Court Filings

The Court of Appeal reversed a superior court judgment that had dismissed a Proposition 65 enforcement lawsuit for inadequate pre-suit notice. The plaintiff, a private enforcer, had sent a 60-day notice that identified the organization and provided contact information for its outside counsel rather than a specific internal “responsible individual.” The appellate court followed a recent decision (Pancho Villa’s) and held the regulation requiring a contact for the noticing entity is directory, not mandatory, and that the notice here substantially complied with the regulation’s purposes (informing prosecutors and giving defendants an opportunity to investigate and cure). The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Christopher Garner’s writ petition after the California Victim Compensation Board rejected his request for compensation under Penal Code section 4900. Garner had his 2007 murder conviction vacated and resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6, and he sought compensation for time served beyond the revised sentence. The Board denied the claim because Garner did not allege an "erroneous conviction" as required by section 4900 — his original conviction was lawful under the law in effect at the time — and the Board permissibly used a regulation (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 642) to screen and dismiss legally deficient claims without a hearing. The court held the statute and regulation were correctly applied and valid.

The Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court award of attorney fees to environmental group Raptors Are the Solution under California’s private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5). Raptors sued the Department of Pesticide Regulation over its renewals and reevaluation decisions for certain rodenticides. Two trade associations (CropLife and RISE) intervened to defend the Department and were held jointly and severally liable for fees along with other defending parties. The appellate court found the associations had asserted direct pecuniary interests when seeking intervention, actively participated in the litigation, and therefore qualified as opposing parties eligible to share fee liability. The court also upheld the trial court’s fee calculation and refusal to apportion liability among defenders.

The Court of Appeal affirmed a trial-court order exonerating a $180,000 bail bond conditioned on payment of extradition costs and later awarding $7,492.40 in extradition expenses to the district attorney. North River (the surety) argued the bond could not be exonerated because the defendant was not physically present when the court acted and that the court lost jurisdiction to order extradition costs. The court held the defendant’s appearance by counsel under Penal Code section 977 satisfied the requirement in section 1305(c)(1) to exonerate the bond, and the court properly ordered extradition costs under section 1306(b).

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court grant of summary judgment in a malicious-prosecution suit brought by attorney Brian Detrick against his former client, Keiko Shimada. Shimada had voluntarily dismissed a prior malpractice case and moved for summary judgment, claiming the dismissal was motivated by the statute of limitations (a procedural ground that would bar malicious prosecution). The trial court relied on Shimada’s English-language declaration, but the appellate court held that because Shimada cannot read or speak English the declaration was incompetent absent evidence identifying and qualifying the interpreter/translator and an attestation that the translation accurately reflected Shimada’s words. The judgment for Shimada was reversed and the summary-judgment motion must be denied.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Southern California Permanente Medical Group (SCPMG) in a negligence suit after a bicyclist was struck by SCPMG employee Dr. Brittany Doremus while she was driving to work. The court held SCPMG met its initial burden by submitting uncontradicted deposition evidence that Doremus was on an ordinary morning commute and not performing work when the collision occurred, shifting the burden to the plaintiff, who failed to produce admissible evidence creating a triable issue. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that occasional work-from-home status converted home into a second worksite on the day of the accident.

The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Hensel Phelps and remanded for further proceedings. AVL, a supplier/installer of vehicle emissions testing equipment, sought a declaratory judgment that its claims for payment were not barred by the Contractors State Licensing Law because its equipment did not “become a fixed part of the structure” under Business and Professions Code section 7045. The appellate court held the factual question whether the goods became part of the structure is for a trier of fact; competing expert declarations and voluminous record evidence created a triable issue, so summary judgment was improper.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of the district’s anti‑SLAPP motion. The Yolo‑Solano Air Quality Management District sued Diamond D General Engineering and Spencer Defty for alleged permitting and air‑quality violations. Diamond and Defty cross‑complained seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the district relied on a secret internal policy (Policy 24) not adopted through required rulemaking. The appellate court held the cross‑complaint challenged the validity of Policy 24 rather than merely the district’s investigative or enforcement acts, so the claims did not arise from protected petitioning or speech and the anti‑SLAPP motion failed.

