Court Filings

The First District of Texas dismissed Star Construction Services, Sandra Scherer (d/b/a Star Construction Services), and Robert Scherer’s appeal because the appellants neither established indigence nor paid required appellate fees and failed to respond to the court’s notice. The court cited Texas rules and statutes governing fee payment and its authority to dismiss for nonpayment and failure to prosecute. Because appellants did not timely explain why they should not pay or actually pay the fees, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and remanded. The dispute concerned interpretation and enforcement of a settlement agreement between M-I L.L.C. and Texas International Terminals (TXIT) about lease and materials-handling payments and removal of equipment. The trial court had added CPI-based price adjustments and ordered M-I to remove certain equipment, relying on extrinsic course-of-dealing evidence. The appellate court held the settlement language was unambiguous, forbade using extrinsic evidence to rewrite the agreement, and concluded the trial court improperly added and altered terms instead of enforcing the agreement as written.

The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas denied Houston Pipe Line Company LP's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate a trial court order that granted a plea to the jurisdiction. The appellate court declined to disturb the trial court's decision, lifted its prior stay issued October 7, 2025, and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The court issued a short per curiam memorandum opinion denying relief without extended discussion.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal brought by Blackbuck Petroleum PropCo I LLC and AGP Energy Services LLC from a trial court order denying their motion to compel arbitration. The parties executed a mediated settlement and a signed settlement, release, and confidentiality agreement that expressly resolved all past and present claims, including the pending appeal, and required dismissals with prejudice. Appellees moved to dismiss the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure; appellants did not oppose. The court granted the unopposed motion and dismissed the appeal, taxing costs against the appellants.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal in a dispute between John Dickerson and Atlas Sand Company, LLC after the parties jointly moved to dismiss. The parties agreed each would bear their own appellate costs as permitted by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court granted the joint motion and dismissed the appeals without reaching the merits of the underlying dispute.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a trial-court judgment ordering specific performance of a written buy-sell agreement requiring Joann Crawford to convey a parcel to Buffalo Creek Properties, LLC (an assignee of Trails End). The trial court found Buffalo Creek ready, willing, and able to perform, that Crawford breached the contract and conveyed the property with knowledge of the pending suit and lis pendens, and it adjusted the sale proceeds for liens, taxes, life-estate compensation, costs, and fees. The appellate court presumed the trial record supported the findings (Crawford failed to timely request the reporter’s record) and found no reversible error in the trial court’s award or its accounting adjustments.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied a petition for a writ of mandamus brought by Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. and TD Ameritrade, Inc. challenging a lower-court action in Travis County. The court issued a short memorandum opinion simply stating the petition is denied and citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. No extended reasoning or factual background appears in the document; the decision is a procedural denial of extraordinary relief rather than a merits ruling on underlying claims.

The Court of Appeals dismissed EZ Automotive and Towing SVC LLC's appeal from the trial court's summary judgment because the judgment was not final or appealable. Recaman Auto Group obtained summary judgment on its declaratory-judgment claim about ownership of a Chevrolet Silverado, but the trial court expressly left Recaman's request for attorney’s fees undecided. Because the fee claim remained pending and the order lacked finality language, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas struck Kevin McBride’s appellate brief for failure to substantially comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure after multiple notices and an opportunity to cure. McBride’s March 30, 2026 brief was deficient—containing conclusory, bulleted statements without citation to the record or legal authority—so the court treated the filing as if no brief had been filed and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court explained that liberal construction of procedural rules does not require the court to perform a party’s legal research or factual hunting.

The court reviewed an appeal by Y.S., who filed a petition to change her minor child’s name and a sworn Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs. The trial court ordered her to pay reduced costs of $400 after an interview with county staff, but did not hold a formal oral evidentiary hearing or make detailed findings required by Rule 145. The appellate court concluded the record contained uncontroverted evidence that Y.S. could not afford court costs, that the trial court failed to follow Rule 145 procedures, and therefore reversed the order and directed the trial court to allow Y.S. to proceed without paying costs or fees.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District) denied Levi Hardy’s petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a successor judge’s order granting a new trial in a divorce case after a three-day bench trial. Levi argued the successor judge (who did not preside over the bench trial) abused discretion by granting a new trial without receiving evidence or stating reasons. The court declined to extend Texas mandamus precedent that allows merits review of new-trial orders after jury trials to new-trial orders following bench trials, concluding extraordinary circumstances were not shown and that a prompt retrial here outweighed the harms of interlocutory review.

