Court Filings

The Sixth District Court of Appeal granted the Department of Revenue’s motion to dismiss an appeal by Adrelynn Shattell Thomas for lack of jurisdiction. Thomas, the obligee parent, attempted to directly appeal a final administrative paternity and support order entered February 10, 2026. The court followed White v. Department of Revenue and concluded Florida law (section 409.2563 read with chapter 120) authorizes direct appellate review only to the obligor parent and the Department in these administrative support proceedings, not to an obligee parent. Because Thomas lacked statutory standing to invoke direct review, the appeal was dismissed.

The District Court of Appeal, Second District, dismissed Denice Ranee Reavely’s appeal from a Hillsborough County Court decision. The filing shows the case was before a three-judge panel, and the court’s one-line per curiam disposition simply states “Dismissed.” No reasoning, factual background, or legal analysis appears in the published entry, and the opinion is marked subject to revision before official publication.

The court dismissed relator Atravion Preston’s mandamus action seeking public records from the Lorain Correctional Institution and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. The magistrate concluded, and the court adopted that recommendation, that Preston failed to file with his complaint the written affirmation required by amended R.C. 149.43(C)(2). Because the statute mandates dismissal if that affirmation is not filed, the court granted respondents’ motion to dismiss, denied as moot the motion to strike, and dismissed the action without reaching the merits or statutory-damages arguments.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District, issued an order on April 30, 2026, quashing Pedro Luis Gavilan-Cruz’s Notice of Appeal. The court relied on Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 910(a)(5), indicating that the appeal did not comply with the requirement that only the questions in the jurisdictional statement (or those fairly comprised therein) will ordinarily be considered. As a result, the court declined to consider the appeal and dismissed the appeal process by quashing the notice.

