Court Filings

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s order that had allowed Michael and Amanda Mufarreh to obtain the identity of an anonymous YouTube user (John Doe) via pre-suit discovery under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224. The petitioners alleged the user posted a video of their 10-year-old son’s emotional outburst and sought to sue for defamation, right-of-publicity, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; only the son’s emotional-distress claim survived below. The appellate court held the petition failed the heightened pleading standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress and therefore did not justify pre-suit discovery, so the discovery order was reversed.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Dawon’s motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration in a construction-payment dispute. The parties had a detailed January 2024 service agreement that included a broad, surviving arbitration clause. In August 2024 they signed a short one-page follow-up agreement about cost handling and scheduling that did not address dispute resolution and did not supplant the original contract. The appellate court held the second agreement did not supersede the first, so the original arbitration clause remained enforceable and dismissal and arbitration were required.

The Texas Supreme Court held that when a party uses the pretrial affidavit process in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.001 to prove medical expenses, only those specific items or charges that are actually controverted by a compliant counteraffidavit lose the statute’s evidentiary effect. Unchallenged portions of an initial affidavit remain competent evidence and may be submitted to the factfinder. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded because the trial court erred by excluding entire medical-cost affidavits and counteraffidavits even though only portions were controverted, which deprived the claimant of admissible evidence of certain medical expenses.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the county court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant Eric Babcock in a defamation suit brought by neighbor and HOA board member Gregory Lattimer. The appellate court held that disputed factual issues remain about whether Babcock reasonably relied on unnamed government sources when he told HOA members that Lattimer threatened to shoot him and was under investigation for a hate crime. Because credibility and verification issues create jury questions under the current summary-judgment standard, the court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Sixth District reversed and remanded a trial-court final judgment awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to DidierGroup, LLC because that fee judgment was based on an underlying final judgment that this Court had already reversed in a prior opinion. The panel held that when the foundation judgment is reversed or vacated, any dependent award of fees and costs must likewise be reversed. The court remanded without prejudice to allow either party to seek attorneys’ fees after the trial proceedings conclude consistent with the mandate.

The Court of Appeals reversed a trial-court award of $14,525 in attorney fees to a third party, Yaarit Silverstone, in a garnishment proceeding. SMS Financial Recovery Services had appealed the fee award under OCGA § 9-15-14 after the trial court found SMS’s post-judgment motions and discovery were frivolous or for harassment. The appellate court held that OCGA § 9-15-14 authorizes fee awards only in "civil actions" and must be strictly construed; garnishment is a special statutory proceeding, not a civil action, so § 9-15-14 does not authorize fees in this context. Because of that legal conclusion, the court reversed the award and did not decide the other claimed errors.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss in a negligence suit filed by a mother on behalf of her burned six-year-old son against his teacher, another teacher/paraprofessional, the school nurse, the principal, and the Cobb County School District. The defendants moved to dismiss under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(1), asserting sovereign and official immunity and submitted affidavits. The trial court treated the motion as converted to summary judgment because affidavits were attached and delayed ruling on immunity. The appeals court held that attaching affidavits did not automatically convert a jurisdictional immunity motion into summary judgment and remanded for the trial court to consider the immunity defenses properly.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement and remanded for further proceedings. The trial court had announced a settlement at an on-the-record hearing in which it expressly stated it would retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement, but its subsequent journal entry omitted that retention of jurisdiction and did not incorporate the settlement terms. The appellate court held the journal entry did not reflect what occurred in open court and directed the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc entry conforming the record to the hearing so the court can enforce the settlement terms.

The Superior Court reversed a Philadelphia County trial court order that had denied Juliett Barzilayeva and Eugene Zwick’s petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale of real property. The panel held that the restitution order imposed in Montgomery County remained a criminal sentencing matter under the sentencing court’s continuing jurisdiction and that the procedures in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728 vested the county clerk (not a private victim) with authority to transmit certified restitution judgments for docketing. Because the Philadelphia filing and resulting judgment were outside the authorized procedure and thus void ab initio, the court struck the Philadelphia judgment and reversed the denial of the petition to set aside the sale.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's May 21, 2025 order and granted Mary Trump's motion to compel discovery from Donald Trump in a breach-of-settlement-agreement case. Mary Trump asserted an affirmative defense of fraudulent inducement based on alleged false asset valuations in a 2001 settlement agreement. The court held that because the requested materials relate to that affirmative defense they are discoverable under CPLR 3101(a), which requires liberal disclosure of matter material and necessary to prepare for trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the decision.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a plea to the jurisdiction and rendered judgment for county officials. Plaintiff Nelson sought mandamus and declaratory relief to force Polk County officials to assign 911 addresses and a street name for lots in his subdivision, claiming a statutory exemption from platting and that officials acted unlawfully. The appellate court held Nelson failed to plead or prove he submitted the required plat, exemption request, or addressing application (or that officials denied one), so he did not show officials failed to perform any ministerial duty. Because governmental immunity was not waived, the court dismissed his claims.

