Court Filings

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed Family Court's November 25, 2024 order allowing respondent's assigned counsel to withdraw and denying the respondent further assigned counsel in a Family Court Article 8 family offense proceeding. The court found the record shows respondent received notice and opposed the withdrawal, but the attorney-client relationship had irretrievably broken down because respondent repeatedly accused counsel of acting against him and engaged in conduct that frustrated representation. Because respondent had a persistent pattern of causing breakdowns with multiple assigned attorneys, the court concluded further appointments would be futile and that he forfeited the right to additional assignment here.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order in a family-law matter between Maschelle Adrianne Pugh (appellant, pro se) and Eric Paul Pugh (appellee). The appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit (Martin County) was reviewed and the appellate panel issued a per curiam decision simply stating 'Affirmed.' No additional reasoning or changes to the lower court's judgment were provided in the published entry. The decision will become final after any timely motion for rehearing is resolved.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed part of a trial court order in a parenting-plan modification case. Ellen-Rose Fitzgerald sought temporary and permanent relief to relocate with her children; the hearing was noticed only for temporary relief. The trial court nonetheless entered an order granting permanent relief. The appellate court held that granting relief beyond the noticed subject violated due process, affirmed the portion granting temporary relief, reversed the portion granting permanent relief, and remanded for a properly noticed final hearing on permanency.

The court affirmed a default final order terminating or modifying parental rights after Mother obtained substituted service and a default hearing while Father did not appear. Father filed a restricted appeal arguing substituted service and service returns were defective, certain certificates were filed prematurely, and the clerk failed to send notice of judgment. The court concluded Father met the procedural requirements for a restricted appeal, found his briefing on several points inadequate, and determined nothing in the record showed error on its face; therefore the trial court’s default final order was affirmed.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed an attempted appeal in a child-support modification case for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant filed a notice of appeal after the trial court had entered and then vacated an order dismissing his motion and granted a new trial date; no final, signed order was in the clerk’s record. The appellate court warned the appellant to show cause and to file any supplemental clerk’s record by a deadline, but the appellant did not respond. Because there was no final judgment or appealable order, the court dismissed the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights to four children. The Department had filed for termination after repeated removals tied to Mother’s chronic methamphetamine use and related instability, including leaving a child in a home with a person against whom a protective order had been obtained. The appellate court found the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support statutory grounds (D) and (E) — that Mother’s conduct and the children’s environment endangered their physical and emotional well‑being — and also held termination was in the children’s best interests based on the children’s repeated disruptions, their expressed desire to remain with relatives, and the relatives’ ability to provide permanency.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed appellant A.C.'s attempted appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A.C., proceeding pro se, filed an application for a protective order and appealed after the trial court orally denied relief; the court later signed an order denying a temporary protective order and modifying visitation. Because A.C. acknowledged that related proceedings (a foreign custody/support registration from Ohio and a suit affecting the parent-child relationship) remain pending, the appellate court concluded the order was interlocutory and not immediately appealable under Texas law, and A.C. did not respond to a show-cause order.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Kyle Ramsey’s direct appeal of a twelve-month protective order granted to Kristina Ramsey under Georgia’s Family Violence Act for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that appeals in domestic relations and Family Violence Act matters must be pursued by filing an application for discretionary appeal in the appellate court rather than by a trial-court notice of appeal. Because Kyle did not follow the mandatory discretionary-appeal procedure, the Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s orders placing N.D. in the permanent custody of Summit County Children Services Board (CSB) and placing K.D. in the legal custody of the parents of her friend. The appeals came after contested juvenile proceedings in which the children were adjudicated abused and dependent due to Father’s physical and verbal mistreatment and Mother’s long absence and history of untreated mental illness/substance abuse. The appellate court held CSB proved an alternative statutory ground that the child could not be placed with either parent and found the placements were in the children’s best interests given parental noncompliance and the children’s expressed wishes.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order terminating the father’s parental rights to his six-year-old son, Z.A.A., and leaving the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) as sole managing conservator. DFPS sought termination so the child’s maternal great-grandfather, who had provided long-term stable care and planned to adopt, could become permanent conservator. The court found by clear-and-convincing evidence that DFPS made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with father and that termination was in the child’s best interest given father’s repeated incarcerations, criminal history, lack of contact, and the child’s improved stability in the great-grandfather’s home.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an Application for Discretionary Appeal filed by Tyrone Pinkston, Sr. in case number A26D0449 arising from LC number 25DR02094 and denied the application on April 14, 2026. The court issued a brief administrative order without opinion, simply stating that the request for discretionary review is denied. No substantive reasoning or discussion of the underlying family-law dispute is provided in the order.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Perry County Domestic Relations Court’s ruling that the pending divorce action abated when the husband (plaintiff) died before any adjudication on the merits. The couple originally filed for dissolution with a separation agreement, the matter was converted to divorce, but no evidentiary hearing or decree occurred before the husband’s death. Because no judicial decision existed that could be journalized after death, the appeals court held the trial court lacked authority to continue the divorce and properly closed the case.