The First Department dismissed an appeal by defendant-appellant Danielle Statuto from a Supreme Court order that denied her CPLR 2221(d) motion for leave to reargue. The appellate court held the order denying reargument is not appealable as of right and declined to treat her notice of appeal as a motion for leave to appeal. The court cited precedent and distinguished circumstances where a notice may be converted into a leave application, finding no extraordinary circumstances here, and therefore dismissed the appeal as taken from a nonappealable paper.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals dismissed Woodforest National Bank's appeal from a final judgment because the bank failed to pay required filing fees and failed to arrange or pay for the clerk's record. The court repeatedly notified the appellant, sent invoices and a certified bill of costs, and warned the appeal would be dismissed if fees were not paid or arrangements made. The appellant did not respond or show indigency, so the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the applicable appellate rules.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Wayne Bridges’s application for discretionary review of a DeKalb County Magistrate Court dispossessory judgment because the court lacked jurisdiction. Georgia law requires that appeals from magistrate court dispossessory judgments be filed within seven days; Bridges filed his application 33 days after the magistrate court’s March 6, 2026 judgment. Because the statutory appeal period expired, the Court declined to transfer the matter to the state or superior court and dismissed the application as untimely.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Steven Donald Lemery’s appeal from the trial court’s February 10, 2026 denial of his extraordinary motion for new trial. The court found it lacked jurisdiction because Lemery’s notice of appeal was filed 41 days after the order and therefore untimely under OCGA § 5-6-38(a), and because appeals from denials of extraordinary motions for new trial must proceed by discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(7). Because both timeliness and the required procedural route were lacking, the Court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Madelene Kinsler’s direct appeal from a superior court judgment favoring BW Links Owner, LLC in a dispossessory proceeding because Kinsler did not follow the mandatory discretionary-appeal procedure for superior-court reviews of magistrate-court orders. The court explained that under Georgia law an application for discretionary appeal is required and that compliance is jurisdictional, so the Court of Appeals lacked authority to consider the merits and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Keola Pasteure’s appeal of a trial-court summary judgment in favor of State Farm Fire and Casualty Company because the notice of appeal was filed more than eight months after the July 2025 order. Under Georgia law, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order. Because Pasteure did not file within that statutory period, the Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the defendants' direct appeal in a dispossessory (eviction) matter for lack of jurisdiction. Realistry Acquisitions obtained de novo judgment and a writ of possession in superior court after the magistrate court dismissed the case. The defendants filed post-judgment motions that were denied, then filed a notice of appeal 15 days after entry of the superior court judgment. The Court of Appeals found the appeal defective because the defendants should have used discretionary-appeal procedures for de novo superior-court review and because the notice of appeal was untimely under the seven-day deadline for dispossessory appeals.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Elizabeth Jordan’s pro se appeal from a September 11, 2025 trial-court order concerning contempt and attorney-fee rulings because Jordan was still represented by counsel when she filed her notice of appeal. The court explained that a litigant cannot both proceed pro se and be represented by an attorney, and that a counsel withdrawal must be ordered by the trial court before a pro se filing can be effective. Because Jordan’s pro se notice of appeal was therefore a nullity, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed a direct appeal by Tyrone Eric Taylor-Shorter challenging a trial court’s orders in a child support action brought by the Georgia Department of Human Services. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because appeals in domestic relations matters, including actions to establish parental support obligations, must be pursued by discretionary application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2). Because Taylor-Shorter did not follow the discretionary-appeal procedure, the court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits of his challenges.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Sonya Chandler Anderson's appeal for failure to prosecute. The appellant did not comply with the Court's notice of docketing or Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) requiring an enumeration of errors and brief within twenty days of docketing, nor with a subsequent order to file those documents by April 27, 2026. Because the required filings were not received, the court deemed the appeal abandoned and ordered it dismissed under applicable Court of Appeals rules.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Sandra Capouch’s appeal from a trial court order that granted defendants’ motion to open default and motion to dismiss. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because Capouch filed her notice of appeal 34 days after the trial court’s October 29, 2025 order, but Georgia law requires a notice of appeal within 30 days. The court relied on the filing deadline statute and precedent holding timely filing is an absolute jurisdictional requirement, and it accepted the clerk’s endorsement as the operative filing date.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Jerome Locke’s appeal challenging the trial court’s dismissal of his 2024 request for credit for time served. Locke had pled guilty in 2018 and was sentenced to 20 years with 12 to be served in confinement. The trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because the Department of Corrections computes credit under OCGA § 17-10-12. The Court of Appeals held the appeal improper because the correct remedy is a mandamus action against prison officials; a motion filed in the criminal case is a nullity and not appealable.

The First District Court of Appeals dismissed Charles Greenlee’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Greenlee, a pro se incarcerated litigant, had sought relief under Civ.R. 60(B) from a March 3, 2025 trial-court dismissal of his claims against Walmart, arguing his amended complaint should have been deemed filed earlier under the prison-mailbox rule. The appeals court held the March 3 dismissal was not a final order because it left claims against municipal defendants pending and did not include a Civ.R. 54(B)/54(B)/no-just-reason-for-delay certification; therefore the trial court’s April 24 denial of his motion was not appealable.

The Appellate Division, Second Department dismissed a CPLR article 78 proceeding brought by Simon Kinsella challenging a March 18, 2021 Public Service Commission determination that granted South Fork Wind, LLC a certificate for an offshore submarine export cable. The court granted motions by the Commission, Department of Public Service, and South Fork Wind to dismiss because the petitioner failed to timely join South Fork as a necessary party within the 30-day limitations period following the Commission’s final order. Because the defect was jurisdictional under the governing statute and precedent, the court dismissed the proceeding without costs.

