Court Filings

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals from five felony convictions for lack of jurisdiction because Brown validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements in each case. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to evidence in five trial causes, signed written waivers and advisals acknowledging he understood and waived appeal rights, and the trial court’s judgments reflected the waiver. Because the record affirmatively shows the waivers were knowing and voluntary and Brown admitted the waivers to this Court, the court concluded it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five criminal cases for lack of jurisdiction. Brown had pleaded guilty to theft-from-person in three cases and aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon in two others, and in each case he agreed as part of plea arrangements to waive his right to appeal. The trial-court paperwork and appellant’s own filings show he knowingly and voluntarily waived appeal rights, and the judgments expressly note appeals were waived. Because the record contains valid appeal waivers and no trial-court permission to appeal, the court dismissed the appeals.

The First Court of Appeals dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five consolidated criminal cases because the trial-court record shows he validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to violations in three theft-from-person cases and pleaded guilty to two aggravated robbery cases; in each cause he signed documents and the judgments reflected an appeal waiver. Because the written certifications and filings demonstrate a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver and the trial court did not grant permission to appeal, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s consolidated appeals from five felony convictions for lack of jurisdiction. Brown pleaded guilty to theft-from-person in three cases and to aggravated robbery in two others, and in each case he signed plea paperwork and certifications expressly waiving his right to appeal. The court found the trial-court certifications and the record show a knowing, voluntary waiver of appeal and that the trial court did not grant permission to appeal, so the appellate court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas dismissed Omarion Brown’s appeals in five criminal cases because the trial-court record shows he validly waived his right to appeal as part of plea agreements. Brown pleaded guilty or stipulated to evidence in five felony cases, signed written waivers and advisals acknowledging he gave up his appeal rights, and the judgments expressly state appeal was waived. Because a valid, knowing, and voluntary waiver bars appeal absent trial-court permission, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals and any pending motions.

The First District of Texas affirmed Nicholas Darris Marshall’s conviction and 12-year sentence for possession of between 4 and 200 grams of methamphetamine. Marshall pleaded guilty after the State waived two enhancement paragraphs; evidence at sentencing included police testimony, lab results showing 2.1152 grams of methamphetamine, and Marshall’s own testimony about how the drugs came to be in his car. The court held Marshall failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment challenge and, even if preserved, the sentence—being within the statutory 2–20 year range—was not grossly disproportionate under the relevant precedent.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s order revoking Q.W.’s probation and committing him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department for seven years. The juvenile had been placed on probation after pleading true to two counts of aggravated robbery. The State sought modification alleging truancy, a positive marijuana test, and unlawful carrying of a handgun. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Q.W. violated probation, including committing a new-law offense by being found with a handgun in a vehicle, and concluded the evidence supported revocation.

The First District of Texas dismissed Donald Wayne Herod’s pro se petition for writ of mandamus because it was a collateral attack on his final felony conviction and thus must be pursued through a post-conviction habeas application under Article 11.07 in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The court explained that mandamus is not the proper vehicle for challenging a final felony conviction and that only the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction over such post-conviction felony relief. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and any pending motions were denied as moot.

The Second Court of Appeals at Fort Worth dismissed Sergio Guadal Maresmartinez’s appeal of his convictions for two counts of sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child because his notice of appeal was untimely. His sentence was imposed June 29, 2023, and without a motion for new trial his notice of appeal was due July 31, 2023. He filed his notice on February 27, 2026. The court concluded that timely filing of a notice of appeal is essential to its jurisdiction and that Maresmartinez’s response did not show any grounds for continuing the appeal or authorization for an out-of-time appeal.

The court dismissed Ross Thomas Brantley’s pro se appeal for lack of jurisdiction because there was no signed trial-court order denying his statutory request for postconviction DNA testing (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64.01). The appellate court gave Brantley ten days to show grounds to continue the appeal but received no response. Citing its rules and prior precedent, the court concluded there was no appealable order and therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) affirmed Reginald Dewayne Taylor’s conviction for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine (4–200 grams) and the jury’s punishment verdict of 35 years’ imprisonment. The court rejected Taylor’s three appellate challenges: (1) the trial court properly denied his motions to suppress because the search-warrant affidavits and reasonable inferences supplied a substantial basis for probable cause to search two residences and vehicles; (2) Instagram records were properly authenticated through a records certificate and corroborating testimony and circumstances; and (3) including a limiting instruction listing all permissible Rule 404(b) purposes was not reversible error and in any event benefited Taylor. The court affirmed the judgment.

