Court Filings

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement and remanded for further proceedings. The trial court had announced a settlement at an on-the-record hearing in which it expressly stated it would retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement, but its subsequent journal entry omitted that retention of jurisdiction and did not incorporate the settlement terms. The appellate court held the journal entry did not reflect what occurred in open court and directed the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc entry conforming the record to the hearing so the court can enforce the settlement terms.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals held that R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a), a statutory restriction that limited who could file undervaluation complaints based on arm’s-length sales occurring before (but not after) the tax lien date and exceeding specified thresholds, violated Ohio’s constitutional requirement that property be taxed by a uniform rule. The court found the provision systematically and intentionally departed from uniform valuation by treating some properties as immune from complaint. The court severed the unconstitutional clause, left the legislative-resolution requirement intact, reversed the Board of Tax Appeals decisions, and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, while certifying a conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the Board of Tax Appeals’ order that vacated a county board of revision decision and remanded to dismiss a taxpayer’s complaint. The court held that R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) — a statutory condition barring third-party valuation complaints unless the property sold in an arm’s-length transaction before the tax lien date and the sale price exceeded listed value by 10% and a monetary threshold — violates Ohio’s constitutional requirement that land be taxed by a uniform rule. The court severed that subsection, left the legislative-resolution requirement intact, and certified a conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The court reversed the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), finding an Ohio statute, R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a), unconstitutional because it allowed different treatment of parcels for valuation complaints and thus violated the state constitutional requirement that land be taxed by a uniform rule. Appellant Bahorek had filed a complaint challenging a neighbor’s valuation; the county Board of Revision dismissed it under R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a). The appellate court held that the statute’s conditions on who may file and when (arm’s-length sale before the lien date and a 10%/threshold sales test) create systematic departures from uniform valuation, so the court severed that subsection, reversed the BTA, and remanded for further proceedings.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the First District Court of Appeals and remanded the case. The dispute involved C.E., an unmarried former partner who sought legal parental recognition of three children born to P.S. through artificial insemination. The First District had directed the trial court to determine whether the couple "would have been married" but for Ohio's pre-Obergefell ban on same-sex marriage and to apply R.C. 3111.95(A) if so. The Supreme Court held R.C. 3111.95(A) applies only to married spouses and that Obergefell and Pavan do not authorize retroactively rewriting that statute to cover unmarried couples.

The Court of Appeals reversed a municipal court order that had set aside a default judgment entered for Shelter Mutual Insurance Company against Dajuan Henry Jones. SMIC had obtained default judgment after certified-mail service to an address; Jones later moved to vacate the judgment claiming improper service, mistaken identity, and that he only learned of the case months later. The appeals court found Jones presented insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of proper service but was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the service issue; it also held Jones’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion was untimely and remanded for denial of relief under that rule and for a hearing only on service.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of leave allowing Kettering Medical Center (KHBMC) to amend its answer shortly before trial to assert immunity under R.C. 2305.51(B), and it reversed the trial court’s subsequent grant of summary judgment to KHBMC. The court held the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the last-minute amendment and reopening discovery because the amendment was untimely, unexplained, and prejudicial. The court also found genuine factual disputes existed about foreseeability, precautions taken, and whether the patient’s conduct constituted an explicit threat, so summary judgment on statutory immunity was improper.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Ninth District and trial court, holding that NC Enterprises did not prove adverse possession of two narrow parcels owned by Norfolk Southern Railway. Although NC Enterprises performed regular lawn and landscape maintenance beginning in 1998 and later erected a fence and drainage in 2000 and 2011, the court concluded the required 21-year period must have begun on or before July 22, 1999. Maintenance alone before the fence was not open and notorious enough to put the title owner on constructive notice, so NC Enterprises failed to meet the open-and-notorious element by clear and convincing evidence.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of class certification in Stewart v. Farmers Insurance. The plaintiff insured’s vehicle was declared a total loss and Farmers invoked a court-ordered, binding appraisal provision in the policy. The appraisal produced a higher actual-cash-value award, which Farmers paid. The appellate court held that because the appraisal award resolved the plaintiff’s individual contract claim before class certification, the controversy was moot and the entire action — including class claims — had to be dismissed. The court declined to apply the “pick-off” exception because the payment resulted from an enforceable contractual appraisal, not a unilateral settlement tactic.

The Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals reviewed a bench trial where Yangtze Railroad Fasteners sued Ohio Valley Trackwork (OVT) for breach of contract and unjust enrichment over about $40,000 for delivered railroad materials. The court found Yangtze proved the contract and delivery, but the trial court had concluded OVT was not liable because payment was misdirected to a third party after fraudulent email instructions. The appeals court held the trial court’s decision on breach of contract was against the manifest weight of the evidence, reversed that portion, and remanded for further proceedings while affirming the unjust enrichment judgment portion not appealed.

The Clermont County Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for homeowners Vernon and Meredith Hubbard in a home-remodeling dispute. The Hubbards had obtained a $108,000 judgment against TFB Development, LLC and two individuals, Lenny (Leonard) Weber and Sandra Davis. The appellate court held the Hubbards did not produce admissible summary-judgment evidence showing Weber or Davis were parties to the written contract or otherwise individually liable, because the contract identified TFB (not the individuals) as the contractor and contained an integration clause. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Ohio appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of the City of Euclid’s motion to dismiss a negligence complaint. Frederico sued the city after a tree fell from private property onto his car, alleging the city owned and failed to maintain the tree. The appellate panel held that under Ohio law the city is generally immune from tort liability unless an exception applies, and the complaint did not plead facts showing the tree was an “obstruction” on the roadway as required to overcome immunity. Because the complaint could not state a viable exception, dismissal was required.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Claims’ grant of summary judgment for the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC). The dispute concerned whether a $120 fee for an independent medical reviewer that BWC included in its subrogation demand was released by a prior settlement. The appellate court held the settlement’s release of subrogation rights did not bar Thomas’s claim for reimbursement because the fee was not part of the statutory subrogation interest and BWC was statutorily required to pay costs of medical reviews itself. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Second District Court of Appeals reversed the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court’s dismissal of Thomas Coddington’s complaint seeking return of equipment allegedly wrongfully withheld after his father’s death. The trial court had dismissed the case as time-barred by the probate creditor-claim statute, R.C. 2117.06. The appellate court held that Coddington’s allegation of ownership and wrongful withholding places his claim outside the probate presentment requirement, so the trial court erred to the extent it dismissed under R.C. 2117.06. The case is remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of other defenses the trial court did not address.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Eighth District Court of Appeals and held that the City of Cleveland retained political-subdivision immunity for the drowning death of William Johnson at a city pool. The executor sued claiming the use of a low folding chair instead of an elevated lifeguard chair amounted to a “physical defect” on pool grounds under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), which would remove immunity. The high court concluded that choosing one chair over another is not a tangible imperfection that impairs the function of pool grounds or equipment, so the statutory exception did not apply and summary judgment for the city must be entered.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for defendant-appellant J.P.S. Properties Diversified, Inc. The dispute involved whether a deed use restriction barred an Amazon fulfillment center and whether that restriction was enforceable. A prior appellate decision (Jay Realty I) had already concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Jay Realty and that the restriction was enforceable and ran with the land. The trial court improperly reinstated its prior summary-judgment entry contrary to the appellate mandate; the appeals court ordered entry of judgment for JPS because no claims remained pending after the earlier opinion.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s post-trial rulings in a fraudulent-transfer suit brought by Raida Allan against her ex-husband Tareq, his brother Qais, and two corporate gas-station entities. A jury found the transfers occurred, were not in good faith, and awarded Raida damages, but the trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for Qais and the Gas Stations on statute-of-limitations grounds and denied JNOV as to Tareq. The appellate court held the trial court improperly weighed evidence when granting JNOV, found the jury’s verdict legally supported, reversed those rulings, and remanded for the trial court to enter judgment consistent with the jury and determine damages against Tareq.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that the State and its municipalities may immediately appeal a trial court order that preliminarily enjoins enforcement of a duly enacted law. The City of Columbus passed two firearm ordinances; plaintiffs obtained a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of several provisions. The Fifth District dismissed the city’s interlocutory appeal for lack of a final appealable order. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that an injunction preventing enforcement of a law inflicts irreparable sovereign injury and therefore qualifies as a final, immediately appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). The case was remanded for consideration of the appeal on the merits.