Court Filings

The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of U.S. Bank’s motion for new trial and upheld the default judgment in favor of Business Unlimited. Business Unlimited sued to quiet title after a lien sale and obtained a default judgment when U.S. Bank failed to answer. U.S. Bank sought a new trial under the three-part Craddock standard for setting aside defaults, claiming an administrative mistake and asserting meritorious defenses. The appellate court found U.S. Bank proved mistake but failed to adequately set up factual support for meritorious defenses, so the Craddock test was not satisfied and the denial of a new trial was not an abuse of discretion.

The court affirmed the trial court’s default judgment against U.S. Bank (USB) in a quiet-title action because USB failed to prove entitlement to a new trial under the Craddock standard. USB was served but did not answer, a default judgment was entered, and USB later sought a new trial supported by a late affidavit from a bank vice president. The court held the affidavit was conclusory and lacked personal knowledge about the registered agent’s handling of service, so USB did not show its failure to answer was an accident rather than intentional or due to conscious indifference.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) dismissed Tonia Lynn Edwards’s appeal for failure to pay the required $205 filing fee after giving notice under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court cited its prior notices (March 3 and March 18, 2026), the appellant’s noncompliance with procedural rules and a Texas Supreme Court fee order, and dismissed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(c) and 43.2(f). The opinion also orders the appellant to pay all appellate costs.

The court reversed a trial-court order that denied the employer’s motion to compel arbitration and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration and stay the case. Josh Adams sued his former employer, The Bridge Strategy & Technology Consulting, LLC, for unpaid cash and phantom-stock commissions. Bridge moved to compel arbitration under an employment agreement clause that referenced wage-related statutes and the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court of Appeals held the arbitration clause was governed by the federal act, that the phrase “wages” reasonably includes commissions, and that the clause’s broad “arising from/relating to” language covers Adams’s claims.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment for attorneys Leslie Hyman and Pullman, Cappuccio & Pullen, LLP in Susan Harriman’s legal-malpractice suit. Harriman sued claiming the lawyers mishandled a 2017 hearing to unseal certain sealed court records and that their actions forced her into an unfavorable settlement in an underlying defamation case. The appellees moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment arguing Harriman offered no proof that their conduct proximately caused her damages. The appellate court held Harriman produced only speculation and no more than a scintilla of evidence on proximate cause, so summary judgment was proper.

The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment committing Edward Lincoln Goff as a sexually violent predator under the Texas SVP Act. On appeal Goff argued the evidence was legally insufficient to show he currently suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to commit predatory sexual violence. The appellate court reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury, relied chiefly on the jury’s credibility determinations, and found the expert testimony (diagnosing pedophilic disorder and identifying risk factors) plus Goff’s history of multiple child-victim offenses, continued offending after detection, lack of insight, and certain coercive acts supported the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeals reversed a trial-court order that granted a plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Cornelius Hudson’s survival-action suit filed on behalf of his deceased mother’s estate. Hudson had sued multiple transportation-related defendants for injuries his mother allegedly sustained before her death. The appellate court held Hudson’s petition sufficiently alleged that the decedent’s estate had standing to pursue the survival claim, and it explained that a plea to the jurisdiction is not the correct procedural vehicle to challenge a plaintiff’s capacity to sue. The case is remanded for further proceedings in the trial court.

The court affirmed the trial court’s final divorce decree enforcing a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) that divided the marital estate. The wife, Soo Jin, argued the MSA should be set aside because she signed under duress and did not sign voluntarily, citing health issues, language barriers, a panic attack, and pressure from counsel and the mediator. The appellate court held the MSA met Texas Family Code §6.602 requirements and found competent evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Soo Jin’s testimony did not show fraud, coercion, or incapacity that would void the agreement. The judgment enforcing the MSA was affirmed.

The court dismissed an eviction appeal as moot after the appellee (the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs) executed a writ of possession and obtained physical possession of the premises. The trial court had entered judgment for the appellee and set the statutorily required supersedeas bond amount under Texas law, but there is no indication the appellants posted a bond to stay possession. Because the appellee already recovered possession and the appellants did not respond to the appellee’s motion to dismiss, the appellate court concluded there was no live controversy and dismissed the appeal.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) dismissed an appeal brought by Dale Cole against Discover Bank after Cole filed an unopposed motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and entered an order dismissing the appeal. No substantive ruling on the underlying merits was made; the dismissal was procedural and based solely on the appellant's request.

