Court Filings

The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Tamer F. Morsi on April 23, 2026, challenging proceedings in a Bexar County district court case. The appellate court held that Morsi did not show the trial court clearly abused its discretion or violated a duty imposed by law, nor that he lacked an adequate appellate remedy. Because the petition failed to meet the high standard for extraordinary relief, the court denied the mandamus petition and found the request for temporary relief moot.

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal summarily affirmed a lower-court judgment in a case brought by appellant Teryleisha Wright against Ricky D. Dixon, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections. The appeal arises from a Palm Beach County circuit court matter (case no. 502025CA006838XXXAMB). The appellate court issued a short per curiam decision simply stating "Affirmed" without issuing a written opinion explaining its reasoning, and noted the decision is not final until any timely motion for rehearing is resolved.

The Florida Supreme Court denied pro se petitioner Armando Arce’s mandamus request to remove Chief Judge Timothy D. Osterhaus’s circuit judge Jennie Kinsey from administrative supervision of First Judicial Circuit cases. The Court found Arce’s filings were frivolous attempts to circumvent prior denials and recusal efforts related to two Okaloosa County domestic-relations cases, and it imposed a filing restriction: the Clerk must reject any future filings by Arce concerning those two case numbers unless signed by a licensed Florida lawyer. The Court expressly retained jurisdiction earlier and declined motions for rehearing.

The Texas court denied the relator's petition for a writ of mandamus and all related emergency and ancillary requests. The court considered the petition, an emergency motion for temporary relief, the State's response, a motion to amend the petition, and a motion for transcript, and concluded none warranted relief. The court also lifted its prior stay of trial-court proceedings, allowing the underlying criminal case to proceed in the trial court.

The Court of Appeals denied Morgan Alyse Foster's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a probate court order about control and disposition of a decedent's remains and dismissed her emergency request to stay that order as moot. Foster had sought to prohibit cremation and preserve the remains pending appellate review, but the opposing party asserted the cremation had already occurred before the petition was filed. Because the emergency relief sought was moot, the court declined to grant mandamus and denied the request for costs and attorney's fees by the real party in interest.

The court dismissed a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by David Disraeli challenging a justice court’s refusal to enforce an arbitration clause. The Third Court of Appeals concluded it lacks jurisdiction to issue mandamus against a justice of the peace or justice court unless issuance is necessary to preserve the appellate court’s jurisdiction, and the relator did not show that necessity. Because the jurisdictional prerequisite was not met, the court dismissed the mandamus petition and all pending motions as moot.

The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio denied Barbara Ann Johnson’s petition for a writ of mandamus filed April 8, 2026. The court reviewed the petition and record and concluded Johnson did not meet the standards required for mandamus relief under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The opinion is brief, states the denial without extended discussion, and notes the underlying case is pending in the 131st Judicial District Court of Bexar County before Judge Nicole Garza.

The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio granted a joint motion to dismiss and dismissed a petition for writ of mandamus filed by Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon Logistics, Inc., Amazon Flex, and Amazon.com Services, LLC. The petition was originally filed March 10, 2026, and the court had set an April 7, 2026 deadline for responses. After the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss, the court granted the motion under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and dismissed the mandamus proceeding. No merits decision was reached.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s award of legal custody of two-year-old D.W. to the child’s paternal grandmother and her partner. The juvenile court had previously adjudicated D.W. dependent and placed the child in temporary custody after concerns about Mother’s methamphetamine use, unstable housing, and association with a drug-using boyfriend. The appellate court found the record shows Mother failed to comply with her case plan (substance use and mental health treatment, drug screens, and housing stability), while custodians provided a stable, supportive home and facilitated parental visitation. The court concluded the award was supported by the greater weight of the evidence and was in the child’s best interest.

