Court Filings

The Appellate Division reversed part of Supreme Court’s dismissal of investors’ securities claims arising from inflated mutual-fund valuations. Plaintiffs alleged that Infinity Q’s CIO manipulated a Bloomberg pricing service, producing false NAVs in the mutual fund’s December 31, 2019 registration statement. The court held that defendant Potter cannot escape strict liability under Section 11 by a disclaimer and that plaintiffs adequately pleaded agency such that IQCM may be vicariously liable under Section 11. The court also found plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded Section 15 control-person claims against Bonderman LP and Potter as to IQCM, but not as to the Mutual Fund or the Trust.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed Supreme Court's April 24, 2024 order denying Feifei Gu's motions to vacate a prior July 28, 2023 dismissal and for sanctions, while noting the court had effectively granted leave to reargue and then adhered to its prior dismissal. The court found the complaint was properly dismissed because Gu failed to file the mandatory notice of claim under General Municipal Law §§ 50-e and 50-i before suing the District Attorney's Office and two prosecutors, a defect that deprives the court of jurisdiction. The court also rejected Gu's fraud and misconduct claims as conclusory and unsupported.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed Supreme Court's order granting plaintiff Lloyd's partial summary judgment that defendant Southwest Marine must defend Lloyd's insured, Arsenal Scaffold Inc., as an additional insured in an underlying personal-injury action and reimburse Lloyd's defense costs. The court held that facts known to defendant created a reasonable possibility of coverage, so the duty to defend was triggered even though defendant's named insured (JGR Services) was not a direct defendant in the underlying suit. The court rejected Southwest Marine's contrary arguments and affirmed the denial of its cross-motion for summary judgment.

The First Department reversed Supreme Court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss a fraudulent inducement complaint and granted the motion. Plaintiff claimed defendant lied about tenants and rents when selling Manhattan property, but documentary evidence in the closing binder (schedule 8.1(k)) and the purchase agreement terms (including a merger clause and an "as is" purchase) conclusively refuted reliance. The court also held that, even absent those documents, the complaint failed to plead all elements of fraudulent inducement with sufficient particularity, so dismissal was required.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed the Court of Claims' dismissal of Ernestiaze Moore's claim against the State under the Adult Survivors Act. Moore alleged two sexual assaults by a correction officer and originally filed dates in 2022, but counsel later disclosed the correct dates were in 2023. The Court of Claims found the incorrect year was a jurisdictional defect under Court of Claims Act § 11(b) that could not be cured by amendment, and therefore denied Moore's motion to amend and dismissed the claim. The appellate court concluded the statutory filing requirements must be strictly construed and affirmed.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court order that had awarded the mother $108,491.83 in counsel fees and expenses under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act after the court ordered the return of the parties' child to Italy. The panel held that Supreme Court made only conclusory findings and failed to apply the statutory and equitable factors required by ICARA and controlling federal caselaw (including the respondent's burden to show an award would be "clearly inappropriate" and use of the lodestar method to set fees). The matter is remitted for the lower court to consider the proper factors, decide whether an award would be clearly inappropriate, and, if not, calculate an appropriate fee amount.

The Appellate Division reviewed a dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's complaint against multiple insurers and Copart that alleged fraud, conversion, conspiracy and negligent hiring tied to sales of salvaged vehicles and parts. The court affirmed dismissal of the claims against the insurer defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction because the plaintiff served them by certified mail instead of through the strict methods required for corporations. The court reversed the dismissal as to Copart, finding Copart had answered and participated in discovery and therefore had not preserved lack-of-service defenses. The case against Copart is reinstated and returned for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed the Supreme Court's December 12, 2024 order dismissing the amended complaint against the Unified Court System (UCS). Plaintiffs — four individuals and Disability Rights New York (DRNY) — challenged SCPA article 17-a and UCS's role, alleging ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations and other claims. The court held DRNY lacked organizational standing because it did not show an injury-in-fact from its advocacy expenditures, and that the individual plaintiffs' ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims were time-barred under New York's three-year personal-injury statute, with accrual at the dates they were placed under guardianship. The court rejected continuing-violation and unpreserved equitable-tolling arguments.