The Appellate Division reviewed consolidated appeals by Allstate and GEICO from interlocutory orders that allowed plaintiffs to pursue common-law bad faith and statutory Insurance Fair Conduct Act (IFCA) claims while their underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage disputes remained unresolved. Allstate's appeal was dismissed as moot after the UIM coverage dispute was resolved. As to GEICO, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by denying GEICO's request to sever and stay discovery on plaintiff Cirelli's bad faith and IFCA claims until the UIM coverage dispute was resolved, because proceeding with expansive bad-faith discovery prematurely would be inefficient and potentially prejudicial. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with that ruling.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed the Supreme Court and granted defendant Joan Crema-Samalya's pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint against her. The plaintiff sued Crema-Samalya after property restoration work allegedly performed by Five Boro Fire Restoration was found deficient, asserting claims for violation of General Business Law § 349 and fraud. The appellate court held the complaint failed to plead any materially misleading consumer-oriented conduct under GBL § 349 and did not plead fraud with the required particularity, so dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) was appropriate.

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability and to dismiss the defendants' comparative negligence defenses in a rear-end collision case. The plaintiff had asserted his vehicle was stopped for about 10 seconds at a red light when the defendants' vehicle struck him from behind. The court found that a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a presumption of negligence by the rear driver, and the defendants failed to present admissible evidence of a non-negligent explanation (such as an unanticipated brake failure), so the plaintiff met his prima facie burden.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment that had dismissed third-party claims for contractual indemnification asserted by the project owner and general contractor against Gabriel Steel Erectors. The underlying lawsuit arises from a 2018 workplace fall of an ironworker employed by Gabriel. The court found that the indemnity clause obligating Gabriel to indemnify for losses “to the fullest extent permitted by law” could permit partial indemnification and that triable issues exist about whether Gabriel had primary responsibility for the worker's safety. Thus the indemnification claims cannot be decided as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division reversed a medical-malpractice judgment for a child born extremely premature after concluding the trial court erred by allowing a neurologist to testify that the defendants' failure to diagnose and treat the mother's preterm labor caused the child's later autism. Applying New York's Frye standard, the court held the proffered causation theory rested on observational associations and speculative inference rather than generally accepted scientific principles linking prematurity or low birth weight to autism. Because that testimony was improperly admitted, the court ordered a new trial and dismissed the plaintiff's cross-appeal as academic.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and granted Drexel University's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's personal injury claim against Drexel. The plaintiff was injured at his employer's workplace when equipment fell from a forklift operated by two Drexel students participating in Drexel's cooperative education program. The court held Drexel did not exercise sufficient control over the students' work or conduct to be vicariously liable as an employer or principal, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact to the contrary.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court judgment that had granted summary judgment to Remede Consulting Group on damages against employee-defendant Jason Pitter for misuse of a corporate credit card. The court affirmed that Remede proved Pitter's liability on breach of contract, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty because Pitter had received the corporate card policy, acknowledged it, and used the card for personal expenses without raising a triable issue of authorization. However, the appellate court held the plaintiff did not establish a precise, uncontested sum owed, so summary judgment on damages awarding $135,246.77 was denied and the judgment was reversed on that point.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court foreclosure judgment because the bank never obtained personal jurisdiction over the homeowner. Nationstar served the summons and complaint by leaving them with the homeowner's former attorney, who lacked authority to accept service. The court held the homeowner timely preserved the jurisdiction defense and that service on a former lawyer does not satisfy statutory service rules. Because service was defective, the foreclosure judgment, referee confirmation, and sale direction were vacated and the complaint dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a Supreme Court order that had allowed Con-Kel Landscaping to reargue and then obtain summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's personal injury claims. The plaintiff slipped on ice in an underground garage and sued Con-Kel, the snow-removal contractor. The appellate court held Con-Kel improperly raised for the first time on a reargument motion the argument that the plaintiff would be precluded from testifying (and thus could not make a case). Because reargument cannot present new legal theories or facts not previously offered, the reargument should have been denied and the grant of summary judgment vacated. Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and granted summary judgment to defendants Eric and Leslie Gulkis in a personal injury action alleging liability under General Obligations Law § 11-100. The plaintiff claimed he was assaulted by an underage guest, Hellerman, at a party hosted at the Gulkis defendants' home and alleged the hosts unlawfully furnished alcohol to the minor. The appellate court held the hosts showed the minor was not intoxicated at the time of the assault and the plaintiff produced no evidence of intoxication, so the statutory claim against the hosts fails as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had dismissed a fraud, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing complaint against Madison Realty Capital and related defendants. The lower court had dismissed the action based on a release in a forbearance agreement and for failure to plead fraud, but the appellate court held the plaintiffs could amend as of right and that their amended complaint raised questions of fact whether the release was unfairly obtained and whether defendants made intentional misrepresentations to induce the plaintiffs to enter agreements. Accordingly, the defendants' CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss was denied.

