Court Filings

The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, vacated, and remanded a trial court order that granted R.T.’s petition to seal a 2003 federal conviction. The appeals court held that a state trial court may only order sealing of records that are maintained by Ohio state agencies under R.C. 2953.32, and cannot compel federal agencies to seal or disregard federal conviction records. Because the trial court’s order used broad boilerplate language (directing all official records sealed and directing service on federal and state agencies), the appellate court found the order exceeded the court’s limited authority and remanded for a more specific hearing narrowly identifying which state-maintained records, if any, may be sealed.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s convictions of Carol A. Seymour for providing heroin that contributed to a neighbor’s overdose death. The central question was whether the State had proved that Seymour’s conduct was an actual cause of death. The Court held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, sufficient circumstantial and expert evidence supported a finding that the heroin Seymour supplied was a but-for cause of the decedent’s death, so the convictions for involuntary manslaughter and corrupting another with drugs must be reinstated.

The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Progressive Direct Insurance Company’s special appearance and dismissed the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. The suit arose after a Washington resident insured by an Ohio-based, non-Texas-licensed insurer was injured in San Antonio and sued in Texas over denial of underinsured motorist benefits. The court held Progressive Direct lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Texas for either specific or general jurisdiction and that exercising jurisdiction would violate fair play and substantial justice, so Texas courts cannot constitutionally adjudicate the contract dispute.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that GEICO was entitled to judgment on the pleadings for breach of a settlement agreement. The case arose after Abdel-Rahman made a pre-suit motor vehicle tort settlement offer that included the five statutory material terms required by OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021) plus additional nonstatutory terms. GEICO sent a written acceptance agreeing to the material terms while rejecting the offeror’s attempt to make the statute inapplicable. The court followed prior appellate decisions holding that acceptance of the statutory material terms alone forms an enforceable settlement under OCGA § 9-11-67.1, so GEICO proved a breach and entitlement to specific performance.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Eighth District Court of Appeals and held that the City of Cleveland retained political-subdivision immunity for the drowning death of William Johnson at a city pool. The executor sued claiming the use of a low folding chair instead of an elevated lifeguard chair amounted to a “physical defect” on pool grounds under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), which would remove immunity. The high court concluded that choosing one chair over another is not a tangible imperfection that impairs the function of pool grounds or equipment, so the statutory exception did not apply and summary judgment for the city must be entered.

The Court of Appeal reversed the convictions of Pedro Thomas DeLeon Tzul for the murders of Martha and Antonio Garcia and directed a new trial. The trial court had excluded a handwritten note found at the scene—in which the author said he found the victim having sex with her brother and that this filled him with rage—during the People’s case under Evidence Code section 352, effectively forcing Tzul to testify to get the note admitted. The appellate court held the note was highly probative of provocation and should not have been excluded; admission during the People’s case likely would have produced a more favorable result for Tzul.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Eighth District and held that a police officer lawfully extended a traffic stop to verify the driver’s license status even after the original basis for the stop (a believed inoperable headlight) was shown to be mistaken. Officer Rose stopped Quentin Fips for a presumed faulty headlight, learned Fips did not have his license, obtained identifying information, and then confirmed through dispatch that Fips’s license was suspended and a warrant existed. The Court ruled the additional inquiry was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that Fips’s failure to produce a license gave new reasonable suspicion to continue the stop.

The appellate court reversed orders detaining Kevin Bagby pending a probation-violation hearing. Bagby had been placed on mental-health probation after a retail-theft conviction, and the State later filed a violation petition based on a newly charged retail-theft offense. The court held that because the new retail-theft charge is not a detainable offense under Illinois’s Pretrial Fairness Act (it is a probationable, nonforcible felony that does not carry mandatory imprisonment), Bagby was entitled to pretrial release pending the violation hearing. The case is remanded for a hearing to set appropriate release conditions.