The Appellate Division dismissed plaintiff David Gennett's appeal challenging Supreme Court's refusal to fix his second attorney Ronald Benjamin's charging lien before the case concluded. The case had settled while the appeal was pending, making the request for an immediate fee determination moot. The appellate court also held that whether the second attorney's compensation should be measured by quantum meruit instead of the contingency agreement is not yet ripe because Supreme Court has not resolved the fee allocation and has placed a portion of settlement funds in escrow pending that determination. The appeal was dismissed without costs.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed a Supreme Court judgment awarding Ellis Hospital $5,048.55 plus costs for unpaid medical bills after a summary judgment motion. The hospital showed it provided services, produced an itemized bill showing the outstanding deductible, and submitted a services agreement signed by the patient’s husband acknowledging financial responsibility. The court found the patient failed to raise a triable issue of fact — her claims about not receiving bills, lack of authorization, and challenge to the contract were not supported by evidence — so summary judgment was properly granted.

The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment for Bassett Healthcare Network in a wrongful-death action by Harvey Brody, administrator of Barbara Brody's estate. The court held that issues of fact exist both on a common-law negligence claim that the facility failed to monitor its parking lot and on medical malpractice claims against the nurse practitioner who evaluated the decedent. The court found defendant met its initial burdens but that plaintiff submitted admissible evidence (job description, photos, and an expert affidavit) creating triable issues about assumed duty and whether the NP departed from the applicable standard of care.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision and ordered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint with costs. The plaintiff, Mega Beverage Redemption Center, appealed from a lower-court ruling but failed to show that its appeal to the Appellate Division did not raise questions of fact or that the Appellate Division made the specific CPLR 5615 findings required when factual questions exist. Because those statutory prerequisites were absent, the Court concluded it was bound to affirm and enter judgment absolute dismissing the complaint.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed a lower-court judgment in a case brought by appellant Luiz Silva against Frances Von Holten, Joseph Von Holten, Vinicius Lara, and Vizzion Construction, LLC. The appeal was decided by a three-judge panel and the court issued a brief per curiam affirmance citing Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.315(a). No appellee brief or appearance was filed. The decision is final subject to any timely motion authorized by the appellate rules for rehearing or clarification.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling in a dispute between Jose and Nancy Quinones (appellants) and Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (appellee). The per curiam opinion, issued April 16, 2026, simply states 'AFFIRMED' without additional explanation in the published text. The appeal arose from the circuit court in Duval County, and the appellate panel—Chief Judge Jay and Judges Lambert and Maciver—concurred in the decision to affirm.

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of appellee Moosa Syhead against appellant Nova Palms Holdings LLC. The appeal arose from a Broward County circuit court case (062022CA009666AXXXCE). The appellate panel issued a brief per curiam decision, stating simply 'Affirmed' without elaboration. Because the opinion offers no substantive explanation, the appellate court left intact the lower court's ruling and allowed any timely motion for rehearing to proceed under normal rules.

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in a dispute between homeowner Mary Burliuk Holt and Lighthouse Bay Condominium Association, Inc. The appeal (No. 4D2025-0869) challenged a ruling from the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County. The appellate panel issued a per curiam opinion simply stating 'Affirmed' without published reasoning, and the three judges concurred. The decision is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a county court judgment in an appeal by Kevin Flynn and Stacey Dever against French Village Condominium Association, Bryan Taylor, and John Beech. The appellate court issued a brief per curiam decision, endorsing the lower court's ruling without published opinion and noting the judgment is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved. No additional factual findings or legal reasoning were included in the opinion provided.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of class certification in a putative class action against owners of a Red Roof Inn asserting violations of Civil Code § 1940.1. The trial court had denied certification because it believed each class member would need to prove the hotel was their personal “primary residence,” making individualized issues predominant. The appellate court held that the statute requires inquiry into whether the hotel is a “residential hotel” (a hotel-wide question), not individualized proof that each guest treated the hotel as their own primary residence. The case is remanded for reconsideration of class certification.

The Court of Appeal vacated and remanded a judgment confirming a large arbitration award because unresolved factual disputes remain about whether the individuals who filed and prosecuted the suit were authorized to represent the plaintiff limited liability company. The trial court had ordered arbitration and later confirmed the arbitrator’s award for respondent NNN Capital Fund I, LLC. Appellants argued the purported “liquidating trustees” (Tyrone Wynfield and later Mary Jo Saul) lacked standing under the company’s operating agreement, so neither the arbitrator nor the court had jurisdiction. The appellate court concluded the standing question was unresolved and directed the trial court to decide it and then either dismiss or reinstate the arbitration confirmation accordingly.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, El Paso) dismissed Ernest Garcia’s appeal from a December 4, 2025 judgment because his March 5, 2026 notice of appeal was untimely and he failed to provide a required reasonable explanation or file a motion for extension of time after the court ordered him to do so. The court concluded the late notice could only be excused by an implied extension under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3 if Garcia supplied a reasonable explanation, which he did not, so the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal and dismissed it under Rule 42.3(a).