The El Paso Court of Appeals denied a petition for mandamus seeking to overturn a probate court order disqualifying attorney Tony Aguilar from representing the estate of Judith Wheatley. The court held that Aguilar’s deposition and other evidence showed he was likely an essential fact witness about how six deeds conveying the Poki Roni Ranch came to be in Judy’s possession. Because his testimony could be necessary and adverse to Travis’s estate, the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in disqualifying him under the advocate-witness rule. The court therefore refused to grant extraordinary mandamus relief.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate its new-trial order in a personal-injury case. The trial court had granted a new trial after a jury found the defendant did not negligently cause a rear-end collision. The appeals court held the new-trial order was facially insufficient because it relied improperly on the idea that negligence was conclusively shown (a basis for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, not a new trial) and failed to explain how the evidence undermined the jury’s finding as required for a factual-sufficiency-based new trial.

The court granted the parties' agreed motion to dismiss the appeal and the plaintiff's underlying claims with prejudice. The Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing Appellant Eric Erdeljac's claims against appellees Kalahari Development LLC, KR Acquisitions, LLC (d/b/a Kalahari Resorts & Conventions), and Gerson Velasquez with prejudice, dismissed the appeal with prejudice, and denied as moot any other pending motions. Court costs are taxed against the party incurring them. No opinion was issued.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Ram Country of Fort Stockton, LLC’s interlocutory appeal from a county court’s order appointing an arbitrator because the court lacks jurisdiction to review orders that merely appoint an arbitrator under the Federal Arbitration Act. Ram Country alternatively asked the court to treat the filing as a petition for a writ of mandamus; the court considered that request but denied mandamus because Ram Country failed to show it lacked an adequate appellate remedy and did not meet procedural certification requirements. The court relied on Texas precedent holding appointment orders are not appealable interlocutory orders.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed a no-answer default judgment entered by the County Court at Law No. 10 in Bexar County in favor of Investment Retrievers, Inc. The Rodriguezes, appearing pro se, challenged the default judgment on three grounds: violation of due process, the absence of a hearing, and that their SSI benefits are exempt from execution. The appeals court found the record showed proper service and compliance with rules for default judgments, that damages may be proved by affidavit without oral testimony, and that the appellants failed to support or cite authority for their exemption claim, so there was nothing preserved for review.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Lawrence Jeanpierre's appeal against Discover Bank for want of prosecution. Jeanpierre repeatedly missed the briefing deadline, filed a late brief and an amended brief that violated the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and failed to file a compliant second amended brief or request further extensions after the court struck his filings and set deadlines. Because he did not file a timely, compliant brief or request an extension, the court dismissed the appeal under the appellate rules permitting dismissal for failure to prosecute.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment granting Castroville State Bank a judicial foreclosure against Lance and Kerry Meyer after the Meyers defaulted on loans secured by deeds of trust. The Bank moved for a hybrid summary judgment and no-evidence dismissal of the Meyers’ affirmative defenses; the trial court granted final summary judgment. The appellate court held the Meyers (pro se) failed to raise fact issues or provide admissible, properly cited record evidence to defeat summary judgment and waived other complaints, so the foreclosure judgment stands.

The Fourth Court of Appeals denied CPS Energy's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a trial court's denial of its motion for protective order and the overruling of objections to a subpoena directed at non-party Dimension Energy Services in a pending Bexar County case. The appellate court held CPS Energy failed to preserve necessary factual issues for mandamus review and also noted an adequate alternative remedy exists because Dimension has filed its own protective-order motion in the trial court. The court therefore declined to consider new evidence or arguments raised for the first time on mandamus and denied relief.

The court considered a mandamus petition from JPMorgan Chase challenging a trial court order that sanctioned Chase and held it in contempt for failing to comply with a trustee appointment order and a subpoena for trust records. The appellate court found the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Chase and that the subpoena was valid, but concluded the trial court abused its discretion in three respects: (1) imposing discovery sanctions against a non-party under rules that apply only to parties, (2) assessing a $750,000 criminal contempt fine that exceeded the $500 statutory cap, and (3) ordering contempt fines payable to the private trustee rather than to the court. The court partially granted mandamus, vacating the $6,700 and $750,000 awards and directing the trial court to modify the contempt fine to $500 payable to the court.