The Court of Appeal granted Karla Amezcua’s petition for a writ of mandate and ordered the trial court to remove a condition requiring her to pay Massage Envy’s attorney fees as a term of leave to amend her complaint. The trial court had sustained Massage Envy’s demurrer but conditioned granting Amezcua leave to amend on payment of $25,000 in fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. The appellate court held section 473 does not authorize shifting attorney fees and that fee-shifting must be grounded in statute or agreement; the trial court therefore erred by imposing a fee condition under section 473.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court’s denial of Blue Origin’s motion to compel arbitration of former employee Craig Stoker’s employment claims. The court found the arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable because it was an adhesion contract presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and substantively unconscionable because it was overbroad, lacked mutuality, waived jury trial, and barred representative claims including PAGA-style claims. Because multiple defects tainted the agreement and severance would not cure the one-sided scheme, the court held the arbitration clause unenforceable and affirmed denial of the petition to compel arbitration.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Citizens Against Marketplace Apartment/Condo Development’s petitions challenging the City of San Ramon’s approval of an infill housing project at Marketplace Center and the city’s finding that the project was categorically exempt from environmental review under CEQA. Citizens argued the project conflicted with the general plan and zoning because a joint “master plan” was allegedly required and the development was not a proper horizontal mixed-use. The court found substantial evidence supported the city’s consistency findings and that CEQA’s in-fill exemption applied, and it upheld the trial court’s award of record-preparation costs to the city.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of Studebaker Health Care Center’s motion to compel arbitration and directed the trial court to grant the motion. The dispute arose after employee J. Asencion Santana signed three arbitration-related onboarding documents and later sued for wage-and-hour and representative Labor Code claims, including a PAGA claim. The trial court found the arbitration agreement invalid because of alleged conflicts among the documents and unconscionability. The appellate court held the documents, read together, showed a clear mutual intent to arbitrate employment disputes; ambiguities did not defeat arbitration; and any unenforceable PAGA waiver should be severed rather than voiding the entire agreement.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of class certification in a wage-and-hour suit by Adam Martinez against Sierra Lifestar, Inc. Martinez alleged Lifestar excluded nondiscretionary bonuses (notably EMS Week bonuses) when calculating the regular rate of pay, underpaying overtime, double time, and meal/rest premiums for about 135 employees. The trial court denied certification because it found Martinez’s claim was not typical, reasoning he might be uniquely subject to a defense that his EMS Bonus was a gift or discretionary. The appellate court held that defense was not unique to Martinez and remanded for further class-certification proceedings.

The Court of Appeal granted petitioner Michelle Paknad’s second writ of mandate ordering the Santa Clara Superior Court to vacate its prior order that accepted Intuitive Surgical’s redactions of investigator Andrea Smethurst’s reports and related investigative materials. The court held Intuitive had waived attorney-client privilege and work-product protection by placing the scope and adequacy of the investigations at issue in defending Paknad’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims. The court directed the trial court to conduct further in camera review and to disclose all factual findings and other information relevant to the investigations’ scope or adequacy, even if that material would otherwise qualify as core work product.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment rejecting challenges by Western Manufactured Housing Communities Association and Rincon Valley Mobilehome Park. Western argued (1) that during a declared state of emergency the statutory definition of “rental price” allows routine annual CPI rent increases despite Penal Code § 396’s 10% cap, and (2) that after the emergency owners may “recoup” denied CPI increases by resetting future baseline rents. The court held the statute must be read to fix the baseline rental amount as of the emergency declaration, so the 10% cap applies, and Santa Rosa’s rent ordinance does not compel the post-emergency recoupment Western sought.

