Court Filings

The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for defendant-appellant J.P.S. Properties Diversified, Inc. The dispute involved whether a deed use restriction barred an Amazon fulfillment center and whether that restriction was enforceable. A prior appellate decision (Jay Realty I) had already concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Jay Realty and that the restriction was enforceable and ran with the land. The trial court improperly reinstated its prior summary-judgment entry contrary to the appellate mandate; the appeals court ordered entry of judgment for JPS because no claims remained pending after the earlier opinion.

The Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Apex Security Group, Inc. in a negligence suit by pro se plaintiff Joshua Bradley, Sr., who was punched at a Cleveland Browns game. The court concluded Apex did not owe Bradley a duty to prevent the unforeseeable assault under the contract and Ohio law governing private security duties, and Bradley failed to show a genuine issue of material fact. The court also rejected Bradley’s procedural and bias claims, found no abuse in evidence rulings or refusal to grant default judgment, and affirmed the judgment for Apex.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s post-trial rulings in a fraudulent-transfer suit brought by Raida Allan against her ex-husband Tareq, his brother Qais, and two corporate gas-station entities. A jury found the transfers occurred, were not in good faith, and awarded Raida damages, but the trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for Qais and the Gas Stations on statute-of-limitations grounds and denied JNOV as to Tareq. The appellate court held the trial court improperly weighed evidence when granting JNOV, found the jury’s verdict legally supported, reversed those rulings, and remanded for the trial court to enter judgment consistent with the jury and determine damages against Tareq.

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh District’s judgment holding that a 1953 deed reservation of “all the coal below the horizon of the No. 8 coal . . . and other minerals, with the right to mine and remove such coal or other minerals of any vein” did not reserve rights to oil and gas. The trial court had granted summary judgment to the surface owner (Faith Ranch) and the court of appeals affirmed based on extrinsic evidence; the Supreme Court agreed the outcome was correct but held the deed was unambiguous on its face. The Court explained that the reservation’s words (mine/mining, vein, and related phrasing) show an intent to reserve solid, mineable minerals like coal, not migratory oil and gas.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court judgment that sustained defendants’ demurrer and dismissed a qui tam claim under the California False Claims Act (CFCA). Relator Jamal Albarghouti filed a sealed complaint alleging false claims involving Los Angeles public entities, served the Attorney General by certified mail, and waited more than 60 days before serving defendants. The trial court held the complaint was improperly unsealed and dismissed it. The appellate court held the CFCA creates a 60-day default seal period that lifts automatically absent a government motion to extend the seal, that failure to allege compliance with the seal rules is not grounds for demurrer, and directed the trial court to overrule the demurrer and proceed.

The Court of Appeal granted The Merchant of Tennis’s petition for extraordinary writ and directed the trial court to modify its curative notice scheme regarding roughly 954 individual settlement agreements (ISAs) obtained by Merchant from putative class members. The trial court had found the ISAs voidable as procured by fraud or coercion and ordered a curative notice advising members they could rescind and join the class without having to immediately return settlement payments (though payments could be offset against any later recovery). The appellate majority concluded the trial court must follow California rescission statutes and preserved the judgment, adding that each side bear its own costs on appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted an application for interlocutory appeal filed by Fowl Life Foods, LLC in the case against Matthew Gray. The court's order allows the appellant to file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the order (dated April 1, 2026) and directs the superior court clerk to include this order in the record sent to the Court of Appeals. The decision is procedural: the court accepted review of an otherwise non-final interlocutory matter and set the filing and record-transmission requirements to effectuate that review.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted Chick‑fil‑A, Inc.'s application for an interlocutory appeal in the case Chick‑fil‑A, Inc. v. Matthew Gray. The court ordered that the appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the April 1, 2026 order and directed the Superior Court clerk to include this order in the record sent to the Court of Appeals. This is an administrative order allowing the interlocutory appeal to proceed, not a decision on the merits of the underlying dispute.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Payne’s appeal as a nullity because the appellant, Wesley Payne, had died before substitution of the estate occurred, and Georgia law treats further proceedings as void as to a deceased party until someone is substituted. The trial court had dismissed the case for discovery violations after Payne’s death; the appellate court held that actions taken after his death are void as to him. The court remanded for the trial court to resolve pending motions to substitute the estate and, if appropriate, to reconsider defendants’ dismissal motions.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted an application for discretionary appeal filed by Wirth Forestry, LLC and others in a case against Heard County, Georgia. The court ordered that the appellants may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the order and instructed the Clerk of the Superior Court to include this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals. The order simply grants permission to pursue an appeal and sets procedural steps for transmitting the record; it does not decide the merits of the underlying dispute.

The court reviewed an appeal by Rialto on Hurstbourne, LLC against US LBM Operating Co. after the trial court granted summary judgment to US LBM and denied Rialto’s motion. The appellate court held that genuine factual disputes exist about whether the ExtremeGreen flooring component breached express warranties of merchantability and fitness for its intended use (based on acoustical testing and expert reports), so summary judgment on those claims was improper. The court affirmed summary judgment for US LBM on Rialto’s design-defect warranty and on indemnity for interparty attorney fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings on the remaining warranty claims.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Summit County Common Pleas Court’s order enforcing a settlement between Randy Dean and Pekin Insurance. Dean had sued for underinsured motorist benefits; his former attorney demanded $185,000 and Pekin accepted. Pekin sent settlement documents and a check, but Dean refused to sign. After a hearing with testimony and an email exhibit, the trial court found a valid settlement existed, that Dean’s counsel had authority to settle above $175,000, and that Dean failed to prove incompetence or duress. The appellate court found sufficient evidence supported those findings and affirmed.

The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Highland County Juvenile Court’s decision denying Derrick Beverly’s objections to an administrative order terminating his child support obligation after the child reached majority. Beverly argued the original 2007 support order was void due to fraudulent or misidentified genetic testing, coercion, lack of notice, and other constitutional defects. The appellate court found Beverly failed to timely object to the original administrative orders and that the juvenile court held multiple hearings and considered his submissions. Because Beverly did not show reversible error or lack of opportunity to be heard, the appeals court affirmed.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that the State and its municipalities may immediately appeal a trial court order that preliminarily enjoins enforcement of a duly enacted law. The City of Columbus passed two firearm ordinances; plaintiffs obtained a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of several provisions. The Fifth District dismissed the city’s interlocutory appeal for lack of a final appealable order. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that an injunction preventing enforcement of a law inflicts irreparable sovereign injury and therefore qualifies as a final, immediately appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). The case was remanded for consideration of the appeal on the merits.

Mallory Harcourt sued Tesla after her toddler climbed into her newly purchased Model X, started it, and the vehicle struck her. She proceeded only on a strict product liability design-defect theory using the consumer expectations test. After Harcourt rested, the trial court granted Tesla's motion for nonsuit, concluding ordinary consumers could not form minimum safety expectations about how the Model X would perform in the unusual scenario of a toddler starting the car, particularly given the vehicle's complex, nonstandard systems. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the consumer expectations test inapplicable and noting Harcourt waived the alternative risk-benefit theory.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of San Rafael in a lawsuit by 16-year-old Kaylin Pagan, a passenger injured when her friend’s car hydroplaned and went down an embankment. Pagan sued the City for a dangerous condition of public property, alleging failures to warn of a sharp wet curve and lack of barriers. The trial court found the roadway’s wet condition and resulting hazard were open and obvious as a matter of law, and Pagan’s later expert theory about a defective pavement surface was not pleaded and relied on inadmissible or unsupported expert opinion. The appellate court agreed and affirmed judgment for the City.