The Court of Appeals granted appellant Yousif H. Alazzawi’s motion for a new trial after finding that a significant and necessary portion of the reporter’s record was lost or rendered unusable without his fault. The missing material consists primarily of English translations of testimony given in Arabic that the court reporter could not transcribe from Zoom recordings. Because the missing portions are necessary to resolve Alazzawi’s appeal of the divorce decree and the protective order, and the parties could not agree on replacements, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded both the divorce decree and the protective order for a new trial.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Tyler Hernandez's appeal from a trial court's Final Decree of Divorce for want of prosecution. The clerk's record was due but not filed because Hernandez failed to arrange payment; the court directed him to pay by a deadline and warned the appeal would be dismissed if he did not. He failed to comply or to elect filing an appendix instead, so the appellate court dismissed the appeal under the appellate rules permitting dismissal for failure to prosecute.

The court issued a memorandum order in an appeal from a trial court’s termination of J.H.’s parental rights to R.D. because the court reporter failed to file the reporter’s record by the due date. Noting lack of communication from the reporter, the appellate court abated the appeal and remanded to the trial court to determine what remains to complete the record, why it is incomplete, how much time is needed, and whether a substitute reporter is required. The trial court must enter orders, include findings in a supplemental clerk’s record, and file that record by April 23, 2026, unless the reporter files the record first.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Kreslyn Barron Odum’s application for discretionary appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of her motion to set aside an order requiring her to pay half of a guardian ad litem’s fees. The court held it lacked jurisdiction because the underlying custody case remains pending and the order is interlocutory. Odum failed to follow interlocutory appeal procedures, including obtaining a certificate of immediate review from the trial court, so the discretionary-appeal process could not cure that jurisdictional defect.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for discretionary appeal filed by Stephen Arthur Vance from a domestic-relations case (LC No. 24V0055). After review, the court denied the application for discretionary appeal on April 13, 2026. The order is a short procedural ruling and does not address the merits of the underlying dispute; it simply declines to grant permission for the case to proceed to the Court of Appeals for full appellate review.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Husband’s direct appeal from a final divorce judgment for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that appeals in divorce and related domestic relations matters must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review under OCGA § 5-6-35, and that compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional. Because Husband did not follow the required discretionary-appeal procedure, the Court of Appeals concluded it could not consider the appeal and dismissed the case.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's grant of permanent custody of John to the Butler County Department of Jobs and Family Services. Mother appealed, arguing the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that her trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to place John with a relative. The court found Mother had abandoned John by failing to maintain contact for more than 90 days and previously lost custody of a sibling, facts that relieved the Agency of reunification obligations and supported a permanent-custody award. The court held Mother's subsequent rehabilitation was insufficient to overcome those statutory factors.

The Ohio appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s July 3, 2025 order granting Allen County Children Services Board permanent custody of J.H., a child born in August 2023. The Agency originally removed J.H. at birth after the mother tested positive for multiple controlled substances and the child suffered withdrawal; J.H. remained in Agency care for over a year. The court found clear and convincing evidence that reunification was not likely within a reasonable time, that J.H. was bonded to his foster family, and that permanent custody was in the child’s best interest. The mother’s request for a short extension to obtain housing was denied as an abuse of discretion did not occur.

The First District Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court’s final decree terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to four minor children. The parents argued lack of jurisdiction due to timing and challenged the sufficiency of evidence on reasonable efforts, predicate grounds, and best interest. The appellate court held the earlier trial commencement was not a sham, so jurisdiction was proper. The court found clear-and-convincing evidence that both parents engaged in conduct and allowed conditions that endangered the children (Family Code §161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)) and that termination served the children’s best interests given parental substance abuse, violence, instability, probation violations, incarceration, and the children’s special needs.

