Court Filings

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the denial of defendant 494 Eighth Avenue LLC’s summary judgment motion in a personal-injury sidewalk-trip case. Plaintiff said she tripped on an uneven sidewalk near a disassembled police barricade and testified the height differential was about one to one-and-a-half inches. The court held the defendant failed to show the alleged defect was trivial as a matter of law because the submitted photos and affidavit were inconclusive and the superintendent’s estimate was not a measured fact. Plaintiff’s testimony and possible violation of the NYC Administrative Code created questions of fact for trial.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's May 21, 2025 order and granted Mary Trump's motion to compel discovery from Donald Trump in a breach-of-settlement-agreement case. Mary Trump asserted an affirmative defense of fraudulent inducement based on alleged false asset valuations in a 2001 settlement agreement. The court held that because the requested materials relate to that affirmative defense they are discoverable under CPLR 3101(a), which requires liberal disclosure of matter material and necessary to prepare for trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the decision.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a lower court order in a malpractice/insurance dispute. It dismissed the third cause of action against Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company (MLMIC) but otherwise affirmed denial of motions to dismiss. The court held that plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged facts supporting a punitive-damages demand against MLMIC and that the legal-malpractice claim against defense counsel Marshall Dennehey and Kevin Ryan should proceed because the complaint plausibly alleges breach of care and causation tied to a failure to inform the insured of settlement offers and a conflict of interest.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's judgment after a nonjury trial in a lease dispute between Rose Group Park Avenue LLC (tenant) and Third Church Christ, Scientist of New York City (landlord). The court held that the lease's audit provisions limit the landlord to auditing only the prior lease year and bar audits seeking information from earlier years; directed certain payroll records be included in future audits; required return of the landlord's protested payment except for amounts the court found due from the tenant's affiliate; and upheld various declaratory and injunctive rulings concerning weekday use, occupancy rights, equipment use, alterations, signage, and auditorium setup. The court grounded its decision in the express lease language and prior appellate rulings interpreting those provisions.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment holding the plaintiff liable on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The plaintiff testified he slipped on gravel and fell into an unguarded trench up to 10–12 feet deep alongside a building foundation; the trench had a makeshift pathway but no guardrail. The court found this testimony uncontradicted and held defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact or justify the absence of a guardrail as necessary to the work. The judgment for plaintiff on liability was therefore upheld.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a lower court order requiring petitioner Harold Peerenboom to reimburse Marvel Entertainment, LLC for reasonable production expenses incurred in responding to a subpoena. The court held that under New York's CPLR the party seeking discovery must pay a nonparty's reasonable production costs, and that such costs can include third-party vendor charges and attorneys' fees. The court also upheld the trial court's reductions to requested attorney rates and rejected petitioner's reliance on federal balancing tests and arguments that certain withholding-related costs were categorically unrecoverable.

The First Department unanimously affirmed a Bronx County Supreme Court order that required the Archdiocese of New York to produce certain documents (with specified redactions) and denied the Archdiocese's request to vacate that order or to obtain a protective order. The court held that evidence about the Archdiocese's patterns or practices in responding to allegations of clergy sexual abuse is discoverable because it could show a deliberate, repetitive practice of silencing accusations and therefore bear on the Archdiocese's negligence in the plaintiff's specific abuse claim. The appellate court rejected the Archdiocese's other arguments without discussion.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff Gordon Grubb's slip-and-fall complaint against the City of New York. The City showed it lacked prior written notice of the specific dangerous condition at the Madison Avenue and East 52nd Street crosswalk as required by the New York City Administrative Code. The court held that the records plaintiff cited did not amount to a written acknowledgment of the particular defect and that plaintiff's allegations did not raise triable issues or satisfy exceptions to the written-notice rule, so dismissal was appropriate.

The First Department affirmed the trial court's posttrial dismissal of Forrest Equities' complaint seeking coverage under a title insurance policy issued by Old Republic. Plaintiffs bought a Bronx building after an explosion and alleged the insurer should cover losses from vacate orders, relocation and emergency repair liens, and related litigation. The court held the policy did not provide coverage because the alleged enforcement actions and liens were not recorded in the public recording system required by the policy, and a lis pendens or vacate order alone did not make title unmarketable. Contract terms and exclusions controlled.