The Court of Appeals held that Washington public policy bars an insured from assigning legal malpractice claims against defense counsel to its liability insurer when a conflict of interest exists between insurer and insured. The dispute arose after Great American (primary insurer) paid a $5 million settlement for its insured C3 and obtained an assignment of C3’s malpractice claims against defense counsel. Because the insurer had defended under a reservation of rights and thus had potential conflict with the insured, the court reversed the superior court’s denial of judgment on the pleadings and ordered dismissal of the assigned claims.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the Marion Municipal Court’s denials of Nicholas Meads’s requests to seal two dismissed misdemeanor matters (domestic violence and violation of a civil protection order). The appeals arose after the trial court denied sealing following a hearing where the victim spoke and the State took no position. The appellate court held the trial court applied the wrong statute and improperly considered the victim’s statements when R.C. 2953.33 governs sealing of dismissed cases and limits the court to considering the movant’s submissions and any prosecutor objection. The matters are remanded for further proceedings under the correct statute.

The California Supreme Court reversed the defendant Omar Richard Deen’s death-row conviction and sentence and remanded for a new trial. Deen was convicted of murdering his mother and a police chief, and a capital trial proceeded in competency, guilt, sanity, and penalty phases. The Court found reversible error in the trial court’s handling of a defense challenge for cause to a prospective juror (Juror No. 5). The trial court applied an unduly narrow standard, accepted the juror’s self-assessment without properly weighing the totality of circumstances, and failed to make the findings necessary for meaningful appellate review.

The court reversed the trial court’s denial of Solomon Lewis’s timely petition for postconviction relief because the lower court failed to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Ohio law. Lewis had pleaded guilty and was sentenced; after a prior direct-appeal remand and resentencing he filed timely postconviction petitions. The trial court denied relief in a one-sentence entry without explaining the bases for the decision. The appellate court held that such an entry is insufficient under R.C. 2953.21(H) and remanded for the trial court to issue proper findings and conclusions.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for defendant-appellant J.P.S. Properties Diversified, Inc. The dispute involved whether a deed use restriction barred an Amazon fulfillment center and whether that restriction was enforceable. A prior appellate decision (Jay Realty I) had already concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Jay Realty and that the restriction was enforceable and ran with the land. The trial court improperly reinstated its prior summary-judgment entry contrary to the appellate mandate; the appeals court ordered entry of judgment for JPS because no claims remained pending after the earlier opinion.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s post-trial rulings in a fraudulent-transfer suit brought by Raida Allan against her ex-husband Tareq, his brother Qais, and two corporate gas-station entities. A jury found the transfers occurred, were not in good faith, and awarded Raida damages, but the trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for Qais and the Gas Stations on statute-of-limitations grounds and denied JNOV as to Tareq. The appellate court held the trial court improperly weighed evidence when granting JNOV, found the jury’s verdict legally supported, reversed those rulings, and remanded for the trial court to enter judgment consistent with the jury and determine damages against Tareq.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court judgment that sustained defendants’ demurrer and dismissed a qui tam claim under the California False Claims Act (CFCA). Relator Jamal Albarghouti filed a sealed complaint alleging false claims involving Los Angeles public entities, served the Attorney General by certified mail, and waited more than 60 days before serving defendants. The trial court held the complaint was improperly unsealed and dismissed it. The appellate court held the CFCA creates a 60-day default seal period that lifts automatically absent a government motion to extend the seal, that failure to allege compliance with the seal rules is not grounds for demurrer, and directed the trial court to overrule the demurrer and proceed.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that the State and its municipalities may immediately appeal a trial court order that preliminarily enjoins enforcement of a duly enacted law. The City of Columbus passed two firearm ordinances; plaintiffs obtained a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of several provisions. The Fifth District dismissed the city’s interlocutory appeal for lack of a final appealable order. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that an injunction preventing enforcement of a law inflicts irreparable sovereign injury and therefore qualifies as a final, immediately appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). The case was remanded for consideration of the appeal on the merits.