Court Filings

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the First District and remanded the case. The court held that Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution (the state right-to-counsel clause) did not apply to Morris’s preindictment investigatory interview, because that provision applies to trials in court. The court also considered whether Morris invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the recorded interrogation after an initial waiver. It concluded Morris did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his federal right to counsel at the relevant point, so suppression under the federal Constitution was not required.

The Court of Appeals reversed a municipal court conviction for operating a vehicle under the influence (OVI) because officers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to extend a traffic stop and administer field sobriety tests. Ingram was pulled over for an unlit rear license plate, admitted having a drink earlier, and officers testified to smelling alcohol from the vehicle, but there was no erratic driving, no notable eye or speech impairment, and body-cam statements conflicted about odor and signs of impairment. The appellate court held the totality of circumstances did not justify prolonging the stop, vacated the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that a capital defendant cannot use Civ.R. 60(B) to reopen a prior state postconviction judgment; instead, R.C. 2953.21 and R.C. 2953.23 provide the exclusive statutory mechanism for collateral attacks on criminal convictions or sentences. The court reversed the appellate court’s decision that permitted Hill to proceed under Civ.R. 60(B) and remanded for consideration of Hill’s remaining assignment of error. The court reasoned that postconviction relief is a special statutory proceeding and the Civil Rules are clearly inapplicable where the legislature has prescribed an exclusive remedy.

The First District Court of Appeals reversed defendant-appellant Joshua Mounts’s felony-murder conviction and remanded for a new trial. Mounts had reopened his direct appeal under App.R. 26(B) to claim ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The court found trial counsel performed deficiently by abandoning key expert testimony (Dr. Wiens) about histology slides, failing to object to undisclosed expert opinion testimony from Dr. Makoroff, and not objecting to improper prosecutorial remarks in closing. Because those errors undermined confidence in the verdict and appellate counsel should have raised them, the conviction was reversed and the cause remanded.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed part of the First District Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the municipal trial court’s denial of J.B.’s applications to seal five misdemeanor convictions prosecuted by the county. J.B. sought sealing of seven misdemeanor convictions; two prosecuted by the city were sealed by the court of appeals and not appealed. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding J.B. had not shown rehabilitation and that the government’s interest in public records outweighed hers. The Court rejected the court of appeals’ substitutions of judgment and novel limitations on what a trial court may consider under R.C. 2953.32.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of a misdemeanor charge against Nathan Hake for illegally disposing of construction and demolition debris and remanded the case for further proceedings. The trial court had dismissed the charge as unconstitutionally vague, focusing on terms like “disposal,” “storage,” “temporary period,” and “substantially unchanged.” The appellate court held that the statutory and regulatory definitions give fair notice and are not impermissibly vague as applied to Hake’s alleged conduct (digging a pit, burying construction debris and household waste), so the dismissal was improper.

The State of Ohio appealed two Lucas County trial-court judgments that allowed cash seized in investigations to be applied toward fines imposed on defendant Shakur Ishmail Shabaa. The appellate court reversed and remanded. It held that (1) $122 forfeited through a civil forfeiture consent judgment could not be used to pay criminal fines because R.C. 2981.12(G) expressly forbids using forfeited property to pay fines; and (2) $4,460 that Shabaa forfeited by plea agreement could not be applied to his fines because the trial court lacked authority to alter the parties’ negotiated plea terms that specified disbursement to the State and Sylvania Township Police.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Kenneth Humphries Jr.’s 2025 misdemeanor domestic-violence conviction. Humphries had been indicted in 2025 for offenses arising from an August 2020 incident; his trial counsel moved to dismiss for preindictment delay but did not argue the two-year statute of limitations for misdemeanors. The State conceded counsel’s failure to raise the statute-of-limitations defense was ineffective assistance. The appellate court agreed with the concession, found the conviction must be reversed, and remanded for further proceedings, rendering the weight-of-evidence claim moot.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Kaelyn Smith’s felony-murder judgment because the trial court failed to complete statutorily required notice and form under Ohio’s violent-offender law (Sierah’s Law, R.C. 2903.41 et seq.) before sentencing. Smith had pleaded guilty to felony murder with a firearm specification; the parties and judge discussed the violent-offender form and defense counsel waived reading the paperwork, but the record does not contain an executed form or an affirmative on-the-record advisement. Because the trial court did not provide the required pre-sentencing notice, the appellate court found plain error and ordered further proceedings for proper notice and signature.