The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for PlainsCapital Bank in a trespass-to-try-title dispute. Appellants C.V.P.G. Family Trust and its trustee claimed ownership as successors to heirs of Joaquin Chapa, but PlainsCapital relied on a 2018 final judgment from a previous suit that adjudicated mineral title and declared hundreds of named and unknown Chapa heirs to have no ownership. The court held PlainsCapital met its burden to show a final judgment and that Appellants failed to raise a genuine fact issue that the prior judgment was void for lack of proper service or that C.V.P.G. lacked privity with the prior defendants.

The Stonewater Homeowners Association sued Luther and Laticia Evans for unpaid HOA fees. The parties presented an agreed judgment to the trial court, but at a hearing the Evanses (pro se) disavowed some terms, and the court orally modified the proposed agreement (reducing attorney’s fees, lowering interest, and striking foreclosure language) before signing the judgment. The HOA later filed a motion for new trial complaining the court lacked authority to alter the agreed judgment. The appeals court held the trial court acted within its authority because the modifications were made in open court after the Evanses did not accept the original terms and the HOA did not pursue separate enforcement remedies.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Patrick Minor’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Minor sought to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion for default judgment, but the appellate court concluded such a denial is an interlocutory order not immediately appealable. The court also noted the clerk’s record did not include an order denying the motion, and that Minor failed to respond to an order to show cause about jurisdiction. Because the appeal was from a non-appealable interlocutory ruling and procedural requirements were not met, the court dismissed the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Patrick Minor's appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his motion for a default judgment for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that denials of default judgments are ordinarily interlocutory and not appealable before entry of a final judgment. The court ordered Minor to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed; he did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal. The decision rests on Texas law that interlocutory orders denying default judgment cannot be appealed until the underlying case is finally resolved.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Latoya Lavasiee Hopkins’s appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County for want of prosecution because she repeatedly failed to file her appellate brief or request extensions despite notices and a court order. The appellate court gave deadlines and warnings under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure but Hopkins did not respond. Because she did not comply with the court’s order to file a brief by the specified date, the court exercised its authority to dismiss the appeal.

The court dismissed an appeal by Ivie Fenoi-Lynch for lack of jurisdiction. Fenoi-Lynch filed a notice of appeal from a justice court judgment, but the appellate record shows the case continued in the county court at law and no final judgment was signed by that county court. The Fourth Court of Appeals explained it only has jurisdiction over appeals from district or county courts in its district and only over final judgments; a notice of appeal from a justice court does not invoke this court’s jurisdiction. Fenoi-Lynch’s response to a show-cause order did not cure the jurisdictional defect.

The Fourth Court of Appeals conditionally granted EOG Resources’ petition for a writ of mandamus overturning a trial-court discovery order that compelled production of five documents (items 3, 4, 5, 10, and 15) from EOG’s privilege log. After in camera review, the appellate court held EOG established a prima facie attorney-client privilege claim by producing a privilege log, affidavits, and the documents for review, and Broadway failed to show EOG waived the privilege either by voluntary disclosure or by offensive use. Because disclosure of privileged communications cannot be undone on appeal, mandamus relief was appropriate and the trial court was ordered to vacate its production order.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment denying appellant George Michael Welch attorney’s fees. Welch sold property to Felix and Summerlyn Lopez under an owner-financed contract. The Lopezes missed a May 1, 2023 payment but attempted to tender payment within the contract’s 91-day cure period; Welch rejected the tender and filed for foreclosure. The trial court found Welch prematurely sought foreclosure, unjustifiably refused payment, and reinstated the note upon payment of $22,221.92, denying fees because Welch was not the prevailing party. The appeals court held a temporary injunction and reinstatement did not confer prevailing-party status under section 38.001.

The Fourth Court of Appeals granted the parties' joint motion to set aside the trial court's final judgment and remanded the case for entry of a judgment consistent with the parties' settlement agreement. The appellate court vacated the existing judgment without addressing the merits and directed the trial court to render the agreed judgment. Because the settlement did not allocate appellate costs, the court taxed costs of appeal against the appellants.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed EFT Express SA de CV's appeal from a Webb County district court for want of prosecution because the clerk's record was not filed and the appellant failed to pay the fee required for preparing the record. The appellate court notified the appellant and ordered a written explanation, but the appellant did not respond by the deadline. Citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court dismissed the appeal and taxed appellate costs against the appellant.