Court Filings

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a lower court judgment that Amtrust North America must defend Authority Fleet Services and related plaintiffs in an underlying personal-injury lawsuit arising from a September 30, 2022 construction accident. The court held that the underlying complaint, liberally construed, reasonably suggested a possibility of coverage under the employer's workers' compensation and employers' liability policy, triggering the insurer's broader duty to defend. Because Amtrust failed to show there was no possible factual or legal basis for indemnity, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment requiring Amtrust to defend the insureds.

The Appellate Division reviewed a mortgage foreclosure where defendant Cheryl Hunte defaulted and a referee's report and judgment of foreclosure and sale were entered. The court dismissed Hunte's direct appeal from an interim order as moot but reversed the foreclosure judgment insofar as it depended on presumed valid service of process. Because Hunte submitted a sworn denial with supporting facts sufficient to rebut the process server's affidavit, the court remitted the case for a hearing to determine whether she was properly served, and ordered a new determination afterward on confirmation of the referee's report and the motion to vacate the earlier default judgment.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Court of Claims' dismissal of Mansoor Alam's claim against the State of New York. Alam had sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for intentional infliction of emotional distress after New York City Department of Social Services accepted his Medicaid application but required a monthly spenddown, which he said left him unable to cover living expenses. The court held the claim necessarily required review of an administrative agency determination and therefore fell outside the Court of Claims' subject-matter jurisdiction; such challenges must be pursued in Supreme Court by an Article 78 proceeding.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the Supreme Court's denial of the defendants' motion to vacate a default judgment and for a protective order. The plaintiff obtained a judgment after the defendants failed to appear or oppose a summary-judgment-in-lieu-of-complaint motion seeking rent and damages under a commercial lease and guaranty. The defendants later moved under CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate the November 2020 judgment and under CPLR 5240 to vacate restraining notices on bank accounts; the court found their excuses for default unreasonable and declined to disturb the restraining notices because they were needed to secure enforcement of the judgment.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court Bronx County's grant of summary judgment to Wells Fargo in a foreclosure-related case and denied Wells Fargo's motion. The court held Wells Fargo failed to prove strict compliance with RPAPL 1304's notice requirements because its affiant did not establish knowledge of the third-party vendor's mailing procedures or integration of the vendor's records into the bank's business records. The court also rejected Wells Fargo's claim that the loan was not a covered primary-residence loan, finding plaintiff did not prove the property was never the borrower's primary residence.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the Supreme Court's denial of plaintiff Moises Ramirez's motion for partial summary judgment on a Labor Law § 240(1) claim against 2500 Webb LLC. The court found that genuine issues of fact remained about which object struck the plaintiff (horizontal versus vertical pipe/post), whether that object was a target of disassembly when the injury occurred, and whether a safety device was available that would have prevented the accident. Because these disputed facts are material to liability under Labor Law § 240(1), summary judgment was properly denied.

The First Department unanimously affirmed Supreme Court's order dismissing Yolanda Murray's complaint against Planned Parenthood as time-barred and for failure to state a viable claim. The court held Murray's claims arising from alleged 1996 misconduct did not fall within the Adult Survivors Act because the complaint did not allege criminal conduct enumerated by that statute, and the Child Victims Act revival window had already closed. The court also found that, even on the merits, Murray failed to plead facts showing Planned Parenthood's knowledge of the provider's dangerous propensities, control over the local affiliate, or any valid alter-ego theory, and there was no evidence of judicial bias.

The First Department reviewed a motion in a class-action landlord-tenant case where defendants sought disqualification of plaintiffs' counsel for an alleged conflict arising from counsel's prior representation of several former building owners. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in finding defendants had waived the conflict claim, and concluded the record was incomplete to decide disqualification. The court therefore ordered plaintiffs' counsel to produce itemized files related to the prior representation so defendants can assess whether an actual conflict exists, and otherwise affirmed the lower court's denial of immediate disqualification and dismissal.

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Harvey's personal-injury complaint arising from a May 2020 motor vehicle accident. Defendants (the New York Foundling Hospital and others) presented expert reports and MRI comparisons showing plaintiff's cervical, lumbar, and right-shoulder conditions were preexisting, chronic, and degenerative from a prior March 30, 2019 crash, not caused by the 2020 accident. The court held plaintiff's expert failed to meaningfully dispute the prior-accident causation, so she could not meet the statutory threshold for a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102(d).