The Court of Appeals of the Eighth District of Texas affirmed a trial court judgment that terminated the father's parental rights to his child, J.K.C. After a bench trial the trial court found termination was in the child's best interest and that the Department of Family and Protective Services proved grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (N). Appellate counsel reviewed the record under Anders procedures and the court conducted an independent review, finding no non-frivolous issues to support reversal. The court also denied counsel's motion to withdraw, preserving the father's right to appointed counsel through further review.

The Ohio Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the Montgomery County trial court's ruling overruling Jonathan Search's objections to a magistrate's decision about parenting time and medical-expense accounting. Father had sought contempt findings, enforcement, and suspension of child support, and filed a self-prepared transcript with his objections. The appellate court held the parenting-time claims moot because the child reached age 18 before the trial court ruled, found no reversible error in the trial court rejecting the uncertified transcript and adopting the magistrate's findings, and determined the dismissal without prejudice of the medical-expense claim left no final order for appeal.

The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the Miami County Common Pleas Court's adoption of a magistrate’s decision that denied Latrisha McGhee’s post-decree motions concerning child custody, visitation, and related relief, and that suspended her parenting time. The appellate court held the appeal despite McGhee proceeding pro se, finding her appellate brief failed to comply with Ohio Appellate Rule 16 and did not present coherent arguments showing trial-court error. Because meaningful review was impossible, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment adopting the magistrate’s decision.

The Texas court of appeals affirmed a trial court order terminating S.A.’s parental rights to her infant daughter, B.G.A.Y. The Department of Family and Protective Services removed the child after she tested positive for opioids and methadone at birth and after evidence of parental heroin and cocaine use. At trial the caseworker testified S.A. failed to complete treatment, had sporadic contact with the Department, did not visit during conservatorship, and did not submit to drug testing. The court found statutory grounds for termination and concluded termination was in the child’s best interest, given the parents’ substance abuse and the child’s stable foster placement with prospective adoptive caregivers.

The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a Texas divorce suit after the trial court recognized a prior Mexican divorce decree. The ex-husband filed the Mexican no-fault divorce and later presented the Mexican trial and appellate judgments in Texas, arguing the Texas court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the parties were no longer married. The Texas appellate court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving comity to the Mexican judgment, concluding the Mexican appellate court’s affirmation meant no valid marriage existed for a Texas court to dissolve, so dismissal was proper.

The Court of Appeals affirmed most of a trial court’s April 19, 2024 agreed order in a suit to modify the parent–child relationship between Russell Lerner and Geraldine Schott, but removed a requirement that Lerner post a $25,000 bond before filing any future pleadings. The court held Lerner cannot appeal terms he expressly agreed to at the April 9, 2024 hearing (such as lifting geographic restrictions, dismissal of pending motions, child-support and fee provisions), and he waived claims about findings of fact and docket management. The bond requirement was improper because the court never followed Texas statutory procedures for declaring a party a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to two children, Timothy (11) and Richard (5), and appointing the Department of Family and Protective Services as permanent managing conservator. The parents raised multiple challenges, including untimely trial, insufficiency of evidence on best interest and statutory predicate grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel, and a constitutional strict-scrutiny claim. The court found the trial was timely, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support termination and best-interest findings, Father received effective counsel, and existing procedural and substantive protections were adequate to address his constitutional complaint.

The First Court of Appeals denied a pro se petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Ryen Michelle Staggers seeking to vacate and stay enforcement of a March 27, 2026 temporary order from a Harris County family-court case. The appellate court concluded Staggers failed to provide the mandatory mandamus record or appendix that includes a certified copy of the challenged trial court order, as required by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because the court could not review the order, it found she had not shown entitlement to mandamus relief and therefore denied the petition and dismissed pending motions as moot.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals granted mandamus relief to Meredith Johnson (Mother) after the trial court denied her motion to compel the production of the father’s federal income tax returns for the past two years in a child-support case. The appeals court held that Family Code § 154.063 requires parties in child-support proceedings to produce two years of tax returns and other financial information, the returns are relevant to determining net resources and above-guideline support, and the trial court’s denial was a clear abuse of discretion. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion and to compel production of the tax returns.