The First District Court of Appeals reversed the municipal court's denial of a victim's request for restitution and remanded for a restitution hearing. Defendant Adam Winkle had pleaded guilty/no contest to several driving-related offenses after side‑swiping multiple cars while intoxicated. Victim M.L. submitted a victim impact statement with documentation that she paid a $500 insurance deductible for damage to her vehicle. The appellate court held the trial court erred in refusing restitution based on the existence of insurance and directed a hearing to determine restitution for the deductible.

The First District Court of Appeals reversed Patricia Hauser’s municipal-court conviction for theft and discharged her. Hauser pleaded no contest after the State recited facts that she left a bar without paying a $69.33 tab when her credit card was declined. The appellate court held the State’s explanation of circumstances affirmatively showed the bar owner consented to her possession of the drinks when he served them, which negated an essential element of the charged theft offense. Because the explanation could not support the conviction under R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), the court reversed and discharged Hauser.

The Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the convictions of Travis Ratcliff because the trial court misinformed him at his plea-change hearing about the nature and maximum length of the prison terms he faced. Ratcliff had pleaded guilty to seven counts, including two second-degree felonies that, under Ohio law after the Reagan Tokes Act, carry mandatory indefinite sentences. The trial judge told Ratcliff those counts carried definite two-to-eight year terms and the written plea form repeated that error. The appeals court concluded this was a complete failure to comply with Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(a) and vacated the pleas without requiring a showing of prejudice.

The Court of Appeals reversed a Warren Municipal Court order that denied the State leave to dismiss an aggravated menacing charge against Christopher Glover. The municipal court refused dismissal despite the prosecutor’s detailed statement that the named victim (A.H.) did not see a gun and did not fear Glover, two on-scene officers could not corroborate aggravated menacing, and the defendant joined the dismissal request. The appellate court held the trial court abused its discretion by substituting a sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry for the narrow leave-of-court review required when a prosecutor seeks dismissal.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, vacated, and remanded a trial court order that granted R.T.’s petition to seal a 2003 federal conviction. The appeals court held that a state trial court may only order sealing of records that are maintained by Ohio state agencies under R.C. 2953.32, and cannot compel federal agencies to seal or disregard federal conviction records. Because the trial court’s order used broad boilerplate language (directing all official records sealed and directing service on federal and state agencies), the appellate court found the order exceeded the court’s limited authority and remanded for a more specific hearing narrowly identifying which state-maintained records, if any, may be sealed.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s convictions of Carol A. Seymour for providing heroin that contributed to a neighbor’s overdose death. The central question was whether the State had proved that Seymour’s conduct was an actual cause of death. The Court held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, sufficient circumstantial and expert evidence supported a finding that the heroin Seymour supplied was a but-for cause of the decedent’s death, so the convictions for involuntary manslaughter and corrupting another with drugs must be reinstated.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Eighth District and held that a police officer lawfully extended a traffic stop to verify the driver’s license status even after the original basis for the stop (a believed inoperable headlight) was shown to be mistaken. Officer Rose stopped Quentin Fips for a presumed faulty headlight, learned Fips did not have his license, obtained identifying information, and then confirmed through dispatch that Fips’s license was suspended and a warrant existed. The Court ruled the additional inquiry was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that Fips’s failure to produce a license gave new reasonable suspicion to continue the stop.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the Marion Municipal Court’s denials of Nicholas Meads’s requests to seal two dismissed misdemeanor matters (domestic violence and violation of a civil protection order). The appeals arose after the trial court denied sealing following a hearing where the victim spoke and the State took no position. The appellate court held the trial court applied the wrong statute and improperly considered the victim’s statements when R.C. 2953.33 governs sealing of dismissed cases and limits the court to considering the movant’s submissions and any prosecutor objection. The matters are remanded for further proceedings under the correct statute.

The court reversed the trial court’s denial of Solomon Lewis’s timely petition for postconviction relief because the lower court failed to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Ohio law. Lewis had pleaded guilty and was sentenced; after a prior direct-appeal remand and resentencing he filed timely postconviction petitions. The trial court denied relief in a one-sentence entry without explaining the bases for the decision. The appellate court held that such an entry is insufficient under R.C. 2953.21(H) and remanded for the trial court to issue proper findings and conclusions.