Court Filings

The Court of Appeal reversed a superior court judgment that had dismissed a Proposition 65 enforcement lawsuit for inadequate pre-suit notice. The plaintiff, a private enforcer, had sent a 60-day notice that identified the organization and provided contact information for its outside counsel rather than a specific internal “responsible individual.” The appellate court followed a recent decision (Pancho Villa’s) and held the regulation requiring a contact for the noticing entity is directory, not mandatory, and that the notice here substantially complied with the regulation’s purposes (informing prosecutors and giving defendants an opportunity to investigate and cure). The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals held that R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a), a statutory restriction that limited who could file undervaluation complaints based on arm’s-length sales occurring before (but not after) the tax lien date and exceeding specified thresholds, violated Ohio’s constitutional requirement that property be taxed by a uniform rule. The court found the provision systematically and intentionally departed from uniform valuation by treating some properties as immune from complaint. The court severed the unconstitutional clause, left the legislative-resolution requirement intact, reversed the Board of Tax Appeals decisions, and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, while certifying a conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the Board of Tax Appeals’ order that vacated a county board of revision decision and remanded to dismiss a taxpayer’s complaint. The court held that R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a) — a statutory condition barring third-party valuation complaints unless the property sold in an arm’s-length transaction before the tax lien date and the sale price exceeded listed value by 10% and a monetary threshold — violates Ohio’s constitutional requirement that land be taxed by a uniform rule. The court severed that subsection, left the legislative-resolution requirement intact, and certified a conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The court reversed the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), finding an Ohio statute, R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a), unconstitutional because it allowed different treatment of parcels for valuation complaints and thus violated the state constitutional requirement that land be taxed by a uniform rule. Appellant Bahorek had filed a complaint challenging a neighbor’s valuation; the county Board of Revision dismissed it under R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a). The appellate court held that the statute’s conditions on who may file and when (arm’s-length sale before the lien date and a 10%/threshold sales test) create systematic departures from uniform valuation, so the court severed that subsection, reversed the BTA, and remanded for further proceedings.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the First District Court of Appeals and remanded the case. The dispute involved C.E., an unmarried former partner who sought legal parental recognition of three children born to P.S. through artificial insemination. The First District had directed the trial court to determine whether the couple "would have been married" but for Ohio's pre-Obergefell ban on same-sex marriage and to apply R.C. 3111.95(A) if so. The Supreme Court held R.C. 3111.95(A) applies only to married spouses and that Obergefell and Pavan do not authorize retroactively rewriting that statute to cover unmarried couples.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that cast vote records (CVRs) — digital spreadsheet reports of votes generated by a county’s tabulating equipment — are not the "contents" of ballot boxes or voting machines under Section 308 of the Election Code and therefore are subject to public disclosure. The dispute arose from a Right-to-Know request to Lycoming County for CVRs from the 2020 general election, which had been denied as exempt. The Court concluded CVRs are documents/reports generated by tabulators (automatic tabulating equipment), not the physical ballots in ballot boxes or the voting machines that let voters mark and verify votes.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court Bronx County's grant of summary judgment to Wells Fargo in a foreclosure-related case and denied Wells Fargo's motion. The court held Wells Fargo failed to prove strict compliance with RPAPL 1304's notice requirements because its affiant did not establish knowledge of the third-party vendor's mailing procedures or integration of the vendor's records into the bank's business records. The court also rejected Wells Fargo's claim that the loan was not a covered primary-residence loan, finding plaintiff did not prove the property was never the borrower's primary residence.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court grant of summary judgment in a malicious-prosecution suit brought by attorney Brian Detrick against his former client, Keiko Shimada. Shimada had voluntarily dismissed a prior malpractice case and moved for summary judgment, claiming the dismissal was motivated by the statute of limitations (a procedural ground that would bar malicious prosecution). The trial court relied on Shimada’s English-language declaration, but the appellate court held that because Shimada cannot read or speak English the declaration was incompetent absent evidence identifying and qualifying the interpreter/translator and an attestation that the translation accurately reflected Shimada’s words. The judgment for Shimada was reversed and the summary-judgment motion must be denied.

The Court of Appeals reversed a municipal court order that had set aside a default judgment entered for Shelter Mutual Insurance Company against Dajuan Henry Jones. SMIC had obtained default judgment after certified-mail service to an address; Jones later moved to vacate the judgment claiming improper service, mistaken identity, and that he only learned of the case months later. The appeals court found Jones presented insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of proper service but was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the service issue; it also held Jones’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion was untimely and remanded for denial of relief under that rule and for a hearing only on service.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of leave allowing Kettering Medical Center (KHBMC) to amend its answer shortly before trial to assert immunity under R.C. 2305.51(B), and it reversed the trial court’s subsequent grant of summary judgment to KHBMC. The court held the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the last-minute amendment and reopening discovery because the amendment was untimely, unexplained, and prejudicial. The court also found genuine factual disputes existed about foreseeability, precautions taken, and whether the patient’s conduct constituted an explicit threat, so summary judgment on statutory immunity was improper.

