Court Filings

The court reviewed an appeal by Y.S., who filed a petition to change her minor child’s name and a sworn Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs. The trial court ordered her to pay reduced costs of $400 after an interview with county staff, but did not hold a formal oral evidentiary hearing or make detailed findings required by Rule 145. The appellate court concluded the record contained uncontroverted evidence that Y.S. could not afford court costs, that the trial court failed to follow Rule 145 procedures, and therefore reversed the order and directed the trial court to allow Y.S. to proceed without paying costs or fees.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court order that had granted the plaintiff summary judgment to quiet title and declared a 2004 administrator's deed void from the start. The plaintiff had sued after her mother, appointed administrator c.t.a., conveyed decedent's property to herself and the plaintiff as joint tenants, contrary to the decedent's will leaving the property to the plaintiff alone. The appellate court held that because the defendant had Surrogate's Court letters of administration c.t.a., her transfer was cloaked with apparent authority and therefore was voidable (subject to attack), not void ab initio. The cross-motion for summary judgment was denied.

The Appellate Division reversed a Nassau County Supreme Court order and granted plaintiff Kelvin Goode leave to enter a default judgment against Bespoke Motor Group, LLC and Bentley Long Island, LLC in a breach of contract action. The court found service on an employee identified as a "service consultant" was proper under the rules for serving limited liability companies, the defendants failed to timely answer, and the plaintiff provided proof of service and the defendants' default. Because the defendants did not show a reasonable excuse for the default, the court granted default judgment without reaching the merits of any asserted defenses.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a Supreme Court order and granted defendant Aileen Betances' renewed summary judgment motion dismissing the amended complaint against her in a personal injury action. Plaintiffs alleged their vehicle was struck from the rear and that the defendant owned or operated the offending vehicle. The court held the defendant made a prima facie showing that she and her vehicle were not involved in the accident, and the plaintiffs' opposing papers failed to raise a triable issue of fact, so dismissal was appropriate.

The Fourth District reversed a trial court judgment that pierced the corporate veil to hold South Dade Dealership liable for a default judgment against CarX Depot. Line 5 had obtained a default judgment against CarX for unpaid finance-and-insurance (F&I) funds and sought to collect from South Dade as an alleged alter ego or mere continuation. The appellate court found the evidence insufficient to show South Dade dominated CarX or that CarX’s separate corporate existence ceased, and it concluded there was no relay-style continuation into SDT Cars. The case is remanded with instructions to enter judgment for South Dade.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a default final judgment entered in a small claims case because the defendant, a self-represented litigant, had notified the trial court before a pretrial conference that she could not attend due to a death in her family. The trial court entered default when she did not appear and later denied her motion to continue. The appellate court found that the denial was an abuse of discretion because the reason was unforeseeable, not suggestive of delay, and the default deprived the defendant of an opportunity to be heard. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Third District reversed a trial-court judgment awarding a referring attorney a full contractual referral fee after the client discharged her. The court held that a client may discharge a referring attorney just as any attorney may be discharged, and that the referring attorney is not automatically entitled to the contractual percentage after discharge. Because the referring attorney was discharged, she is limited to a modified quantum meruit recovery for services actually performed prior to discharge and within the scope of the agreement. The case is remanded for the trial court to determine reasonable recovery under those principles.

The Third District reversed a trial-court judgment awarding a referring attorney a full contractual referral fee after the client discharged her before final settlement. The court held a client may discharge a referring attorney just as any other lawyer, and that the referring attorney is not automatically entitled to the agreed contractual percentage once discharged. Instead, where a client discharges counsel without cause the attorney may recover only the reasonable value of services performed before discharge, capped by the contract (modified quantum meruit). The case is remanded for the trial court to calculate an appropriate quantum meruit award limited to pre-discharge, in-scope work.

The Third District reversed a trial court judgment awarding a referring attorney a full contractual referral fee after the client discharged her. The dispute arose from a wrongful-death case where the client had signed an agreement dividing fees between lead counsel (Podhurst) and referring counsel (Frexes). The appellate court held that a client may discharge a referring attorney and that discharge limits the referring attorney to recovery under a modified quantum meruit for work performed before discharge. The case is remanded for the trial court to calculate reasonable compensation limited to services rendered before the January 28, 2019 discharge and within the contract’s scope.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of Studebaker Health Care Center’s motion to compel arbitration and directed the trial court to grant the motion. The dispute arose after employee J. Asencion Santana signed three arbitration-related onboarding documents and later sued for wage-and-hour and representative Labor Code claims, including a PAGA claim. The trial court found the arbitration agreement invalid because of alleged conflicts among the documents and unconscionability. The appellate court held the documents, read together, showed a clear mutual intent to arbitrate employment disputes; ambiguities did not defeat arbitration; and any unenforceable PAGA waiver should be severed rather than voiding the entire agreement.

