Court Filings

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reviewed Jordan Potts’s conviction for murder and the Anders brief filed by his appointed counsel asserting the appeal is frivolous. After independent review of the full record and noting Potts received notice and the chance to file a pro se response (he did not), the court concluded there are no arguable grounds for reversal. The court affirmed the trial-court judgment sentencing Potts to 45 years, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and directed counsel to notify Potts of the result and file proof of that notice.

The court affirmed the trial court’s revocation of Edward Bobby Martinez’s community supervision for indecency with a child by sexual contact and the imposition of his ten-year sentence, but it modified the judgment and bill of costs to remove language permitting future assessment of court-appointed attorney’s fees. The court held that Martinez’s refusal to submit to an instant-offense polygraph—required by his sex-offender treatment—constituted a violation of supervision because his Fifth Amendment privilege no longer applied to the final, adjudicated offense. Because Martinez has been found indigent, the court deleted any prospective attorney-fee assessment.

A jury convicted Jordan Stephens of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated after police stopped his truck following a citizen’s 911 call reporting erratic driving. Officers observed signs of intoxication (odor of alcohol, glassy eyes), found empty alcohol bottles in the vehicle, and administered standardized field sobriety tests on which Stephens performed poorly. Stephens argued on appeal that errors in test administration and other explanations could account for observations, but the court found the combined evidence — eyewitness report of dangerous driving, officer observations, test performance, admissions about drinking, and refusal of blood testing — sufficient to support the conviction and affirmed.

The Tenth Appellate District of Texas reversed the trial court’s denial of Joseph Blair Brooks’ habeas corpus application seeking release under article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Brooks had been jailed more than 90 days awaiting trial on an indictment for solicitation of capital murder. The Court held article 17.151 mandates release—either by personal recognizance or by reducing bail to an amount the record shows the defendant can afford—when the statute’s prerequisites are met, and that the trial court abused its discretion by denying relief even though Brooks previously had a bail reduction and did not post bond.

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Appellate District of Texas reviewed Dustin Eric Rubio’s appeal after he pleaded guilty and was convicted of multiple sexual offenses and related counts. Rubio received lengthy prison terms totaling consecutive and concurrent sentences. His appointed appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief concluding the appeal was frivolous. After an independent review of the record, the court agreed the appeal lacked any nonfrivolous grounds, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The opinion explains the court performed the required frivolity review under Anders and related precedent.

The Texas Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed Derek Joseph Daigneault’s conviction and life sentence for the murder of his cousin, Mandy Rose Reynolds. The court rejected Daigneault’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, reasoning that cumulative circumstantial evidence — including his possession of Mandy’s car and handgun, video and cell‑phone location data, purchases of items matching debris at the burn site, a high‑speed flight in Mandy’s car, and ballistic matches — supported a rational juror’s finding he shot Mandy and burned her body. The court also upheld the trial judge’s exclusion of proffered “alternate perpetrator” evidence as speculative and lacking the required nexus to the crime.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment revoking Juan David Garcia’s deferred-adjudication community supervision for sexual assault of a child, adjudicating him guilty, and sentencing him to seven years’ imprisonment. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no arguable grounds for appeal; the court independently reviewed the record, found no reversible error, and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. The opinion instructs counsel to notify Garcia of the decision and his right to seek discretionary review and explains procedural steps for further review.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction and twelve-year sentence for Ashley Lynette Salinas following a revocation of deferred adjudication community supervision for burglary of a habitation. The dispute centered on whether prior trial counsel misinformed Salinas about which drug treatment program she had agreed to attend (Journey Recovery Center versus the county Substance Abuse Treatment Facility). The court found the record supported the trial court’s disbelief of Salinas’s claim because she signed an amended order explicitly requiring SATF participation and acknowledged the modification, so her ineffective-assistance claim failed under governing standards.

The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences of Anthony Schultz after a jury found him guilty on multiple counts arising from a re-indictment: two counts of sexual assault of a child, three counts of improper relationship between educator and student, and one count of solicitation of prostitution of a minor. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief asserting there were no arguable grounds for appeal; the court conducted an independent review of the record and found no reversible error. The court granted counsel's motion to withdraw and directed counsel to notify Schultz of his right to seek discretionary review.

The Court of Appeals affirmed appellant Luis Gerardo Lugo Pena’s conviction and fifteen-year sentence for aggravated robbery. Pena argued the trial court erred by not holding a hearing under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.22 to determine the voluntariness of his police statement and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found any failure to hold the hearing was harmless because the recorded statement was largely cumulative of other properly admitted evidence and there was no evidence the statement was involuntary; similarly, counsel’s conduct did not fall below professional standards or prejudice the defense.

