Court Filings

The Court of Appeal reversed two convictions and affirmed one from defendant Wayne Hansen Hsiung’s convictions arising from “open rescue” animal-rights protests at Sonoma County poultry farms. The court held the trial court erred by barring a mistake-of-law defense based on defendant’s good-faith (though mistaken) reliance on legal advice that a necessity justification made trespass lawful for rescuing or treating suffering animals; that defect required reversal of the conspiracy count and one trespass count and remand for further proceedings. The court rejected challenges to Penal Code section 31 and to section 602(o) and affirmed the remaining conviction.

The California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence of Cary Anthony Stayner for the murders of Carole Sund, her daughters’ friend Silvina Pelosso, and 15-year-old Juli Sund, and related kidnapping. After a jury convicted Stayner of three counts of murder and one count of kidnapping, found multiple special circumstance allegations true, found him sane, and the jury fixed penalty at death, the trial court denied motions for new trial and sentence modification. The high court reviewed guilt, sanity, and penalty-phase claims and concluded the record did not establish reversible error, affirming the judgment in full.

The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded the case of Robert Lopez, convicted in 2007 of murder and related offenses, for further proceedings under Penal Code section 1172.6 (Senate Bill 1437/775). The trial court had denied his resentencing petition after an evidentiary hearing; the Court of Appeal affirmed on the ground Lopez forfeited his instructional-ambiguity claim by not raising it on direct appeal. The Supreme Court held that section 1172.6 does not categorically bar petitions based on jury instruction ambiguity that may have permitted conviction by imputed malice, and ordered the appellate court to consider Lopez’s claims on the merits.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to increase defendant Sami Wayne Mohammed’s sentence after execution of his original sentence had begun. Mohammed initially received an aggregate seven-year, four-month term on January 12, 2024. The CDCR later notified the trial court that parts of that sentence were unauthorized under the Three Strikes law, and the trial court resentenced Mohammed on October 21, 2024 to an aggregate 10 years, eight months. The appellate court concluded the trial court could not lawfully resentence him after jurisdiction had ended, treated the appeal as a habeas petition, granted relief, and ordered reinstatement of the January 12, 2024 sentence.

The Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Div. Three) reviewed a challenge to probation condition no. 24, which allowed the probation department to jail a probationer for up to 120 days if he did not "successfully complete" residential treatment and denied credits for time in unsuccessful programs. Although Emrick’s probation was later terminated and he received the disputed custody credits, the court exercised discretion to decide the issues because they are recurring. The court held the condition impermissibly delegated core judicial authority to probation and was invalid for failing to reflect a knowing waiver of the statutory right to custody credits under Penal Code section 2900.5.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court’s denial of a writ petition seeking to stop youth offender parole hearings under Penal Code section 3051 for offenders sentenced under section 667.6’s “full, separate, and consecutive” scheme. Jessica, a victim, challenged section 3051 as an unconstitutional legislative amendment of voter-approved Proposition 83 (which restated and expanded parts of § 667.6). The court held Jessica had standing under Marsy’s Law to challenge the parole hearing, but concluded Proposition 83’s changes to § 667.6(c)–(d) were not substantive and therefore did not prevent the Legislature from enacting § 3051. The petition was denied and the judgment affirmed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed appellant Dylan James Hardy’s convictions and eight-year split sentence following guilty pleas to multiple firearm offenses. Hardy mounted facial Second Amendment challenges to California statutes banning assault-weapon activity, possession of a short-barreled shotgun, possession of a silencer, large-capacity magazine activity, and unlawful handgun transfer without a licensed dealer. The court rejected those challenges, holding short-barreled shotguns, silencers, and large-capacity magazines are not arms protected by the Second Amendment and that the assault-weapon and transfer regulations do not meaningfully burden the core right to keep and bear arms. The judgment was affirmed and certified for publication.

The Court of Appeal granted a writ of mandate directing the appellate division to reverse its summary denial and order the superior court to reconsider petitioner Aimee Bobo’s request for misdemeanor diversion under Penal Code section 1001.95. Bobo had been charged with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter after running a red light and killing another driver. The trial court denied diversion solely because her negligent conduct caused a death. The appellate court held that denial based only on facts inherent in the offense improperly ignored the statute’s rehabilitative purposes and thus was an abuse of discretion.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial court order that dismissed multiple burglary, theft, and identity-theft charges after a defendant, Keena Landrine, was placed on mental health diversion. Although Landrine made substantial progress while in custody, the appellate court held the diversion statute requires defendants to substantially comply with diversion conditions before charges may be dismissed. Landrine repeatedly violated diversion requirements—relapsing on drugs, refusing recommended detox/treatment, and committing dozens of new criminal offenses—so the trial court abused its discretion by finding satisfactory performance. The matter is remanded for further proceedings on the dismissed charges.