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Ninth District and trial court, holding that NC Enterprises did not prove adverse possession of two narrow parcels owned by Norfolk Southern Railway. Although NC Enterprises performed regular lawn and landscape maintenance beginning in 1998 and later erected a fence and drainage in 2000 and 2011, the court concluded the required 21-year period must have begun on or before July 22, 1999. Maintenance alone before the fence was not open and notorious enough to put the title owner on constructive notice, so NC Enterprises failed to meet the open-and-notorious element by clear and convincing evidence.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed the trial court's dismissal of a personal injury complaint brought under New York's Adult Survivors Act (CPLR 214-j). The plaintiff alleged sexual abuse by a Syracuse University employee while he worked at a university-affiliated fraternity house. The court held the amended complaint sufficiently pleaded lack of consent and therefore alleged conduct that would constitute a Penal Law sex offense, so the claims were timely revived under the ASA. The case is remitted to Supreme Court for consideration of other dismissal grounds the lower court did not decide.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had granted defendant Rochester Rev Holdings summary judgment in a dispute over ownership of real property under New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) articles 6 and 15. The court held that defendant failed to meet its initial burden for summary judgment because its own submissions (including a lease with a purchase option and an affidavit indicating knowledge that plaintiff was a tenant) created triable issues of fact about plaintiff's title claims and defendant's counterclaims. The case was sent back with the complaint reinstated for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and held that the Chief Administrator of the Courts has the exclusive constitutional authority to appoint Chief Clerks and Deputy Chief Clerks of the Surrogates' Courts. The case arose from Erie County Surrogate Acea M. Mosey seeking a declaration that she had appointment power under the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act. The court concluded those statute-based appointment provisions are superseded by New York Constitution article VI, § 28 and implementing law and regulations vesting appointment authority in the Chief Administrator because the positions are nonjudicial officers within the Unified Court System.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had dismissed claims against The William Powell Company for lack of personal jurisdiction in an asbestos-exposure wrongful-death action. The court held that the defendant, which moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on absence of long-arm jurisdiction, failed to meet its initial burden on the summary judgment standard. Because the defendant did not make a prima facie showing that plaintiff could not establish long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3), the motion was denied and the complaint against The William Powell Company was reinstated.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a lower-court order that denied a final extreme risk protection order (ERPO) against a state correction officer, Mathew J. Galliher. The court held that petitioner New York State Police proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent participated in a violent assault on a restrained inmate that caused serious injury and death, and thus met the statutory definition of a substantial risk of physical harm to others. The Fourth Department concluded the trial court applied the wrong standard and remitted the case for further proceedings consistent with issuance of the ERPO.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Supreme Court's denial of Deutsche Bank's summary judgment motion in a mortgage foreclosure. The loan was originated by Ameriquest, later placed into a trust under a pooling and servicing agreement that named Deutsche Bank as trustee, and an assignment to Deutsche Bank was executed in 2009 by the servicer acting under a limited power of attorney. The appellate court held Deutsche Bank met its burden to show standing by producing the assignment and mortgage documents, and directed the trial court to appoint a referee to compute the amount due.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to multiple defendants and reinstated the City of Rome’s amended complaint. The City sued after a chlorine gas leak at a new water filtration facility damaged property; defendants were involved in design and construction. Supreme Court had held the plant operator’s removal of a frosted chlorine tank was a superseding, unforeseeable event absolving defendants. The appellate court ruled defendants failed to prove that the operator’s conduct broke the causal chain, so summary judgment was improper and issues of foreseeability must go to a factfinder.

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in full. Plaintiff sued for breach of an option agreement that allegedly gave him an exclusive right to repurchase company interests; he attempted to exercise the option in November 2023. The court held the written option was clear and expired on December 31, 2020 (and could only be extended by plaintiff before that date), so the attempted exercise was untimely and there was no breach. The court rejected plaintiff's alternative strained reading that the option barred any sale or never expired.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a jury verdict in favor of defendants in a medical malpractice case and granted a new trial. Plaintiffs alleged the radiologist defendant failed to identify a potentially cancerous abnormality on chest X-rays. The court held the trial judge erroneously gave an "error in judgment" jury instruction, which is appropriate only when a doctor chooses among several medically acceptable alternatives. Because the evidence showed only an alleged failure to meet the standard of care (a failure to diagnose), giving that charge risked confusing the jury and was not harmless, requiring reversal and reinstatement of the complaint.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a default judgment entered against Access Dental Management, LLC (ADM) in favor of June’s Boutique, LLC. June attempted service on ADM by first trying the named agent at a Dallas address, then seeking substitute service via the Texas Secretary of State. The court held the record did not demonstrate ADM’s registered agent or registered address matched the Dallas address used for service, and the Secretary of State’s certificate did not establish the forwarding address required by statute. Because strict service requirements were not met, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction and the default judgment is void.