The Second Court of Appeals, Fort Worth, dismissed Wes and Tina Dobransky's appeal from the County Court at Law, Cooke County, because the appellants repeatedly failed to pay the required filing fee despite two warnings and deadlines. The court gave notice on February 19 and March 11, 2026, allowed at least ten days to cure, and concluded the deadlines passed with no payment. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellants to pay all costs of the appeal.

The Second Court of Appeals, Fort Worth, dismissed Tumininu Banwo's appeal from the 325th District Court for want of prosecution because the appellant failed to file the required appellate brief. The court had notified appellant after the March 16, 2026 brief deadline and gave a grace period until March 30, 2026 to file the brief and explain the delay, but received no response. Because the appellant did not comply with Texas appellate rules or offer an explanation, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered appellant to pay all appellate costs.

The court denied the appellee’s motion for rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and issued a replacement opinion that reaches the same result: the Texas Department of Public Safety’s plea to the jurisdiction was sustained and the employee’s disability-discrimination and retaliation claims against DPS under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act were dismissed with prejudice. The court found Sanders failed to plead facts establishing a prima facie discrimination or retaliation claim (and thus failed to invoke the TCHRA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity). Because Sanders had multiple opportunities to amend and the defects were incurable, dismissal was proper.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas reviewed an interlocutory appeal by Nidal T. Baem from a trial court’s temporary injunction freezing all First National Bank of Texas accounts in his name. Western Frontier Trading alleged Baem embezzled customer payments and sought to freeze accounts where those funds were deposited. The appellate court found sufficient evidence to support a temporary injunction in part but held the injunction was overbroad: it unlawfully froze all Baem’s bank accounts and did not limit the freeze to the dollar amount tied to Western’s disputed funds. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a narrowly tailored injunction and further hearing.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas dismissed James Kristopher Limon's appeal for want of prosecution. Limon failed to file his brief by the March 21, 2026 deadline, did not request an extension, and did not comply with the clerk's ten-day notice. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.8(a)(1) and 42.3(b), the court dismissed the appeal. The opinion is a short memorandum concluding dismissal is warranted where a party fails to prosecute and does not seek an extension after notice.

The Court of Appeals (Seventh District) granted the appellants' unopposed motion for voluntary dismissal of their appeal from an Agreed Final Judgment in the probate matter Estate of Eliot Carmi. The court found the motion complied with the appellate rule, that dismissal would not prejudice any party, and no decision had been issued, so the appeal was dismissed. Because the motion did not allocate costs, the court taxed appellate costs against the appellants and declined to entertain a motion for rehearing, issuing its mandate immediately.

The Court of Appeals (Eighth District, El Paso) dismissed Ernest Garcia’s appeal from a December 4, 2025 judgment because his March 5, 2026 notice of appeal was untimely and he failed to provide a required reasonable explanation or file a motion for extension of time after the court ordered him to do so. The court concluded the late notice could only be excused by an implied extension under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3 if Garcia supplied a reasonable explanation, which he did not, so the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal and dismissed it under Rule 42.3(a).

The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for PlainsCapital Bank in a trespass-to-try-title dispute. Appellants C.V.P.G. Family Trust and its trustee claimed ownership as successors to heirs of Joaquin Chapa, but PlainsCapital relied on a 2018 final judgment from a previous suit that adjudicated mineral title and declared hundreds of named and unknown Chapa heirs to have no ownership. The court held PlainsCapital met its burden to show a final judgment and that Appellants failed to raise a genuine fact issue that the prior judgment was void for lack of proper service or that C.V.P.G. lacked privity with the prior defendants.

The Stonewater Homeowners Association sued Luther and Laticia Evans for unpaid HOA fees. The parties presented an agreed judgment to the trial court, but at a hearing the Evanses (pro se) disavowed some terms, and the court orally modified the proposed agreement (reducing attorney’s fees, lowering interest, and striking foreclosure language) before signing the judgment. The HOA later filed a motion for new trial complaining the court lacked authority to alter the agreed judgment. The appeals court held the trial court acted within its authority because the modifications were made in open court after the Evanses did not accept the original terms and the HOA did not pursue separate enforcement remedies.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Patrick Minor’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Minor sought to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion for default judgment, but the appellate court concluded such a denial is an interlocutory order not immediately appealable. The court also noted the clerk’s record did not include an order denying the motion, and that Minor failed to respond to an order to show cause about jurisdiction. Because the appeal was from a non-appealable interlocutory ruling and procedural requirements were not met, the court dismissed the appeal.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Patrick Minor's appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his motion for a default judgment for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that denials of default judgments are ordinarily interlocutory and not appealable before entry of a final judgment. The court ordered Minor to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed; he did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal. The decision rests on Texas law that interlocutory orders denying default judgment cannot be appealed until the underlying case is finally resolved.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Latoya Lavasiee Hopkins’s appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County for want of prosecution because she repeatedly failed to file her appellate brief or request extensions despite notices and a court order. The appellate court gave deadlines and warnings under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure but Hopkins did not respond. Because she did not comply with the court’s order to file a brief by the specified date, the court exercised its authority to dismiss the appeal.