The First District of Texas reversed the trial court’s order that had halted an arbitration between Humphries Construction Corporation (HCC) and Highland Village-related entities, holding the trial court erred in finding HCC waived its contractual right to arbitrate by using the courts. The appellate court concluded, after reviewing the litigation and discovery conduct, that Highland Village failed to show HCC clearly intended to relinquish arbitration. The court denied Highland Village’s collateral requests for mandamus relief challenging denials of a protective order, motion to quash a third-party subpoena, and sanctions, finding no clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment for a law firm in a legal-malpractice suit. Plaintiff DePina sued the firm for failing to timely pursue property-damage claims against a railroad after repeated flooding of his land. The firm obtained summary judgment arguing the underlying nuisance was permanent and the statute of limitations had run before representation. The appellate court held the record did not show as a matter of law the nuisance was permanent because flooding was sporadic, contingent on heavy rain and culvert condition, and thus created fact issues for a jury. The case is remanded.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Smart Venture Capital’s appeal and ruled that the trial court erred in denying Smart Venture’s motion to set aside a default judgment. The Association sued the property owners and added Smart Venture (a secured creditor) but failed to effect service on Smart Venture’s registered agent. The court held the certified-mail evidence lacked a required postmark and there was no proof Smart Venture received or signed for the mailing, so service was not perfected and the default judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals reviewed a bench trial where Yangtze Railroad Fasteners sued Ohio Valley Trackwork (OVT) for breach of contract and unjust enrichment over about $40,000 for delivered railroad materials. The court found Yangtze proved the contract and delivery, but the trial court had concluded OVT was not liable because payment was misdirected to a third party after fraudulent email instructions. The appeals court held the trial court’s decision on breach of contract was against the manifest weight of the evidence, reversed that portion, and remanded for further proceedings while affirming the unjust enrichment judgment portion not appealed.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court (Bronx County) and granted plaintiff Wilmington Savings Fund Society's motion to confirm a Referee's report and enter a judgment of foreclosure and sale. The court found the Referee's report was substantially supported by the affidavit of the plaintiff's corporate counsel for its loan servicer, which detailed the borrower's full payment history, established default as of October 1, 2008, and set forth the unpaid principal balance and accrued interest. The court relied on precedent permitting business records and servicer-calculated amounts when properly supported.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of class certification in a wage-and-hour suit by Adam Martinez against Sierra Lifestar, Inc. Martinez alleged Lifestar excluded nondiscretionary bonuses (notably EMS Week bonuses) when calculating the regular rate of pay, underpaying overtime, double time, and meal/rest premiums for about 135 employees. The trial court denied certification because it found Martinez’s claim was not typical, reasoning he might be uniquely subject to a defense that his EMS Bonus was a gift or discretionary. The appellate court held that defense was not unique to Martinez and remanded for further class-certification proceedings.

The Clermont County Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for homeowners Vernon and Meredith Hubbard in a home-remodeling dispute. The Hubbards had obtained a $108,000 judgment against TFB Development, LLC and two individuals, Lenny (Leonard) Weber and Sandra Davis. The appellate court held the Hubbards did not produce admissible summary-judgment evidence showing Weber or Davis were parties to the written contract or otherwise individually liable, because the contract identified TFB (not the individuals) as the contractor and contained an integration clause. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division held that New Jersey's Ski Act applies to snow tubing. The court reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment for Ski Campgaw Management LLC, concluding the Act displaces common-law negligence claims where it applies. Because plaintiff failed to show the operator had actual or constructive notice of the deceleration mat being bunched up (a condition the statute requires notice of before liability attaches), Campgaw was entitled to summary judgment. The court remanded with directions to dismiss the plaintiff's claims with prejudice.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order that dissolved prejudgment writs of garnishment obtained by Texas Global Equity Fund XII (TGE) against 22 entities believed to owe money to Breckenridge Development 2019 (BD19). TGE had sued BD19 for unpaid loan principal and interest after BD19 failed to provide required financial reports, repay a prior Frost Bank loan as required, and cure defaults. The appeals court held TGE proved the statutory grounds for garnishment (the debt was liquidated, due and unpaid; BD19 lacked sufficient property to satisfy it; and the garnishment was not sought to injure BD19), and BD19 failed to prove extrinsic grounds to dissolve the writs. The court reinstated the writs and remanded for further proceedings.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for further consideration. The dispute arose from Platinum Construction’s suit against Copper Creek and Jose Escoffie for theft of services and related claims after key emails and accounting records were missing. The court of appeals had found the trial court’s spoliation jury instruction reversible error and ordered a new trial without first addressing other appellate issues that might have led to rendition. The Supreme Court held that appellate courts must first decide rendition issues and that the court of appeals’ harm analysis was insufficient.