The court reversed a jury verdict awarding noneconomic and exemplary damages to Candace Williams after finding that her malpractice claim was based solely on the emotional harms of an unplanned pregnancy that arose from a doctor’s failure to perform a tubal ligation. Relying on the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Noe v. Velasco (2024), the court held that pregnancy-related noneconomic harms (including mental anguish from deciding to terminate) are not legally compensable because pregnancy is inseparable from bringing about a child’s life. Because Williams offered no other compensable damages, the judgment was reversed and judgment rendered that she take nothing.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of class certification in Stewart v. Farmers Insurance. The plaintiff insured’s vehicle was declared a total loss and Farmers invoked a court-ordered, binding appraisal provision in the policy. The appraisal produced a higher actual-cash-value award, which Farmers paid. The appellate court held that because the appraisal award resolved the plaintiff’s individual contract claim before class certification, the controversy was moot and the entire action — including class claims — had to be dismissed. The court declined to apply the “pick-off” exception because the payment resulted from an enforceable contractual appraisal, not a unilateral settlement tactic.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed a Delaware County contempt order that jailed Dominic Anusionwu for seven days with a $1,200 purge for failing to pay child support. The court held that because imprisonment was a likely outcome, the trial court was required to ensure Anusionwu either had appointed counsel or knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel via a formal colloquy. The Superior Court found the trial court erred by not conducting that waiver inquiry or determining indigency at the March 12, 2025 hearing and remanded the matter for compliance with the applicable procedures.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's partial denial of defendants' summary judgment motion and granted defendants' motion to dismiss the medical malpractice claim. Plaintiffs alleged defendants failed to diagnose Cushing's syndrome, but defendants' expert attested that care met the standard and there was no biochemical or pathological evidence of Cushing's or an ACTH-secreting tumor during defendants' treatment. Plaintiffs' expert did not meaningfully rebut defendants' causation evidence or address 2019 surgical pathology, so plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue on causation.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's order that had vacated an arbitration award in a dispute between transit employees and the New York City Transit Authority. The appellate court held the arbitrator acted within his authority, properly reviewed the process by which the Medical Review Officer reached and then altered his drug-test determination, and found improper influence by the employer's representative. The panel concluded the award did not violate public policy and reinstated the arbitration award, denying the Authority's cross-motion to vacate and granting the petition to confirm.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court Bronx County's grant of summary judgment for New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation and reinstated Janice Campbell's medical malpractice complaint. The suit alleges surgeons lacerated the plaintiff's bladder during pelvic surgery. The appellate court found that plaintiff's expert affidavit raised a triable issue by opining surgeons deviated from the standard of care by failing to perform a retrograde bladder fill, which would have better delineated bladder margins given substantial pelvic adhesions. The court held this claim was included in the bill of particulars, so dismissal was improper.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed Rae Neel’s suit against the City of Hurst for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Neel sued after tripping on an uneven section of public sidewalk and the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The appeals court held the sidewalk condition was not a “special defect” and, under the premises-defect standard, Neel’s own deposition showed she knew of the sidewalk’s condition before the fall, defeating her claim of lack of knowledge and preserving the City’s immunity.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and remanded. The dispute concerned interpretation and enforcement of a settlement agreement between M-I L.L.C. and Texas International Terminals (TXIT) about lease and materials-handling payments and removal of equipment. The trial court had added CPI-based price adjustments and ordered M-I to remove certain equipment, relying on extrinsic course-of-dealing evidence. The appellate court held the settlement language was unambiguous, forbade using extrinsic evidence to rewrite the agreement, and concluded the trial court improperly added and altered terms instead of enforcing the agreement as written.

The court reviewed an appeal by Y.S., who filed a petition to change her minor child’s name and a sworn Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs. The trial court ordered her to pay reduced costs of $400 after an interview with county staff, but did not hold a formal oral evidentiary hearing or make detailed findings required by Rule 145. The appellate court concluded the record contained uncontroverted evidence that Y.S. could not afford court costs, that the trial court failed to follow Rule 145 procedures, and therefore reversed the order and directed the trial court to allow Y.S. to proceed without paying costs or fees.