The court dismissed an appeal by Ivie Fenoi-Lynch for lack of jurisdiction. Fenoi-Lynch filed a notice of appeal from a justice court judgment, but the appellate record shows the case continued in the county court at law and no final judgment was signed by that county court. The Fourth Court of Appeals explained it only has jurisdiction over appeals from district or county courts in its district and only over final judgments; a notice of appeal from a justice court does not invoke this court’s jurisdiction. Fenoi-Lynch’s response to a show-cause order did not cure the jurisdictional defect.

The Fourth Court of Appeals conditionally granted EOG Resources’ petition for a writ of mandamus overturning a trial-court discovery order that compelled production of five documents (items 3, 4, 5, 10, and 15) from EOG’s privilege log. After in camera review, the appellate court held EOG established a prima facie attorney-client privilege claim by producing a privilege log, affidavits, and the documents for review, and Broadway failed to show EOG waived the privilege either by voluntary disclosure or by offensive use. Because disclosure of privileged communications cannot be undone on appeal, mandamus relief was appropriate and the trial court was ordered to vacate its production order.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment denying appellant George Michael Welch attorney’s fees. Welch sold property to Felix and Summerlyn Lopez under an owner-financed contract. The Lopezes missed a May 1, 2023 payment but attempted to tender payment within the contract’s 91-day cure period; Welch rejected the tender and filed for foreclosure. The trial court found Welch prematurely sought foreclosure, unjustifiably refused payment, and reinstated the note upon payment of $22,221.92, denying fees because Welch was not the prevailing party. The appeals court held a temporary injunction and reinstatement did not confer prevailing-party status under section 38.001.

The Fourth Court of Appeals granted the parties' joint motion to set aside the trial court's final judgment and remanded the case for entry of a judgment consistent with the parties' settlement agreement. The appellate court vacated the existing judgment without addressing the merits and directed the trial court to render the agreed judgment. Because the settlement did not allocate appellate costs, the court taxed costs of appeal against the appellants.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed EFT Express SA de CV's appeal from a Webb County district court for want of prosecution because the clerk's record was not filed and the appellant failed to pay the fee required for preparing the record. The appellate court notified the appellant and ordered a written explanation, but the appellant did not respond by the deadline. Citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court dismissed the appeal and taxed appellate costs against the appellant.

The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed Capital Fund I, LLC’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had entered a default judgment against Capital Fund but expressly labeled it interlocutory. The plaintiff then obtained a severance order moving the entire dispute against Capital Fund (both defaulted and still-pending claims) into a new cause. The appellate court concluded that severing the entire case did not convert the interlocutory default judgment into a final, appealable judgment, so the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court reviewed an appeal from a final judgment in which plaintiffs (Decedent’s children) sought a declaratory judgment voiding a lien affidavit filed by appellant Agueda and attorneys’ fees; Blanca intervened claiming a homestead interest in the property. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part: it affirmed the trial court’s power over its interlocutory order, vacated the trial court’s merits declarations about Blanca’s homestead and the declaration voiding the lien, reversed the award of attorneys’ fees against Blanca (rendering judgment she owes nothing), and reversed and remanded the fee award as to Agueda for further proceedings on the fees claim.

The court affirmed a trial-court judgment forfeiting $8,000 and a 2006 Harley-Davidson to the State under Texas civil forfeiture law. The owner, Chad Wade Spence, argued the trial court abused its discretion by forcing him to trial without material witnesses and that doing so violated his constitutional rights. The appellate court held Spence never properly requested subpoenas — he filed only informal witness lists and failed to complete the clerk’s subpoena request form — and therefore the trial court did not err in proceeding. The court also explained the right to compulsory process is a criminal right and does not apply in civil in rem forfeiture proceedings.