The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed a lower court order denying the insurer Mountain Valley Indemnity Company's summary judgment motion to dismiss an insureds' fire-damage complaint. The insurer argued the dwelling was a three-family property (allowing a coverage disclaimer) based on the basement configuration, while the insureds said it was two-family and the basement was shared family space. The court found disputed facts about the basement's physical separation, usage, and the investigator's qualifications, so summary judgment was improper and the case must proceed.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s dental malpractice complaint against the Deol defendants. Plaintiff sued for injuries from root canals performed by an endodontist, Dr. Taggar, who practiced at premises operated by the Deol defendants. The court concluded Taggar was an independent contractor, not an employee, and the Deol defendants neither controlled his professional work nor actually supervised him, so they are not vicariously or directly liable. Plaintiff’s opposition lacked admissible evidence to create a triable issue of fact.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a Supreme Court order dismissing plaintiff Varma's complaint against Allstate and Wayne LeVan. The court held the complaint was barred by res judicata because the claims — challenging termination and asserting breach based on the same agency agreement and incorporated supplement — either were raised or could have been raised in an earlier action between the same parties. The court also held that the prior dismissal and the denial of leave to amend had preclusive effect because the new complaint mirrors the proposed amended pleading previously rejected on the merits.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed the trial court's dismissal of a personal injury complaint brought under New York's Adult Survivors Act (CPLR 214-j). The plaintiff alleged sexual abuse by a Syracuse University employee while he worked at a university-affiliated fraternity house. The court held the amended complaint sufficiently pleaded lack of consent and therefore alleged conduct that would constitute a Penal Law sex offense, so the claims were timely revived under the ASA. The case is remitted to Supreme Court for consideration of other dismissal grounds the lower court did not decide.

The defendant appealed from a Supreme Court (Onondaga County) order denying his motion to vacate a default judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action. While the appeal was pending, the defendant and plaintiff’s attorney signed a stipulation of discontinuance in February 2026. The Appellate Division consequently dismissed the appeal without costs on April 24, 2026. The court did not reach the merits of the underlying motion to vacate because the parties stipulated to discontinue the action.

The Appellate Division dismissed an appeal and cross-appeal in an Erie County civil action between Sycamore Maple Family Ltd. Partnership and James F. Jerge. The parties filed a stipulation of discontinuance on April 2, 2026, and the court ordered the appeals dismissed without costs on April 24, 2026. No opinion on the merits was issued because the case was discontinued by the parties.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, unanimously affirmed a lower court order denying plaintiff Jeremiah Smith's motion for leave to amend his complaint against the City of Buffalo, its police department, and unnamed officers. The appeal challenged Supreme Court (Erie County)'s November 12, 2024 decision refusing permission to amend, but the appellate court found no reversible error and denied relief. The appellate decision is brief and affirms the trial court's exercise of discretion without further elaboration in the slip opinion.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed an order of the Court of Claims that granted the administrator of Kaazim Freeman’s estate leave to amend her wrongful-death claim against the State and denied the State’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the proposed amendments related back to the original claim for statute-of-limitations purposes because they arose from the same occurrence — Freeman’s unexplained death in state custody — and that the State failed to show prejudice from the delay. Consequently, amendment was properly allowed under CPLR 3025 and CPLR 203(f).

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had granted defendant Rochester Rev Holdings summary judgment in a dispute over ownership of real property under New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) articles 6 and 15. The court held that defendant failed to meet its initial burden for summary judgment because its own submissions (including a lease with a purchase option and an affidavit indicating knowledge that plaintiff was a tenant) created triable issues of fact about plaintiff's title claims and defendant's counterclaims. The case was sent back with the complaint reinstated for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a Supreme Court (Erie County) order granting summary judgment to defendants in a dispute brought by plaintiff-appellant Colleen Pandy, as executor and individually, against Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America and individual defendants. The appellate court agreed with the lower court that the moving defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, resolving the appeal against the plaintiff. The decision is brief and affirms the dismissal of the plaintiff’s remaining claims without further comment or costs awarded to the appellant.