The Court of Appeal granted a peremptory writ directing the Contra Costa County Superior Court to vacate its minute order that denied a petition for mandate brought by four teachers challenging West Contra Costa Unified School District’s staffing practices. The trial court had denied the writ based on the District’s claim it was impossible to fully staff classrooms with credentialed teachers. The appellate court held the District failed to prove it had exhausted statutory procedures (including seeking waivers from state entities) before asserting impossibility, so the defense was premature and the denial of the writ was reversed for entry of an order denying the petition.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of class certification in a putative class action against owners of a Red Roof Inn asserting violations of Civil Code § 1940.1. The trial court had denied certification because it believed each class member would need to prove the hotel was their personal “primary residence,” making individualized issues predominant. The appellate court held that the statute requires inquiry into whether the hotel is a “residential hotel” (a hotel-wide question), not individualized proof that each guest treated the hotel as their own primary residence. The case is remanded for reconsideration of class certification.

The Court of Appeal vacated and remanded a judgment confirming a large arbitration award because unresolved factual disputes remain about whether the individuals who filed and prosecuted the suit were authorized to represent the plaintiff limited liability company. The trial court had ordered arbitration and later confirmed the arbitrator’s award for respondent NNN Capital Fund I, LLC. Appellants argued the purported “liquidating trustees” (Tyrone Wynfield and later Mary Jo Saul) lacked standing under the company’s operating agreement, so neither the arbitrator nor the court had jurisdiction. The appellate court concluded the standing question was unresolved and directed the trial court to decide it and then either dismiss or reinstate the arbitration confirmation accordingly.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Victor Valley Community College District in Jessie Walton’s suit alleging sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and related claims. The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion by excluding counsel’s curable declaration defect, and erred in holding Walton lacked FEHA standing, failed Government Claims Act notice, and could not show the District acted with deliberate indifference under Education Code section 66270. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its summary judgment, grant summary adjudication only on Walton’s Civil Code claim she did not contest, and deny summary adjudication on the remaining claims for trial setting.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment denying The Retail Property Trust’s request to have its Brea Mall property reassessed under Revenue and Taxation Code section 170(a)(1) based on COVID-19 related closures and restricted access. The assessor summarily denied the trust’s calamity applications, the Assessment Appeals Board upheld that denial, and the trial court concluded as a matter of law that section 170(a)(1) requires physical damage to property (direct or indirect) before reassessment relief is available. The appellate court agreed, finding neither government closure orders nor the virus itself constitute the required physical damage.

The Court of Appeal affirmed a trial-court order awarding attorney’s fees to respondent Ponani Sukumar after the court dismissed appellant Afshin Zand’s cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Zand argued the anti-SLAPP ruling and subsequent fee awards were void or procedurally defective, but the appellate panel held those contentions were meritless, largely barred by law of the case or forfeited, and improper collateral attacks. The panel also found the appeal frivolous and imposed $10,000 in sanctions payable to the clerk, granted Sukumar appellate fees under section 425.16(c)(1) to be fixed on remand, and remanded to determine certain fee amounts.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and ordered the County to meet and confer with the Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association (PPOA) about the County’s decision to outsource security work. PPOA had sought a writ of mandate after ERCOM and the superior court concluded the parties’ memorandum of understanding (MOU) waived PPOA’s bargaining rights as to such reorganization decisions. The appellate court held the MOU did not contain a clear and unmistakable waiver of the statutory right to meet and confer about outsourcing, because the MOU’s notice and management-rights language was ambiguous and did not explicitly waive MMBA rights.

The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for Ghilotti Construction in a suit by ironworker Leonardo Cordero, who was injured while working for subcontractor Camblin Steel on a bridge project. The trial court granted summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine, which presumes a hirer of an independent contractor delegates responsibility for workplace safety to the contractor. The appellate court held California safety regulations (including Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 1711) do not create a nondelegable duty that defeats Privette, and Cordero failed to raise a triable issue that Ghilotti retained and exercised control over Camblin’s work in a way that affirmatively contributed to the injury.