The court construed Ignacio Lara Jr.'s pro se filing as a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the trial court's order for a competency examination. The court explained mandamus standards and the requirements for such petitions under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, including the need to show a ministerial duty and an inadequate legal remedy and to supply an adequate record. Because Lara failed to meet procedural and record requirements and did not show entitlement to relief, the court denied the petition for writ of mandamus without issuing an opinion for publication.

The First District of Texas affirmed Jason Jermaine Armster’s 55-year murder conviction and $10,000 fine. Armster challenged three rulings: denial of his motion to suppress a custodial statement, admission of testimony about past bad acts, and the trial court’s refusal to give a sudden-passion instruction at punishment. The court found the statement admissible because Armster himself reinitiated conversation after invoking counsel and then knowingly waived his right; any error admitting extraneous-act testimony was harmless given overwhelming evidence; and the record did not minimally support sudden passion as an affirmative mitigating finding.

The First District of Texas dismissed appellant Dayanara Danae Baker’s attempted appeal of a 2010 prostitution conviction because the notice of appeal was filed fifteen years after judgment and the trial-court certification from 2010 stated she had no right to appeal. Baker, pro se, also sought appointment of counsel and asked the court to consider waiving fees to aid access to employment, housing, and records, but the court explained an untimely appeal is not a proper vehicle for fee relief. Because the court lacked jurisdiction over the belated appeal, the appeal and pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The court of appeals reviewed Billy Jack Barrera’s conviction for felony cruelty to animals after his lawyer filed an Anders brief asking to withdraw because the appeal was frivolous. The record shows Barrera was convicted by a jury based on eyewitness testimony and photographic and veterinary evidence of injuries inflicted with a machete. After conducting an independent review of the record, the court concluded there were no arguable grounds for appeal, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the trial court’s four-year sentence and costs.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas affirmed John Paul Ortega’s conviction and life-without-parole sentence for capital murder in the deaths of Iliana Garza and her unborn child. Ortega challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to the unborn child’s death and argued the jury charge was erroneous for including self-defense in the abstract but not in the application paragraph. The court found the evidence sufficient because Ortega knew Garza was pregnant and a jury could infer he knew killing her was reasonably certain to kill the fetus. The court also found the charge error non-egregious given the evidence and arguments, so the conviction stands.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed Scott Crow’s appeal from his 2015 guilty plea and twenty-year sentence for third-degree felony driving while intoxicated. Crow filed a second pro se notice of appeal nearly ten years after sentencing, which the court found untimely under the appellate rules. The court also relied on the trial-court certification showing this was a plea-bargain case in which Crow waived any right of appeal. Because the notice was untimely and the certification precludes an appeal, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals reviewed Jason Padilla’s bench-trial convictions for three counts of sexual assault of a child, one count of indecency with a child, and one count of possession of a controlled substance. The court held that testimony about prior minor acts of violence in the household was admissible to explain the victim’s delayed reporting and did not unduly prejudice Padilla. However, the court found the evidence insufficient to prove the seized residue was cocaine (no lab analysis or expert testimony), reversed the possession conviction, rendered an acquittal on that count, and modified one judgment to correct the statutory citation.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed Fred Gonzales’s conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and the resulting 25-year sentence. Gonzales argued his trial lawyer was ineffective for not showing him a dash-cam video before he rejected a misdemeanor plea offer and that the trial court erred by refusing a hearing on his motion for new trial. The court found the record did not affirmatively show deficient performance, and Gonzales failed to prove prejudice under the standard for plea-negotiation claims. The court also held the trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying a hearing on the motion for new trial.

The Court dismissed Bobbie Hall Wooldridge’s appeal of a guilty plea conviction for possession of methamphetamine because the trial court certified this was a plea-bargain case in which Wooldridge had no right to appeal. Wooldridge pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement and received the agreed three-year sentence. The appellate court found no statutory or procedural basis to continue the appeal, noting the certification was signed by the defendant, defense counsel, and the judge, and that the record supported the certification.

The Texas Sixth Court of Appeals affirmed Markeith Terrell Oliver’s conviction and ten-year sentence for unlawful carrying of a weapon by a felon. Oliver filed a consolidated brief raising a single appellate point that did not challenge the conviction in this particular appellate cause. Because the sole point of error concerned Oliver’s other cases and raised no issue about the conviction at hand, the court found there was nothing to review and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court issued a brief memorandum opinion denying relief in this cause.