The Appellate Division reversed a Nassau County Supreme Court order and granted the plaintiff leave to enter a default judgment on liability in a slip-and-fall personal injury case. The defendant failed to timely answer the complaint; when he served a late answer the plaintiff rejected it and moved for default judgment. The trial court had compelled the plaintiff to accept the late answer, but the appellate court found the defendant did not show a reasonable excuse for the delay (his counsel had no personal knowledge and the insurer’s affidavit was inadequate) and thus the trial court abused its discretion.

The Appellate Division reversed two Supreme Court orders that had granted Deutsche Bank summary judgment and an order of reference in a mortgage foreclosure against Andrew Benson. The bank submitted affidavits about mailing required 90-day RPAPL 1304 notices; a later affidavit said the servicer mailed the notices in-house, but an earlier affidavit had stated a third-party vendor did the mailings. The court found the contradiction created a triable issue about strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 and that the plaintiff’s counsel’s reply did not cure the discrepancy, so summary judgment was improper.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had granted summary judgment dismissing a negligence complaint against defendant Kathleen P. Wallace. The plaintiff alleged injuries from a facial treatment Wallace performed while employed by David's New Beginnings, LLC. The appellate court held that Wallace was not entitled to dismissal simply because the employer might be vicariously liable; an employee can be personally liable for torts even if the employer is also liable. Because Wallace did not meet her initial summary judgment burden, the court denied her motion.

The Appellate Division, Second Department reversed a trial court order and granted summary judgment to defendants Dr. Steven Athanail and Lutheran Medical Center in a medical malpractice suit. The plaintiff alleged the defendants failed to timely diagnose and treat a colonic perforation after a May 2016 hospital admission, but the defendants produced expert proof showing no departure from the standard of care. The plaintiff's opposing expert offered only conclusory and speculative assertions and failed to confront the defendants' experts with specific, record-supported reasoning, so no triable issue of fact existed.

The Third District reversed a final summary judgment of foreclosure entered for Miami Beach Townhomes because the trial court never adjudicated the homeowner-appellant Steven Kwartin’s pending affirmative defenses and counterclaims. The Association proved overdue assessments and obtained a judgment liquidating the amount due, but the judgment did not rule on Kwartin’s claims that he had tendered payment, that the Association rejected payments, and that it breached duties. The appellate court followed precedent holding a foreclosure judgment is premature and reversible when interrelated defenses and counterclaims remain unresolved.

The Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court order that denied Hartford’s motion to dismiss MSP Recovery’s second amended complaint. MSP had sued for a pure bill of discovery and declaratory relief under Florida’s motor-vehicle no-fault statute, alleging the trial court had specific personal jurisdiction over Hartford. The trial court found Hartford had abandoned its jurisdictional defense, but the appellate court held Hartford did not abandon that defense and, applying a recent controlling precedent (USAA Casualty Ins. Co. v. MSP Recovery Claims), concluded the long-arm jurisdictional allegations were insufficient. The case is dismissed and remanded with directions to dismiss the action.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a three-year injunction for protection against stalking that the trial court had entered for the Wife against the Girlfriend. The appellate court held the evidence did not show the two separate, legally distinct instances of harassment required by Florida law: the October 23 barrage of messages constituted a single episode, and the other alleged acts (two social-media posts and one child-support text) were either isolated or served legitimate purposes. The court also found the communications did not objectively cause the high level of emotional distress the statute requires.

The Fourth District reversed a trial court order denying dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Ruth sued nonresident trustee Dunham Trust Company (DTC) in Florida for breach of fiduciary duties related to a trust created by a Florida resident. The court held DTC’s acceptance of a successor co-trusteeship and routine communications to a beneficiary who later moved to Florida were insufficient to show that DTC purposefully availed itself of conducting business in Florida. Because DTC’s administration occurred in Nevada and contacts with Florida were tied to unilateral acts of the settlor/beneficiary, due process was not satisfied.