negligence affirmative defense under CPLR 3211(b).

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded a final judgment for the property owner against Berman Construction arising from a fire that destroyed a home during renovation. The trial court had denied the contractor’s requested interrogatory asking whether the contractor was excused from performance under a contract risk-of-loss clause allocating certain perils to the owner. The appeals court held the denial was an abuse of discretion because the affirmative defense tied to section 15.9 was unresolved and the jury should have been able to decide whether the fire was caused by an owner-borne peril, such as arson or other events beyond the contractor’s reasonable control.

The court considered a mandamus petition from JPMorgan Chase challenging a trial court order that sanctioned Chase and held it in contempt for failing to comply with a trustee appointment order and a subpoena for trust records. The appellate court found the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Chase and that the subpoena was valid, but concluded the trial court abused its discretion in three respects: (1) imposing discovery sanctions against a non-party under rules that apply only to parties, (2) assessing a $750,000 criminal contempt fine that exceeded the $500 statutory cap, and (3) ordering contempt fines payable to the private trustee rather than to the court. The court partially granted mandamus, vacating the $6,700 and $750,000 awards and directing the trial court to modify the contempt fine to $500 payable to the court.

The court considered an appeal by the State and two state agencies seeking dismissal of claims by landlord 8317 Cross Park, LLC arising from a lease termination notice. The court held that the landlord’s breach-of-lease and declaratory-judgment claims against the State, Texas Facilities Commission (TFC), and Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) are barred by sovereign immunity and were dismissed. The court also dismissed the landlord’s ultra vires claim against HHSC deputy executive commissioner Rolland Niles. The court affirmed jurisdiction over and preserved the landlord’s ultra vires claim against TFC Executive Director Mike Novak for alleged violations of TFC regulations, and remanded for further proceedings on those surviving claims.

The Court of Appeals considered an appeal from a no-evidence summary judgment in a multi-vehicle pileup case. The trial court granted summary judgment for the truck driver Mark Richard and his employer Millwood Trucking. The court held it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal as to Richard because he died before the judgment and no estate representative was substituted, so the judgment as to him is void and must be vacated. The court nonetheless reviewed and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Millwood Trucking, concluding the plaintiffs produced no evidence of causation or damages against the employer.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals reviewed a default-judgment ruling in a bailment case where Mahadev Logistics claimed Columbus Truck & Equipment failed to safeguard and return a 2015 Volvo truck after it was stolen from the repair facility. The trial court found breach and awarded only $1,447.94 for increased repair costs, denying towing, storage, replacement-key, and lost-profit claims. The appellate court affirmed liability but reversed the damages ruling in part, finding insufficient evidence to support the trial court's limited calculation and remanding for a hearing to quantify repair- and towing-related damages while rejecting lost-profit and most storage claims.

The appellate court reviewed a dismissal under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure of negligence claims filed by Samantha Allumi on behalf of her son Chase after he fell from an inflatable slide at a school field day. The trial court dismissed the negligence claims against the school district, board, and the parent organization (SHSO) as immune under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. The appellate court affirmed dismissal as to negligence allegations that amounted to failures of supervision, but reversed as to specific pre-activity failures to guard or warn (including failure to provide safety equipment, notify parents, ensure medical clearance, and provide a safe slide) and remanded for further proceedings, including a determination whether the activity was a "hazardous recreational activity." The court also held SHSO qualifies as a local public entity under the Act.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas reviewed an interlocutory appeal by Nidal T. Baem from a trial court’s temporary injunction freezing all First National Bank of Texas accounts in his name. Western Frontier Trading alleged Baem embezzled customer payments and sought to freeze accounts where those funds were deposited. The appellate court found sufficient evidence to support a temporary injunction in part but held the injunction was overbroad: it unlawfully froze all Baem’s bank accounts and did not limit the freeze to the dollar amount tied to Western’s disputed funds. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a narrowly tailored injunction and further hearing.

The Appellate Division reviewed a dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's complaint against multiple insurers and Copart that alleged fraud, conversion, conspiracy and negligent hiring tied to sales of salvaged vehicles and parts. The court affirmed dismissal of the claims against the insurer defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction because the plaintiff served them by certified mail instead of through the strict methods required for corporations. The court reversed the dismissal as to Copart, finding Copart had answered and participated in discovery and therefore had not preserved lack-of-service defenses. The case against Copart is reinstated and returned for further proceedings.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals reviewed a summary judgment the Summit County Common Pleas Court granted to defendants Mike and Janine Brustoski against plaintiff Nahas Construction. The trial court deemed Nahas’s responses to requests for admission admitted after Nahas missed the discovery deadline, and then granted summary judgment finding Nahas breached the construction contract and the Brustoskis were justified in withholding final payment. The appeals court affirmed that breach was established by the admitted facts but reversed as to the damages award, finding the Brustoskis failed to present competent evidence of the amount of damages and remanded for a determination of damages.

The Court of Appeals reviewed a challenge to the Department of Natural Resources’ (DNR) determination of nonsignificance for the Wishbone Timber Sale, a proposed harvest of about 100 acres within a larger sustainable harvest plan. The court held the DNS was not clearly erroneous and struck the lower court’s order requiring a site-specific climate impact assessment. However, it held DNR must perform an alternatives analysis under RCW 43.21C.030(2)(e) because the sale presents an actual choice of uses for the trees at the sale site. The case is partially reversed, partially affirmed, and remanded for that limited compliance.

The Court of Appeal reversed in part a trial-court dismissal of an attorney-plaintiff’s lawsuit against Wells Fargo and a branch employee. The court held the complaint failed to state breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant, and negligent hiring claims because the bank agreement and pleading did not support those theories, and amendment would be futile. But the court concluded the negligent misrepresentation claim survived: the complaint alleged a bank employee told the plaintiff the check had “cleared” despite lacking a reasonable basis and after the plaintiff warned the bank the check might be fraudulent. The dismissal is reversed only as to negligent misrepresentation; all other rulings are affirmed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of Spectrum and its award of prejudgment interest, but vacated and remanded solely to recalculate the prejudgment interest start date. Spectrum demanded payment of the fixed arbitration award by letter on December 9, 2020, and later sought confirmation when Amendia did not pay. The court held Spectrum’s demand (and its later oral request at a 2022 hearing) sufficed as a timely request for prejudgment interest under Georgia law, so interest must be awarded; however, interest should run from the expiration of the payment deadline set in the demand letter, not from the letter date itself.