The California Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of John Anthony Bertsch and Jeffery Lee Hronis for the 1985 murder, rape, and kidnapping of Linda Canady. The court affirmed the death sentence for Bertsch but reversed Hronis’s death sentence and remanded for further penalty-phase proceedings because Hronis was allowed to represent himself at penalty phase without the trial court applying current law assessing competency to self-represent. Both defendants’ convictions remain affirmed. The court also vacated any remaining unpaid balances of $10,000 restitution fines under the statutory 10-year enforcement limit and ordered amended abstracts of judgment.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial court order that had authorized involuntary antipsychotic medication for defendant C.F., who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity. At the renewal hearing the trial court proceeded without a court reporter because defense counsel failed to request the no-cost reporter available under local rules; the hearing lasted about 13 minutes and the transcript of testimony is therefore missing. The appellate court found defense counsel’s failure to secure a reporter was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial because it eliminated any meaningful appellate review, and because the medication order will expire before a settled statement could be produced, the case is remanded for a new hearing.

The Court of Appeal granted the People’s petition for a writ of mandate and ordered the trial court to vacate its August 12, 2025 denial of an amended statement of disqualification (ASD) and to disqualify Judge Samah Shouka. The People sought disqualification because Judge Shouka had been a Riverside County deputy district attorney in the homicide unit and had participated in staffing and charging decisions relevant to a pending Racial Justice Act evidentiary hearing about whether the district attorney’s office disproportionately files death-penalty or special-circumstance charges. The appellate court concluded that a person aware of those facts might reasonably doubt the judge’s ability to be impartial, requiring disqualification under CCP §170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii).

A jury convicted Jan Curtis Harzan of communicating with and arranging to meet a minor for sexual purposes after he messaged and agreed to meet an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old. Before trial the court ruled evidence of alleged sexual misconduct by Harzan from the 1970s would be excluded in the prosecution’s case-in-chief but could be admitted if Harzan asserted an entrapment defense. To avoid that prejudicial evidence, Harzan declined the entrapment defense and was convicted. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the court’s conditioning of exclusion violated Harzan’s constitutional right to present a defense, though the evidence supporting guilt was otherwise substantial.

The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded defendant Jose Gerardo Espiritu’s conviction for sexual offenses because the trial court failed to follow the process required by Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 during jury selection. Defense counsel objected when the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror who identified herself as a nurse. The trial court accepted the prosecutor’s stated reason (that the juror was a nurse) without determining whether that reason was a presumptively invalid ground under section 231.7(e)(10). Because the court did not make the required inquiry into presumptively invalid categories, the appellate court reversed and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal reviewed a 2024 trial-court proceeding in which the trial court attempted to correct an error on the 2019 abstract of judgment for Victor Lopez Sanchez. The appellate court held that the 2019 error was a clerical mistake (a math/recording error that included county-jail misdemeanor time in the stated state-prison total) and therefore the trial court was not required to conduct full resentencing. The denial of a Romero motion and denial of full resentencing were affirmed. However, the trial court exceeded its authority by altering misdemeanor terms (reducing and making them concurrent), so that portion of the 2024 order was vacated and the case remanded to amend the abstract to reflect the lawful 2019 sentence.

A jury convicted Jazz Bradley of multiple sexual offenses, including forcible rape of two victims (one aged 16) and unlawful sexual intercourse with another 16-year-old. The trial court imposed heavy sentences under California’s One Strike law, the Habitual Sexual Offender law, and Three Strikes, including consecutive life terms and determinate terms for robbery and unlawful intercourse. On appeal Bradley challenged several sentencing decisions. The court affirmed the judgment but modified it: it rejected the dual-use claim about the robbery upper term, but held that the trial court erred by imposing and staying additional sentences under the Habitual Sexual Offender statute and by imposing stayed additional One Strike terms on the same counts; those stayed/duplicative sentences were stricken.

The Court of Appeal reversed the convictions of Pedro Thomas DeLeon Tzul for the murders of Martha and Antonio Garcia and directed a new trial. The trial court had excluded a handwritten note found at the scene—in which the author said he found the victim having sex with her brother and that this filled him with rage—during the People’s case under Evidence Code section 352, effectively forcing Tzul to testify to get the note admitted. The appellate court held the note was highly probative of provocation and should not have been excluded; admission during the People’s case likely would have produced a more favorable result for Tzul.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Lavell Tyrone Player’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The resentencing court, after an evidentiary hearing, found beyond a reasonable doubt that Player was the actual killer (and alternatively a major participant acting with reckless indifference), making him ineligible for resentencing. The appellate panel held that a jury’s earlier “not true” findings on a personal firearm enhancement and robbery special circumstance did not collaterally estop the resentencing court from finding Player was the shooter, relying on People v. Santamaria and subsequent authority. The court also found substantial evidence—principally the testimony of accomplice Walter Fonteno and corroborating witnesses—supports the actual-killer finding.

The California Supreme Court reversed the defendant Omar Richard Deen’s death-row conviction and sentence and remanded for a new trial. Deen was convicted of murdering his mother and a police chief, and a capital trial proceeded in competency, guilt, sanity, and penalty phases. The Court found reversible error in the trial court’s handling of a defense challenge for cause to a prospective juror (Juror No. 5). The trial court applied an unduly narrow standard, accepted the juror’s self-assessment without properly weighing the totality of circumstances, and failed to make the findings necessary for meaningful appellate review.