The court reviewed an appeal by Oliver Perry Harris from the trial court’s revocation of his deferred adjudication and seven-year sentence after the court found a supervision violation true. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding the appeal was frivolous. After its independent review, the appellate court found no arguable grounds for reversal but identified an unsupported $1,743.00 reparations assessment in the written judgment and related inmate trust withdrawal order. The court deleted that reparations assessment from the judgment and the withdrawal order, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the judgment as modified.

The Second Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court’s adjudication of guilt and three-year prison sentence for Joey Sullivan. Sullivan had been placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision after pleading guilty to evading arrest with a vehicle. The State later petitioned to adjudicate, alleging Sullivan fled from a peace officer; after a hearing the trial court found the violation true, adjudicated guilt, and imposed sentence. Sullivan’s appointed appellate attorneys concluded the appeal was frivolous, submitted an Anders brief, and the court agreed there were no arguable grounds for relief.

The Court of Appeals dismissed a duplicative cross-appeal filed by defendant Austin Luke Bradley. The State had appealed a trial court order granting Bradley's motion in limine; Bradley filed a timely cross-appeal challenging an earlier denial of his motion to suppress. Bradley later refiled the same notice of cross-appeal after the trial court re-entered its denial nunc pro tunc. Because that second filing duplicated an already pending cross-appeal in a separate docket number, the Court dismissed the later appeal as superfluous.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an Application for Discretionary Appeal in the criminal case captioned TZVI YEHUDA STRAUSS v. THE STATE (LC No. 25CR00175) and issued a short order on April 16, 2026. The court denied the application for discretionary appeal, meaning it declined to review the lower court's decision. No written opinion or reasoning is included in the order; the denial is a discretionary procedural ruling rather than a substantive decision on the merits.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Dwayne Eugene Jackson’s direct appeal of his March 2026 guilty plea and 20-year sentence because the appeal was not filed under the state’s newly amended discretionary review procedure required for guilty pleas entered on or after May 14, 2025. The court explained that OCGA § 5-6-35 now requires such appeals to begin by application for discretionary review and that failure to follow that procedure is jurisdictional. Because Jackson did not comply, the court concluded it lacks jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order that had granted Ricky Thompson an out-of-time appeal from his convictions for involuntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. The court found the trial court lacked authority under the statutory deadline in OCGA § 5-6-39.1 because Thompson filed his motion 114 days after the time to appeal expired, exceeding the statute’s 100-day window. The panel remanded with directions to dismiss the out-of-time appeal motion and noted that any remedy must be pursued by habeas corpus under existing precedent.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed Tyler Stafford’s convictions and sentences after he pleaded guilty in three Cuyahoga County cases, including a third-degree count for having weapons while under disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). Stafford argued the statute was facially unconstitutional based on this court’s prior Philpotts decision and that counsel was ineffective for advising the plea. The court held Philpotts had been stayed by the Ohio Supreme Court when Stafford pled, so the statute remained valid; and the record did not show counsel was deficient or that Stafford suffered prejudice. The convictions and aggregate sentence were affirmed.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed Lorinzo Sampson’s total 36-month prison sentence after he pled guilty to attempted having weapons while under disability in two separate cases. The court rejected Sampson’s claims that the trial judge was biased, that the sentence was unlawful, and that he was improperly denied the right to hire counsel. The court found the judge’s courtroom comments and scheduling decisions did not demonstrate bias, that the record shows the court considered sentencing statutes and explained its reasons, and that the denial of a last-minute continuance to hire new counsel was a permissible exercise of discretion.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of Marlon Lewis’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle after a traffic stop. Police smelled burnt marijuana, Lewis admitted he had smoked in the car earlier, and an officer then searched the reachable area and found used blunts and a bag containing a firearm. The appellate court concluded that, given Ohio law at the time, smoking marijuana in a vehicle did not constitute a statutory criminal offense for a driver, so there was no probable cause to justify the warrantless search under the automobile exception.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Kenneth Humphries Jr.’s 2025 misdemeanor domestic-violence conviction. Humphries had been indicted in 2025 for offenses arising from an August 2020 incident; his trial counsel moved to dismiss for preindictment delay but did not argue the two-year statute of limitations for misdemeanors. The State conceded counsel’s failure to raise the statute-of-limitations defense was ineffective assistance. The appellate court agreed with the concession, found the conviction must be reversed, and remanded for further proceedings, rendering the weight-of-evidence claim moot.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s November 20, 2025 denial of Letwan E. Cherry’s motion to vacate his six-to-nine year prison sentence for trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound. Cherry argued his sentence was void under Apprendi/Alleyne and Ohio authorities, but the appellate court held his sentence was an authorized indefinite term within the statutory range and that judicial factfinding to select a minimum within that range does not violate the Sixth Amendment. Several other challenges raised on appeal were tied to a later post-sentencing motion and thus were not properly before the court.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals reviewed Joseph Toth’s guilty pleas and sentence for two first-degree drug felonies. The court affirmed Toth’s prison terms but reversed the trial court’s orders imposing mandatory fines and directing sale of his 2018 Cadillac to pay those fines. The appellate court held the trial court lacked statutory authority to order forfeiture/sale because no forfeiture specification or civil forfeiture proceeding was invoked, and the court failed to give the required oral Reagan Tokes advisements at sentencing. The case is remanded for re-sentencing limited to providing the required advisements and correcting the fines/vehicle order.

The Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed Walter Jackson’s convictions and sentence following his March 2023 jury trial and May 15, 2023 sentencing in Scioto County Common Pleas Court. Jackson was convicted on a 12-count indictment (drug trafficking/possession, weapons offenses, and related counts with firearm specifications). He raised five assignments of error including ineffective assistance, absence from trial, failure to merge allied offenses, improper consecutive sentences, and insufficiency/manifest-weight challenges. The court found the record supported the convictions and the consecutive sentences, and that the evidence (including circumstantial evidence and forensic lab results) was sufficient and not against the manifest weight.

The New Jersey Supreme Court held that historical cell site location information (CSLI) involves technical and specialized knowledge and therefore must be presented to a jury by a qualified expert under N.J.R.E. 702. The case arose from defendant Jule Hannah’s murder conviction where a detective testified as a lay witness mapping cell towers from phone records; the Appellate Division had reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The Court found CSLI interpretation goes beyond ordinary juror knowledge, that the detective’s lay testimony and the prosecutor’s closing remarks risked misleading the jury, and that limiting instructions were insufficient to cure the error.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed defendant Robert F. Whitbeck Jr.'s convictions for multiple sexual and related offenses after a jury trial. Whitbeck was convicted of third-degree rape, first-degree criminal sexual act, first-degree attempted rape, criminal obstruction of breathing, second-degree unlawful imprisonment, and criminal contempt, and sentenced to aggregate prison terms and postrelease supervision. The court held the guilty verdicts were not against the weight of the evidence, deferring to the jury's credibility findings given the victim's testimony, corroborating observations by the victim's daughter, and defendant's text messages that included apparent admissions. Claims of trial error and ineffective assistance were rejected as either unpreserved or unsupported by the record.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed defendant Nsikak K. Okure’s conviction and sentence after he pleaded guilty to aggravated vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of an incident without reporting. Okure entered a plea agreement specifying concurrent prison terms (no less than 7–21 to no more than 8–24 years for the homicide count and 2⅓–7 years concurrent for leaving the scene) and waived his right to appeal. The court rejected his sole claim—that the within-agreement sentence was harsh—holding that his valid, unchallenged appeal waiver bars review of that challenge.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed defendant David Host’s conviction and 25-years-to-life sentence after he pleaded guilty to first-degree murder for a break-in that resulted in two deaths. Host had waived appeal rights, but the court considered his preserved claim that the plea was involuntary. The court found his claim unpreserved because he did not make a postallocution motion and that no statements during the plea proceeding raised significant doubt about voluntariness. Even on the record, the court concluded mental-health history did not undermine the plea, and the appellate waiver bars a challenge to sentence severity.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed defendant Jonathan Guerin’s 2019 convictions and prison sentence following his guilty plea to multiple driving-related offenses arising from an April 2018 incident. The court held that challenges to the voluntariness of the plea and to counsel’s effectiveness were unpreserved because defendant did not move to withdraw his plea after allocution, and no statements during the plea colloquy triggered the narrow exception to preservation. The court also found the excessiveness claim moot because defendant has reached his sentence's maximum expiration and is incarcerated on a separate conviction.

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed County Court's denial of defendant Alex M. Ferrer's CPL 440.10 motion to vacate his burglary convictions. Ferrer argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to his being fitted with a concealed stun cuff and the presence of SERT officers during trial. After a hearing County Court credited trial counsel's testimony that he was not informed of the device and found counsel's strategy reasonable because the cuff was not visible, alternatives would have been more obvious restraints, and Ferrer was not chilled from testifying. The appellate court deferred to those credibility findings and affirmed.