Court Filings

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s temporary injunction that had blocked the Texas Department of State Health Services from treating manufactured delta-8 THC products as Schedule I controlled substances. The Department and its commissioner had amended Schedule I definitions after objecting to a federal rule; the Court held those amendments were within the commissioner’s broad, statutorily granted discretion and did not conflict unambiguously with the 2019 Texas Farm Bill. The Court also held the Administrative Procedure Act did not govern publication of schedule changes, and that sovereign immunity bars the vendors’ claims.

The Texas Supreme Court held that when a party uses the pretrial affidavit process in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.001 to prove medical expenses, only those specific items or charges that are actually controverted by a compliant counteraffidavit lose the statute’s evidentiary effect. Unchallenged portions of an initial affidavit remain competent evidence and may be submitted to the factfinder. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded because the trial court erred by excluding entire medical-cost affidavits and counteraffidavits even though only portions were controverted, which deprived the claimant of admissible evidence of certain medical expenses.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a plea to the jurisdiction and rendered judgment for county officials. Plaintiff Nelson sought mandamus and declaratory relief to force Polk County officials to assign 911 addresses and a street name for lots in his subdivision, claiming a statutory exemption from platting and that officials acted unlawfully. The appellate court held Nelson failed to plead or prove he submitted the required plat, exemption request, or addressing application (or that officials denied one), so he did not show officials failed to perform any ministerial duty. Because governmental immunity was not waived, the court dismissed his claims.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default judgment entered against Access Dental Management, LLC (ADM) in favor of June’s Boutique, LLC. June attempted service on ADM by first trying the named agent at a Dallas address, then seeking substitute service via the Texas Secretary of State. The court held the record did not demonstrate ADM’s registered agent or registered address matched the Dallas address used for service, and the Secretary of State’s certificate did not establish the forwarding address required by statute. Because strict service requirements were not met, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction and the default judgment is void.

The court reversed a jury verdict awarding noneconomic and exemplary damages to Candace Williams after finding that her malpractice claim was based solely on the emotional harms of an unplanned pregnancy that arose from a doctor’s failure to perform a tubal ligation. Relying on the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Noe v. Velasco (2024), the court held that pregnancy-related noneconomic harms (including mental anguish from deciding to terminate) are not legally compensable because pregnancy is inseparable from bringing about a child’s life. Because Williams offered no other compensable damages, the judgment was reversed and judgment rendered that she take nothing.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed Rae Neel’s suit against the City of Hurst for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Neel sued after tripping on an uneven section of public sidewalk and the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The appeals court held the sidewalk condition was not a “special defect” and, under the premises-defect standard, Neel’s own deposition showed she knew of the sidewalk’s condition before the fall, defeating her claim of lack of knowledge and preserving the City’s immunity.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and remanded. The dispute concerned interpretation and enforcement of a settlement agreement between M-I L.L.C. and Texas International Terminals (TXIT) about lease and materials-handling payments and removal of equipment. The trial court had added CPI-based price adjustments and ordered M-I to remove certain equipment, relying on extrinsic course-of-dealing evidence. The appellate court held the settlement language was unambiguous, forbade using extrinsic evidence to rewrite the agreement, and concluded the trial court improperly added and altered terms instead of enforcing the agreement as written.

The court reviewed an appeal by Y.S., who filed a petition to change her minor child’s name and a sworn Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs. The trial court ordered her to pay reduced costs of $400 after an interview with county staff, but did not hold a formal oral evidentiary hearing or make detailed findings required by Rule 145. The appellate court concluded the record contained uncontroverted evidence that Y.S. could not afford court costs, that the trial court failed to follow Rule 145 procedures, and therefore reversed the order and directed the trial court to allow Y.S. to proceed without paying costs or fees.