The Appellate Division affirmed a Supreme Court order that authorized involuntary administration of psychotropic medication to Thomas B., an involuntarily committed patient who denied having a mental illness. The court reviewed a petition brought by the State and held that the petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Thomas B. lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision about treatment and that the proposed medication was narrowly tailored to protect his liberty interest. The court deferred to the hearing court’s factual findings, including the treating psychiatrist’s testimony diagnosing schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder with violent symptoms.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied Elizabeth Weston's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a trial-court matter originating in Comal County. The opinion is a brief memorandum order disposing of the original proceeding and denying the requested extraordinary relief under the appellate rules. No extended reasoning or factual discussion is provided in the published entry; the court issued the denial and cited the appellate rule governing disposition of such petitions.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, El Paso) denied Andrew Silva's petition for a writ of mandamus and his emergency motion for temporary relief. Silva sought to stop a county-constable eviction after a writ of possession issued, arguing the eviction turned on a bona fide title dispute and that a Rule 736 order was given improper preclusive effect. The court held Silva failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7(a) by filing a two-page letter without required headings, record, certification, or legal citations, and therefore could not meaningfully review his conclusory claims. Because Silva did not show entitlement to extraordinary relief, the petition was denied and the emergency motion denied as moot.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) considered Justin Randall Jones’s petition for a writ of mandamus and an emergency motion to stay a Denton County district court matter. After review, the court denied both the petition for mandamus and the emergency motion to stay. The memorandum opinion is per curiam and provides no extended reasoning or discussion of the merits; it simply states that relief is denied and the motions are dismissed on April 21, 2026.

The Texas Second Court of Appeals considered Harold Dammon McCray’s original petition for a writ of mandamus and his request for emergency temporary relief arising from a proceeding in the County Court at Law of Cooke County. The appellate court reviewed the filings and denied both the petition for mandamus and the emergency temporary relief. The court issued a brief per curiam memorandum opinion without publishing extended reasoning, delivering its decision on April 21, 2026.

The Texas Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) considered a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by A.Y. seeking relief from an order of the 271st District Court of Wise County (trial court No. CV25-03-218). After review, the appellate court denied the petition and refused to grant mandamus relief. The memorandum opinion is per curiam and does not elaborate the reasoning beyond the denial; the court simply announces that relief is denied and issues no written opinion expanding on its conclusion.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted an application for interlocutory appeal filed by the Fulton County District Attorney's Office in the matter styled In re Fulton County District Attorney's Office v. Donald John Trump et al. The court ordered that the appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the order and directed the Clerk of Superior Court to include a copy of this order in the record sent to the Court of Appeals. This is an administrative order certifying that the interlocutory appeal is permitted and outlining next procedural steps.

The Georgia Supreme Court accepted attorney Leonard Richard Medley, III’s petition for voluntary surrender of his law license after he pled guilty in federal court to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud (a felony). Medley admitted his conviction violated the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and asked the Court to accept surrender of his license, which is equivalent to disbarment. The Court reviewed the Special Master’s recommendation, noted no exceptions were filed, relied on precedent treating felony financial-crime convictions as warranting disbarment, and removed Medley from the roll of attorneys licensed in Georgia.

The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed a disciplinary proceeding charging attorney Darryl J. Ferguson with violating parts of Rule 1.15(I) for failing to protect a chiropractor’s asserted interest in two clients’ settlement proceeds. The Review Board had recommended a 60-day suspension conditioned on restitution, but the Court concluded the Bar did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Ferguson violated Rule 1.15(I)(b), (c), or (d). The Court held that Ferguson reasonably could conclude the chiropractor’s form was an unperfected lien or attempt at a statutory lien that he could disregard under Rule 1.15(I)(b), and therefore no discipline was imposed and the matter was dismissed.

The court reversed a juvenile delinquency judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The juvenile, D.W.R., had been adjudicated for gross sexual imposition and sexual imposition based principally on testimony from a developmentally disabled adult, N.O. The state moved to dismiss the appeal as moot after community supervision ended; the court denied that motion because the adjudication still carries a firearms disability. The court concluded N.O. was incompetent to testify because he lacked a basic understanding of truth, so admitting his testimony was prejudicial. Because the evidence (including the admitted testimony) was nonetheless sufficient, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with law.