The Appellate Division, First Department modified a New York County Supreme Court order in a dispute over a loan agreement. The court held that plaintiff Arena Vantage stated breach of contract claims against guarantors but not against the Deal Agent (CoVenture — Vantage Credit Opportunities GP, LLC). The panel found the loan agreement expressly made the Deal Agent's enforcement duties discretionary and contingent on directions from the Required Lenders, so no mandatory contractual breach was alleged. By contrast, guarantors made unconditional payment promises, so the breach claim against them may proceed. The court otherwise affirmed the lower court's rulings.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's dismissal under CPLR 3211 of all claims in plaintiff Belina Anderson's complaint against multiple defendants. The court held Anderson's derivative claims failed because she did not plead a required pre-suit demand or futility, her individual fiduciary-duty and nuisance claims did not allege fraud, self-dealing, or unconscionability and were barred by the business judgment rule or arose from contract duties, and her declaratory-judgment and direct claims were speculative or lacked factual support. The court rejected Anderson's procedural challenge under CPLR 2219(a).

The First Department dismissed an appeal by defendant-appellant Danielle Statuto from a Supreme Court order that denied her CPLR 2221(d) motion for leave to reargue. The appellate court held the order denying reargument is not appealable as of right and declined to treat her notice of appeal as a motion for leave to appeal. The court cited precedent and distinguished circumstances where a notice may be converted into a leave application, finding no extraordinary circumstances here, and therefore dismissed the appeal as taken from a nonappealable paper.

The Appellate Division reversed part of Supreme Court's order and granted the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to add a negligence claim against the school district. The plaintiff, a former student who was struck on the head in class in 2019, had sought to add negligence after depositions showed the teacher testified the contact was accidental. The trial court had denied the amendment as unexplained delay and prejudicial; the appellate court found no undue delay or surprise, held the proposed negligence claim was not plainly meritless, and concluded the district would not suffer the type of prejudice that justifies denial.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reviewed a combined CPLR article 78 petition and plenary action challenging a school board's termination of a bus driver, James Shara, and related claims of retaliatory discharge and constitutional violations. The court upheld Supreme Court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss the retaliation claim under Civil Service Law § 75-b and the § 1983 due-process/freedom-of-association claim as sufficiently pleaded, and rejected the defendants' collateral estoppel argument because they did not provide the PERB record. But the court reversed as to claims brought against individual school officials, concluding plaintiff failed to plead their personal involvement. The order was otherwise affirmed.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed Supreme Court's denial of Gravity Ciders, Inc.'s pre-note-of-issue motions for summary judgment on three counterclaims. Gravity had asked the court to declare unenforceable a contract provision awarding Copeland Holdings a 5% ownership interest (plus another 5%) and to win on a conversion/replevin claim over a corporate book. The court found genuine factual disputes and legal issues (including whether Alcoholic Beverage Control Law provisions render the ownership-transfer clause void) that precluded summary judgment, and held return of the corporate book while the motion was pending defeated replevin but left conversion contested.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reversed part of a Court of Claims judgment and held that the State can be liable for the alleged rectal intrusion by correction officers. Claimant had been allowed to file a late claim for assault and battery but the Court of Claims declined to consider sexualized conduct under the law of the case. This Court found that the law of the case did not bind it and that the alleged rectal intrusion was sufficiently connected to officers' duties to survive the late‑claim screening and to support vicarious liability. The case is remitted for recalculation of damages.

The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed part of a Supreme Court order that had denied a nursing assistant's motion to compel two internal incident reports (RL6 forms) and granted the hospital a protective order. The plaintiff sued for wrongful termination and retaliation after reporting safety concerns. The court held the hospital failed to carry its burden to show the reports were privileged under New York Education Law § 6527(3) or the federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, because there was no proof the reports were actually part of a medical peer‑review or submitted to a patient safety organization. The case was otherwise affirmed.

The Appellate Division reviewed a nonjury trial judgment in a contract and related action arising from the 2016 sale of a gas station business. The court modified the trial judgment to declare that plaintiff Yong Xu does not own an interest in defendant 401 Foster Gasoline, Inc., and awarded Xu $60,625.63 on his conversion claim against co-defendant Xiao Yan Wang for withdrawing funds from a joint bank account. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The court relied on the asset purchase agreement's clear written terms and the parol evidence rule to reject oral-contract and fraud claims, but found evidence supported Xu's conversion claim against Wang as to funds taken beyond her one-half share of the joint account.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed the Supreme Court and granted defendant Joan Crema-Samalya's pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint against her. The plaintiff sued Crema-Samalya after property restoration work allegedly performed by Five Boro Fire Restoration was found deficient, asserting claims for violation of General Business Law § 349 and fraud. The appellate court held the complaint failed to plead any materially misleading consumer-oriented conduct under GBL § 349 and did not plead fraud with the required particularity, so dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) was appropriate.

