Court Filings

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Capital Fund I, LLC’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had entered a default judgment against Capital Fund but expressly labeled it interlocutory. The plaintiff then obtained a severance order moving the entire dispute against Capital Fund (both defaulted and still-pending claims) into a new cause. The appellate court concluded that severing the entire case did not convert the interlocutory default judgment into a final, appealable judgment, so the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court reviewed an appeal from a final judgment in which plaintiffs (Decedent’s children) sought a declaratory judgment voiding a lien affidavit filed by appellant Agueda and attorneys’ fees; Blanca intervened claiming a homestead interest in the property. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part: it affirmed the trial court’s power over its interlocutory order, vacated the trial court’s merits declarations about Blanca’s homestead and the declaration voiding the lien, reversed the award of attorneys’ fees against Blanca (rendering judgment she owes nothing), and reversed and remanded the fee award as to Agueda for further proceedings on the fees claim.

The court affirmed a trial-court judgment forfeiting $8,000 and a 2006 Harley-Davidson to the State under Texas civil forfeiture law. The owner, Chad Wade Spence, argued the trial court abused its discretion by forcing him to trial without material witnesses and that doing so violated his constitutional rights. The appellate court held Spence never properly requested subpoenas — he filed only informal witness lists and failed to complete the clerk’s subpoena request form — and therefore the trial court did not err in proceeding. The court also explained the right to compulsory process is a criminal right and does not apply in civil in rem forfeiture proceedings.

The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s decision upholding the Georgia Public Service Commission’s approval allowing Sandersville Railroad Company to condemn privately owned land to build a new spur. The Court found substantial evidence supporting the PSC’s factual findings that the spur would function as a channel of trade and aid the railroad’s operations, which qualifies as a statutory “public use.” The Court also rejected landowners’ complaints about subpoena enforcement and attorney-fee claims, and it upheld the superior court’s discretionary stay of condemnation proceedings pending appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed McGarvey-Wilkins’s appeal from a Georgia State-Wide Business Court order denying her request to proceed as an indigent. The appellant repeatedly failed to file a compliant affidavit of indigency, pay the filing fee, or provide an adequate certificate of service despite the Court’s orders to do so. Because she did not file a timely initial brief and did not show good cause for the defaults required by Court of Appeals Rule 23(a), the Court dismissed the appeal for noncompliance with procedural rules.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an Application for Discretionary Appeal filed by Catherine Corkren in case A26D0426 concerning LC No. 19CV0611. After review, the court issued a short administrative order denying the application. The document contains no substantive opinion explaining the court's reasoning beyond the single-word disposition denying the request for discretionary review.

The Georgia Court of Appeals issued a short order denying the appellant's motion made under Court of Appeals Rule 40(b) in case A26E0180, Fontes v. Bloom. The order contains no extended explanation or factual findings — it simply states the motion is denied and is certified as an official extract of the court minutes. There is no discussion of the grounds for denial or any further relief granted.