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Twelfth District Court of Appeals’ dismissal of Ramone Wright’s mandamus petition asking the Madison County Municipal Court to vacate a prior traffic conviction. Wright argued he could not have committed the traffic offense because he was allegedly jailed on another matter at the time, and said his time to appeal had passed. The Supreme Court held Wright had an adequate remedy at law—direct appeal or postconviction procedures—and therefore mandamus was not available. The municipal court’s motion to dismiss the appeal was denied as procedurally improper but its brief was considered on the merits.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed (quashed) Ajani Posey’s appeal because the Commonwealth Court’s order was not final or immediately appealable. The court relied on Pennsylvania appellate procedure rules defining final orders and explaining limits on appeals from certain interlocutory orders, including transfer orders under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103. Because the challenged order did not meet the rules for an appeal as of right, the Supreme Court ended the case without addressing the underlying merits.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court quashed Ajani Posey’s notice of appeal on April 21, 2026, because the Commonwealth Court’s order was not final or immediately appealable. The court concluded the appealed order did not meet the state rules' definition of a final order and noted that certain interlocutory transfer orders are not appealable as of right. Consequently, the appeal cannot proceed in the Supreme Court at this time.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Surrogate's Court order denying objectant Michael Marino’s motion for summary judgment challenging executor Janet Marino Gerlach’s accountings for two accounting periods. The court held objectants failed to prove, as a matter of law, that Gerlach’s decisions caused financial loss, that she overpaid herself fees, or that she failed to withhold estate tax to certain beneficiaries. The court found triable issues of fact based on Gerlach’s investment strategy, will provisions granting broad discretion, competing expert opinions on fees, and an attorney affidavit about tax withholding, so summary judgment was inappropriate.

The Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's denial of Mother's petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking return of four children removed to protective custody. The children were adjudicated in juvenile court after a May 31, 2023 shelter-care removal; Mother later revoked consent to a proposed legal custody transfer and pursued various postjudgment motions and appeals. The juvenile court denied habeas relief because Mother had an adequate remedy at law (a motion for further disposition and appeals) and the lack of notice of the initial shelter-care hearing did not strip the juvenile court of jurisdiction. The appellate court found no reversible error.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal reviewed an appeal by a child identified as H.H.E. from a decision of the Circuit Court for Jackson County. The appellate court issued a short per curiam opinion on April 20, 2026, summarily affirming the lower court's judgment. No written opinion explaining the court's reasoning was published; the decision states only “AFFIRMED” with all three judges concurring. The ruling ends this appeal unless a timely motion for rehearing or other authorized relief is filed.

The Court of Appeals (First District of Texas) denied a petition for writ of mandamus filed April 16, 2026 by Latonya Shand and Renford D. Balfour. The relators asked the court to compel the district court to rule on their combined motion for new trial, stay of judgment, and waiver of bond (allegedly filed March 27, 2026 and heard April 14, 2026). They also sought an emergency stay of execution and foreclosure proceedings in the underlying Harris County case. The court denied the mandamus petition and all related emergency relief.

The Texas Sixth Court of Appeals denied Brian Keith Melton’s petition for a writ of mandamus asking the Hunt County trial judge to rule on his motion to dismiss counsel. The court explained that mandamus requires showing no adequate remedy at law, a ministerial duty by the trial court, and a sufficient record. Melton failed to provide certified copies of his motion or a request for a ruling as required by the appellate rules, and he offered no authority showing that the trial court’s roughly thirty-day delay was unreasonable. For those reasons the petition was denied.

The Ohio Supreme Court accepted the resignation of attorney David Paul Greulich Jr. under the rule for resignation when disciplinary action is pending. The court treated the filing as a resignation with disciplinary action pending and ordered that Greulich be immediately prohibited from practicing law in Ohio, surrender his admission certificate, and have his name stricken from the roll. The court also imposed post-resignation obligations: notify clients and opposing counsel, deliver client files, refund unearned fees, refrain from handling client funds, reimburse the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection if applicable, and file proof of compliance with the court and disciplinary counsel.

The Second District Court of Appeal reviewed a pro se appeal by Monika Margarethe Shirley from an order of the Sarasota County Circuit Court. The appellate court, in a brief per curiam decision, affirmed the lower court's ruling. No written opinion explaining the court's reasoning was published beyond the single-word disposition, and no appellee participated in the appeal. The panel of judges Silberman, Morris, and Black concurred in the affirmance.

The Florida Second District Court of Appeal denied Spiros C. Paizes's petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a Hillsborough County circuit court decision. The petition was considered on its merits and the appellate court, in a brief per curiam order, concluded relief was not warranted and denied the petition. All three judges concurred. No additional reasoning or detailed factual background was provided in the published entry.