The Sixth District reversed and remanded a jury verdict in a car-accident negligence suit because the trial court wrongly excluded deposition testimony of the sheriff’s office organizational representative about the office’s internal investigation and finding that its deputy’s crash was “preventable” and therefore the deputy was at fault. The district court held the trial court’s stated legal bases for exclusion did not support it and concluded the appellate court cannot apply the evidentiary balancing rule (Section 90.403) in the first instance to affirm under the tipsy coachman doctrine. The case is remanded for a new trial and the court certified conflict with two First District decisions.

The Sixth District reversed a county court's orders that had set aside a default final judgment for possession and dismissed an eviction complaint. Landlord Wayne Rickert sued tenants Karen and Erin Valencia for nonpayment of rent under an oral month-to-month tenancy and obtained a default final judgment after the tenants failed to timely pay the rent allegedly due on September 1. The appellate court held the tenants waived defenses other than payment by not paying alleged rent when due or timely moving to have the rent determined, so the trial court erred in vacating the default and dismissing the complaint. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

The Sixth District reversed a trial-court judgment that had enforced a 1973 deed addendum requiring Riviera’s land to be used as a golf course. The trial court had concluded the restriction remained enforceable because it was preserved by a 1990 affidavit (the Gifford Affidavit). The appellate court held the affidavit was not a muniment of title and therefore could not preserve the pre-root restriction under Florida’s Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA). Because no muniment preserved the restriction, MRTA extinguished it; the case is remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for Riviera.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered forfeiture of a 2007 Lincoln Navigator. The State sought forfeiture after R.C. Scott was arrested while driving the Navigator and later pled guilty to evading and third-or-more driving-while-intoxicated charges. The court held the State proved the vehicle was contraband under Chapter 59 because Scott had three prior DWI convictions and used the vehicle in a qualifying felony, and that Scott was an equitable owner despite the vehicle titled to his parents. Because Scott was an owner, the parents could not prevail on the innocent-owner defense.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default judgment entered for Deere Credit against Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger. The court held this was a restricted appeal and reviewed only the clerk’s record, finding that Shelia — a non-lawyer — timely filed a letter that, in substance, amounted to an answer both for herself and for the limited partnership. Because that filing constituted an appearance, the defendants were entitled to notice of Deere Credit’s motion for default judgment and an opportunity to be heard; the trial court signed the default judgment without providing such notice, producing error apparent on the face of the record.

The court reversed a trial-court order that denied the employer’s motion to compel arbitration and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration and stay the case. Josh Adams sued his former employer, The Bridge Strategy & Technology Consulting, LLC, for unpaid cash and phantom-stock commissions. Bridge moved to compel arbitration under an employment agreement clause that referenced wage-related statutes and the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court of Appeals held the arbitration clause was governed by the federal act, that the phrase “wages” reasonably includes commissions, and that the clause’s broad “arising from/relating to” language covers Adams’s claims.

The Court of Appeals reversed a trial-court order that granted a plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Cornelius Hudson’s survival-action suit filed on behalf of his deceased mother’s estate. Hudson had sued multiple transportation-related defendants for injuries his mother allegedly sustained before her death. The appellate court held Hudson’s petition sufficiently alleged that the decedent’s estate had standing to pursue the survival claim, and it explained that a plea to the jurisdiction is not the correct procedural vehicle to challenge a plaintiff’s capacity to sue. The case is remanded for further proceedings in the trial court.

The court denied the appellee’s motion for rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and issued a replacement opinion that reaches the same result: the Texas Department of Public Safety’s plea to the jurisdiction was sustained and the employee’s disability-discrimination and retaliation claims against DPS under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act were dismissed with prejudice. The court found Sanders failed to plead facts establishing a prima facie discrimination or retaliation claim (and thus failed to invoke the TCHRA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity). Because Sanders had multiple opportunities to amend and the defects were incurable, dismissal was proper.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that Robert Sydow acquired title to a disputed strip of land by adverse possession as a matter of law. Sydow had fenced, used, and maintained the land continuously from 2008 to 2020, and successive purchasers and owners had actual or constructive notice of his possession. The court rejected the defendant Douglass Properties’ defenses based on the common grantor doctrine and equitable estoppel because the deed line was not a visible boundary on the ground and Douglass had actual knowledge of the encroachment. The case is remanded for entry of partial summary judgment for Sydow and determination of attorney fees under RCW 7.28.083.

The Ohio appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of the City of Euclid’s motion to dismiss a negligence complaint. Frederico sued the city after a tree fell from private property onto his car, alleging the city owned and failed to maintain the tree. The appellate panel held that under Ohio law the city is generally immune from tort liability unless an exception applies, and the complaint did not plead facts showing the tree was an “obstruction” on the roadway as required to overcome immunity. Because the complaint could not state a viable exception, dismissal was required.