The Georgia Court of Appeals denied Andrea Plummer’s emergency motion seeking a stay of enforcement while her application for discretionary appeal is considered. The court issued a short order on April 15, 2026, declining to pause enforcement of the underlying judgment or order pending further appellate review. No extended reasoning or citation of law appears in the order; it is a procedural disposition denying temporary relief requested by the movant.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals reviewed a summary judgment the Summit County Common Pleas Court granted to defendants Mike and Janine Brustoski against plaintiff Nahas Construction. The trial court deemed Nahas’s responses to requests for admission admitted after Nahas missed the discovery deadline, and then granted summary judgment finding Nahas breached the construction contract and the Brustoskis were justified in withholding final payment. The appeals court affirmed that breach was established by the admitted facts but reversed as to the damages award, finding the Brustoskis failed to present competent evidence of the amount of damages and remanded for a determination of damages.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the Steubenville Municipal Court's August 5, 2025 judgment awarding plaintiff-appellant Sol Rose III $683.50 plus 8% interest for conversion of personal property by Jefferson Behavioral Health System (J.B.H.S.) after its employee, Lou Stein, entered and discarded items from Rose’s unit. The trial court found Stein acted within the scope of his employment but without malice, so J.B.H.S. was liable under respondeat superior while Stein faced no individual or punitive damages. The court declined to award compensation for the decedent daughter’s urn and ashes because sentimental value is speculative and no market value testimony was offered.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Richland County Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division judgment that denied Heidi Back’s objections to a magistrate’s child support decision. The magistrate had designated Back the child-support obligor and ordered monthly support of $221.50. Back argued she was rushed at the July 24, 2025 hearing and prevented from presenting evidence about her inability to work and financial situation. The appellate court found she was sworn, had the chance to testify, was asked at the close if she had more to present, and did not provide the additional evidence at the hearing, so the trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate’s decision.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Thelma Peake's late request to file her appellate brief after the deadline and quashed her appeal in a dispute over Shaun Griffith’s nomination petition for Pennsylvania’s 3rd Congressional District. The court acted on an application for leave to file the brief nunc pro tunc and concluded the application must be denied. Because Peake failed to file a timely brief, the Court ended the appeal without reaching the merits of the underlying nomination-petition dispute.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Victor Valley Community College District in Jessie Walton’s suit alleging sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and related claims. The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion by excluding counsel’s curable declaration defect, and erred in holding Walton lacked FEHA standing, failed Government Claims Act notice, and could not show the District acted with deliberate indifference under Education Code section 66270. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its summary judgment, grant summary adjudication only on Walton’s Civil Code claim she did not contest, and deny summary adjudication on the remaining claims for trial setting.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment denying The Retail Property Trust’s request to have its Brea Mall property reassessed under Revenue and Taxation Code section 170(a)(1) based on COVID-19 related closures and restricted access. The assessor summarily denied the trust’s calamity applications, the Assessment Appeals Board upheld that denial, and the trial court concluded as a matter of law that section 170(a)(1) requires physical damage to property (direct or indirect) before reassessment relief is available. The appellate court agreed, finding neither government closure orders nor the virus itself constitute the required physical damage.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ruben Dario Almela’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and also granted attorney’s fees but did not set the fee amount, so the order did not resolve all claims or parties and was not a final, appealable judgment. The appellate court previously questioned jurisdiction and gave Almela time to show cause; he did not respond. Because the judgment was not final and Almela failed to justify appellate jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Terry Akwue’s appeal from a small claims judgment because his notice of appeal was untimely. The trial court entered final judgment on September 26, 2025; Akwue filed a motion for new trial which extended his deadline to December 26, 2025, but he did not file his notice of appeal until January 7, 2026. The appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction for a late-filed notice, gave Akwue notice that the appeal would be dismissed, received no response, and therefore dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals denied a petition for a writ of mandamus from Anjeneya Vijay Cheruvu, who sought to overturn a March 19, 2026 trial-court order holding him in contempt for possession or access in a Fort Bend County child-protection case. Cheruvu argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the contempt order. The appellate court concluded he did not meet the heavy burden required for mandamus relief, so it refused to direct the trial court to vacate the contempt order and dismissed any pending motions as moot.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a trespass to try title suit. Houston International Management & Trade, Inc. (HIM) claimed ownership of 23 commercial lots by adverse possession, but a jury found HIM had not possessed the property peaceably and adversely for the statutory period and instead found a verbal management agreement existed between HIM and the record owners (the Peacock parties). The court held there was some evidence supporting the jury’s findings, rejected HIM’s challenges to JNOV, new trial claims, and factual-sufficiency complaints, and affirmed the hold that the Peacock parties own the properties.

The First District of Texas dismissed Christina Keller's appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2, Harris County, because she failed to provide or pay for the reporter’s record and then failed to file her appellate brief by the court-ordered deadline. The court notified Keller of the missing reporter’s record and limited consideration to issues not requiring that record, gave her time to file a brief, warned that dismissal could follow, and received no response. The court dismissed the appeal and any pending motions as moot under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Court of Appeals dismissed this interlocutory appeal because the parties informed the court they reached a settlement and filed a joint motion to dismiss. Both parties agreed to bear their own appellate costs, counsel signed the motion, and no cross-appeal was filed. The court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, ordered costs taxed against the parties who incurred them, and denied as moot any pending motions.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Antique Fields’ application for discretionary review of a magistrate court writ of possession because the application was filed too late. The magistrate court entered judgment on 2026-02-27, and Antique Fields filed for review on 2026-03-24, which exceeded the seven-day deadline for filing under Georgia law. The Court explained that its jurisdiction to review magistrate court orders exists only after review by a state or superior court, and because the application was untimely and filing deadlines are jurisdictional, the Court could not transfer the matter and therefore dismissed the application.