The Court of Appeal reversed in part a trial-court dismissal of an attorney-plaintiff’s lawsuit against Wells Fargo and a branch employee. The court held the complaint failed to state breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant, and negligent hiring claims because the bank agreement and pleading did not support those theories, and amendment would be futile. But the court concluded the negligent misrepresentation claim survived: the complaint alleged a bank employee told the plaintiff the check had “cleared” despite lacking a reasonable basis and after the plaintiff warned the bank the check might be fraudulent. The dismissal is reversed only as to negligent misrepresentation; all other rulings are affirmed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of a preliminary injunction that would have enjoined a family planning provider from offering abortion services at a parcel subject to recorded CC&Rs. The CC&Rs were adopted and recorded in 1991 by the Tulare Local Hospital District and expressly prohibited abortion clinics within the Tulare Medical Center development. The court held the prohibition is unenforceable because (1) the District’s adoption and recording of the CC&Rs is government action that interferes with the fundamental right of reproductive choice under the California Constitution and (2) Civil Code section 53, read with section 531 and the Unruh Act, voids recorded covenants that indirectly limit property use because of a characteristic protected by the Unruh Act (the decision to have an abortion).

The Court of Appeal reversed in part and remanded. The Gonzalez family sued a California mortuary after a Texas medical examiner misidentified a body, causing the family to bury the wrong person and have their loved one cremated. A jury found for the mortuary on negligence and contract claims, finding the mortuary proved the affirmative defense of impracticability. The court held the defense of impracticability is equitable and must be decided by a judge, not a jury, so the contract verdict is reversed and remanded for a bench determination of the defense and, if necessary, a damages trial. The court affirmed that only the decedent’s wife had standing to sue on the contract.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court judgment that sustained defendants’ demurrer and dismissed a qui tam claim under the California False Claims Act (CFCA). Relator Jamal Albarghouti filed a sealed complaint alleging false claims involving Los Angeles public entities, served the Attorney General by certified mail, and waited more than 60 days before serving defendants. The trial court held the complaint was improperly unsealed and dismissed it. The appellate court held the CFCA creates a 60-day default seal period that lifts automatically absent a government motion to extend the seal, that failure to allege compliance with the seal rules is not grounds for demurrer, and directed the trial court to overrule the demurrer and proceed.

The Court of Appeal granted The Merchant of Tennis’s petition for extraordinary writ and directed the trial court to modify its curative notice scheme regarding roughly 954 individual settlement agreements (ISAs) obtained by Merchant from putative class members. The trial court had found the ISAs voidable as procured by fraud or coercion and ordered a curative notice advising members they could rescind and join the class without having to immediately return settlement payments (though payments could be offset against any later recovery). The appellate majority concluded the trial court must follow California rescission statutes and preserved the judgment, adding that each side bear its own costs on appeal.

Mallory Harcourt sued Tesla after her toddler climbed into her newly purchased Model X, started it, and the vehicle struck her. She proceeded only on a strict product liability design-defect theory using the consumer expectations test. After Harcourt rested, the trial court granted Tesla's motion for nonsuit, concluding ordinary consumers could not form minimum safety expectations about how the Model X would perform in the unusual scenario of a toddler starting the car, particularly given the vehicle's complex, nonstandard systems. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the consumer expectations test inapplicable and noting Harcourt waived the alternative risk-benefit theory.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of San Rafael in a lawsuit by 16-year-old Kaylin Pagan, a passenger injured when her friend’s car hydroplaned and went down an embankment. Pagan sued the City for a dangerous condition of public property, alleging failures to warn of a sharp wet curve and lack of barriers. The trial court found the roadway’s wet condition and resulting hazard were open and obvious as a matter of law, and Pagan’s later expert theory about a defective pavement surface was not pleaded and relied on inadmissible or unsupported expert opinion. The appellate court agreed and affirmed judgment for the City.