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and held that the Chief Administrator of the Courts has the exclusive constitutional authority to appoint Chief Clerks and Deputy Chief Clerks of the Surrogates' Courts. The case arose from Erie County Surrogate Acea M. Mosey seeking a declaration that she had appointment power under the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act. The court concluded those statute-based appointment provisions are superseded by New York Constitution article VI, § 28 and implementing law and regulations vesting appointment authority in the Chief Administrator because the positions are nonjudicial officers within the Unified Court System.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a Supreme Court order granting summary judgment to two third-party defendants and denying NYAC summary judgment on its indemnification claim. Plaintiff sued for injuries from a scaffold fall. The court held that Next Level was not contractually obligated to indemnify NYAC because the indemnity language covered only claims arising from Next Level's work and there was no evidence plaintiff’s injury related to Next Level’s work. The court also held that an indemnity agreement between NYAC and Anderson, signed after the accident, could not be applied retroactively because NYAC failed to show the parties intended an earlier effective date.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had dismissed claims against The William Powell Company for lack of personal jurisdiction in an asbestos-exposure wrongful-death action. The court held that the defendant, which moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on absence of long-arm jurisdiction, failed to meet its initial burden on the summary judgment standard. Because the defendant did not make a prima facie showing that plaintiff could not establish long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3), the motion was denied and the complaint against The William Powell Company was reinstated.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a lower-court order that denied a final extreme risk protection order (ERPO) against a state correction officer, Mathew J. Galliher. The court held that petitioner New York State Police proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent participated in a violent assault on a restrained inmate that caused serious injury and death, and thus met the statutory definition of a substantial risk of physical harm to others. The Fourth Department concluded the trial court applied the wrong standard and remitted the case for further proceedings consistent with issuance of the ERPO.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed the Town of Floyd Zoning Board of Appeals' denial of three variances sought by petitioner Jeffrey Kotary to incorporate two shipping containers into a new barn and to exceed height and setback limits. Kotary sought judicial review under CPLR article 78 after the ZBA granted only a height variance and denied the other variances. The court held the ZBA properly applied the statutory balancing test, relied on safety concerns, feasible alternatives, and the largely self-created nature of petitioner’s need, and concluded there was a rational basis for denying the variances.

The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court's denial of petitioner Karen Anthone's motion for summary judgment in a proceeding to enforce a judgment lien against real property owned by George Carlo and the Carlo Family Trust. The court held that the trust is a self-settled trust and therefore its assets are available to satisfy the settlor's creditors, so petitioner did not need to prove a fraudulent conveyance. However, the court found a triable issue whether the homestead exemption applies to the property sale, so summary judgment was improper and the matter remains for further fact-finding on that exemption issue.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department denied plaintiff-appellant Hoi Trinh's motion for reargument or for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals in his action against defendant-respondent Joseph Thien Nguyen. The court's one-paragraph memorandum and order, issued April 24, 2026, simply denies both requested forms of relief, leaving the prior appellate disposition in place and refusing further review by the state's highest court or reconsideration by this panel.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a Supreme Court order in a medical malpractice and wrongful death case that compelled defendants TLC Health Network and Lake Shore Health Care Center to produce electronic medical record audit trails and related discovery. The court concluded the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion because new deposition evidence—developed after an earlier appeal—suggested audit-trail data might exist, had not been fully disclosed, and that defendants' representatives lacked knowledge about retention policies. The appellate court held the new evidence justified additional discovery and found no conflict with its prior decision.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Supreme Court's denial of Deutsche Bank's summary judgment motion in a mortgage foreclosure. The loan was originated by Ameriquest, later placed into a trust under a pooling and servicing agreement that named Deutsche Bank as trustee, and an assignment to Deutsche Bank was executed in 2009 by the servicer acting under a limited power of attorney. The appellate court held Deutsche Bank met its burden to show standing by producing the assignment and mortgage documents, and directed the trial court to appoint a referee to compute the amount due.

The Appellate Division modified a Supreme Court order in a breach-of-contract dispute over who must pay an additional tax attributable to a cell tower installed on plaintiffs' property. Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted defendant's cross-motion to dismiss; the Appellate Division affirmed in part by denying defendant's cross-motion and reinstating the complaint. The court held the lease language about who pays "real estate taxes and assessments" versus "personal property taxes on the Communications Facility" is ambiguous, so the parties did not meet their burdens to show a single reasonable interpretation and summary judgment was improper.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment to multiple defendants and reinstated the City of Rome’s amended complaint. The City sued after a chlorine gas leak at a new water filtration facility damaged property; defendants were involved in design and construction. Supreme Court had held the plant operator’s removal of a frosted chlorine tank was a superseding, unforeseeable event absolving defendants. The appellate court ruled defendants failed to prove that the operator’s conduct broke the causal chain, so summary judgment was improper and issues of foreseeability must go to a factfinder.