The Appellate Division dismissed an appeal from a Family Court order that granted the respondent's unopposed motion to dismiss a Family Court Act article 8 petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Family Court concluded the parties did not have an intimate relationship under Family Court Act § 812(1)(e). Because the dismissal order was entered after the petitioner defaulted and CPLR 5511 bars appeals entered on a default, the Second Department held the petitioner must first move to vacate the default before seeking review, so the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Seventh District Court of Appeals dismissed Zenayda Guadalupe Portillo-Rodriguez’s appeal from a Potter County district court judgment because she failed to pay the required appellate filing fee and did not seek to proceed without payment. The Clerk notified her of the overdue fee and gave a deadline of April 13, 2026, but she took no action. Relying on the court’s appellate rules and the Clerk’s notice requirement, the court concluded dismissal was appropriate for noncompliance and entered a per curiam dismissal on April 29, 2026.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas granted the appellant's unopposed motion to voluntarily dismiss his appeal of a trial court order adjudicating him guilty of theft of a firearm and sentencing him to seven months confinement. The motion complied with the appellate rule requiring signature by both the appellant and his attorney. Because no opinion had been issued in the case, the court dismissed the appeal, denied any rehearing motions, and directed that the court's mandate issue immediately.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas dismissed an unopposed voluntary motion by appellant D.E.P. to dismiss an appeal from a final order in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (child referred to by initials). The court found the motion complied with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1), that granting dismissal would not prejudice any party, and no appellate decision had been issued. The court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal, declined to entertain a rehearing motion, and ordered issuance of its mandate immediately.

The Second District Court of Appeal dismissed J. Stanford Lifsey’s petition for writ of certiorari as moot. The court concluded that changed circumstances meant it could not provide any effective relief, citing precedent that moot appeals must be dismissed. The petition had sought review of a circuit court decision, but because subsequent events eliminated the possibility of judicial relief, the appeal was terminated without reaching the merits.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Troy Rimes's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Rimes was convicted after a jury trial and the trial court denied his motion for a new trial on August 17, 2023. After Rimes moved for an out-of-time appeal, the trial court vacated and re-entered its denial order on January 26, 2026. Rimes filed a notice of appeal on March 31, 2026, but because Georgia law requires a notice of appeal within 30 days of the order's entry and his notice was filed 64 days after re-entry, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Nichelle Taylor’s direct appeal from the trial court’s denial of her motion to set aside a final judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60(d). The court held it lacked jurisdiction because appeals from denials of such motions must be pursued by application for a discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(8), (b), and Georgia precedent makes that process jurisdictional. Because Taylor filed a direct appeal instead of seeking discretionary review, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on April 28, 2026.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ashlee Mock’s application for interlocutory review of the trial court’s order striking her answer in a civil forfeiture case because the application was filed late. The trial court struck Mock’s answer on January 7, 2026, and issued a certificate of immediate review on January 20, 2026. Mock filed her application in this Court 28 days after that certificate, but Georgia law requires an application be filed within ten days of the certificate. Because the timeliness requirement is jurisdictional, the court had to dismiss the untimely application.

The Court of Appeals dismissed a direct appeal by Robert Stafford and Icon Studios, LLC because the Court previously denied their application for discretionary appeal and that denial constituted an adjudication on the merits, barring a second direct appeal. The case arose after Heritage purchased property at foreclosure, obtained a writ of possession in magistrate court, and brought a dispossessory action; Icon and Stafford sought superior-court review but the superior court dismissed the petition and Stafford’s motion to join. The Court held that the prior denial precludes relitigation and thus the court lacks jurisdiction to hear this direct appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Gary D. James's appeal for failure to file his brief and enumerations of error by the deadline set under Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) and a subsequent court order. The court had given James until 4:30 P.M. on April 27, 2026, to file the required materials and warned that failure to comply would result in dismissal. Because James did not comply, the court dismissed the appeal and cited Tolbert v. Tolbert as authority supporting dismissal for noncompliance with appellate deadlines.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal by William Martin, independent executor, from a trial-court order that required co-executor Steven Martin to resign or be removed. The appellate court found the appeal moot because Steven formally resigned after the order was entered, so reversing the order would have no practical effect on Steven’s status or estate administration. The court therefore declined to address the parties’ standing and procedural arguments and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The State of Texas, as appellant, moved to dismiss its own appeal in a criminal case from the County Court at Law No. 9 of Travis County. The motion to dismiss was signed by the Travis County Attorney and filed under the applicable Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals granted the State’s motion and dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a short memorandum decision, noting the procedural compliance with the rule and disposing of the appeal accordingly.