The First District of Texas reversed the trial court’s order that had halted an arbitration between Humphries Construction Corporation (HCC) and Highland Village-related entities, holding the trial court erred in finding HCC waived its contractual right to arbitrate by using the courts. The appellate court concluded, after reviewing the litigation and discovery conduct, that Highland Village failed to show HCC clearly intended to relinquish arbitration. The court denied Highland Village’s collateral requests for mandamus relief challenging denials of a protective order, motion to quash a third-party subpoena, and sanctions, finding no clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment for a law firm in a legal-malpractice suit. Plaintiff DePina sued the firm for failing to timely pursue property-damage claims against a railroad after repeated flooding of his land. The firm obtained summary judgment arguing the underlying nuisance was permanent and the statute of limitations had run before representation. The appellate court held the record did not show as a matter of law the nuisance was permanent because flooding was sporadic, contingent on heavy rain and culvert condition, and thus created fact issues for a jury. The case is remanded.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order that dissolved prejudgment writs of garnishment obtained by Texas Global Equity Fund XII (TGE) against 22 entities believed to owe money to Breckenridge Development 2019 (BD19). TGE had sued BD19 for unpaid loan principal and interest after BD19 failed to provide required financial reports, repay a prior Frost Bank loan as required, and cure defaults. The appeals court held TGE proved the statutory grounds for garnishment (the debt was liquidated, due and unpaid; BD19 lacked sufficient property to satisfy it; and the garnishment was not sought to injure BD19), and BD19 failed to prove extrinsic grounds to dissolve the writs. The court reinstated the writs and remanded for further proceedings.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and remanded, holding that the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) timely sought an Attorney General opinion under the Public Information Act. Sierra Club had requested a large set of records on July 1, 2019. TCEQ emailed July 2 seeking clarification whether Sierra Club wanted confidential material released or would accept a narrowed response; Sierra Club declined. The Court held the ten-business-day clock began on July 2, the interagency-mail “mailbox rule” made TCEQ’s July 17 submission timely, and therefore TCEQ did not miss the statutory deadline. The case returns to the trial court to decide the merits of TCEQ’s claimed deliberative-process withholding privilege.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for further consideration. The dispute arose from Platinum Construction’s suit against Copper Creek and Jose Escoffie for theft of services and related claims after key emails and accounting records were missing. The court of appeals had found the trial court’s spoliation jury instruction reversible error and ordered a new trial without first addressing other appellate issues that might have led to rendition. The Supreme Court held that appellate courts must first decide rendition issues and that the court of appeals’ harm analysis was insufficient.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered forfeiture of a 2007 Lincoln Navigator. The State sought forfeiture after R.C. Scott was arrested while driving the Navigator and later pled guilty to evading and third-or-more driving-while-intoxicated charges. The court held the State proved the vehicle was contraband under Chapter 59 because Scott had three prior DWI convictions and used the vehicle in a qualifying felony, and that Scott was an equitable owner despite the vehicle titled to his parents. Because Scott was an owner, the parents could not prevail on the innocent-owner defense.

The Court of Appeals reviewed James Chadleigh Schrotel’s conviction for misdemeanor assault causing bodily injury against a family member. The court upheld the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction but found reversible error in jury selection: a prospective juror (venireperson six) admitted a bias favoring victims of family violence and could not guarantee that bias would not affect his decision. The trial court denied the defendant’s challenge for cause and also denied an additional peremptory strike, resulting in an objectionable juror sitting. Because that denial was erroneous and harmful, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The Eleventh Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default judgment entered for Deere Credit against Unger Texas Stone, LP and Shelia Unger. The court held this was a restricted appeal and reviewed only the clerk’s record, finding that Shelia — a non-lawyer — timely filed a letter that, in substance, amounted to an answer both for herself and for the limited partnership. Because that filing constituted an appearance, the defendants were entitled to notice of Deere Credit’s motion for default judgment and an opportunity to be heard; the trial court signed the default judgment without providing such notice, producing error apparent on the face of the record.

The court reversed a trial-court order that denied the employer’s motion to compel arbitration and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration and stay the case. Josh Adams sued his former employer, The Bridge Strategy & Technology Consulting, LLC, for unpaid cash and phantom-stock commissions. Bridge moved to compel arbitration under an employment agreement clause that referenced wage-related statutes and the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court of Appeals held the arbitration clause was governed by the federal act, that the phrase “wages” reasonably includes commissions, and that the clause’s broad “arising from/relating to” language covers Adams’s claims.

The Court of Appeals reversed a trial-court order that granted a plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Cornelius Hudson’s survival-action suit filed on behalf of his deceased mother’s estate. Hudson had sued multiple transportation-related defendants for injuries his mother allegedly sustained before her death. The appellate court held Hudson’s petition sufficiently alleged that the decedent’s estate had standing to pursue the survival claim, and it explained that a plea to the jurisdiction is not the correct procedural vehicle to challenge a plaintiff’s capacity to sue. The case is remanded for further proceedings in the trial court.

The court denied the appellee’s motion for rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and issued a replacement opinion that reaches the same result: the Texas Department of Public Safety’s plea to the jurisdiction was sustained and the employee’s disability-discrimination and retaliation claims against DPS under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act were dismissed with prejudice. The court found Sanders failed to plead facts establishing a prima facie discrimination or retaliation claim (and thus failed to invoke the TCHRA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity). Because Sanders had multiple opportunities to amend and the defects were incurable, dismissal was proper.

The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the Texas Department of Public Safety lawfully terminated Texas Ranger Robert Christopher Callaway after an incident at his daughter’s high school in which he threatened counselors and other officers while carrying his badge, handcuffs, and a firearm. Callaway claimed his conduct was caused by PTSD and sued for disability discrimination under the Texas Labor Code. The Court held that Section 21.105 excludes from Chapter 21 protection disabilities that impair an individual’s ability to reasonably perform the job, and concluded Callaway’s PTSD objectively impaired his ability to perform DPS duties, so his discrimination claim fails as a matter of law.