The Georgia Court of Appeals denied FPL Foods, LLC's application for discretionary appeal in the case FPL Foods, LLC et al v. Terrie Martinez-Tello. The order is brief: the court considered the application and denied it, which means the intermediate court's decision stands and the Court of Appeals will not review the matter on the discretionary docket. No substantive reasoning or opinion explaining the denial is provided in the document.

The Court of Appeals granted the appellant's motion to remand so the trial court can consider a request to incorporate records from two separate cases into the record of this appeal. Previously, the court denied the appellant's motions to supplement the record because there was no trial-court order adopting or incorporating the other cases' records into this case. The remand allows the trial court to rule on a motion to incorporate those documents; if the trial court grants it and the appellant timely files a new notice of appeal, the matter will be re-docketed as a new appeal after the record is transmitted.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Claims’ grant of summary judgment for the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC). The dispute concerned whether a $120 fee for an independent medical reviewer that BWC included in its subrogation demand was released by a prior settlement. The appellate court held the settlement’s release of subrogation rights did not bar Thomas’s claim for reimbursement because the fee was not part of the statutory subrogation interest and BWC was statutorily required to pay costs of medical reviews itself. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals denied Thomas Jones’ request for a writ of mandamus seeking to force Judge Lisa L. Sadler to serve him with an entry of dismissal and to rescind a bill for court costs. The court adopted the magistrate’s decision and granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss, finding that the duty to serve judgment and note service on the docket lies with the clerk of court under Civ.R. 58(B), not with the judge. The court also held Jones has an adequate remedy at law (e.g., Civ.R. 60(B) or appeal) and thus cannot meet mandamus requirements.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. The appeal challenged (1) the municipal court’s grant of leave to amend a counterclaim and transfer to common pleas court, (2) the common pleas court’s grant of additional time under Civ.R. 56(F) for discovery, and (3) denial of plaintiff-appellant Castro’s motion for summary judgment. The appellate court held the municipal court properly transferred the case because the amended counterclaim exceeded its $15,000 jurisdictional limit, the trial court did not abuse discretion in granting a Civ.R. 56(F) continuance, and genuine disputes of material fact (about the terms and performance of an oral agreement concerning sewer-line work) precluded summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal affirmed a trial-court order awarding attorney’s fees to respondent Ponani Sukumar after the court dismissed appellant Afshin Zand’s cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Zand argued the anti-SLAPP ruling and subsequent fee awards were void or procedurally defective, but the appellate panel held those contentions were meritless, largely barred by law of the case or forfeited, and improper collateral attacks. The panel also found the appeal frivolous and imposed $10,000 in sanctions payable to the clerk, granted Sukumar appellate fees under section 425.16(c)(1) to be fixed on remand, and remanded to determine certain fee amounts.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas dismissed Katherine Wesley King’s appeal from a Denton County default judgment because she failed to file her appellate brief. The appellant’s brief was due March 9, 2026; the court notified her on March 16 that the appeal could be dismissed if no brief arrived by March 26, 2026. King did not file a brief or otherwise communicate with the court, so the panel dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the superior court's dismissal of a putative class complaint by absent class member Destiny Corbin against Life Care Centers. Corbin filed claims for unpaid meal periods five days after a separate, court-approved class settlement (Atkinson) resolved claims about unpaid COVID-19 testing and screening time. The court held that the scope of preclusion depends on the settling parties’ intent; because the Atkinson settlement and its notices released only claims related to COVID-19 testing and screening for absent class members, it did not bar Corbin’s distinct meal-period claims. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals reviewed a challenge to the Department of Natural Resources’ (DNR) determination of nonsignificance for the Wishbone Timber Sale, a proposed harvest of about 100 acres within a larger sustainable harvest plan. The court held the DNS was not clearly erroneous and struck the lower court’s order requiring a site-specific climate impact assessment. However, it held DNR must perform an alternatives analysis under RCW 43.21C.030(2)(e) because the sale presents an actual choice of uses for the trees at the sale site. The case is partially reversed, partially affirmed, and remanded for that limited compliance.