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability and to dismiss the defendants' comparative negligence defenses in a rear-end collision case. The plaintiff had asserted his vehicle was stopped for about 10 seconds at a red light when the defendants' vehicle struck him from behind. The court found that a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a presumption of negligence by the rear driver, and the defendants failed to present admissible evidence of a non-negligent explanation (such as an unanticipated brake failure), so the plaintiff met his prima facie burden.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment that had dismissed third-party claims for contractual indemnification asserted by the project owner and general contractor against Gabriel Steel Erectors. The underlying lawsuit arises from a 2018 workplace fall of an ironworker employed by Gabriel. The court found that the indemnity clause obligating Gabriel to indemnify for losses “to the fullest extent permitted by law” could permit partial indemnification and that triable issues exist about whether Gabriel had primary responsibility for the worker's safety. Thus the indemnification claims cannot be decided as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division reversed a medical-malpractice judgment for a child born extremely premature after concluding the trial court erred by allowing a neurologist to testify that the defendants' failure to diagnose and treat the mother's preterm labor caused the child's later autism. Applying New York's Frye standard, the court held the proffered causation theory rested on observational associations and speculative inference rather than generally accepted scientific principles linking prematurity or low birth weight to autism. Because that testimony was improperly admitted, the court ordered a new trial and dismissed the plaintiff's cross-appeal as academic.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claims for specific performance, fraud, and tortious interference and denied the plaintiff's summary judgment motions. The court found that the seller (Gholis) showed it was ready, willing, and able to close by producing a title policy and that the buyer (Scott Randolph, LLC) defaulted by failing to appear at the time-of-the-essence closing, so Gholis may retain the down payment. The court also found Bushwack and Stellberger entitled to dismissal of the fraud and interference claims because key events occurred after the plaintiff sought to terminate the contract.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and granted Drexel University's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's personal injury claim against Drexel. The plaintiff was injured at his employer's workplace when equipment fell from a forklift operated by two Drexel students participating in Drexel's cooperative education program. The court held Drexel did not exercise sufficient control over the students' work or conduct to be vicariously liable as an employer or principal, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact to the contrary.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court's dismissal of Rosario's wrongful-death, fraud, and civil-conspiracy claims against the Town and Village of Mount Kisco. The plaintiff alleged the municipality failed to enforce housing regulations after her adult son died in a basement fire in an illegally converted apartment. The court held the complaint did not plead a special relationship between the municipality and decedent, did not identify a private right of action under the cited statutes, and failed to allege facts showing voluntary assumption of duty, affirmative control, justifiable reliance, or municipal participation in fraud or a conspiracy.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court judgment that had granted summary judgment to Remede Consulting Group on damages against employee-defendant Jason Pitter for misuse of a corporate credit card. The court affirmed that Remede proved Pitter's liability on breach of contract, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty because Pitter had received the corporate card policy, acknowledged it, and used the card for personal expenses without raising a triable issue of authorization. However, the appellate court held the plaintiff did not establish a precise, uncontested sum owed, so summary judgment on damages awarding $135,246.77 was denied and the judgment was reversed on that point.

The Appellate Division affirmed a Supreme Court order granting summary judgment to Lakeview Auto Sales and Service, Inc., and to Herold Motor Cars, Inc. and John C. Herold, and denying RJK Auto Brokers' cross-motion. RJK had purchased nine vehicles from Dream Carz, which never obtained title; RJK then paid Herold Motor to obtain title to eight sold vehicles. The court held the moving defendants showed they had no contract or fraudulent conduct with RJK and that Dream Carz was not an entrustee or a merchant able to pass good title. RJK failed to raise triable issues of fact to avoid dismissal.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's personal-injury claims against homeowner Kim Eichle and certain claims against third-party defendant Joseph Russo. The plaintiff alleged the infant was injured after being punched outside a New Year's Eve party at Eichle's home and asserted causes of action under New York's Dram Shop statutes and premises liability. The court held Eichle showed she neither served visibly intoxicated guests nor furnished alcohol to minors, and that the infant could not identify whether an icy sidewalk caused his fall, so the plaintiff failed to raise triable issues of fact.

The Appellate Division reviewed a nonjury trial judgment enforcing a 2016 judgment against B & A Demolition and related parties. The court dismissed appeals from two interlocutory orders as moot, modified the trial judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' veil-piercing claims, but affirmed the trial court's setting aside of two truck transfers as fraudulent under the Debtor and Creditor Law, and awarded costs to the defendants. The court found insufficient proof that the owner exercised complete domination to pierce the corporate veil, but sufficient evidence and badges of fraud to avoid certain transfers and recover attorneys' fees under the fraudulent conveyance statutes.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's order (after reargument) granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' personal injury complaint. The court held the defendants had shown, as a matter of law, that the injured plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102(d) and that the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of causation because their expert did not rebut defendants' evidence that the injuries were preexisting and degenerative. The court affirmed on the alternative ground of lack of causation, though it noted some triable issues as to certain injury categories before resolving causation against the plaintiffs.