The Texas Supreme Court decided that a 1984 pole-attachment contract between Spectrum (successor) and CPS Energy incorporates later-enacted statutory limits on pole-attachment rates. The Court held the agreement’s clear promise to “at all times observe and comply with . . . all laws” and that the contract is “subject to” such laws means legislative changes affecting the parties’ rights and obligations become enforceable under the contract. Because CPS charged and collected higher rates from Spectrum while collecting less from AT&T, Spectrum may pursue its breach-of-contract claim alleging violations of the Public Utility Regulatory Act. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded to the trial court.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated summary judgment for H-E-B in a slip-and-fall premises-liability case. The plaintiff slipped on a clear liquid puddle in a grocery aisle and sued H-E-B, alleging the store knew or should have known of the hazard. The Court held that to raise a fact issue on constructive notice a plaintiff must present some evidence about how long the dangerous condition existed at the time and place of injury. Because the record lacked any evidence on the puddle’s duration, H-E-B could not be charged with constructive knowledge and summary judgment was proper.

The Texas Supreme Court resolved a dispute over how to value a nonparticipating royalty reserved in a 1960 deed. The court held the deed’s phrase “produced from the above described acreage” fixes the valuation point at the wellhead, and the phrase “free of cost forever” refers only to exemption from exploration and production costs. Because the deed lacks language shifting valuation to processed, downstream sales or expressly adding postproduction costs to the royalty base, postproduction costs may be deducted from downstream proceeds to determine the value of the raw minerals at the well. The court reversed the court of appeals and rendered partial summary judgment for the operator, remanding for further proceedings consistent with that interpretation.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for ISI Contracting, Inc. in Robert Huber’s trespass suit arising from a TxDOT highway project adjacent to Huber’s restaurant. ISI had claimed immunity under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 97.002, arguing it complied with contract documents. The appellate court held ISI failed to conclusively prove every statutory element: Huber sought loss-of-use and lost-profit damages not barred by the statute, some alleged harms arose from ISI’s activities rather than a contract-related condition or defect, and ISI did not conclusively show compliance with contract documents material to any alleged condition or defect. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals reversed and rendered judgment for AZZ, Inc. in a breach-of-contract case. Southeast Texas Industries (STI) sued multiple AZZ entities for defective galvanizing and obtained a jury verdict and judgment against AZZ, Inc. for $4,539,468.25 plus fees and interest. On appeal AZZ, Inc. argued there was no evidence it was the entity that contracted with STI. The court held the evidence was legally insufficient to show AZZ, Inc. (rather than the Beaumont galvanizing entity) agreed to galvanize the pipe, so the verdict against AZZ, Inc. could not stand and STI takes nothing from AZZ, Inc.

The Tenth Appellate District of Texas reversed the trial court’s denial of Joseph Blair Brooks’ habeas corpus application seeking release under article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Brooks had been jailed more than 90 days awaiting trial on an indictment for solicitation of capital murder. The Court held article 17.151 mandates release—either by personal recognizance or by reducing bail to an amount the record shows the defendant can afford—when the statute’s prerequisites are met, and that the trial court abused its discretion by denying relief even though Brooks previously had a bail reduction and did not post bond.

The Court of Appeals reversed a post-answer default judgment awarding over $27 million to William Carrell and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was entered after appellants’ counsel withdrew days before trial and appellants did not appear. The court held appellants’ failure to appear was due to mistake or accident (not conscious indifference) because there was no reliable evidence appellants received actual notice of the trial setting after counsel’s withdrawal and substitute counsel lacked authority/adequate time to prepare. Because the lack of notice defeated the default, a new trial was required.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Esdras Pineda’s suit against his workers’ compensation carrier, National Specialty Insurance Company, and remanded for further proceedings. The trial court had granted the insurer’s plea to the jurisdiction, finding Pineda’s pro se petition did not show he exhausted administrative remedies or identify the appeals-panel decisions that aggrieved him. The appeals court held the defects in Pineda’s petition were curable because the insurer’s plea and attached evidence showed Pineda had appealed the administrative law judge’s decisions to the appeals panel and that the appeals panel allowed those decisions to become final, so Pineda should be allowed to amend his pleadings.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, Texas) reviewed sanctions entered against Genevieve Glasgow in a post-divorce civil case brought against her former husband. The court held the trial court abused its discretion in awarding monetary attorney’s fees because the evidence did not meet the required showing of reasonable and necessary fees, reversed the portion awarding fees, affirmed the remaining sanctions (including dismissal with prejudice of remaining claims), and remanded solely for redetermination of attorney’s fees. The court found the declarations and spreadsheets submitted did not detail particular services, who performed them, when, or the time reasonably required.

The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Progressive Direct Insurance Company’s special appearance and dismissed the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. The suit arose after a Washington resident insured by an Ohio-based, non-Texas-licensed insurer was injured in San Antonio and sued in Texas over denial of underinsured motorist benefits. The court held Progressive Direct lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Texas for either specific or general jurisdiction and that exercising jurisdiction would violate fair play and substantial justice, so Texas courts cannot constitutionally adjudicate the contract dispute.