A jury convicted Markeith Terrell Oliver of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and the trial court sentenced him to nine years in prison. On appeal Oliver argued the trial court should have instructed the jury that witness Carlina McComb was an accomplice as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals held McComb was not an accomplice as a matter of law because she was not a felon at the time and her conviction for unlawful carrying was not a lesser-included offense of Oliver’s charge; the evidence showed separate, parallel possession of different weapons. The court therefore affirmed the conviction.

The Texas Sixth Court of Appeals affirmed Markeith Terrell Oliver’s conviction and six-month sentence for attempted tampering with physical evidence. Oliver filed a notice of appeal and later submitted a single consolidated brief raising one point of error, but that point did not challenge the tampering-with-evidence conviction at issue in this appeal. Because the brief contained no argument directed to the conviction in this cause, the appellate court found there was nothing to review and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Manuel Mata’s conviction for interference with public duties (a Class B misdemeanor) following his arrest during a police DWI investigation. Mata argued the statute was unconstitutional as applied, that the evidence was insufficient, and that the jury charge improperly used the word “belligerent.” The court held Mata waived the as-applied constitutional challenge, found the evidence legally sufficient because he approached officers, recorded a patrol computer displaying confidential data, and repeatedly refused to obey a clearly established boundary, and rejected charge-error claims as invited or harmless.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Derwin Dewayne Bell’s conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Bell was tried for two counts; a jury convicted him on Count I (threatening Robert Curry by shooting at him) and the court declared a mistrial on Count II. Bell argued (1) the jury charge improperly defined “firearm” and (2) the evidence was insufficient. The court upheld the conviction, finding the evidence (eyewitness IDs, shell casings, vehicle damage, sign-in sheet, and other testimony) was sufficient and that any error in including a nonstatutory definition of “firearm” did not cause egregious harm or deprive him of a fair trial.

The Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed Derwin Dewayne Bell’s convictions for three counts of possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver (methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine) after a jury trial. The court reviewed sufficiency-of-the-evidence and jury-charge complaints. It held the evidence — including controlled-substance testing, large quantities and packaging consistent with distribution, scales, guns, cash, matching bags found in a vehicle and a residence linked to Bell, social-media and mail evidence, and his gang leadership — provided affirmative links supporting possession and intent. The court also held the trial court properly omitted a DEA-registration instruction because Bell bore the burden to produce any exemption evidence and did not do so or request such an instruction.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Stephen Kay Thorp Jr.’s criminal appeal because the trial-court certification states this was a plea-bargain case and the defendant has no right to appeal. The clerk’s record confirms the sentence did not exceed the prosecutor’s recommendation and there is no written pretrial motion, trial-court permission to appeal, or statute authorizing the appeal. The court gave Thorp an opportunity to supply an amended certification but none was filed, so the court dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d).

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Samantha Ann Marie Vargas's appeal challenging a December 8, 2025 order that modified her community supervision to include a 30-day jail sanction (with credit for time served). The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from an order that alters conditions of community supervision, relying on controlling precedent. The panel ordered dismissal after Vargas failed to show a basis for continuing the appeal when asked to show cause.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Kenisha Sharron Simms's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Simms had been placed on deferred community supervision after a plea; the State later moved to adjudicate guilt, and the trial court modified the supervision conditions. The appellate court held that appeals from modifications to deferred adjudication supervision are not authorized by the legislature, cited controlling precedent, gave Simms an opportunity to show cause, received no response, and dismissed the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals, San Antonio, denied Shawn L. Sanders's petition seeking either a writ of mandamus or, alternatively, a writ of prohibition. Sanders filed the petition on March 23, 2026, asking the appellate court to intervene in underlying criminal case No. 2023-CR-3165 in Bexar County. After reviewing the petition and record, the court concluded Sanders did not establish entitlement to the extraordinary relief requested and therefore denied both the mandamus and prohibition petitions without publishing an opinion.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Bryan Keith Gutierrez's filing for lack of jurisdiction. Gutierrez filed a "Motion for Bond Relief" that appeared to challenge bail and seek to quash multiple indictments. The appellate court treated the filing as a notice of appeal but found no final judgment of conviction in the record and noted that courts of appeals lack statutory authority to hear interlocutory appeals on excessive bail or motions to quash indictments. Because the appellant did not respond to an order to show cause, the appeal was dismissed.