The court considered an appeal by the State and two state agencies seeking dismissal of claims by landlord 8317 Cross Park, LLC arising from a lease termination notice. The court held that the landlord’s breach-of-lease and declaratory-judgment claims against the State, Texas Facilities Commission (TFC), and Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) are barred by sovereign immunity and were dismissed. The court also dismissed the landlord’s ultra vires claim against HHSC deputy executive commissioner Rolland Niles. The court affirmed jurisdiction over and preserved the landlord’s ultra vires claim against TFC Executive Director Mike Novak for alleged violations of TFC regulations, and remanded for further proceedings on those surviving claims.

The First District of Texas Court of Appeals granted the appellant's unopposed motion to dismiss an appeal. The appellant had filed a notice of nonsuit and later a motion to dismiss the appeal; the court requested clarification and held the motion for the required period for a response, but none was filed. The court therefore granted the motion, dismissed the appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and denied as moot any other pending motions. The decision disposed of the appeal without reaching the merits of the underlying judgment.

The First District of Texas dismissed an appeal by WC 4th and Colorado, LP and WC 4th and Rio Grande, LP for want of prosecution after the appellants failed to file their brief by the extended deadline and did not respond to the court's notice. The court explained the brief was originally due October 27, 2025, an extension to December 1, 2025 was granted, and the appellants failed to file a brief or request a further extension. Because of that failure and no response to a December 11, 2025 dismissal notice, the court dismissed the appeal and denied as moot any pending motions.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Terrell Samuels’ appeal from a judgment of the County Civil Court at Law No. 3, Harris County, because Samuels failed to timely file an appellant’s brief and did not provide a reasonable explanation after being warned. The court cited Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governing briefing deadlines and the court’s authority to dismiss appeals for failure to prosecute. Any pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ray Jackson's appeal for want of prosecution because Jackson did not establish indigence, did not pay for or arrange payment for the clerk's record, and failed to respond to the court's notice that dismissal was possible. The court invoked the appellate rules permitting dismissal when the clerk's record is not filed due to the appellant's fault and when an appellant fails to prosecute the appeal. All pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The First District of Texas reversed the trial court’s order that had halted an arbitration between Humphries Construction Corporation (HCC) and Highland Village-related entities, holding the trial court erred in finding HCC waived its contractual right to arbitrate by using the courts. The appellate court concluded, after reviewing the litigation and discovery conduct, that Highland Village failed to show HCC clearly intended to relinquish arbitration. The court denied Highland Village’s collateral requests for mandamus relief challenging denials of a protective order, motion to quash a third-party subpoena, and sanctions, finding no clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.

The court dismissed an appeal by Delanie Perkins from a County Civil Court at Law judgment because Perkins failed to file an appellant’s brief by the deadline and did not respond to the court’s notice to file the brief or request an extension. The First District applied Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure that permit dismissal for want of prosecution and dismissed any pending motions as moot. The decision is a procedural dismissal rather than a decision on the merits of the underlying dispute between Perkins and West Lake Park Apartments.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment for a law firm in a legal-malpractice suit. Plaintiff DePina sued the firm for failing to timely pursue property-damage claims against a railroad after repeated flooding of his land. The firm obtained summary judgment arguing the underlying nuisance was permanent and the statute of limitations had run before representation. The appellate court held the record did not show as a matter of law the nuisance was permanent because flooding was sporadic, contingent on heavy rain and culvert condition, and thus created fact issues for a jury. The case is remanded.

The First District of Texas consolidated two duplicate appeals filed after the trial court granted partial summary judgment and later severed the case, making that interlocutory order final and appealable. The court found the notices of appeal filed in two appellate dockets were identical and stemmed from the same October 2, 2025 severance order, so it granted the unopposed motion to consolidate and ordered the consolidated appeal to proceed under cause number 01-26-00052-CV. Because the appellate record is incomplete, the court declined to set a briefing schedule and dismissed the duplicate appellate docket 01-25-01093-CV.

The Court of Appeals considered an appeal from a no-evidence summary judgment in a multi-vehicle pileup case. The trial court granted summary judgment for the truck driver Mark Richard and his employer Millwood Trucking. The court held it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal as to Richard because he died before the judgment and no estate representative was substituted, so the judgment as to him is void and must be vacated. The court nonetheless reviewed and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Millwood Trucking, concluding the plaintiffs produced no evidence of causation or damages against the employer.